SOME APPLICATIONS OF ANANDA COOMARASWAMY’S
TRADITIONALISM
KENNETH R. STUNKEL, Ph.
D.
Professor
of History, Monmouth College,
West Long
Branch, New Jersey, U. S. A.
Ananda
Kentish Coomaraswamy is more a spiritual and intellectual anachronism in 1977
than he was at the time of his death in 1947. Although born and educated in
England and for most of his working life a resident of the United States, he nevertheless
presented the temperament and convictions of an outsider, for his alienation
from the western ethos was profound. With eloquent passion, always controlled
and precise, he denounced the vacuity and compulsive materialism so prevalent
in modern industrial societies, mourned the decline of tradition in craft and religion,
and scoffed at the notion, more or less institutionalized and sanctified in the
West, that economic success is the royal path to cultural greatness and
personal fulfilment. Many bright, well-educated people have squirmed restlessly
in the presence of Hindu Jeremiah’s uncompromising views, who believed that too
much gentlemanly toleration leads one to tolerate the intolerable.
Thus
he was often represented, and still is, as a naive reactionary, a man thrust
into the wrong historical era, a bitter misplaced person more suited to the
European or Indian middle ages, a stray spirit yearning inconsolably and
testily for hierarchical and absolute values. On these grounds alone it might have
been easy for the children of progress, secular individualism, and expanding
gross national product to ignore his troublesome existence, but the polemics
were accompanied by dazzling performances as a scholar and writer. Coomaraswamy
was able to beat most western intellectuals at their own game. As literary
stylist, lnguist, critic, erudite master of a dozen academic fields, trained
scientist (his doctorate was in geology), and pioneer of the comparative method
in art, aesthetics, philosophy, religion, and literature, he was quite
formidable. He was also entirely adept at playing the role of worldly wit and
sophisticate, but generally chose a more self-effacing demeanour as the
appropriate behaviour of a grown man with serious work to do. In the West,
where public success and renown count for so much, it was difficult to ignore
the range and quality of Coomaraswamy’s publications, which amounted to some
twenty books and five hundred articles and reviews. His reputation among
Occidentals, and many Asians educated in the West, was on the whole ambiguous
and uneasy. On the one hand he was respected and honoured for great
scholarship, while on the other he was, viewed with suspicion or open bewilderment
for his caustic assaults on modernism. Much has been done of late to keep
Coomaraswamy the scholar visible by publishing collected essays, critical
studies, and biographical portraits. As familiarity with his work grows, the
result can only be more lustre for his reputation. The purpose of this brief
essay is to explore the relevance of Coomaraswamy’s traditionalism and “archaism”
thirty years after his death. I am interested in this question: what does the
great “reactionary” have to teach us about the state of our world and the
meaning of our lives in the last quarter of the twentieth century? Naturally
what I have t to say is merely suggestive because of the high level of
generality, necessary in a short article, but those readers possessed of the
right frame of reference will have no insuperable problem with the four points
I wish to make.
In
way of introduction, the world is far more dangerous, insecure, and fragile
than it was in Coomaraswamy’s time. He was a contemporary of world wars,
revolutions, imperialism, and global economic depression. In addition to all
that, or the imminent threat thereof, we are contemporaries of the nuclear arms
race and nuclear proliferation, food and energy crises, global environmental
pollution, and a dramatic polarization of rich and poor nations in which the
former are getting richer while the latter get poorer. The secular, industrial
type of society Coomaraswamy excoriated with such distaste and moral indignation
has become even more ubiquitous, showing real promise of marching triumphantly
into the world’s few remaining enclaves of unspoiled religious and social
tradition. The signature of industrialised society–nationalism and pluralism
reinforced by science and technology, all perched on a base of machine industry–is
imprinting itself everywhere. The signature stands for power, economic gain,
worldly success, and material growth as the desirable goals of human life. As a
result, the master value and activity of the modern world is economics. As
Coomaraswamy notes, “modern civilization takes it for granted that people are
better off the more things they want and are able to get; its values are
quantitative and material.” In a feverish struggle for economic advantage,
peoples and nations increasingly guage their worth and significance in the
world by the standards of gross national product and military power. The image
of Japan, for example, both for the Japanese and others, has been shaped almost
entirely by its spectacular economic success in the past twenty years.
Americans celebrate their prosperity and technological skill as evidence of “greatness”
and hold themselves as a model for the rest of humanity. The Soviet Union takes
endless comfort in production figures and serried ranks of tanks and missiles.
Dozens of poor countries can hardly wait to acquire factories and modern
armaments as the symbols and substance of prestige and “progressiveness.” All
of this strikes me as a sorry spectacle filled with explosive peril.
Coomaraswamy had powerful insights as to what it all means on four related
conceptual levels: principle, universe of discourse, traditional society, and
freedom.
