1. The net result of the British cabinet Mission’s labours of three months in India is a revival of signs of mobility in the postures of the principal parties which had hardened up under the chill miasma of Britain’s nonpossumus of over a decade. The Mission had two objects in view: (I) setting up agreed machinery for the framing of a permanent constitution, and (2) forming a representative national government for the interval. It has only partially achieved the first and failed in respect of the second object,–to judge from things as they appear at the moment. While the interim government proposals had to be given up because of the Congress’s refusal of co-operation mainly owing to the non-admission of its freedom to include a Muslim in its own quota of ministers, both the Congress and the Muslim League have agreed to join in forming a Constituent Assembly subject to certain conditions and reservations. The Mission had thus to return contented with having at the most got only four annas in the rupee. The ambiguities and the pusillanimities of its own proceedings have to account for the extent of the failure of the Mission which started its career under every augury of hope and success.
2. No one with any insight into conditions in India
can have the courage to predict a smooth passage for the Constituent Assembly.
Everybody has been suspecting shoals and snags on the path. The speeches of the
leaders of the Congress and the League are full of ominous hints and minatory
gestures. The Sikhs, having at first sworn total opposition and boycott, and
then having provisionally agreed to let their quota be elected for the
membership of the Constituent Assembly,–this out of deference to the Congress,–have now reverted to their first resolve of non-co-operation. The
League’s leaders have also been threatening to revise their attitude. The
Rulers of the States have been planning and preparing in silence, for what–the outer world has not been enabled to see. The
skies are thus not exactly smiling at the birth of the Constituent Assembly.
Are they at least not mocking?
3. The decisive Documents of the Mission are far
from being decisive on some vital issues. They are indeed so framed as to
announce to the ear of each contending party the very thing it has been looking
for. Thus the Congress President read the famous State Paper of May 16 as a
charter for Unity and the League President as a charter for Division. The
Document recalls to one’s mind the well-known passage of Cardinal Newman’s
about the type of wisdom that consists in mistiness of speech: –
“A man who can set down half a dozen general
propositions which escape from destroying one another only by being diluted
into truisms, who can bold the balance between opposites so skillfully as to do
without fulcrum or beam, who never enunciates a truth without guarding himself
from being supposed to exclude the contradictory, who holds that the Scripture
is the only authority, yet that the Church is to be deferred to, that Faith
only justifies, yet that it does not justify without Works, that Grace does not
depend on the Sacraments, yet is not given without them, that Bishops are a
divine ordinance, yet those who have them not are in the same religious
condition as those who have,–this is your safe man and the hope of the
Church…..But, alas! reading sets men thinking…..Doctrines lead to action.”
Thus it is that Mahatma Gandhi, who hailed the
Document of May 16 with noticeable enthusiasm, came in the course of some three
weeks of study to see in it vital defects affording ground for fear.
4. The sincerity and the earnestness of the Cabinet
Ministers may be readily and gladly admitted. But that cannot exhaust the
combination of qualities needed. Not less important than sincerity and
earnestness are an insightful appreciation of the relative momenta of the
forces of the situation and a firm resolve to attend to the corollaries of
admitted principles. The enunciation of an ideal, be it ever so satisfying, is
bound to go for nothing if it is not accompanied by a scrupulous implementation
of the essential working details. Let us examine the postulates with which the
Mission started.
They are three: –
(1) That India should be helped to attain Independence;
(2) That India’s Unity should be preserved; and
(3) That, as incidental to the first postulate, the Paramountcy of
Britain should be withdrawn.
These are a clear statement of the ideals; and the
country is deeply grateful for it. The Mission have convincingly set out the
reasons for rejecting the demand for a separate, sovereign and independent
Pakistan State; And that is a service of capital significance. But there are
two other corollaries of equally vital importance that have been forgotten or
ignored by the Mission:
(4) That, in the interests of Unity, centripetal forces should be
maintained at the maximum in the All-Indian polity consistently with the
reality of the autonomy of Provinces and States; and that concessions made to
communal and other would be separatists should therefore not be at the expense
of the Union’s strength;
(5) That the disappearance of Paramountcy should be pari passu accompanied
by the advent of other agencies to perform those functions that were the
admitted responsibilities of Paramountcy,–that is, an All-Indian Federation to
look after the protection and all external concerns of the States, and
democratic responsible government in the States to obviate the need for
extraneous supervision over their internal affairs.
It is hard to persuade ourselves that the Cabinet
Ministers lacked the clear-headedness to perceive these logical implications of
the admirably high position from which they started. Is it then the fear of
offending the Muslim League and the Princes that stood in the way of the
Mission’s incorporating these two fundamental propositions in its State
Document?
5. Not only has the Mission shrunk from the logic
of its own initial declaration; it has actually gone the opposite way, in–
(a) delimiting the jurisdiction of the Union Government to the barest
minimum conceivable;
(b) requiring the preliminary sub-federation of Provinces, gerrymandered
as they at present are communally as well as geographically;
(c) prescribing majorities in the present gerrymandered communal blocs
for determining communal questions in the constitution making process; and
(d) ignoring the rights of the people of the Indian States and leaving
it to the sweet will and pleasure of their Ruling Princes to fix what date and
what terms they please for coming into the Indian Union, and indeed to come
into it or not at all.
It is these significant compromising’s with the
requirements of the ideals professed that placed chances of unqualified success
beyond the reach of the Cabinet Mission.
6. The procedure adopted by the Mission suffered
from the defects of the “cart before-the-horse” order. In Parliament’s debate
on the Mission on the eve of its leaving London, the supreme importance of the
Mission’s carrying with it a “positive” attitude was pointed out on the one
side and acknowledged on the other. But from the negotiations that kept the
country tantalized for several weeks after the Mission’s arrival in India, it
did not appear that the Mission had come with its mind made up as to what had
to be honoured as a matter of fundamental and unalterable principle, not open
to compromise, and what was to be left an issue for settlement after debate and
compromise in the Constituent Assembly. As though it had no mind of its own,
the Delegation embarked on a course of protracted plumbings in the turgid
streams of communal fanaticism and the turbid pools of princely fogeyism. On
the other hand, the proper order of proceeding for the Delegation would have
been–
first, to issue a comprehensive statement
embodying the basic ideals and principles as shown above, together with their
inevitable implications and indispensable subsidiaries, and to make it clear to
one and all that there is to be no compromise on those principles and ideals;
next, to invite the parties to co-operate in
setting up a national cabinet conformably to the principles so declared, the
Viceroy not tying up his hand with formulas of parity or any other inequitable
concession and reserving power for himself to act in the spirit of the
declaration if any party’s co-operation was not forthcoming; and
then, to outline the tentative plan for the
formation and functioning of the constitution-making body, on the understanding
that all matters not declared to be fundamental are to be decided by the
constitution-making body itself by agreed methods of procedure.
7. If such had been the sequence, we may be sure
the talks held at the second and the third stages would have shown the party
leaders as less refractory and taken a more constructive turn. Matters ancillary
to the inviolable central principles,–details of the constitutional structure,
alternative arrangements for minorities, rules for the constituent body
procedure and similar questions of the second order of importance,–should have
been the subject for consultation and compromise upon, but not matters of the
first order. If, at the third stage, the Mission had discovered an unbridgeable
gulf between one party and another as regards the division of sovereign powers between the All-Indian Union
authority on the one side and the authority of the Province on the other, the
idea of a middle storey in the edifice by the grouping or sub-federation of
Provinces might have been suggested for exploration by the Constituent Assembly
as one of the possible ways of adjustment between extreme Unionists and extreme
Provincialists. But the Delegation preferred to reverse the order. By not
speaking out its own mind at first and commencing its business with prolonged
interviews and searchings for guidance from others, the Delegation conveyed the
impression that it had brought nothing definite or unalterable with it and
could therefore be induced to change and re-shape anything anyhow. So our party
bosses felt coaxed and opened their mouths wide. This stiffening of the parties
in their customary warlike attitudes ruined the atmosphere for the Mission’s
endeavours. Negotiation became higgle-haggle.
