The Five Year Plan: A Critique
By
Prof. K. V. RAO, M.A., M.Litt.
(Govt.
S. C. College, Puri)
India’s ‘First Five Year Plan’, like our new Constitution, is the first of its kind in this country attempted by the people themselves. And being the first of its kind, again like the Constitution, it contains all our aspirations, and, as we are novices in the art, contains also the shortcomings natural to any new attempt.
This Plan has been praised by many and at the same time equally blamed by many. But, paradoxical as it might look, it has not received that much of attention from the public of India that should be expected from a nation yearning for independence and planning. An attempt is made in this article to understand the Plan as well as to understand the criticism and assess its true value,–all from an academic point of view.
The Plan
A
Draft Outline of this Plan was first published in the middle of 1951. This was
the work of a Planning Commission set by the Government of India in March, 1950
by a Resolution. In that Resolution the Government of India defined the scope
of its work in something like the following terms:
The
Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens of India certain Fundamental
Rights and also enunciates certain directive principles of State policy.
Particularly the State is asked to strive to promote the welfare of the people
by protecting as far as possible a social order in which justice, social,
economic and political, shall prevail, and shall direct its policy for
securing, especially, that all citizens shall have a right to adequate means of
livelihood, that all the material means of production are used for the common
good, and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the
concentration of wealth and the means of production to the common detriment. In
furtherance of these principles and also the declared policy of the Government
“to promote a rapid rise in the standard of living” by “efficient exploitation
of the natural resources, increasing production and offering equal
opportunities to all for employment in the service of the community,” the
Government appointed a Planning Commission.
This
Planning Commission shall therefore assess the natural resources of India,
formulate a Plan for the most effective and balanced utilisation of the
country’s resources, determine priorities, indicate the factors responsible for
the backwardness of the country, and so on.
The
most glaring point that strikes the reader is the difference, in the above
Resolution, between the ambition of the Government and the scope they give to
the Planning Commission. To repeat a few of the above points, the ambition of
the Government is to “secure a social order in which justice, social, economic
and political, shall prevail,” to see that “all citizens have aright to
adequate means of livelihood,” to prevent the economic system resulting in
“concentration of the wealth and the means of production,” “to promote the
rapid rise in the standard of living” and to offer “equal opportunities to all
for employment,” but all that the Planning Commission had been asked to do was
to asses the resources and plan out priorities. In a way the high objects of
the Government reflect the aspirations and expectations of the people in
general, and that is why the Plan has so much disappointed them. And for this
we must put the blame on the Resolution of the Government but not on the
Planning Commission which had to report within the general framework of that
Resolution.
In
the Draft of the Plan which the Planning Commission published in July l951,
they envisaged an expenditure of Rs. 1,793 crores in a period of five years,
and this total expenditure was divided into two parts: the first involving an
expenditure of Rs. 1,493 crores and consisting largely of projects in execution
which were to be implemented in any case, and the second an outlay of Rs. 300
crores to be undertaken if external aid was forthcoming. This Draft was
discussed at many levels and the Planning Commission published a new Draft (in
the final form?) as a result of the suggestions they received from various
persons and bodies. This was presented to parliament in December, 1952. The
broad objectives and the philosophy of the Plan remain the same, but the Plan contains
two changes,–the two parts of the first Plan have been combined together and
the total outlay has been increased to Rs. 2,069 crores, and all this amount is
to be spent on what is called the Public Sector, which means the capital outlay
of the Governments of the Union and the States. The Plan also gives enough
scope to private enterprise which we will leave out of discussion at this
stage. The expenditure in the Public Sector is summarised by the Plan as
follows:
Agriculture and Community
Development Irrigation Multi-purpose
irrigation and power projects Power Transport and
Communications Industry Social Services Rehabilitation Others |
CroresRs. 361 168 266 127 497 173 340 85 52 |
Percent ofTotal17.5 8.1 12.9 6.1 24.0 8.4 16.4 4.1 2.5 |
|
2,069 |
100.0 |
|
This total outlay in
the Public Sector is distributed between the Central and the State Governments
as follows:
Central Government
(including railways) States: Part A Part B Part C Jammu and Kashmir |
Crores
Rs. 1,241 610 173 32 13 |
|
2,069 |
|
The Plan proposes to find
the finances required for the implementation of the various projects in the
following way:
|
Centre |
States
including Jammu and Kashmir |
In
Crores of rupees |
Planned outlay on
development |
1,241 |
828 |
2,069 |
Budgetary resources: i. Savings from Current revenues |
330 |
408 |
738 |
ii. Capital receipts. |
396 |
124 |
520 |
iii. Internal inter-governmental transfers i.e. Central assistance to states. |
–
229 |
229 |
|
|
497 |
761 |
1,258 |
External Resources
already received. |
156 |
--- |
156 |
Total |
653 |
761 |
1,414 |
“As brought out by the assessment of
financial resources of the Plan,” says the Plan, “the balance of Rs. 655 crores
necessary for public development Programme will have to be found from further
external resources that may be forthcoming, or from internal taxation and
borrowing as far as possible and by deficit-financing.”
The
above summary roughly gives us an outline of the Plan and the way it is to be
financed. This Plan, as already indicated, has received very high
praise from some and the opposite from others. To a layman it looks surprising that
some (and they are all experts and men of authority) should praise and some
should condemn. Commonsense would tell us that there should be only one
opinion. But this is not surprising if we remember that there is a fundamental
difference between these two sections in their definition of ‘planning’, and
this accounts for the great difference of opinion on the Plan. To some planning
means merely assessing your resources and estimating the capacities and
arranging your projects in an order of priorities, so that there could be an
orderly development of the country according to ‘Planning in a given fixed
period of time. This we may call democratic planning. To others it means
something more than “merely preparing a bundle of schemes in advance and
finding the finance and the technical know-how for it. It requires an apparatus
for affecting a balance between production and consumption at every stage and
every time, and at the same time it should take us towards our goal of social
equity, whatever it might mean, without disturbing our equilibrium too much.”
If planning means merely making a sincere effort to increase our income with
all the resources at our disposal, then ours is a good plan and it is difficult
to imagine what more could be possible within the five-year period which really
commenced before the Plan was got ready. But, if planning means more than that,
(and it means more to many, and we may call this the economist’s definition of
planning), then ours falls short of the definition, firstly because our social
aims are not clear and the mechanism of achieving those ends is not perfect. To
ask a few questions which this Plan cannot answer, but which must be answered
satisfactorily by any Plan by the second definition:
1.
How much additional wealth and purchasing power
are created at the end of each year of planning?
2.
To which section of the community do they go and
to which region of India? Is that distribution of additional wealth among the
various income-groups and regions in accordance with our intentions?
3.
Is that additional purchasing power enough, and
just enough only, to purchase all the consumption goods created by the Plan? Is
that going into the hands of those income-groups that require to purchase these
consumption goods?
The
need for such balanced production and consumption is great. Otherwise there
will be either over-production or under-production, and both are bad for
planning. Take an example. Suppose we plan to produce more rice. At the same
time we must see that enough additional purchasing power is put into the hands
of those that require to consume this additional quantity of rice produced by
the plan. Is there such adjustment in our Plan? To the professional economist,
therefore, this Plan is not a ‘plan’ but a mere Capital budget made for a
period of five years instead of for one year. Not that it is bad in any way,
but this is not what an economist would like to call a Plan. This accounts for
the great divergence of opinion on the merits of the Plan.
If we adopt the first definition of Planning and look at ours, we would not find it bad at all. But there is one difficulty. The plan itself does not adopt this definition and that is the justification for all the criticism. Our Plan has several objectives and some of them we have already seen in the Resolution of the Government. But unfortunately, the critics point out, the Plan does not contain anything to bring about the fulfillment of these objectives. Take, for instance, the objectives of employment and reduction in the inequalities of incomes. The Resolution of the Government speaks of “offering opportunities to all for employment” while the Final Report testifies that “a substantial increase in the volume of employment in the economy as early as possible is a major consideration in planning in India”. But it contains no definite solution for solving the problem directly! Similarly, the Resolution says that the Plan should see that “the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment,” and the Final Report affirms that “inequalities of income and wealth have clearly to be reduced”. And what we get in the Plan is not any deliberate attempt to achieve this objective, but only a hope that progressive rates of income-tax, along with controls and the imposition of death duties, would “make a significant contribution towards reduction of inequalities”! This is how it has disappointed, according to the critics, a number of people who expected a bold lead from the Commission towards attaining, what they consider to be, a better social structure.
Really
speaking, the Plan has not got any such objectives; all this confusion has been
created by the Resolution of the Government and some stray sentences here and
there in the Reports of the Commission. The only and real objective of
planning, as the Commission have understood it, is found in the very first
sentence of Part I of the Final Plan (Summary) and it runs as follows: “The
central objective of planning in India is to raise the standard of living of
the people and to open out to them opportunities for a richer and more varied
life.” If we take this alone and judge the Plan, we must raise our hats to it,
for it contains enough means of achieving that objective. In fact, one of the
great merits of this Plan is its realistic approach to the problem. It does not
contain any utopian ideas and schemes; and there is nothing in the Plan that
cannot be achieved, provided all co-operate to make it a success. And if the
only objective is to raise the standard of life and giving opportunities for
employment, an investment of the magnitude of Rs. 2,069 crores is bound to
result in its fulfilment.
But
there is a snag here. If meanwhile the population of India rises at the rate at
which it has been doing all these years, there is a danger that the good
results of the Plan might be more than counteracted by this increase in
population, so that there could be neither a rise in the standard of living nor
any reduction in unemployment. This involves, therefore, planning our
population also, which is more social than economic. The Plan realises this
when it says that “the essence of planning is a co-ordinated approach to
economic and social problems”. But instead of giving a positive lead to tackle
this problem, the solution is left in the air with a mild warning to whomsoever
it concerns that “unless measures are initiated at this stage to bring down the
birth-rate and thereby to reduce the rate of population growth, a continuously
increasing amount of effort on the part of the community will be used up only
in maintaining existing standards of consumption”. Nay, there may be even a
reduction in the existing standards if the rate of population growth exceeds
the rate of increase in national income. According to the Plan, the national income
of India in 1950-51 was Rs. 9,000 crores and it is expected that it would be,
as a result of the Plan, Rs. 10,000 crores, i.e., roughly an increase of about
2 per cent per year. This is not much and it may easily be outstripped by the
growth of population, which will be accelerated by the higher standards of life
and lower death-rate due to the decrease in the mortality rate
as a result of better health services etc. It is true that, in the
opinion of some, In the West, population rates decreased due to higher
standards of living, but India is different. In the West religious forces were
never so strong as in this country and the same may not happen here. If the
Plan has to succeed, a vital factor like population cannot be left to chance.
At the same time in such an important matter where religion, sentiment and
biology play a great part, nothing other than moral persuasion could be
suggested, and that is what the Government are attempting. But the present
methods are fraught with another injurious effect. Propaganda and moral
persuasion has an effect, if any, only on the middle classes, and any reduction
in the educated middle class population in the present context of India is not
a good thing at all; they are essential to give leadership in our infant
democracy based on adult franchise.
The
financing part of the Plan has raised a big controversy in India and abroad.
This is largely a technical matter and the layman should approach the subject
with a sense of caution. We have already seen how the Plan aims at financing
itself. After exhausting available resources from current revenues and external
help, there is a gap of Rs. 655 crores left to be “found from further external
resources or from internal taxation and borrowing and by deficit-financing”. At
the same time the Plan itself realises that “a programme...cannot be made
inflexibly conditional on the availability of external resources”, that “unless
fiscal policy and the machinery of taxation are reoriented….the tendency will
be not only for tax revenues to fall…..but the sharing of the burden of
development outlay increasingly iniquitous”, that there is a “single pool of
investible resources on which both the Private and the Public Sector have to
draw, and the problem is not merely to find resources for the Public Sector but
to enlarge progressively the size of the common pool and to see that the total
thus available is allocated between the two sectors in terms of agreed
priorities”, and that “deficit-financing involves injecting additional
purchasing power into the economic system; it has therefore inflationary
possibilities”.
At
present, the Commission estimate, only 7 per cent of the national income is collected
as tax in India and it is low compared with the other countries of the world.
The Commission hope that there are possibilities of greater taxation in the
country, and in this connection the recent appointment of the Taxation Enquiry
Commission is welcome.
There
are the twin questions of popular savings and deficit-financing. Can the nation
be depended upon to save at a greater rate than at present? If it does, then
one of the great problems is solved. Otherwise, if the additional purchasing
power is utilised by the people only on the purchase of consumer goods, then
the Plan would be upset in two ways. On the one hand capital formation will be
retarded and on the other there will be a rise in prices of those commodities
highly demanded. And if the demand is for foreign consumption goods, an
additional problem of balance of payments would arise. The problem can to some
extent be solved by controls, but controls alone cannot solve it, as the
administration of controls in India has proved so far. What is required is
education of the masses to which I will revert later.
Deficit
finance, it is pointed out, will surely result in inflation. Let us see.
Suppose the Reserve Bank issues more bank notes and lends them to the
Government with which the Government will finance the Five Year Plan. To
this extent of additional pumping in of money there are no corresponding
consumption goods, and so, it is argued, there is bound to be a rise in prices
of consumption goods. So far it is understandable; but the critics confuse
between two different kinds of problems. To the orthodox monetary authorities,
inflation means (or deficit finance means) printing more notes than the gold
assets of the bank would warrant. This is too nonsensical today to deserve any
attention. There is no hard and fast rule about the proportion of assets to
notes in circulation, and in a country which is not on the Gold Standard, there
is no reason why gold reserves should have any say in the matter of note issue
at all. The second view is more correct, that deficit finance means creation of
additional money when there is no addition of goods, and so the price
level may rise. True; but this may not happen always, provided two steps are
meanwhile taken, as I told Mr. Bernstein, the Leader of the I. M. F. Mission in
India, at a recent interview at Delhi. We can either plan in such a way that,
by the time the additional money pumped into circulation comes into the
consumers’ market, we can provide that market with the additional goods as a
result of planned production. Or we can mop up the surplus purchasing power by
a policy of induced saving. Will the people save? Indians are not in the habit
of saving at all, so runs the argument. Here we are making a big mistake. It is
not correct to say that Indians have no habit of saving. They have, but they
save in a different way; they put their saving into the form of metals.
Everybody in India invests in metals–brass, silver or gold as the case may
be–depending upon the economic status of the person. And this is because they
are not accustomed to the idea of keeping their savings in the form of money in
the banks. So what we have to do is not to educate the people to save but to
keep their savings in the form of money and keep it in the banks or with the
Government. This can be done by opening Post Office Savings in Banks in the
rural areas and so on. If this is not quite successful, I would advocate the
Government selling off their gold reserves in the Reserve Bank in the open
market to mop up the surplus money; and I am sure that the heavens will
not fall if we do that. The gold in the Reserve Bank is serving no purpose at
all, and it is only our bankrupt orthodoxy that is keeping it there when we are
not on the Gold Standard. At any rate, it is meaningless to be afraid of
deficit-financing at the present moment.
The
Plan is not without its faults and drawbacks; but at the same time it contains
enough features that ought to induce us to work. If worked well, it is bound to
result in a higher standard of life; and that is what is urgently required in
this poor country. The Plan has to succeed for another reason. People have been
accustomed to think of planning with such great hopes as a panacea for all
their ills, that any failure of this Plan is bound to result in a great
national despair; and that would be a great catastrophe to be avoided at any
cost. It is therefore for every one of us interested in India’s stability and
future to see that the Plan succeeds. Therefore it requires the co-operation of
all the people. Is the co-operation of the people required at all, asks such a
responsible paper as the Eastern Economist of Delhi. It is, and it is
required both in the negative and the positive ways. Negatively people who are
pessimistic about the Plan should cease to be pessimistic, and at least cease
telling others that it is a bad Plan and so bound to fail. Nothing can succeed
when we start with the view that it would fail. Here is another lesson of
democracy that we have to learn in this country. We have to learn that in a
democracy the Majority have a right to take a decision and the Minority have a
right to criticise; but they have also a duty to co-operate with the Majority
to make the decisions, once taken, take effect. So every one of us,
irrespective of our political ideologies, has a national duty to make this Plan
a success.
On
the positive side, people have to save and avoid unnecessary rise in the
standard of life in the early stages of the execution of the Plan. Every one of
us can help to avoid inflation in the country. We have to realise that saving
is another of our national duties. If we have to survive as a nation in this
age of industrial civilisation, we have to behave as a nation; and this
requires a new outlook on our part. Our old conception of citizenship was based
on the negative duty of not doing anything injurious to society; but our new
conception is that we have positive duties towards society. One of those duties
is national saving. Saving, no doubt, means lowering the standard of life
immediately, but there cannot be any planning without tears.