First,
if individuals or nations are governed by principle, they must stand above all
small-minded considerations of expedience, profit, or aggrandizement.
Coomaraswamy himself resembled ,the chun
tzu (higher man) of Confucius, who always put what is right above what
pays, a rock bottom definition of living by principle. Surely he was correct in
observing that differences between governments and cultures cannot be erased or
adjusted harmoniously by means of diplomacy, economic aid, and other such
technical devices if there is no common ground on matters of principle, for “there
is nothing in economic intimacies that is likely to reduce prejudice or promote
mutual understandings automatically. “Clearly if one profits from the misery or
enslavement of another, whether directly or indirectly, principle says an aware
person, or nation, must renounce the profit as immoral and undeserved. It is
not principle but profit that motivates Soviet Union and the United States to
sell arms to developing countries, arms which drain away capital needed for
schools and hospitals and which confirm the grip of tyrannical leaaers on their
impoverished peoples. To even a casual observer of the contemporary scene,
nothing is more evident than the cynicism and opportunism oozing through the
international system. National leaders pride themselves on being tough and “realistic,”
not principled. The pursuit of “national self-interest,” which nearly always
means security, power, and economic advantage, seldom implies what is right as
a categorical imperative. If there should on occasion be a convergence between
right and advantage, it is normally due to coincidence rather than design. If
nations were guided by even the most elementary moral principles, much human
anguish would be in danger of continuance; instead, the anguish persists and
thrives in the midst of lost opportunities to mitigate it.
But
the concept of principle entailed a good deal more for Coomaraswamy than moral
conscience and rectitude. He astutely pointed out that “what ‘the century of
the common man’ actually predicates is the century of the economic man, the
economically determined man whose best and worst are equally unprincipled–a man
who is far too common for our ends.” The ends referred are at once vocational,
social, and religious. Unlike the handicraft industries of traditional
societies, work commonly provided industrial societies is bereft of
satisfactions that come from joining practical use with a strong awareness of
the non-material role of an object or service in the social order and in the
context of definite religio-philosophical or mythical ideas. The ritual setting
of traditional handicraft labour sets off reverberations that transcend physical
acts and products. Coomaraswamy maintained that without such reverberations
there can be no real pride, dignity, or spiritual meaning in work, only a more
or less satisfactory material return. Work naked of meaning beyond the profit
it brings is work devoid of principle. In a principled society there is
principled labour, which means that social and economic organization encourage
spiritual and moral growth in the act of securing and distributing the
necessities of life. No one is reduced to the primitive state of “making sure
of mere existence,” a state equally applicable to assembly line workers and the
executive who rules over them. The ultimate principle for Coomaraswamy is, of
course, religious and metaphysical: the nameless Self underlying all existence.
Hence the ideal culture or civilization is one whose social structure and
mundane activities derive from “a constant intuition of the unity of all life,
and the instinctive and ineradicable conviction that the recognition of this
unity is the highest good and the uttermost freedom.” Clearly a society based
on such a principle would be readily distinguishable in form, function, and
style from the industrial type obsessed with production, consumption, and a “high
standard of living,” which nearly always means financial power to command more
goods and services. It is this insatiable appetite for the externals of life,
even in countries of unparalleled affluence like America, that prompts
Coomaraswamy to say that “our boasted standard of living is qualitatively
beneath contempt.” Coomaraswamy believed the strength of Indian civilization,
despite its lamentable fissures, decaying tradition, and veneer of
modernization, to lie in its possession of “a definite view (definite whether
right or wrong) of the meaning and purpose of life,” while the weakness of
industrial civilization is its chaos of competing views loosely strung together
on the thread of economic activity.
Coomaraswamy
thought the philosophia perennis had
found its best social expression in traditional Indian civilization. Did he also
believe that principle, manifested to the highest degree in the philosophia perennis, could be restored
to the West, or rather to industrial society, by returning to the arrangements
of earlier times, or by consciously borrowing from oriental or other sources?
He made himself abundantly clear on this crucial point, about which there has
been serious misunderstanding: “How can this world be given back its meaning?
Not, of course, by a return to the outward forms of the Middle Ages nor, on the
other hand, by assimilation to any surviving, Oriental or other, pattern of life.
But why not by a recognition of the principles on which the patterns were
based?” Indeed, “everyone must make use of the forms appropriate to his own
psychophysical constitution,” and “I do not suggest that the ancient Indian
solutions of the Indian problems, though its lessons may be many and valuable,
can be directly applied to modern conditions.” So much for the canard that
Coomaraswamy was an archaist, unless one insits that only the latest ideas in
history are relevant to the human condition in this century, a rather parochial
outlook at best.
