NIKITA
SERGEYEVICH KHRUSHCHEV:
THE
ROAD TO POWER
The
task of the biographers of Soviet leaders is often similar in a way to that of
archaeological researchers. Soviet public life is absolutely
depersonalised in the sense that the private life of
public figures is taboo. According to Marxist principles subjective and personal
aspects are of no consequence. None of Stalin’s
marriages, for instance, were ever reported in the
In
the
In
this strangely depersonalised and dehumanised
world men start to be visible when, and as far as, they act out their public
functions. Hence the Khrushchev-story has to begin with his “Party-birth”, with
the time when he was chosen to become a member of Stalin’s apparatus. From then
on there is increasingly more circumstantial material, and later more and more
direct evidence, for tracing the development of this almost anthropologically
different human species–the Communist apparatchik.
As
an apparatchik makes his way to the higher rungs of the hierarchical
ladder, there is increasingly more direct documentary evidence on his actions
and general behaviour.
Khrushchev’s rise in the hierarchy had been
uncommonly, unbelievably swift. He was then forty years old but as to the
all-important “Party-age” he was much younger. He had joined the party only in
1918, when he was twenty-four, and had stepped on to the lowest rung of the
hierarchical ladder of the party apparatus as late as 1925, when thirty-one
years old. In 1934 he reached the uppermost region of Soviet power by becoming
first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. On the anniversary of the
revolution he stood there on the top of the Lenin Mausoleum in
Khrushchev represented a new type among the Soviet leaders. He was entirely a product of Stalin’s apparatus. Although only four years younger than Molotov and roughly of the same generation as many of the “old” Bolsheviks who took part in the conspiratory struggles before the revolution, Khrushchev was, not one of the fathers but, a child of the Bolshevik revolution.
The fathers of the revolution, Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and the others, were European revolutionary intellectuals, shaped by the revolutionary heritage of the nineteenth century. They are fully comprehensible even to people unfamiliar with the Soviet system. Stalin’s personality was already shaped partly by the party monolith created by Lenin and perfected by himself. Yet large regions of Stalin’s personality are immediately comprehensible to the external world. Khrushchev, who was a semi-literate peasant worker and an adult when he joined the party, had nothing of intellectual-emotional background of the fathers of the revolution. He learnt to think from the party and knew no other system than the Soviet one. His personality is just as enigmatic as the Soviet world. Khrushchev, the functionary, grew up together with the party apparatus. His personality is only comprehensible through the story of his incredibly dangerous climb up the ladder of Communist hierarchy.
Khrushchev, as a member of the Communist Party, did not belong to the class of intellectuals who had the interest and the will-power to go on reading and learning. He was certainly not of this type. The cultured intellectual, after embracing Marxism, had to relinquish, often through a very painful process, his old habit of thinking, discussing and arguing. The possibility that the opponent of Marxism can be right in the least little detail is firmly excluded. A Marxist must be immune to outside argument. Marxism, as the supreme science of human society, and Marxist dialectics, the method for every science, are infallible. And Krushchev, an uneducated and a roughly-going man, had no intellectual habits to give up. His complete acceptance of Marxist theory was not hindered by a previous cultural background. He knew no science, no other system of thought, no other philosophy, to other economic theory but the Marxist one.
The Marxists whom Khrushchev met were immensely sure of themselves. They could, according to his impression, calmly and simply refute and annihilate any counter-arguments. For a really good Marxist the world with all its puzzles is not a terribly complicated, incalculable and unknowable thing, but something easy to understand and explain.
Thoughts are simple tools if you are taught how to use them. And if you have learnt thinking (that is: Marxism), then it is of little importance how cultured you are. Marxism teaches you what makes the human world and the world of nature tick. Marxism gives the simple worker immense superiority over the confused intellectuals, over the aristocrats and millionaires of the mind. The revolution gives all this intellectual superiority to the workers. Lenin’s remark that Marxist theory is a terribly strong weapon is quite correct.
Khrushchev
and his fellow-students learnt in party schools and Rabfaks
that the stars in heaven, the Sun, the earth, all life on the earth, every
activity is governed by scientific laws. These are like the laws ordered by the
Tsar or by the police except that they are stronger laws, because no human
beings, no armies, nothing can change them. What these scientific laws ordain
is inevitable. It happens whether we like it or not.