8. The explanation that the Mission did not wish to
force any settlement and that it made it a point of principle to try out
every possible means of getting the nationalists and the Pakistanis to come to
an agreement between themselves by mutual give-and-take is one no doubt
pervaded by an amiable sentiment, It reminds one of the miracles of the Rishis
in the forest hermitages of ancient India where tigresses are described as
having mothered lambs and serpents as having entertained frogs. Could such
miracles be wrought in the year 1946 A.D.? Carlyle is said to have pointed to a
certain noble lord among his contemporaries as an ideal candidate for the
office of President of a Heaven-&-Hell Amalgamation Society. The Cabinet
Delegation were qualifying themselves for a similar honour by their efforts to
induce convinced nationalists and bigoted communalists to embrace each other.
Planning to placate both, the Mission has pleased neither. Sir Stafford
Cripps’s second visit has only watered and manured the poison-tree planted
during his first visit.
9. Much was said in Parliament about the
undesirability of Britain’s “imposing” a constitution upon India. Britain
should not, it was argued, force even self-governing institutions upon this
country. But in sober truth, there was no need at all for such cautioning.
Britain is simply called upon to afford room for the translation into fact of
that very ideology which she has herself promoted in this country by the
education and the experience of institutional life which she has provided
directly and indirectly, unintentionally as well as intentionally. The fact of
facts today is that the nationalistic and democratic idealism of India is fully
in accord with the ideals of political progress to which Britain stands pledged
by the promises she has herself held out to India time and again. It is only in
pursuance of this coincidence of progressive ideology between the two countries
that action is now being looked for. There is no question here of Britain’s
“imposing” or forcing any institution upon an unwilling or unprepared India. On
the contrary, Britain is being urged only to help in the removal of obstacles
to the realization of the common ideals of nationalist India and liberalist
Britain. If Britain’s statesmen will but be faithful to her own light, if they
would only just desist from encouraging would-be disintegrators and
reactionaries, they will have earned the gratitude of India. The help asked of
them is mainly of the negative kind. Let them not feed the fires of
recalcitrancy and obstructionism. As to the positive side, India has confidence
in herself. She is prepared to take risks. She hopes to profit from her own
independent striving and experience.
10. A fact to remember about the Cabinet Mission’s
plan is that it is avowedly a descendant of the Cripps plan of 1942. The
Grouped Provinces clause of today is a re-incarnation of the Counter-Union
clause of the earlier scheme. It should only be counted a Human trait in Sir
Stafford Cripps if there persisted in his mind a desire to retrieve his pet
cause this time by bringing off a veiled gift of Pakistan,–of Pakistan factual,
but not nominal, –and to wreak resentment upon his frustrators of four years
ago. Considering the igeniousness of the devices in the Mission’s scheme,
popular fancy counts him its guiding genius. This is not only an explanation of
what is past, but also a warning for what is to be expected. The press has
forecast it as probable that Lord Pethick-Lawrence will be retiring from office
in a few weeks from now. Is it likely that Sir Stafford Cripps will succeed as
India Secretary? That office is not likely to be abolished before the actual
advent of the new regime. Sir Stafford is sure to have an effective hand in the
shaping of things preparatory for the new regime. Even if he is not India
Secretary, he will, regarded as an expert on India in the Cabinet, be able to
order affairs connected with the making of the constitution to come. It is
greatly to be desired that some friend of Sir Stafford would acquaint him of
the existence in the mind of the Indian public of a certain feeling of distrust
towards men reputed for diplomatic cleverness.
11. Whatever happens, the deadlock must be ended
and a fresh start made. The chief value of the Cabinet Mission’s labours is in
having opened out an opportunity for this. As was said above, the prospects for
the Constituent Assembly are none too bright at the time these words are being
written. The Muslim League leaders have begun to threaten to retrace their
steps, because the Congress leaders interpret the Mission’s proposals in a
particular sense. Whatever other parties choose to do, the Congress should
itself do nothing that is likely to render the Constituent Assembly scheme a
fiasco. It is extremely re-assuring to hear the new Congress President affirm
the Congress’s decision to give a “fair trial” to the proposal. The promise of
a “fair trial” involves obligations of self-restraint in speech of careful
attention to time and circumstance in dealing with matters of controversy, of
forbearance and “deaf-ear” policy, of a scrupulous sense of dignity. In this
regard, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has set an illustrious example to all; and it
should not in any case be for Congressmen to forget it. Here is a man who,
during six weary years of the sorest trial of temper and the most clamant
provocation to use angry language, never for once allowed himself to utter
anything rash or unworthy of his great position. Nobless obliges. Great
are the prestige and the power of the Congress; and great therefore is its
burden of responsibilities more than any other organization’s. The Congress is
our grand patriarch; and the patriarch’s one concern should ever be to hold the
family together, whatever befalls. He must therefore be kindly and tactful with
all.
12. The Mission’s Document of May 16 bears signs of
haste and woolliness of mind in drafting. Its style, for a State Paper of such
importance and authority, is a strangely confusing mixture of the
conversational and the legalistic modes of expression. There are contradictions
in phrasing; and the hiatuses in the scheme of arrangements outlined are many.
It is difficult to be certain about the correctness of any one of the two or
more meanings possible in a clause. Is it made so by inadvertence or by design?
Such lack of precision may put the central purpose itself in jeopardy by
raising controversies when the operative causes are invoked by any party in the
Constituent Assembly. For example, paragraph 19 (iv) provides: – “A preliminary
meeting (of the Constituent Assembly) will be held at which (1) the general
order of business will be decided, (2) a chairman and other officers elected”
etc. Is this the proper order of events? Should not the election of the
chairman take place first, before every other kind of business? Then, who will
preside at the election of the chairman? Is it intended that the Viceroy should
nominate a person to be the convener of the preliminary meeting and to preside
over it till it has elected a chairman of its own? Is it fair to the Assembly
to require it to decide its order of business under the chairmanship of some
one not of its own choice? Where is the justification for such a reversal of
the sequence usually followed as natural and reasonable? Perhaps the Mission
has the intention of issuing another statement to clear up all doubts and
obscurities in the Document of May 16 when once its scheme has definitely found
acceptance from the principal parties. Perhaps the Viceroy will be authorized
to decide all moot points. It is indeed a point for immediate clarification
whether the Constituent Assembly could not itself decide, by the ordinary processes
of discussion and voting, all questions arising in the course of its
working,–with the exception, of course, of those communal questions for which a
special procedure has been prescribed in the Document, Par. 19 (vii). The
Congress appears to prefer such a construction; and if it be endorsed by proper
authority at the outset, it will take away one potent cause for quarrel and the
break-up of the Assembly at the very threshold.