Second,
Coomaraswamy illustrated in his work a style of learning, actually one pursued on
principle, sorely needed in our information glutted world. I have in mind a
mode of inquiry set in a spacious, elevated universe of discourse. The many
fields of knowledge that yielded to his persistent discipline were always
manifested in a spirit of synthesis when he reflected and wrote. Moreover, his
skill in unifying and coordinating knowledge was subordinated to lofty
purposes. Coomaraswamy would ask the bold, sweeping question, and then pursue
his answer from an unashamedly normative posture, consciously eschewing the
fashionable western notion that in truly objective researches there is no place
for value. The overwhelming scholarly detail in his studies of Indian art is
inseparable from his judgment about the meaning of that art and its quality.
The greatness of Indian art is not to be found in historical accidents of style
but in its organic association with a magnificent and coherent religious
tradition. Genuine art is created ritually as a symbolic reminder of spiritual
purport beyond the objects themselves and is never intended solely for
amusement, decoration, or pleasurable distraction. One can deduce from this
judgment Coomaraswamy’s indifference to much that goes under the rubric “modern
art.” Similarly in philosophy, it is not enough to play the intellectual
taxonomist who is satisfied to classify and analyze beliefs. One must ask what
is worth believing. If a philosopher
never wrestles with that question; the game is not worth the candle.
Coomaraswamy’s
broad, inclusive, value-oriented style of inquiry is a perfect antidote for the
swollen, diseased state of contemporary knowledge. Mankind is awash in books,
articles, journals, and esoteric academic fields. Traditional fields of study
like history and philosophy have splintered into ever smaller parts, each
fragment presided over by a coterie of “experts.” Ph. D.’s swarm from the
universities, each clutching a hair or two from the bloated carcass of
knowledge. As the facts and microscopic studies heap up around us, the general
perspective of inquiry narrows to a pinhole. Most academic specialists do not seem
to realize that they are part of an industry,
grinding out bits and pieces to be thrown on a chaotic pile without design
or meaning. It is assumed that all knowledge, however trivial, is of value, and
that knowledge sought for its own sake has an air of nobility hovering about
it. It is precisely these rudderless, anarchic assumptions that render the
thriving knowledge industry of our time virtually useless, for hardly anyone knows
what we know much less how it can be applied to the service of urgent human
ends, such as the elaboration of a global value system capable of taming the
furious destructiveness of the modern world. More than ever, in Coomaraswamy’s
words, “we need mediators to whom the common universe of discourse is still a
reality, men of a sort that is rarely bred in public schools or trained in
modern universities,” men who can provide us “with the necessary basis for
communication, understanding and, agreement, and so for effective cooperation
in the application of commonly recognized spiritual values to the solution of
contingent problems of organization and conduct.” It remains for the knowledge
explosion to be translated into a semblance of wisdom relevant to human needs,
but at least we have Coomaraswamy’s forceful example before us.
Third,
Coomaraswamy’s distrust of industrial civilization is more widely shared today
than he might have thought possible. For him the crime of industrialism is its
annihilation of traditional life, for “we have destroyed the vocational and
artistic foundations of whatever traditional cultures our touch has infected.”
That species of destruction is still thriving as so-called “backward” societies
continue to vanish under the advancing edge of industrial civilization.
Hundreds of unique ways of life have disappeared in the past century,
irreversibly degrading mankind’s once varied tapestry of cultural heritages.
The key is a people’s language. Once that drops from sight under foreign
influences, a culture’s literature (oral or written), religion, and art quickly
follow.
Now
this indictment of industrial society can be extended to other types of
desolation. The nuclear arms race is an invention of competitive industrial
societies, which preserve their “national security” by threatening the health,
lives and patrimony of present and future generations. Prodded by the example
of the great powers, small, new nations regard a military establishment as the sine qua non of respectability. The
growing militarization of the world economy is a wasteful and sinister
phenomenon that can be laid chiefly at the doorstep of the big
industrial-military states. In addition to arsenals of deadly weapons, the
industrial world has blessed mankind with global environmental pollution that
is unravelling chemical and biological relationships essential to the
well-being of higher forms of life. Over billions of years evolutionary process
created ever higher levels of order, diversity, and interdependence between living
creatures and their environments. There is
strong evidence that industrial civilization, in a shocking fraction of the
time, is reversing and undermining the creative tendencies of evolution with
its prodigious wastes and environmental depredations. The great agricultural
civilizations of the past–Egypt, China, India and Medieval Europe–were
ecologically benign, for their use of land and resources did not, compared with
industrial civilization, endanger fundamentally the material legacy of
succeeding generations. On top of this one must also note the unbelievable
appetite of industrial societies for energy and nonrenewable resources. Unlike
agricultural societies, which are self-regulating in the sense of drawing their
primary energy from the photosynthesis of green plants, industrial societies
are sustained by the parasitic use of fossil fuels, a fixed, exhaustible source
of energy whose combustion returns dangerous wastes to the atmosphere that were
withdrawn and locked up when the fuels were created from dead plants in the
evolutionary history of the earth. The waste and extravagance of the larger
industrial societies has already plundered the energy and resource subsidy of
future generations. Thus the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, with
about sixteen per cent of the world’s people, consume about sixty per cent of
the world’s available energy and resources each year, while some thirty
industrial states, with thirty per cent of the world’s people, require
eighty-five per cent of the world’s resources to enjoy “the good life.” Here is
a clue to the etiology of poverty and underdevelopment in our time, which can only
grow more severe as the rich insist on getting richer, And western “prosperity,”
its meaning and cost, draws sharply into focus. Industrial states have used
more energy and other resources for wars and consumer goods than have been used
by all of mankind in its entire history. When the industrial roman candle has
burned out, there may be no means left to ignite gentler, steadier, longer
burning flames. Thus Coomaraswamy was not merely ranting when he characterized
industrial society as a paradigm of “disorder, uncertainty, sentimentality and despair.”