Khrushchev
was to learn words and sentences explaining the scientific laws, by heart. He
was to learn by heart: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their
consciousness.” He was also to cram: “The activity of the Bolshevik Party must
not be based on the good wishes of ‘outstanding individuals’, not on the
dictates of ‘reason’, ‘universal morals’ etc., but on the laws
of development of society and on the study of these laws.” He
was told, during his training in party schools, that the real meaning of
democracy is dictatorship.
“Democracy
is a state which recognises the subordination of the
minority to the majority, i.e., an organisation for
the systematic use of violence by one class against the other, by one section
of the population against the other.” l
And again:
“Soviet
Socialist Democratism does not in any way contradict
one-man management and dictatorship; the will of the class is sometimes given
effect to by a dictator who sometimes does more alone and often is more
necessary.” 2
Thus
Khrushchev learnt with utmost sincerity all those lessons which were thought
necessary by the Communist Party to make him a staunch die-hard comrade.
In
various speeches Khrushchev often mentioned how hard he strove at the Rabfak to master the sciences. He certainly
must have excelled in learning Marxism and in behaving as a loyal
party-man, because barely a year after his entering the school, the Yuzovka City Party Committee sent his name to the Rabfak Party Committee as the comrade who should be
elected Party Secretary. The Vydvizhenets–“one
who pushed himself forward”–was now pushed forward by his superiors in the
party apparatus. The Rabfak had several party
cells. Khrushchev became the superior of all the cell-secretaries–in fact the
most important man in the Rabfak, in real
influence outranking even the dictator of the school and all the teaching
staff. He became the representative and the watch-dog of the party over the
entire school, over all the teachers and students.
After
finishing the workers’ faculty N. S. Khrushchev was in leading party-work in
the Donbass and then in
In
January 1938 Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the
After
the war the political situation in the
From
December 1949 until Stalin’s death in 1953 Khrushchev worked in daily contact
with Stalin. On the latter’s 70th birthday Khrushchev wrote a pamphlet praising
Stalin’s genius. It was published in
The
day Stalin died Khrushchev was a member of the Presidium and one of the
secretaries of the Central Committee. He was ranked as Number
Five in the leadership. He became the actual head of the
apparatus on March 14, when Malenkov had to relinquish
his first secretaryship. This was the outcome of the
struggle for power among all the leaders. Khrushchev himself had comparatively
little to do with it. He was rightly placed. He had a very long past in the
apparatus. He had been continuously a member of the Central Committee for the
past nineteen years and of the Politbureau or
Presidium for the past fourteen. The fact that he had the party apparatus in
his hand made it possible for him to exploit the further intrigues between the
rivals for accession, and to use the enormous power of the apparatus in order
to achieve his official accession to the first secretaryship.
This rank was as yet not spelled with capital letters. It was his own doing,
however, that he soon became the First Secretary and the
dictator of the
Khrushchev
became Prime Minister of the
Khrushchev,
like many others, had a deep-rooted hatred for Stalin and for those who had an
unshakable faith in Stalin’s policies although he (Khrushchev) worked with
Stalin and praised him during the latter’s regime. Perhaps, it was for tactical
purposes. But after the death of Stalin anti-Stalin feelings grew steadily
in force and scope in
But
on the 25th February, 1956 Khrushchev delivered a long speech making an
all-round exposure of Stalin’s mass-murders. He said:
“Stalin
originated the concept “enemy of the people”. This term automatically rendered
it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a
controversy be proven: this term made possible the use of the most cruel
repression, violating all forms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who
in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of
hostile intent, against those who had had reputations. This concept “enemy of
the people”, actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological
fight or the making of one’s views known on this or that issue, even those of a
practical character”….…
This
led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality, and to the fact that many
entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the party line, became
victims. We must assert that in regard to those persons who in their time had
opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for
their physical annihilation. The formula “enemy of the people” was specifically
introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.”
Although
this speech was delivered by Khrushchev, he was not very happy with the
contents of the speech. In fact, he was forced by Mikoyan, Malenkov and their
associates to present it. They thought that by this act Khrushchev
would make it impossible for himself ever to aspire
again to one-man dictatorship. But Khrushchev did everything with his
insertions to show that he had nothing to do with the murder cases and that
Stalin was exclusively responsible for them.
Also, in making the official exposure of Stalin,
Khrushchev had a chance to blacken his enemies as Stalinist and award the halo
of anti-Stalinism to his adherents and to those of his rivals whom it was
expedient at the moment to placate. Consequently, he took great pains in his
last minute insertions to show, to prove, to announce, that Malenkov
was the evil spirit and alter-ego of Stalin during the war, in fabricating the
The
theses of the speech are:
1.
Marxist-Leninist refutations of ideological pretexts for one-man dictatorship,
for terror and mass repression. Hence the thesis is refuted that “as we march
forward towards socialism, class-war must allegedly
sharpen.” The “enemy of the people” concept is sharply denounced.
2.
Proofs that according to Marxist theory and Lenin’s practice ultimate power
rests in the Party Congress and the Central Committee plenum. “There was no
matter so important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice
and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of the members
of the Politbureau.”
3.
That without democratic majority rule in the Central Committee and the
Presidium, and without Socialist legality, there is no defence
against “the willfulness of individuals abusing their power.”
It
is quite evident from the above theses that Khrushchev is against the concept
of one-man dictatorship. Also, he believes that majority principle, to decide
policies in the party meetings, should be adopted. Further, he insists that war
is not inevitable to defeat capitalism. He, in his television interview to the
Columbia Broadcasting System on June 2, 1957, stated: “With regard to the
ideology of capitalist and socialist countries, we have never concealed that
there will be a struggle in this field, an ideological struggle……Some people
reproach me for allegedly changing my point of view, since I once said that if
an atomic war came about it would be capitalism that would perish in that war.
This I repeat today. But we think that capitalism should be destroyed
not by means of war…..but through an ideological and economic struggle……” Thus
Khrushchev appears as a revisionist of the old Marxist- Leninist theses.
Keeping
in view his policy of peace, he placed a programme of seven-year plan before
the Twenty-first Party Congress at the end of January, 1959 for the building up
of communism, which was finally approved by the Congress. His theses and report
on the seven-year plan described its main tasks as follows:
1.
the creation of the material and technical basis of
communism;
2.
the full satisfaction of the material and cultural
needs of the Soviet people;
3.
the consolidation of the economic and defence power of the
4.
ensuring the victory of the
The
seven-year plan was the most important campaign in the Kremlin struggle for
world supremacy, but through peaceful competition. Khrushchev claimed that
“If
we calculate per head of the population, another five years will probably be
needed after the fulfilment of the seven-year plan to
catch up and outstrip the
Khrushchev
pointed out that in this peaceful competition the
Two
other important political factors are:
1.
The plan “will raise to an unparalleled degree the force of attraction of
communist ideas,” especially in the less developed countries of the world.
2.
The economic progress of the entire Socialist camp, including
The
Congress heard also something of the difficulties in the way towards victory. Aristov, one of the most powerful leaders under Khrushchev,
referred to the heavy demands that are to be made on the Soviet engineering
industry during the next seven years. He said that some engineering works were
already overloaded and still had to deal with aid commitments to
Khrushchev
spoke about ideological dangers:
“Some
workers under-estimate the harm of bourgeois influences upon Soviet youth,
thinking that the bourgeoisie is far from us, and that our youth is beyond its
reach. But this is an error. We cannot ignore the possibility of bourgeois
influence and are obliged to wage a struggle against it, against the
penetration of alien views and morals among Soviet people and particularly among
the young.”
Speaking
about the transition to communism (“to each according to his needs”) Khrushchev
emphasised that this can be attained only when there
is “an abundance of goods”. But the satisfaction of the material and cultural
needs of the people does not mean the satisfaction of “whims” or “luxuries” as
in the capitalist countries.
His
thesis on the transition to communism contained a very severe attack on the Mao
and the Chinese leadership. He did not name them, but Mao is
unmistakably one of the “comrades” whom he accused of inflicting damage on the
building of communism and of having distorted and compromised the communist
cause.
Khrushchev
is a man of the atomic age, and he is quite aware of the consequences of the
thermonuclear war. That is why he tries to base his theory, policy and action
on the real situation of the present world and not on dogmatic generalisations based on the situation in the last century.
