THE INDIAN SCENE

Padmahbushan PROF. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M. A., D. LIT.

The outstanding event in the quarter October–December 1973, is the five-day visit to New Delhi of Leonard Brezhnev, the Communist Party Chief of Soviet Russia, the elaborate and meaningful discussions he had with our Prime Minister, Srimati Indira Gandhi, and the conclusion of fifteen-year Agreement on Economic Co-operation between the two countries. This is another symbol of the growing friendship between India and the USSR which began about 1955 when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India which reached a sort of climax in 1971 when the Indo-Soviet Treaty of friendship and co-operation was concluded. It is well- known how this treaty contributed to India’s victory in the war with Pakistan in December 1971 and to the liberation of Bangladesh. It also enabled India to occupy a leading role both politically and militarily in South and South-East Asia. The recent visit of Brezhnev goes a great deal towards assuring India that she has a genuine and reliable friend in USSR who will come to her rescue whenever necessary. This was made specially clear in the speeches he made at the public reception given to him in the Red Fort and in the Parliament. This constitutes the main significance of his visit.

Such an assurance was necessary because there was an apprehension in India that the detente between the USSR and the USA which resulted from Brezhnev’s visit to Washington some months earlier and the growing economic co-operation between the USSR and the West might lead to the weakening of ties between India and USSR. Such a view was expressed by our Prime Minister in June last immediately after she came to know of the detente. She was afraid that the detente might result in the two super-powers carving the world into two spheres of influence and pursuing agreed politics to the detriment of other countries. Such a thing happened in International affairs in the past and it would not be surprising or strange if it happened again. It was a game in which the great powers accustomed to indulge.

The Soviet leaders immediately recognised the force of her views and took the earliest opportunity to remove her fears. Prime Minister Kosygm told on June 29 a delegation of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Society which met him in Moscow that the Soviet-American detente was not directed towards a joint attempt to dictate to other peoples, that the USSR always stood by the side of India in her difficult days and that in view of the Treaty of 1971 India could depend on Moscow’s help at all times. The visit of Brezhnev was in a way aimed at strengthening the assurance given by Kosygin and it has succeeded in achieving the aim to an

appreciable extent.

In his address to both Houses of Parliament Brezhnev referred to the detente and even went to the extent of complimenting the American leadership (something rare in Soviet references to America) for its ‘political realism, and an awareness of the demands of time in having forged a detente with Soviet Union. This has not led to any adverse criticism in Parliament or elsewhere. India now understands the Soviet attitude in the matter. Though it is not quite clear whether the explanations given by the Soviet Chief completely satisfied our Prime Minister, it is significant that in the joint declaration issued at the end of his visit there is the statement: “The Prime Minister of India welcomes the detente between the USSR and the USA as a step towards relaxation of tension in the world.” This goes to show that there is a better understanding of the subject between the two countries and this is a point of great value to both of them.

The visit is of significance from the political standpoint in another way. There is in the joint declaration little reference to China. Readers are aware that the relations between USSR and China are highly strained. There are ideological differences between the two countries even though both belong to the Socialist and the anti-imperialist camp and there are also disputes regarding border areas. One reason for USSR coming closer to India is her need for a reliable political ally in the third world of sufficient weight in her diplomatic war with China. In spite of this she is not averse to India’s present attempts to normalise her relations with China. This is in contrast to the attitude which Soviet leaders displayed five years ago when Mr. Fryubui said that what surprised the Soviet Union most was that India spoke of reconciliation after she was abused and humiliated by Peking. In those days some leaders in Moscow even feared that India might forge an alliance with China to the disadvantage of USSR. The fact that in the joint declaration there is little reference to China shows that Soviet leaders now better appreciate the stand of India in the matter, and recognise India’s right to shape her policies as she best understands them. There is a limit beyond which it is not prudent for them to impose their views on the Government of India.

This unwillingness to impose their views on India is also shown in respect of the subject of Asian security. It was in 1967 that Brezhnev enunciated his doctrine of Asian security–doctrine which invited the countries of South and South-East Asia to come closer together and enter into a Sort of alliance in the interests of common security. He has not however spelled out at any time all the implications and details of such an alliance, though he has been quite keen on it. In his discussions with Indira Gandhi it came up for consideration and he also referred to it in his address to the Indian Parliament. He pointed out that conditions were at present favourable for the conclusion of such a security pact. But it did not make any appeal to our Prime Minister. The situation in Asia is very much different from that in Europe where there are only two blocs–the Atlantic community with which USA is associated and the Warsaw Pact countries under Soviet leadership. It is not difficult to arrive at some understanding between them. Not so in Asia where there are too many causes of tension between country and country. Moreover an Asian security Pact under the initiative of USSR will rouse the suspicion of China and will add to tensions instead of easing them. India’s stand that such a pact is neither possible nor desirable at present appreciated by Brezhnev and he did not put any pressure on India to accept his proposal. The joint declaration is content with the observation that India and the Soviet Union “attach particular significance to a broad development of mutually beneficial co-operation and the strengthening of peace and stability in Asia through common efforts by all the states of this largest and most populated area of the world,” an observation to which no one will take any objection.

Another point on which Brezhnev was keen was on getting port facilities for Soviet ships moving about in the waters of the Indian Ocean. Here also India does not seem to have made any commitments. In his speeches in the Parliament Swaran Singh, our Minister for External Affairs, denied emphatically that there were any such commitments.

It is worthwhile noting in this connection that the growing understanding and the closer relationship between India and Soviet Union is not unwelcome to USA. In his talks with the Soviet ambassador in Washington the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, stated that the talks in New Delhi, between Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi, did not in any manner go against the interests of the US and were entirely in keeping with the spirit of detente. It may therefore be concluded that one significant outcome of Brezhnev’s visit is the guarantee that friendship between India and Soviet Union will continue in spite of the latter’s detente with USA and her growing economic co-operation with the West a co-operation necessitated by the domestic situation in USSR.

There is also a second aspect of his visit which is equally welcome to India. The political situation in the country has become a source or misgiving and anxiety to the Government of Indira Gandhi. Apart from the headaches caused by factionalism in her party there is the irresponsible behaviour of opposition parties which take advantage of domestic discontents and indulge in all sorts of agitations leading to the disruption of the smooth working of the political machine. Among these parties is the CPI which is closely allied to the Soviet Communist Party. The association is so close that on all crucial matters it bows to the dictates of the Soviet Party, its mentor. Surveying the situation in India Brezhnev felt it necessary and desirable to give a piece or advice to the CPI leadership in their dealings with Indira Gandhi’s Government and the Congress.

Though the CPI has electoral alliance with the Congress, and though it is a member of the coalition government in Kerala along with the Congress, it has not hesitated to lead agitations against the Government of Indira Gandhi and to organise strikes which have been proving so detrimental to the economy of the country. It is in this context that Brezhnev told the CPI leadership that the Government of Indira Gandhi is wedded to the pursuit of socialist and anti-capitalist policies and that nothing should be done by the CPI to obstruct her policies and that on the other hand it should do everything to strengthen her hands. There is therefore some hope that at least one of the more active among the opposition parties will henceforward adopt a more positive and constructive attitude towards the Government of Indira Gandhi. Of course no one wants outside interference in shaping the domestic politics of our country. But this is a peculiar case. Communism is an international movement. Communism in India is a part of it. Whatever influence the CPI has on Indian politics is the outcome of an external force. What Brezhnev has now done is not something new. But it is welcome because the outside intervention will henceforward strengthen the hands of the Indian Government and not weaken it. He plainly told the CPI leadership that there was no need for strikes in a developing economy where production at an increasing rate was the main problem. He also asked them not to make much fuss about monopoly houses. This is sound commonsense. At a time when, public sector concerns are not yielding any returns, there is no meaning in preventing the expansion of such houses if they are capable of bringing profitable returns. It is also significant that when Madhu Limaye, the Socialist leader, sought and secured an Interview with him, Brezhnev questioned the utility or even the relevance of opposition parties in a developing economy, a point of view which Ashok Mehta put forward several years ago.

The advice given to the C P I leadership is bound to influence the “Young Turks” and the so-called radicals in the Congress Party who are close associates of the CPI. That it has already done so is clear from what happened at the meeting of the executive of the Congress Parliamentary Party in the last days of November. The radicals including A. D. Malaviya favoured a more pragmatic approach to the role of monopoly houses because of the stagnation in industrial production. They agreed with the Prime Minister when she said that in a choice between import and allowing an industrial house to expand the latter should be preferred if foreign exchange is to be saved.

Brezhnev’s visit has in a way given fresh moral and political strength to the Government of Indira Gandhi and weakened forces opposed to her. This adds to the political significance of his visit.

As important as the political outcome of his visit–and perhaps more important than this–is its economic outcome. The country is passing through a severe economic crisis. Economy for some years has been more or less stagnant. No solution has been found for the problems of rising prices (especially of essentials like food, clothing, etc.) and unemployment. It is in this atmosphere that the fifth Five-Year Plan which provides for a total investment for about 54,000 crores has been prepared. It is not quite clear how the resources required for the purpose can be mobilised. Acute differences have arisen among experts on this issue. Part of it consists in foreign exchange to the tune of 4,000 crores. It is in this context that we have to evaluate the significance of Brezhnev’s visit.

The visit has resulted in the first place in the conclusion of a 15-year economic agreement between the two countries. This gives an assurance that whatever aid the Soviet Union gives to India will be of a fairly long period character, not subject to fluctuations due either to domestic situation in Soviet Russia or her economic commitments to other countries with which her relations are growing closer. It appears that the Soviet leader was prepared to enter into even a 25-year agreement but India did not want to commit herself to such a long period.

In the second place there is now the likelihood of the Soviet Union meeting India’s foreign exchange needs to the extent of 600 crores. The details of the scheme for which the aid will be granted have still to be worked out but they will all be the “core-sector” schemes. The terms on which the aid will be granted are more favourable than in the past as they allow for a longer grace period and maturity though the rate of interest continues to be 2.5 per cent.

In the third place the Soviet Union has agreed to import a large variety of Indian manufactured goods in place of or in addition to mere raw materials. She has also agreed to export to India several essentials like fertilisers, power-generating equipment, etc.

In the fourth place she has agreed in respect of the production of these manufactured commodities to provide designs and specifications and supply equipment and technology to the extent required. This will ensure that the goods manufactured will be to the tastes and needs of the consumers in Soviet Russia.

There is also provision in respect of some goods like leather for the setting up in India of Russian centres of production. There is a corresponding provision for the setting up of Indian concerns in the Soviet Union as for example a production unit in Siberia for the manufacture of paper and pulp to meet Indian needs.

There is provision for the expansion of industries set up previously with Russian aid like the Iron and Steel Plants in Bhilai and Bokaro, the Oil Refinery in Mathura, the Copper Mining complex in Maland-Jhand, etc. The equipment needed at Ranchi to enable it to work to full capacity will be provided.

There is finally a special article in the agreement providing for scientific and technical co-operation in the field of atomic energy and space electronics.

There is no need to go into further detail about the economic agreement. The point to be noted is that it covers a wide field and that it brings about a qualitative change in the kind of economic relationship between the two countries.

The visit of Brezhnev has in this way contributed to the strengthening of both the political and economic ties between the two countries.

It is quite true that compared to the total needs of the country the resources made available by the Soviet Union do not amount to much. But we should keep in mind when estimating the value of any external source of help that no country can make progress by relying entirely on external aid. Every country should try to stand on its own legs. The role of external help ought to be peripheral.

During the quarter the malady of social indiscipline which has for some years overtaken the country manifested itself in a variety of ways. There was sabotage by the employees of the Indian Airlines which led to the declaration of a lock-out by the management on November 25. There was a wild-cat strike by locomen in the third week of December, the third of its kind within the course of six months. There were communal clashes in Meerut and several other towns of Northern India. There was the usual crop of student disturbances in Jammu-Kashmir, Madras and Karnataka. In the last of the states it necessitated a reshuffling of the cabinet. There were violent disturbances in both Karnataka and Maharashtra on the border issue for nearly three weeks accompanied by Bandhs. None of those who resort to activities like these are mindful of the huge losses resulting from them. To them the public interest has no meaning.

For example, the Bombay Bandh sponsored by Shiv Sena on December 18 in protest against the “atrocities committed on Maharashtrians in Karnataka” brought a loss of Rs. 40 lakhs to hotels in the city, of Rs. 1.20 crores to the textile mills, Rs. 40 lakhs to railways besides huge losses to shopkeepers, and others whose work came to a standstill.

The Airlines employees have not cared to see the rationale behind the new shift system introduced by the management in the interests of efficiency (which today is far below international standards), economy and safety. How inefficient the Airlines has become in recent years is shown by the increasing proportion of delays in flights. It was one-fifth in 1967-68, one-third in 1971-72 and two-thirds in September 1973. The management wanted to introduce the new schedule in agreement with the employees but the representatives of the latter wrecked the negotiations by dilatory tactics. Air traffic has practically come to an end, only a few skeleton services being maintained.

The same failure to see reason is clear in the case of the December strike of locomen. To induce them to call off their earlier strike the Railway Minister hastily agreed to reduce their working day to 10 hours. On further consideration it is now found that it cannot be put into effect immediately and that it would take three to four years to do it. Implementation involves the construction of additional staff quarters, running rooms, crew vans, and looplines, the acquisition of locomotives, and the recruitment and training of nearly 20,000 additional staff. To complete this process it takes time. A committee, with the representatives of locomen included in it, was set up to work out the details but the locomen went on strike even before the committee went half-way through its work.

The time has come to consider whether the right to strike should be recognised as a right at all. Rights should always go with duties. But those who exercise the right to strike do not feel that they have corresponding duties. The disruption which their action causes to every sphere of public life does not carry an weight with them. Some effective remedy has to be found for the malady of social indiscipline which is growing worse from day to day.

21st December, 1973

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