He was far closer to the truth than he was in a position to know. In the longer
perspective of evolution and human history, industrial civilization has all the
symptoms of being abnormal, a social and economic cancer inimical to the long-range
interests of the human species.
Fourth,
Coomaraswamy recognized that political, economic, and social freedom have their
limitations. This is a delicate point, especially at an historical juncture
when “liberty” is often proclaimed the supreme end of human life. For him the
choice is not between egalitarian individualism on the one hand and
authoritarian regimentation on the other, but rather between a type of
political, economic and social order that promotes spiritual self-realization
and one that does not. There are historical examples of social systems founded
on a principle of status without sacrificing the principles of dignity,
humaneness and meaningful vocation. The Confucian system of China, at its best,
was a status oriented society in which the highest human ideal was sageliness within
and kingliness without. The Brahmanical-Hindu system of India, at its best,
with its balanced ideal of the four ends of life–material sustenance, 0sensual
gratification, ethical observance, and spiritual release–understood status to
reflect not arbitrary advantage but the authentic needs and potentialities of
men and women at different stages of ethical and spiritual development. The
aims of industrial societies, whether communist, capitalist, or “mixed,” are
dominated by economic and material considerations. In communist societies the
material basis of life is everything, in capitalist societies it is
supplemented by the ideal of individual liberty, which means being able to do
as one pleases within defined social limits. Let us concede that materialism
with freedom is preferable to materialism without it, and then ask how the former
is lacking.
The
freedom of the industrial democracies has included perfect liberty to squander
irreplaceable resources and to devastate the natural environment. It is
doubtful that mankind can long afford or endure that kind of liberty. The
excesses of industrial civilization are partly a consequence of irresponsible,
un-disciplined freedom. A second weakness is the notion that freedom is end in
itself. Whether it is used for noble or vulgar ends is considered a matter of
personal taste and inclination about which there can be no decisive argument.
Thus freedom joins hands with relativism a union described by Coomaraswamy as a
“desire to do and think what we like more than a freedom error.” If we do not
recognize that “human individuality is not an end but only a means” to ethical
and spiritual transformation, it is more likely than not to be used for trivial
and destructive purposes. A third flaw is that western notions of freedom
weaken individual ties with the past and the future. The free floating human
atom of the industrial democracies has a minimal allegiance to tradition and
custom and feels virtually no obligation to future generations. In traditional
societies regulated by status and ritual, links with past and future are deep
and strong, a point often stressed by Coomaraswamy. A fourth weakness is the
cult of personality, the worship of ephemeral self-hood, which has reached
something of an apotheosis in the United States through the influence of
movies, television, and the popular press. How Coomaraswamy detested the
celebrity syndrome with its assumption that all value comes from the gifted
individual. In opposition to this view he maintained that everything of value
has already been done and said. There is no place for the “original” mind. Our
task is to recollect and apply fundamental truths and insights long shared by
the world’s great cultural traditions. It is in this context that he says: “We
write from a strictly orthodox point of view...endeavouring to speak with
mathematical precision, but never employing words of our own, or making any
affirmations for which authority could not be cited by chapter and verse.” The
passage bridges western and eastern modes of analysis, but repudiates the
freedom to think what one likes. The vast erudition and universal sympathies of
Coomaraswamy were not ornaments of the liberated intellectual but the selfless
voice of tradition speaking through its unassuming servant.
“I
had been a student of Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy’s writings for many years and had
the great pleasure of meeting him at Boston in 1946. Among those who are responsible
not only for the Indian Renaissance but for a new Renaissance in the world Dr.
Coomaraswamy holds a preeminent position. It is my hope that students who are
now led away by the passing fashions of our age will turn to his writings for a
proper orientation.”
–Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNA