DR.
NALINI PANT
Lecturer
in Political Science,
The
notion of individual self-interest began to figure in political theory in the
sixteenth century and reached its high watermark in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Spencer, though he came on the scene a little later,
belonged to the tradition of Bentham and Mill. His
own contribution to the creed was to give a biological flavour
to the theory of laissez-faire, and he discussed politics in terms of
survival and of science.
Like
a thorough-going individualist Spencer’s whole political philosophy was based
upon individual rights. The ultimate goal of human endeavours,
according to him, is to achieve self-satisfaction. He, however, differs from
the utilitarians in making the principle of happiness
“divinely ordained.” The utilitarians thought that it
could be created by the State, as it is achieved by agreeable sensations from
without. To Spencer happiness is something inward. It signifies a gratified
state of all the faculties.”1 The due exercise of human faculties is
a divine will, and it is man’s duty to fulfill divine will. The freedom to
exercise his faculties is, therefore, the innate right
of the individual. Nobody is allowed to infringe its sanctity–not even the
State.
Had
Spencer elaborated only his individualistic system and corollary–the system of
natural rights–he would have been the greatest exponent of individual freedom
and would have been more consistent. With his cult of the abstract individual
and of innate natural rights he combines his belief in the organic view of
society. The result is that throughout his writings he remains the exponent of
two contradictory systems of political thought. On the one hand, he is an
anarchic individualist whose sole concern is to safeguard natural rights of the
individual, and, on the other hand, he becomes an evolutionary sociologist to
whom community appears as an organism.
If
the ‘divine idea’ or ‘the greatest happiness’ can be achieved by the due
exercise of human faculties, freedom of action is the primary and supreme
natural right of the individual. But man who lives in
society, has to respect the right of others also. Therefore,
the second deduction from the divine idea of happiness is: “Every man has
freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not
the equal freedom of any other man.” 2 Freedom, thus conceived,
demands the least possible interference from the State. It is the ‘moral
sense,’ and not state-coercion, which infuses in man a conviction of the
equality of human rights.
All
other rights flow from the primary right of equal freedom. If the law of equal
freedom is divinely ordained, it is manifest that these rights can exist
independently of either social or legal recognition. They pertain to the laws
of life, sociological and biological. Society does not create them, but only
defends and defines them. Natural rights do not derive their warrant from law;
instead law derives its warrant from them.
In ‘Social Statics’ and ‘justice’
Spencer enumerates various natural rights. These are: the
right to life and liberty, the right to the use of natural media, the right to
free motion and locomotion, the right of free exchange and free contract, the
right of free industry, the right of free belief and worship and the right of
free speech and publication. In the domain of relative ethics, these rights are
limited by the exigencies of war and internal dissensions; for the preservation
of society sometimes requires the subordination of these rights.
The
most important right that Spencer discusses is the right to the use of natural
media–such as air, water, light and earth. Such natural media, however, cannot
be taken away from the common possession of the whole community. Spencer, the Individualist–paradoxical
though it may appear–therefore, suggests the common ownership of land. His
reasoning is like this: if one portion of the earth’s surface becomes the
possession of one and another portion of some one else, and if in this way the
whole of earth’s surface is apportioned, what would become of those who are
left out? Therefore, the lawful owner of earth’s surface is the society. But
then this right is important for self-realization also. How to reconcile these
two contradictory points? Spencer finds a way out. He cites Locke with approval
that the labour of one’s body turns a thing into
private possession. But if the land is owned by the society its consent is also
necessary. Spencer suggests that under the supreme ownership of the society, A,
B, C, and the rest might compete for a vacant farm; and one of them might take
a farm for a fixed number of years. All would be equally free to bid. In
‘Justice’ Spencer modifies a little his revolutionary ideas about the social
ownership of landed property and the supposed individual tenancy under it. He
still believes in it; but now he realises the utter
impossibility of turning this idea into practice, and thus finds a relative
justification in the existing system of rights of landed property.
Along
with the right of corporeal property, Spencer also discusses the right of
incorporeal property–such as the right of property in ideas, and the right of
property in character. These are earned like other property by labour.
The
right of property also includes in it the right of gift and bequest, but not
the right of entail. The case of property in the form of capital is different.
It can be bequeathed according to the testator’s will.
Spencer’s
plea for the equality of rights among individual includes in it the rights of
women as well. What is, however, revolutionary is his defence
of equal rights of children. He deprecates paternal coercion, and has an
aversion for the family as an institution for the organization of discipline.
In Social Statics he says that the rights of
children are co-extensive with those of adults, for they also have faculties to
develop. Practically also, its denial leads to various difficulties. For
example, it is difficult to ascertain the time when a child acquires manhood. Moreover,
if a child has no right, then infanticide is certainly not a crime. And if they
have the right to live, why not they have other rights as well?
What is the criterion of the line of demarcation Taking
in view all these factors “we must admit that the rights of
the youth and adult are co-extensive.” 3 Though against coercion,
Spencer still sees the need of education. But this need is only temporary, and
like other institutions, resulting from man not having achieved the social
state so far, it must in the end vanish.
In
‘Justice’ Spencer modifies his revolutionary assertion of the rights of
children. Now he no more speaks of the ‘rights of children,’ but uses a new
phrase instead–‘the rightful claims of the children,’ such ‘claims’ are for
food, clothing, shelter, etc.
In
The Man Versus the State Spencer attempts to demonstrate the existence
of natural rights by various methods. The customs of savage people like Korvana, Hottentots, the Dyaks
and others illustrate their existence. For example, they all had a sense of
private property over such articles as tools, etc. The reform of law from time
in conformity to some higher authority also justifies the existence of natural
rights–this authority is often nothing else than the authority of natural rights.
Again, the uniformity of rights leads to the same conclusion. The uniformity of
claims means that there are certain innate rights which no civilized State
likes to infringe. With the rise of regime of contract the tendency of
Government to meddle with individual claims has declined and natural rights are
restored. This, however, is not borne out by present day facts. With the
industrial and cultural growth, all the spheres of political and social life
are now being fairly co-ordinated by the all pervading
State activities.
Spencer’s
assumption that as civilization advances there would be more and more
conformity to natural rights gives an idea of the existence of natural rights
at the far end of the long process of culture. As laid down by Aristotle, it
seems quite correct to interpret the more developed by the less developed. This
view also fits with Spencer’s theory of evolution. What, however, is
incongruous is that at one place he justifies the existence of natural rights
by the customs of savage tribes and at the other place projects them in a ‘visioned future.’
The
greatest drawback of Spencer’s theory of natural rights lies in the way in
which they are turned into ethical rights. The renunciation of a part of
Individual freedom which is necessitated by the presence of society,
turns natural rights into ethical rights. Thus, “while positive element in the
right to carry on life-sustaining activities originates from the laws of life,
that negative element which gives ethical character to it, originates from the
conditions produced by social aggregation.”4 In fact, it is
the presence of society which gives positive element to the rights, and not the
abstract biological laws of life. Society makes men moral as Rousseau and
idealists believed. Moreover, the above assertion gives the impression that
Spencer has divided natural rights into two categories–(1) natural rights that
are independent of social life and are positive; (2) natural rights that are
social and therefore ethical, but negative. Now, which of these two are more
important? Spencer would prefer those which are Independent of social life, as
they are rights to carry on life-sustaining activities. But then it would mean
relegating social life to background, and this would be at variance with his
notion of ‘social equilibrium.’ This difficulty is also referable to the
contradiction which runs through the whole of Spencerian
philosophy, viz., the opposition between his individualistic theory based on
natural rights and the conception of society as an organism.
Again,
if the presence of society turns natural rights into ethical rights, it means
that now there are no natural rights. Such a conception would horrify Spencer,
for it is only on natural rights that he weaves his whole theory of individualism.
Another confusion arises due to
Spencer’s assertion that natural rights are pre-social rights and are,
therefore, devoid of social recognition. But if natural rights inhere in the
customs of primitive people, it means that they are products of society. Again,
if such a primary right as the right of property needs consent of the society,
how can it be called a pre-social right?
It
was perhaps in order to remove this discrepancy that Spencer used the device of
demarcating the ‘State’ from the ‘society’. Natural rights are, perhaps, not
precedent to the life of society, but they precede the State. What, however,
makes his exposition vague is his confusion in the use of the word ‘State’.
Spencer’s
theory of natural rights necessarily presupposes a contract. His conception of
social organic growth, however, would not permit the entrance of the idea of
contract. Yet, this conception enters into both Social Statics
and The Man Versus the State to limit the functions of the State.
Summing
up, we may say that in spite of his theory of social organism, Spencer’s
political teaching is exactly in line with Mill’s who was unaffected by the
conception of social organism.
Since
in Spencer’s political system, government cannot create any facilities for the
exercise of faculties, it follows that political rights do not exist.
Government is only a means for the protection of rights already existing, and
it employs various methods for their maintenance. In modern times, with the
growth of democracy people have come to possess a share in the political power
by the use of franchise. Such a share in the political power by citizens, which
is only a guarantee for the maintenance of natural rights, is mistakenly spoken
of as ‘rights’. The so-called political rights, such as the right to vote, are
thus not real rights.
Spencer,
who is such a strong supporter of co-extensive rights of women and children,
denies the equal use of political power by them. Yet, there is nothing
surprising in it, as he discards the concept of the political rights
altogether.
In
his enthusiasm to safeguard the individual from the freedom-destroying hands of
the State, Spencer not only reduces the functions of the State to the
protection of individual rights but even goes further and confers upon the
individual the revolutionary right ‘to ignore the State.’ He says: “If every
man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal
freedom of any other man, then he is free to drop connection with the State–to
relinquish its protection, and to refuse paying towards its support. It is
self-evident that in so behaving he in no way trenches upon the liberty of
others; for his position is a passive one, whilst passive he cannot become an
aggressor.” 5
The
‘right to ignore the State’ is the most revolutionary right that has ever been
propounded. Its exercise would lead mankind to perpetual anarchy–there is no
doubt about it. Spencer himself sensed this danger. Perhaps this is the reason
why, after propounding this doctrine in Social Statics,
he remained silent about it in his succeeding works. Even in Social Statics he says at the end of the chapter, “Let not any
be alarmed….at the promulgation of the foregoing doctrine….probably a long time
will elapse before the right to ignore the State will be generally admitted,
even in theory. It will be still longer before it receives legislative
recognition. And even then there will be plenty of checks upon the premature
exercise of it.”6
The
‘right to ignore the State’ thus becomes an ideal principle which can only be
used when mankind will have reached the stage of Utopian anarchy. Even then,
this right would be useless–as in such a regime there would be voluntary
organizations and no State coercion.
There
is one more discordant note. It is quite perplexing to note that after his
emphatic assertion that the ‘law of equal freedom’ is the highest authority,
and this right alone justifies the right of individual ‘to drop connection with
the State,’ he still yearns for this right to get legislative sanction.
“Administrative
nihilism” was the name given to Spencer’s political system by Huxley. This
phrase is the correct expression of his political ideas. Throughout his life he
remained an ‘administrative nihilist’ and it culminated in his famous chapter
in Social Statics–‘The Right to Ignore
the State.’ Spencer gave to the government and the legislator no work but the
safeguarding of natural boundaries and the protection of individual rights. He
would totally reject the view of Bosanquet who,
following Rousseau, conferred upon the legislator the great task of
interpreting at criticising the individual conduct.
Spencer’s
individual is an abstract individual. Barker says that his men ‘are men of
straight lines.’ His society becomes society of perfect and self-disciplined
men, and they need
No government. This
ideal, however, could only be achieved in a city of gods.
Spencer
never contemplated the possibility of an extension of economic security of the
regulation of education, sanitation, public health, etc., as a guarantee of
individual’s day-to-day liberty. Green was far more consistent in his view. He
took into account ordinary men of existing society–over-worked women and
children, labourers on the verge of starvation, and
“denizen of a London Yard with gin shops on the right hand and the left.”
Spencer’s law of equal freedom could be enjoyed when the State has
removed all these obstacles from the path.
Due
to his one-sided view of the individual, Spencer’s theory of rights also
remained one-sided. He does not believe in political rights. He may be
consistent in deprecating the Benthamite principle
that all rights are the creation of government, but when he says that even
after the State acts in the capacity of the protector of rights, still they
(rights) remain outside the sphere of the State he begins to show signs
of discrepancy. Green’s thesis is more logical. He admits that rights existed
prior to the State, but when these are co-ordinated
and adjusted by the State they proceed from the State, and the State has full
control over them.
In
spite of all these inconsistencies, Spencer’s political ideas are of great
value. There is a persistent note in his writings throughout, that the State
can function only through individuals, and that these individuals are no better
than average men. Therefore, all mystic worship of the ‘power’ should be
avoided. The watchwords of his philosophy are ‘individual initiative’ and
‘intelligent self-interest.’ His ideal is a community where there will be no
need of the police to enforce the natural rights, and where virtue will be
spontaneous and voluntary; where along “with a moral consciousness of the
claims of self and others, there comes an intellectual perception of them.”
7
1 Spencer,
Herbert: Social Statics, 1868, p. 9.
2 Spencer,
Herbert: Social Statics, 1868, p. 121.
3 Spencer,
Herbert: Social Statics, 1868, p. 195.
4 Spencer,
Herbert: The Man Versus the State, 1914, p. 81.
5 Spencer,
Herbert: Social Statics, 1868, p. 229.
6 Ibid.
p. 240.
7 Spencer,
Herbert: Justice: Being Part IV of the Principiles
of Ethics, 1891, p.119.