13. The very first problem to be taken up at
(not by) the Constituent Assembly will be that of the future of the
Provinces. According to Par. 19 (iv) of the Document of May 16, after technical
and business preliminaries have been gone through at the first formal meeting
of the Assembly, “the Provincial representatives will divide up into the three
Sections–A, B and C.” Is it or is it not open to any member at that plenary
session, before it so divides up, to raise a question whether it is necessary
for the Provincial representatives so to go into the Sections? He may take his
stand on Par. 15 (v). It says: “Provinces should be free to form
Groups.” An automatic grouping is not made obligatory. Grouping, if it should
be at all, is to be optional and voluntary. If a member from any Province
wishes that grouping should be brought about, it will be for him to make a
motion to that effect at the plenary session. The question would then have to
be debated and voted upon. The voting will have to be as prescribed in Par. 19
(vii): –“In the Constituent Assembly, resolutions….raising any major communal issue shall require a
majority of the representatives, present any voting, of each of the two major
communities.” Thus the grouping idea may find no majority support from each of
the two communities (but may from only one) and may thus have to be dropped. Is
that possible? How is the Assembly to get over the dilemma of which Par. 15 (v)
and Par. 19 (iv and v) are the two horns? Which of the two is to be taken as
endowed with greater validity? If it be held that Par. 19 (iv and v) should
prevail, then, in order to conform to Par. 19 (v, vii and viii), Par. 15 (v)
would have to be re-written somewhat as follows: –
“(a) Provinces should be free, (b) after sitting to
form groups, (c) to try to escape from them (d) if formed.”
It is possible to argue that while the forming of
Groups is no doubt a matter of free option, dividing up into Sections is not
so. The Section procedure must be gone through in any case; and the question
about Grouping must be taken up at the Section’s meeting. It is not specified
that voting at the Section’s meeting should be community-wise. Will the Section
then vote collectively (as one single college) or Province-wise? This is the
pith of the matter. If the voting be in Provincial blocs, then the counting of
the Provincial voting’s separately, and afterwards taking the unanimity of
Provincial majorities for Grouping as decisive, seems the more rational course,
especially in view of the freedom postulated for the Provinces (Par. 15-v). But
if the authors of the Document are to be taken as its commentators too, there
is no escape from initial Grouping. In its clarificatory talks to the press and
in correspondence with the Congress President, the Cabinet Mission has held
that Grouping is an essential feature of its scheme and is not to be avoided at
the start. A Province may opt itself out later on under Par. 19 (viii). But how
can we be sure that this liberty to opt out will not be reduced to the
triviality of a paper concession by sabotage provisions smuggled into the
constitutions of both the Province and the Group by the Section at its meeting?
The psychology of mutual suspicion between the Congress and the League will
keep alive while the Constituent Assembly sits; and when there is room left for
maneuvering and counter-maneuvering, they are human enough to keep alert and
active at it. A flexible scheme in rough outline has always such a
disadvantage. On the other hand, a cut and dried scheme might have repelled
either of the parties and bolted the door for all time against a settlement.
Such was the perplexity of the Mission. That is presumably the reason why the
Mission prefers to call its proposals recommendations and yet attaches
to them the finality of an award. It would have been best if the Mission
had had the frankness to stand by its own declared objective of All-Indian
Unity and put forward the Grouping idea as a mere tentative suggestion.
14. The Grouping idea is in itself neither
necessarily bad,–nor necessarily good. For scores of some very small and not
very rich Indian States, regional Grouping or sub- federation as an
intermediate level of the constitutional tower,–between the all-national top
floor and the local ground floor,–is an arrangement to be strongly recommended.
Similarly, when the bulk of the inhabitants of a Province and those of one or
more States in the neighbourhood have linguistic, educational, social or
economic interests in common, they may find it advantageous to combine into a
kind of subject on federation for certain limited purposes. But there is no
such consideration present to justify the compelling of British Indian
Provinces into the, proposed A, Band C Groups. The only criterion is the
advantage to be gained by the Province as a distinct unit; and of this the Province
concerned should itself be the sole judge. Compulsion applied from without is
the first of the evils in the Cabinet Mission’s Grouping proposals.
15. And there is another evil. In addition to
having to put up with an unwanted and even disagreeable yoke fellow, the
Province will have to have its own domestic constitution framed by one who has
not to live under it. Thus the N. W. Frontier Province will have to accept for
itself a constitution in the making of which the Punjab had a hand,–and that a
hand larger than the Frontier Province’s own. And thus, although Assam has felt
no need for erecting Hindu Muslim parity into an invariable rule for the
composition of its legislature or its executive, she may have to submit to it
because of the pressure from Bengal, the rule (19-vii) about the coincidence of
majority votes in both the communal blocs not being prescribed for meetings of
Group Sections. Thus the Group arrangement can make for the spread and
perpetuation of religion-fed communalism in Indian politics. Instead of
banishing the non-civic, and even anti-civic, theocratic fanaticism’s from the
realm of pure citizenship, it will further crystallize them and render free and
secular citizenship impossible for all time.
16. And there is a third evil too. The Group can
easily turn out a formidable rival to the Union. Since the limits of the
Union’s jurisdiction are already drawn by the Mission itself, the dominant
party in a Section of the Constituent Assembly may decide to assign more out of
the remaining powers and functions of sovereignty to the Group than to an
individual Province. Between an anaemic Union Centre above and a famished
Provincial administration below, the Group authority can annex vital spheres of
government to its own field and become the most effective centrifugal machine
to subdue the Union. It would verily be a Pakistan without the name.
Such, among others, are
the sinister potentialities of the group scheme.
17. No blame could attach to the Mission if it had,
without making the Grouping condition compulsory, just contented itself with
suggesting the Group idea for the unfettered consideration of the Constituent
Assembly as one possible way of resolving a conflict between extreme Unionists
and extreme Provincialists. But the Mission has designed Grouping as a special
attraction to the Muslim League. The Mission ventured too far into the unknown
in insisting upon Grouping when its knowledge of the actual conditions of the
areas concerned was no more than what could be gathered merely from census
tables and maps. The social and cultural affinities and the interdependencies
in the economic organization in a body of people are in some respects even
deeper forces than community of religion. No stronger tie need be assumed as
between the Punjabi and the Sindhi and the Pathan on the strength of their
common allegiance to Islam than may be assumed as between the Englishman and
the German and the Pole on the basis of their common Christianity. If the
Mission had found some six months to spend in Assam and Sind and the Frontier
Province, studying conditions of life and labor in those areas and inquiring
into the details of their social and economic relationships, the Mission would
have discovered for itself that its grouping scheme is a thing utterly
artificial and not referable to existing conditions of society, and that the
fact that the bulk of the populations in the Frontier Province and the Punjab
and Sind are Mussalmans does not require, either for the better cultivation of
their faith or for the better promotion of their prosperity, that the smaller
Provinces should lose their individuality under the hegemony of the larger.
18. We may be sure these and other points against
compulsory Grouping will be raised first at the plenary session, if permitted,
and then in any event at the Section meetings. Even more certain may we be that
the Muslim League will put up a deadly fight for the retention of Grouping. We
public have to pray that it may be granted to both parties to keep their
tempers. It is of prime importance that each party preserves its sense of
proportion and balance and follows the rules of the game,–success or defeat.
Above all, there must be a firm resolve on all sides not to break; and all talk
of boycotts and walk-outs should be scrupulously eschewed when once the parties
are gathered around the Assembly’s table.