He fully understands that nuclear warfare by its very nature is exceedingly
dangerous, particularly for dictatorships. If A– or H– bombs were dropped on
the principal cities of the Soviet and Satellite Empire, thereby cutting off or
annihilating central direction of the organs of repression, MVD, KGB, police,
etc., popular revolts could break out everywhere. All his experience since
Stalin’s death has shown to Khrushchev and the apparatus that populations,
armies, students, workers, even communists “are not to be trusted”. Wherever
the system of oppression appeared to be weakened, small and large-scale revolts
followed. The general disorder and disorganisation
following a nuclear attack would not turn the British or American population
against their regimes. “Nuclear war would entail for the free world many
dangers, but not the danger of revolts again the British or American “systems”.
In Soviet Russia the regime itself would be in the greatest of dangers.” A
regime, which in the last analysis depends on the party apparatus (less than
half a per cent of the population) and its secret police–cannot risk breaks in
the “monolithic unity” and strength of the entire machinery of oppression.
Further,
he knows that his country has not yet got over the after-effects of the Stalin
era and of the II World War. A third war could dangerously reduce the
proportion of Russians within the USSR to that of the non-Russian majority of
the inhabitants. And a third atomic war could annihilate the total population
of the USSR. Rebutting the view that the recent events in the Caribbean were a
victory for the United States, Mr. Khrushchev said on the 7th November, 1962,
4 after a sombre
passage wherein he told his listeners how close the world had been to a
thermonuclear war, that there was only one victor–reason, What is needed,
according to him, in regulation of international disputes a flexibility.
Thus
Khrushchev’s regime stands for many bloodless successes in the international
arena through a policy of compromise and mutual concessions and many
achievements on the home front by permitting a far higher living standard and a
far easier and safer political climate for the average citizen.
Khrushchev
was and is a pragmatist in Marxism-Leninism, Marxist “theses”, and the dogmatic
approach are used by him only on occasions when it suits his aims. In foreign
affairs his approach is often non-ideological and peaceful. He feels that today
there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means “to
prevent the imperialists from unleashing war and, if they actually try to start
it, to give a crushing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans.” 5
To be able to do this, all anti-war forces must be vigilant and prepared, must
act as a united front and never relax their efforts in the battle for peace.
In
fact, Khrushchev wants to defeat capitalism, not by fighting a devastating war,
but by attracting the peoples of the world towards the values of socialism,
which, according to him, are: free, democratic, and open society; tolerance and
individualism; belief in the basic human rights; belief in absolute moral
principles; the right to strike, the right to disagree; the non-acceptance of
an exclusive political dogma; and a non-militarized society. And his socialism
comprises, not only the Marxian values like economic equality, democratic and
free society, and dignity of human labour, but it
also maintains the democratic values such as the freedom of expression, the
right to differ, and faith in basic human rights, and absolute moral
principles. He firmly asserts that there is no harm if Russia accepts certain
democratic principles and fits them in her own life as many of her socialist
values have been adopted by the Western Democracies.
Thus
he dismisses completely the idea of waging a physical war against the
capitalist countries. But the war for men’s minds remains. This “peaceful,
ideological war” can be waged, on both sides, with Khrushchev’s blessings. This
war might even influence Khrushchev himself if waged on both sides.
Ntkita Sergeyevich Khrushchev is at the cross-roads. Emerging from
the blood-red chaos of the Russian revolution, surviving the nightmare decades
of the Stalin era, intriguing, manreuvring, fighting
his way to the top, he struggles now with tremendous problems. Dogma-bound, he
is emotionally guided by the petrifaction of Marx’s genuine anger at the social
conditions of the last century. These emotions, kept alive by a sort of
collective self- hypnosis of communist leaders, seek to justify tyranny and
hatred of freedom and individualism by peopling the free world with the ghosts
of bygone ages. His peasant common sense and pragmatism pull him towards
present reality, while the occupational disease of dictators has the opposite
tendency. However, it is hoped that his great dreams, although they appear
quite fantastic to dogma-bound communists, will pave the way for the survival
of humanity at least for a few decades more.
l
Lenin: Selected Works, Lawrence and Wishart,
London, 1937, Vol. IX, p. 70.
2
Lenin: Works, 4th Russian edition, Vol. XXX, p. 444.
3 Khrushchev’s
speech, January 27, 1959.
4 Khrushchev’s
speech at Kremlin in regard to Cuban crisis on the 7th Nov., 1962.
5 Khrushchev
by George Paloczi-Horvath (Secker
& Warburg, London, 1960.) p. 288.