19. The next battle-scene in the Constituent
Assembly will be reached when (Par. 19-vi) “the representatives of the Sections
and the Indian States, re-assemble for the purpose of settling the Union
Constitution.” The phrase “representatives of the Sections” here is
misleading. We hope it should be taken to mean “representatives (of the
country) who sat in the Sections.” The
storm centre now will be the scope and jurisdiction of the All-India Union, as
distinguished from the Provinces and their Groups. Par. 15 (i) assigns the
following responsibilities to the Union: – (i) Foreign Affairs, (ii) Defence,
(iii) Communications, and (iv) “Powers necessary to raise the finances required
for the above subjects.” There is nothing in the Mission’s Document to support
the view that the Mission considered this list of powers, sufficient and would
deprecate additions. The Mission thought it better to confine itself to indicating
only the datum line and leave it to the Constituent Assembly to build on that
minimal basis according to its own sense of necessity. Everyone outside the
Muslim League and a school of the Ruling Princes is of the view that the Union
cannot subsist worthily on the minimal fare recommended by the Mission and that
liberal cessions of sovereign power to the Union Centre are indispensable, if
it should prove the fitting crown and canopy of a strong and progressive
nation. In particular, the Union should, be invested with power under the
following heads: –
(I)
INDIANIZATION: Every
Indian born man, woman and child must be taught to think and act in terms of
the citizenship of India,–of the whole of India as one homeland. The boundaries
of caste and communalism, of Province and State, must be transcended; and the
habit of “INDIA FIRST” should be inculcated. The U.S.A. owes her strength and
solidarity of today to the policy or Americanization pursued consistently for
over three generations. Such a process of consolidation is promoted by means of
a common body of all-national laws, common judicial institutions, and common
educational and social policies. In particular, legislation affecting the
status of citizens and the rights and obligations of secular citizenship,–such
as laws for Naturalization, Domiciliation, Extradition, Emigration and
Immigration–should be placed within the purview of the Union Government.
(II)
PLANNING: If India is
looked upon as a self-sufficing unit of the international community, it is
requisite that the policies of her several States and Provinces in educational
and economic development should, above a given level, be shaped with a close
eye to All-Indian needs and resources. Universities industrial and commercial
enterprises of more than a particular magnitude, and, legislation relating to
labour, wages, contracts, transfers of property etc., should be regulated on an
All-India plan. The last three years have brought home to us the need there is
for planning agriculture and distribution of life’s necessaries on a reasoned
All-India basis.
(III)
TAXATION: The Cabinet
Mission has not explicitly marked out the sources of revenue for the Union
Government. It has made an omnibus recommendation of “powers to raise the
finances required.” This is taken in some quarters as a suggestion of
contributions from Provinces and States. Can the Union Government function
efficiently if it is to live upon such precarious doles? Let us remember that
the Union is charged with the defence on India. The extent of that responsibility
will be determined by international conditions rather than by our State or
Provincial inclinations to spare. Are armies to be cut down to suiting the
conveniences of States and Provinces? And if the Provinces are niggardly or
neglectful, will the Union Centre have power to coerce them? On the other hand,
if the Union be given the power of independent taxation and it goes on
exercising that power without reference to the size of the burden laid on the
same tax-payer’s back by the Provincial or State Government and without pausing
to think of his capacity, where is he to find relief? Is it not just and
equitable that authority should be vested somewhere to look into the grades and
incidences of taxation and order an equitable correlation between the
Provincial and the Union levies? There must be an All-Indian nexus somewhere.
This will present a tough job to the Constituent Assembly.
(IV)
RE-CONDITIONING:
Hardly any words would be necessary to convince one of the indispensability of
a central authority, (1) to settle non-justiciable disputes between one
Province and another, or between a Province and a State, (ii) to assist weak or
backward States and Provinces in promoting the work of nation-building and
administrative efficiency, (iii) to co-ordinate regional developments, and (iv)
to take charge of affairs during grave constitutional or administrative crises
in a Province or a State. Let us not conceal from ourselves the fact that
democratic institutions, in the form in which we are adopting them, are new to
our country; and that inexperience may sometimes land us in bogs and marshes.
We must be mentally prepared to see seats of authority filled by cabals and
caucuses sustained by communal votes and protected by party machines. Our soil
may develop its own varieties of Tammany Hall. When the bulk of the electorate
is doped or made corrupt by the demagogue and the careerist, and a communalist
clique or a pack of place-leeches has irremovably established itself in
ministerships, the aggrieved minority would be helpless if there were no
quarter to which to turn for remedy. There may be popular commotion and tumult
in a State or a Province in consequence of the long-continued dominance of a
party junto; and it may at last be carried to the point of a revolt. Such
possibilities are no doubt implicit in the philosophy of democracy. The people
have the right to rebel when they have no other remedy left against misrule.
But is it wise, and is it necessary, to let evil rise to that pitch? What is
the effect likely to be upon other States and Provinces if there is a popular
rising in one? Will it not spread and lead to the imperilment of the Union
itself? It would be safe for all to entrust the Union Legislature and
Government with power to take action, on complaint received from the public of
a State or a Province through approved channels, in cases of (i) a failure of,
or a fraud upon, the constitution, (ii) grave inefficiency or injustice in the
public administration, long left unrectified by the local authority, and (iii)
excesses of racial, caste or communal spirit resulting in policies of
discrimination against particular classes or the persecution of any group of
people. Restrictions will of course have to be placed, by the Constitution Act
itself in the most precise terms possible, on this correctional power of the
Union. The Union’s action should be limited only to cases of proved wrong for
which there is no reasonable expectation of a local remedy; and the action
should not exceed the requirements of correction.
(V)
EMERGENCY ACTION: To
no mortal is it given to foresee and catalogue all the trials and hardships
that a country may have to face in years to come. But famine, flood and
pestilence are no strangers to India. And they are not to be classed under the
head either of Defence or of Communications (unless “communication” is to mean
“contagion”!). Foreign States may not recognize them under “Foreign Affairs”.
Thus, under the present proposals, the Union will have to sit with folded hands
and look on helplessly when there is widespread suffering in the land, while
the Provincial and State Governments may be individually without resources to
afford relief and without any coordinating centre to organize what resources
they have. If such emergencies should be met promptly and adequately, the Union
must be given power to step in any part of India to concert relief measures. In
view of the existence of any number of backward communities, tribal areas and
attenuated States in India,–in any of which it is possible that trouble of any
kind may break out at any moment,–it will be safe to place in the hands of the
Union Government general powers to secure public welfare, peace and progress
throughout India.
20. The above are special matters which it is
essential to allot to the Union Centre if India’s independence should prove a
blessing. In addition to them, there are general matters like Currency and
Exchange, Inter-provincial Trade and Banking, Inter-provincial recognition of
centres of learning like universities and of organized professions like the
Bar, which are commonly handed over to the national centre in all federal
constitutions. The Federal and the Concurrent Lists of the Government of India
Act of 1935 are illustrative.
21. Proposals to enlarge the Union Centre’s powers
will be opposed not only by the Muslim League, but also by many among such
representatives of the States as are the nominees of their Ruling Princes or
their Durbars. On the other hand, the People’s representatives from the States
may relied upon to support those proposals; for the States’ People need an
omni-competent Union Centre even more than those of the rest of India do. The
fight for more strength for the Union is bound to be a determined, inch-by-inch
fight. And it will be worth all that can be put into it for gaining success.
22. A point not contemplated at all by the Cabinet
Mission, but one that must without fail be raised in the Constituent Assembly
at the very first stage, is that of so re-arranging provincial areas and
forming new Provinces that each of the more important Indian languages will, as
far as may be practicable, get a separate administrative territory to serve as
its own natural home. The most urgent cases are those of Kannada (Karnataka),
Andhra, Kerala and Maharashtra. The Kannada people are at present living
divided under as many as 18 or 19 administrations; and everywhere they are in a
subordinate position, dominated by others who, owing to a variety of
circumstances, have for decades been the strong occupants of seats of power.
Without adequate facilities provided for educational and cultural development,
how are the Kannadas to contribute worthily to the practical service and the
cultural enrichment of India? The question of linguistic provinces has for
decades been agitating the country; and the Congress has accepted and followed
up the principle. The Madras Presidency has in recent years experienced in very
acute forms the manifold difficulties of a polyglot Province. What is the use
of a Constituent Assembly which cannot help us here? The question must be
raised at the preliminary meeting itself of the Assembly, before the members
divide up into Grouping Sections. As this is a question that will interest only
the Provinces in Section A, and may not effect Sections B and C, there could be
no objection to be raised against members in Section A dealing with the problem
conclusively. The Constituent Assembly must authorize them in this behalf.
23. The Princes of the States, in their way,
present a problem as stubborn as that of the Muslim League. Both problems are
the offspring of medieval ideologies,–one theocratic and the other feudalistic.
The Cabinet Mission, for some mysterious reason, did not choose to put itself
to so much trouble over the States as it did over the Muslim League’s
agitation. Its handling of the States problem was partial, ill-informed and
perfunctory. The Mission’s initial error lay in not appreciating the need there
is to hear the People of the States directly, as distinguished from their
Princes and their Durbars. Owing to the non-existence in the States of that
influence of a democratic constitution which alone can fuse the rulers and the
ruled in a State into one entity, there is a dualism in the personality of an
Indian State today; and the case of its People is not necessarily the same as
that of its Prince. Indeed the two cases are divergent in some vital matters.
This circumstance was repeatedly pressed upon the attention of the Cabinet
Mission; but the mission preferred to adhere to the old ostrich tradition. It
would be strange if the Mission could not realize, from what Pandit Nehru
showed in Faridkote and Kashmir, that the car of Manhood’s right cannot be made
to stand still.
24. The Mission’s Document of May 16 has the
following on the States: –
“Par. 14. With the attainment of independence by
British India, whether inside or outside the British Commonwealth, the
relationship which has hitherto existed between the Rulers of the States and
the British Crown will no longer be possible. Paramountcy can neither be
retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government. This fact
has been fully recognized by those whom we interviewed from the States. They
have assured us that the States are ready and willing to co-operate in the new
development of India.”
“Those” whom the mission interviewed from the
States are not more than 5 or 6, for the 562 States that there are; and “those”
favoured ones are either pushful potentates or hand-picked Dewans. Many of the
major States like Mysore were not among the invited ones. What was the
authority of the 5 or 6 to give the assurance,–acceptable altogether though its
nature be? And was the assurance unencumbered? Everybody knows that the Indian
Princes gave ample assurances at the Round Table Conference, only to eat them
after the 1935 Act came.
25. Then the Mission’s Document of May 16 has this:
–
A.
“15 (i) There should
be a Union of India embracing both British India and the States....”
B.
“19 (ii) The States
should be given, in the final Constituent Assembly, appropriate representation
which would not, on the basis of the calculations adopted for British India,
exceed 93; but the method of selection will have to be determined by
consultation.”
C.
“The States would in
the preliminary stage be represented by a Negotiating Committee.”
Part A above is a definition of the accepted
national objective. But where is it implemented? On July 18, in reporting to
Parliament, the Secretary for India said: –
“As to the States, they need have no anxiety since
it is for them to decide freely to come in or not (into the Indian Union) as
they choose.”
If, exercising the option thus allowed, a State
chooses not to come in, will Paramountcy stay or quit in respect of it? If it
stays, there is no independence for India. If it quits without providing
substitute arrangements it will be deserting a plan duty. Where then will the
Union be? This could not have escaped the notice of Lord Pethlck-Lawrence. Does
he believe that it will come off well in the end if only plenty of rope is put
in the hands our Princes? That will take long; but India is impatient. Or is it
likely that, while there is outwardly the appearance of freedom kept up, a
policy of pressure is being inwardly applied by the Political Department? The
Cabinet Ministers are great optimists to think that secret nudgings and timid
beckonings can do the work. Long association with imperialists could not but
have its effect on the sensitiveness in the skins of our Princes.
26. As regards the progress of the “consultation”
promised in part B of the above quotation, we may note that the Dewan of Cochin
said on July 7 that he had received no official reference. Nothing has been
heard of matter subsequently either. Perhaps the matter has been under
consideration in the Political Department of the Government of India. Perhaps
the consultations will be begun when it is known definitely that the
Constituent Assembly plan will really be proceeded with. Whenever they may be
begun, it is imperative that the Crown Representative should insist that at
least 70 out of the 93 seats allotted to the States,–that is a three-fourths
share, roughly,–be reserved for non-official citizens to be returned by popular
legislatures as far as possible or recommended by public organizations in the
States. The advantage of this from the all-Indian point of view has already
been referred to in Par. 21 above. The States’ People realize that, for their
own uplifting, they should let their life’s currents flow into the broader
streams of the national and the international.
27. The Chamber of Princes, under the leadership of
the Nawab of Bhopal, has already “packed” the Negotiating Committee*
contemplated in passage C above. Not one is there in that Committee known to
have ever stood up for the People’s rights and earned their goodwill and
confidence. Has the Crown Representative given his full and unconditional
recognition to the Committee? The Mission was requested in good time by States’
People’s agencies (i) to make a public statement on the nature, scope and
functions of the Negotiation Committee, and to see (ii) that some place was
given on it for authentic spokesmen of the People’s cause, and (iii) also that
the Committee gives due hearing to popular leaders and public organizations in
the States. The evasive reticence with which the Mission answered the request
was a prelude to the hurried and hole-and-corner fashion in which the Committee
has since been allowed to take birth. The suspicions thus roused in the popular
mind are only strengthened by the knowledge that the Chamber of Princes has
been spending freely out of its coffers to purchase the services of foreign
lawyers like Sir Walter Monckton. Can law stand against public opinion? Why
does not the Chamber call for advice from Sir M. Visvesvaraya and Sir N.
Gopalaswami Ayyangar who are statesmen having inside knowledge, gained at first
hand, of administrative and civic conditions within the States? Why, in the
name of all that is honest and decent, will not the Princes seek advice and
support from their own subjects? Even yet, it could be open to them to improve
the character and prestige of the Negotiation Committee. Even now, it should be
possible for the Crown Representative to have that Committee made more
acceptable to the People of the states.
28. It is essential that States People’s
representatives should be enabled to take part in the Constituent Assembly from
the very beginning. (1) In the choice of the Chairman for the Assembly and (2)
in deciding its procedure, they are entitled to a voice equally with members
from British India. (3) They also need representation in the Committee (Par.20)
on Fundamental Rights, Safeguards for Minorities etc. (4) And the People of the
States neighbouring the Provinces of the proposed Group A are vitally concerned
in the question of Linguistic Provinces which must be considered at the very
first plenary session of the Constituent Assembly. For these four purposes,
among others, it is just and proper that States’ People’s representatives
should be asked to join in the Assembly at the initial session itself. The
Negotiation Committee’s good offices are not necessary in the case of many
States. Such States as are ready to join the Union may be invited to send their
quota immediately. It should not take more than two weeks or three for a State
to hold an emergent meeting of its popular legislature and have an election
held. The remaining States may join later on. And at the second stage of the
Union Assembly, when all States are in it, the States’ members should be
authorized to meet as a separate Section and frame one or more type
constitutions for adaptation according to local conditions by al Indian States
generally. A “reforms” fuss has now started in many States. Bhopal, Baroda,
Travancore, Hyderabad, and several others are setting about the improvisation
of constitutional facades for their administration. Why should not they all
agree to follow an approved pattern in regard to the vital features of a
democratic constitution and to have their devices tested by canons universally
accepted as essential to responsible governance? Freak fabrications cannot do
duty for the genuine article for long; and when the public discover that they
are being offered playthings instead oft authentic implements of citizenship,
upsetting in the extreme are bound
to their reactions. The present reformist hurry of the Princes is as
telltalish as is its suddenness. They stand a better chance of earning
gratitude if they would let a body under the auspices of the Union Constituent
Assembly draft the outlines of a scheme of responsible government for the
Indian States, to be adopted by each State with amendments suited to local
circumstances. It must be remembered by all that until the States’ problem is
got completely out of the way, the work of the Constituent Assembly cannot be
taken to have reached its consummation. The leaders of British India,–who will
be more than three times as many as the representatives of the States
there,–should see to it that the questions of the States are gone into
thoroughly and settled satisfactorily, before the Assembly concludes; for, the
acceptance by the British Government of the conclusions of the Assembly is
subject to the possibility of revision on two points : –(i) “matters arising
out the transfer of power” (Par. 22) and (ii) safeguards for minorities. The
issue of the obligations of Paramountcy may well be brought under the first
head and, stretching the argument a bit, also under the second. A residuum of
the States problem left unsolved may thus render the labours of the Constituent
Assembly infructuous. It is for this reason that a very special plea has been
made here for a special agency to devote itself exclusively to the States’ problems
from the standpoint of the future of their People.
29. It is of melancholy significance that neither
in the historic State-Paper of May 16 nor in the Mission’s Memorandum on
Paramountcy etc. (May 22), nor even in the speeches of the Secretary for India
and his colleagues of the Delegation in Parliament on July 18 is there an
explicit reference to the People of the States. In the published parts, too, of
the correspondence between the Crown Representative and the Chancellor of the
Chamber of Princes, amidst all that wealth of floss and flummery, there is a
studied avoidance of direct reference to the case of the People. Of the two, it
is the Crown Representative that goes somewhat near the subject. It is in this:
–
“We particularly appreciate the action of the
Standing Committee (of the Chamber of Princes) in endorsing the suggestions we
made in regard to the manner in which the States could best fit themselves to
make their due contribution to India’s new constitutional structure. We are
confident that when the time comes for the States to make their final decision,
that decision will be characterised by the same sense of realism and the same
spirit of accommodation as have already been manifested.”
For roundaboutishness in speech, it should be difficult
to find a more impressive example. Is this symbolic of the tortuosities
involved in dealing with the Princes? This anxiety on both sides not to yield
so much as an open reference to the People of the States has a depressing
significance that is obvious. The representation of the States in the
Constituent Assembly conceded by the Cabinet Mission, though computed on the
basis of population, is not earmarked explicitly for their People. If at all
the direct representatives of the public are to be allowed into the Constituent
Assembly from the States, that will have to be decided by the States
Negotiation Committee acting in consultation with a Corresponding Committee to
be set up by the British Indian part of the Constituent Assembly. The States
People are not to have a share in electing the Chairman of the Assembly or
determining its procedure. They are poor relations, to be allowed into the
dining room only after the master and mistress and their favourites have all
taken their seats.
30. The cabinet Mission is correct in holding that
when India has become independent in law and in fact, Britain can neither
continue her Paramountcy nor transfer it to any authority of which the States
are not themselves an integral part. How is it then to be disposed of?
Paramountcy is not something that can dissolve into thin air. It is not a
phrase of mere pomp or formality. It has some positive content of ascertainable
powers and responsibilities. When two States of unequal strength or unequal
resources have, for whatever reasons, contracted to live in association, the
stronger holding itself responsible for the protection of the less strong and
the latter for supporting the stronger, the relationship between them is termed
either Paramountcy or Federation according to the nature of the status reserved
for itself by each. When the powers entrusted to the stronger can be exercised
by it without scrutiny or question by the less strong, the nexus is that of
Suzerainty or Paramountcy. When the powers are held by the stronger subject to
conditions of equitable partnership with the less strong, the bond becomes
Federal. The substance of both is the same; but the methods of operation are
different. Paramountcy submerges but Federation maintains the individuality of
the less strong. Paramountcy is something external; Federation is organically
one with its units. In the context of the Indian States, the ingredients of
Paramountcy can be set down in concrete terms under three comprehensive heads:
–
(i)
Protection and
External Affairs.
(ii)
Superintendence of
internal administration, so as to correct error and promote good government;
and
(iii)
Securing succession
to the gadi (throne) according to established law and usage, and
connected dynastic questions.
It should be evident that Paramountcy cannot be
abruptly shaken off if accepted duties are to be faithfully discharged. If
Britain has to relieve herself of it,–as she now must,–she should find proper
depositaries for its powers and responsibilities. Paramountcy is in fact made
up of slices of sovereignty taken from the States from time to time; and it is
only fair that it should be returned to the States in such a manner as will
ensure the faithful fulfillment of the three obligations noted above. That
manner is the securing of (i) democratic responsible government inside the
States, (ii) and their entry into an All-Indian Federal Union outside, and
(iii) getting their Princes to accept the verdict of the Federal Court or any
arbitration agency created by the Union Government under the law to settle
questions of succession and other dynastic privileges. The first will put the
People of the State in full power over their own local affairs and thus obviate
the need for an outside superintendent. The second will make them sharers in
the life of a national State having complete and independent sovereign status,
and thereby dispense with the need to keep a foreign protector and manager of
external, affairs. In short, Paramountcy has to re-incarnate itself as
democratic authority within and as federal authority without the States.
Paramountcy cannot come to an end, without injustice to its charge and without
discredit to itself, except through such re-incarnation.
31. This is not to plead that Paramountcy should
tarry on till all the 560 odd Ruling Princes and Chiefs make up their minds to
renounce their vassalage-nursed autocracy and accept democracy. What is desired
is that the Paramount Power should unequivocally explain to the Princes the two
fold pre-requisite for its withdrawing Paramountcy and call upon them to accept
both Responsible Government and Indian Federation immediately. The Paramount
should also leave behind arrangements to ensure Progress in the two directions.
Such arrangements, with guarantees as to their getting fair chances of
operation, are an essential part of the preparatory work for the coming
changes. It is therefore imperative that an agency to deal exclusively with the
States’ problems should be set up as an auxiliary to the Interim Government. It
may be a small advisory committee or board made up of both nominees of the
Durbars and non-official representatives of public opinion. It will serve as a
liaison agent between the Interim Government of India and individual States and
tender advice to the Crown Representative about measures of reform necessary in
the States. It must of course be prepared to yield place to other arrangements
that may come in as part of the permanent Union Constitution. It is most urgent
that some such substitute should be devised without loss of time to take the
place of the present Political Department.
32. On one point connected with Paramountcy, some
publicists of British India seem to need correction. They seem to think that
Paramountcy is something like an incidental office-perquisite of the present
Government of British India and could be transferred to a successor Government
of British India irrespective of the wishes of the States. That is not a
correct view of the position at all. The British Sovereign functions in two
different capacities in India: (1) as direct Ruler, and (2) as Suzerain.
(“Suzerain” is the word used in law.) His instrument, the Government of India,
has accordingly two capacities: (1) that of a Subordinate Branch of the
British Government, headed by the Governor General, and (2) that of the Agent
of the British Government, headed by the Viceroy. The first capacity, that
of a subordinate administration, is one that can be unilaterally disposed of.
The second,–the agential office,–is bilateral in its incidence and therefore
cannot be properly disposed of by one party except through an arrangement
acceptable to the other party. That such an arrangement is possible has been
shown above. No more Paramountcy then; and no more Political Department. For
the period of transition from now until the actual disappearance of
Paramountcy, a States’ Advisory Committee which includes People’s
representatives should be attached to the Interim National Government.
33. There will be plenty for such a Committee to do
by way of helping the States to prepare for the coming changes. An important
part of the preparatory work will be to draw plans for the regional grouping or
sub-federation of the smaller collectively-preservable States and secure
support therefor. (See Par. 14 above.) Yet another item of work will be to
prepare drafts of agreements or treaties on non-political local matters, to be
concluded between individual States and the Union. But the most important bit
of work for the Committee will be that which we might have expected the
Negotiation Committee to take up if only it had been properly
constituted,–namely democratizing the internal administration of the States.
Sir Stafford Cripps observed in Parliament on July 18: –
“The States are willing and anxious to co-operate
and to bring their own constitutions into such conformity with those of British
India as will make it possible for them to enter the Federal Union.”
The constitutions of British India were first given
their present inner character nearly a generation ago (1917) when Montagu
announced responsible government as their goal. The Chamber of Princes started
about that date. What has it done these 30 years? The Princes have made it a
fashion, when asked to reform their Durbars, to deliver primitive platitudes in
Olympian accents. They have tried to silence the political hunger of their
subjects with promises of concession and improvement, and practice of ruthless
repression. They hope to hoodwink outside observers with camouflage
constitutions and frightening caveats about rights of sovereignty. The recent
speech of the Ruler of Kashmir is a case in point. How is Pandit Nehru a
foreigner to Kashmir when Sir N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar was not? Is closing the
gates against a citizen of India, as if he were a foreigner, in consonance with
that State’s anxiety to be a part of the All-Indian Union? It is no use blaming
our Princes. Their advisers have been such. The Chamber of Princes has been
specializing in the art of issuing long winded communiques breathing Pickwickian
solemnity about the vaporous confabulations of its many committees. It
furnishes no ground for the hope that it will be instrumental in bringing about
democratic reforms in the States. The task is one both important and difficult;
and it needs the services of a special agency like the Committee above
suggested.
34. The Political Department is verily the Factory
of Fate for our States. It works so secretly and so unpredictably. Sheltered
from public inspection and not liable to be questioned in Council for Assembly,
it is a law unto itself. Only those who have a first-hand acquaintance with the
inward conditions of the States can form an idea of the sinister workings its
Residents and Agents. It should surprise nobody if some among them, seeing that
the days of imperialist rule are numbered, try their hidden hand at causing the
postponement of its last day and so prolonging their own stay and in the
meanwhile using present opportunities to do themselves well. They see in the
medievalism and the fear complex of the Princes a prop for the Empire and a
milch cow for themselves. What has the Political Department done to modernize
the administrations in the States? During recent years, the Department has come
to be suspected of manipulating the Durbars for anti-national and
anti-democratic ends. It is also being saddled with responsibility for the
pitchforking of Ex-Officers of the Government of India, both European and
Indian, as Dewans and Ministers in many Indian States. If the Cabinet Mission’s
policy is meant in seriousness, one of the first things to be done should be to
stop the foisting of the Government of India’s prize boys into the States as
administrators and advisers. A Government organization like the Political
Department, working in the dark and inaccessible to democratic control, is
bound to prove a breeding ground for corruption and demoralization of many
kinds. It is a poignant anachronism in the context of the year 1946. Even
though the exit of Paramountcy may have to await the birth of the Union
Constitution, not a day’s reprieve need be granted to the Political Department.
It should as an independent Department be closed down forthwith; and its staff
should be converted into a Secretariat for the States’ Advisory Committee above
suggested.
35. A Provisional National Government is the most
imperative need of the moment, –to prepare, during the interim period, for the
faithful transference of power from the old to the new regime, to take
charge of the nation’s resources and develop them in the meantime, and to help
towards the smooth progress of the work of the Constituent Assembly. How is it
to be formed, after the failure of the Cabinet Mission in that effort? The
shape of the Interim Government should, as far as possible, be a foreshadowing
of the features of that which is desired under the new constitution. If so, the
choice of Ministers for the Cabinet would have to be left in the hands of the
person called upon and agreeing to be the Prime Minister. That would be the
normal practice under responsible government. But our present case is peculiar;
and the Viceroy has to shoulder the responsibility. It would have been well if
the Mission had taken at least the latter stand during the parleys, therein
indicating the limits of the freedom allowable to the rival parties. In the
worsened circumstances of today, a different technique should be looked for;
and one suggestion is that the Constituent assembly, if it comes into being,
may be asked to help the Viceroy. This seems a reasonable way out of the impasse;
and there can be nothing to say against it. Going to the Constituent
Assembly for material for a Ministry is certainly to go nearer to the country
than going to the Working Committees of the Congress and the League. Further,
the Assembly will contain representatives not only of the two organizations,
but also of other elements in the life of the country. Why should not the
Assembly be called in to serve as arbitrator? The essential condition however
is that it should vote as a single common-purposed body and not in separate
communal blocs. Luckily there is ready to hand a formula1 of party
ratios accepted by both Congress and League. The only point for reference to
the Assembly is the one on which the Cabinet Mission’s effort broke down,
namely–the question of the Congress’s right to include a Muslim among its
nominees. If on this issue the arbitrament of the Constituent Assembly is not
to be taken as decisive, the cause must be given up as hopeless.2
36. Two reasons in particular, among so many, may
be mentioned which render the appointment of a Provisional National Government
imperative. One uncontemplated outcome of the Cabinet Mission’s softnesses and
wobblings is the encouragement, which forces of recalcitrance appear to have
derived. “Intransigence pays. If you want to gain your point, start trouble and
make all the trouble you could”–such seems to be the moral inferred. Ahmedabad,
Bombay, Madura, Poona and scores of other towns and cities are continuing scenes
of ugly communal demonstrations and threats of worse. And there have been
labour strikes–of kinds. This psychology of insurgence, so unwittingly
promoted, must be dealt with; and an atmosphere of peace and goodwill should be
created for the Constituent Assembly. A Coalition Government, in which the
leading parties are duly represented, can alone take measures needed for the
purpose. It must feel itself firm in office and must pursue a firm policy
towards the elements bent upon disturbance and mischief. Secondly, another
unintended result of the Mission’s announcement of the end of the present regime
is to quicken the “bird-of-passage” mentality in the European members of
the public services. They have now come to see definitely that their days in
this counter are numbered. It is said that when the Cabinet Mission interviewed
Provincial administrators,–soon after the Mission’s arrival in India,–some of
them spoke in terms suggestive of discouragement, exaggerating communalist
difficulties and doubting Indians’ ability to manage impartially and
effectively,–in a tone and spirit of speech reminiscent of that in which the
European bureaucrats of the last generation expressed themselves to Secretary
Montagu when he consulted them. Such being the natural psychology of foreigners
who are here as careerists, the present interregnum is to them the chance of a
lifetime. They must be more than human not to think of making hay while the sun
of a non-responsible regime shines. They can have no heart in their work here
any more. They live for the day and extort out of it all they can; because
tomorrow is not to be theirs. So the public administration is bound to suffer.
A Government made up of the Nation’s Representatives can alone mitigate the
evils of a ramping bureaucracy and hold power intact and unimpaired to be
handed over loyally to the new Government when it comes.
37. The members of the Cabinet Delegation will be
grievously in error to think that they have succeeded in dispelling the doubts
in India’s mind as to Britain’s bona fides. The vaguenesses in their
Documents on significant points of detail, the lacunae noticed therein and the
Mission’s vacillations in the handling of recalcitrant parties have invested
the whole enterprise with an air of uncertainty and risk. It is true the
Mission’s task was one of extraordinary difficulty and delicacy. It had to make
its moves with all possible cautiousness and tact. But in every great
undertaking of this kind, a stage is inevitably reached when all masks must be
cast aside and when the true and the just must be faced in all their fullness
and with all their exacting rigours. Such a moment of trial came to the Mission
more than once or twice. If only it had kept firm and frank in its fidelity to
the cause of India. One and Independent; it would have saved itself as well as
others from many false positions. After all, the decisive consideration
is–which among the parties is in a position to “deliver the goods.” After every
possible endeavour had been made to reach settlement by amicable methods, if at
last it came to the Mission’s having to make a choice between the Congress and
the League or the Princes as the immediate transferee of power, it should not
have cost the Mission much thought to arrive at the proper answer. At some
psychological moment in the parleys with the League, this reading of the
relative positions should have been made clear to it. That could not have
failed to produce a salutary effect. Even at the present stage, that
understanding of the position should guide the British Cabinet. There is urgent
need, as pointed out already, for a further State Paper to fill up the gaps in
the earlier ones and to help in their fair construction. That supplementary
state Paper should authorize the Constituent Assembly to interpret the basic
Documents in a liberal spirit, to take cognizance of all relevant matters not
specifically stated in those Documents, and to resolve all conflicts in
construction by agreed methods and in a manner not repugnant to the ideal of
India’s Unity and Independence.
38. The reports made by Lord Pethick-Lawrence to
the Lords and by Sir Stafford Cripps to the Commons on July 18 are a fair and
straightforward summary of the Cabinet Mission’s endeavours and the reactions
of the Indian political parties thereto, as well as of the Mission’s positive
achievements and hopes. Theirs was a historic mission; and in a manner fully
worthy of it have the three Ministers and the Viceroy carried it out. Their
steadfastness, their courageous perseverance and their patient study to
understand and conciliate are entitled to the warmest admiration and mark them
out as types of the high-minded statesmanship that is so essential for
re-establishing goodwill and peace in the world. Criticism passed on the
Cabinet Mission’s work is related rather to its technique than to the members’
motive or their earnestness. The speeches of Mr. Churchill and Mr. R. A. Butler
in the parliamentary debate on July 18 show the kind of difficulties created
and bequeathed to the Attlee Government and Lord Wavell by their predecessors
in authority. In closing the debate, Lord Pethick-Lawrence struck a moving note
of brother like trust. “I am going to put my confidence, faith and hope in the
Indian people doing the right thing,” he said; “I have confidence that we shall
gain the solid friendship of the people of that great country.” And Mr.
Alexander touched the target of international idealism when he said, in answer
to Mr. Churchill the Mischievous: –
“The British are not offering this independence and
freedom to India simply because India had done Britain a great military
service. We give it on the basis of its being our own birth-right in this
country and the birth-right we desire to see given to men and women in all
parts of the world.”
39. No one can quarrel with Lord Pethick-Lawrence
for affirming the binding character of the Document of May 16,–except of course
for such changes as are made in it by an agreed procedure: –
“The parties in India are at perfect liberty to
advance their own views as to what should or should not be the basis of the
future constitution….They can put forward their views as to how the Assembly
should conduct its business. But having regard to the statement of May 16, and
the Constituent Assembly elected in accordance with it, they cannot go outside
the terms of what has been agreed to. Th would not be fair to the other parties
who go in; and it is on the basis of that agreed procedure that the British
Government have said they will accept the conclusions of the Constituent
Assembly.”
It is the very foundation of all constitutions and parliaments that
certain rules of procedure and settlement should be accepted by all parties as
equally binding on all and as not to be questioned by any. Certain basic
documents and certain final authorities must be accepted by all without
reserve. In the absence of some such generally accepted means to reach
conclusions, all must end in chaos. It is proper that every party should regard
and honour the Document of May 16 as a Gentlemen’s Agreement. It is not proper
to be technical and legalistic in construing its phrases. The broad intention
and the general tenor alone should be the guiding factors. Patient reasoning
and persuasiveness in speech and manner should alone be the weapons used. Good
sense is always more than the letter of the law. Whatever happens, a new
All-Indian State must be helped to emerge. Whatever the defects left over to be
suffered, when once we have a new constitution under which we are the free
masters of our own affairs, we could find ways of rectifying them. Public
opinion will do all. Getting the new constitution is the thing; and keeping
together till then in the Constituent Assembly is the thing. In the British
Cabinet, decisions are not reached without differences and wrangles among the
Ministers. They are certainly not yes-men, though of one party. They sometimes
behave like a “rather disorderly board of directors.” But they do not break
before a settlement is reached, and that a settlement which no Minister would
afterwards disown. It is said that at the end of the Cabinet which agreed to
propose a fixed duty on corn, Lord Melbourne put his back to the door and
said,–“Now, is it to lower the price of corn, or isn’t it? It is not much
matter which we say, but mind, we must all say the same.” This story
illustrates the spirit needed for working together. Living together and working
together are a mode of self-discipline. That is one of the moral gifts of
democracy.
40. Will the Constituent Assembly meet? Will it not
bust up on the way? Will it see the job through? Let the gods and the saints of
India answer. No mere mortal may.
Postscript:
Is the Muslim League out to wreck the Cabinet
Mission’s scheme? Its Council, on July 28 (Bombay), resolved to withdraw its
acceptance of the proposals for both the Constituent Assembly and the Interim
Government, and also to launch “direct action”,–“as and when necessary”,–to
achieve Pakistan. This reversal of attitude by the League has come on the top
of an outburst of verbal rowdyism and bluster aimed at the Cabinet Mission, the
Viceroy, the Congress and all else. We should, however, take it all as no more
than the natural reaction of one feeling jilted after prolonged and persistent
wooing. There was additional provocation, too,–it must be admitted,–in the
ill-timed hectoring tone of the utterances of some Congress leaders. Premature
challenging and unseasonable loudnesses of tone always lead to a re-opening of
trouble. Maulana Azad, who as President was responsible for bringing about the
Congress’s acceptance of the Constituent Assembly plan, has come forward
promptly and with characteristic directness of speech to correct the
misrepresentation made by the League. He has affirmed that the Congress has
accepted the Cabinet Mission’s long-term plan of May 16 with all its
implications; that it has not by any means repudiated (as alleged by the
League) the fundamental features of that plan; and that it intends to work it
faithfully. Pandit Jawaharlal has also offered a similar explanation. There is
thus no room left for the League’s ostensible grievance that the Congress will
not play the game according to rules meant for both parties. On the other side, the Sikhs seem to be in a
less refractory mood of late; and their coming in will be an invaluable
accession of both strength and authority to the Constituent Assembly. An Indian
proverb speaks of what a feat it is to make frogs settle down in a scale-pan
for weighing. Let us trust the British Government will not take the frog-like
erraticities of disappointed parties too tragically and will proceed undismayed
with setting up both the Provisional Government and the Constituent Assembly.
More than both the Congress and the League is the country; and it is prepared to
support both plans if the Government would go ahead. It is Britain’s courage
that is under trial now.
* A delegation of the British Cabinet consisting of (1) Lord Pethick
–Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, (2) Sir Stafford Cripps, President of
the Board of Trade, and (3)Mr. A. V. Alexander
, First Lord of the Admiralty, arrived in India on the 23rd
of March, 1946, to negotiate, in collaboration with the Viceroy Lord Warrel, a
settlement of India’s political problem, holding consultations with the leaders
of Indian opinion. The Delegation left India on the 29th of June
1946.
* The Hindu (Madras) of June 12, 1946.
1 Congress including a
Harijan 6, M. League 5, Sikh 1, Parsi 1, Christian 1 = Total 14.
2 The papers have
announced that the Viceroy has returned to the task of forming an Interim
Government. What his new formula is has not been announced to the public. On
guess is that the choice may be Province wise. This may be as good a device as
an other. Politics is a field in which it is possible to devise many different
contrivances, each as good or as bad as any other among them, for accomplishing
one and the same object. The only conditions now are (1) that the non-communal,
all-national organization should not be asked to agree to be treated as a communal
organization, and (2) that an actual majority should not be treated as though
it were a minority. Subject to these points of principle, any rough arrangement
may be accepted for the interim period.