MOUNTBATTEN AND KASHMIR
By
P. KODANDA RAO, M.A.
In
his book “Mission with Mountbatten”, Mr. Alan Campbell Johnson gives a
fascinating account of Mountbatten’s Mission in India, including Kashmir. As
regards Kashmir, Mr. Campbell-Johnson gives credit to Mountbatten for the
following steps. While pressing the Maharaja of Kashmir, along with other
Indian Rulers, to make up his mind about accession prior to the transfer of
power, Mountbatten exerted his maximum influence to prevent the Maharaja from
making up his mind about accession without ascertaining the will of his people
in the first instance, either by a plebiscite, referendum, or election, and if
these be considered impracticable, by representative public meetings. Secondly,
when in the face of grave and imminent danger, the Maharaja pleaded with
independent India for help to repel the raiders, Mountbatten pressed the view
that accession of Kashmir should precede India’s help. Thirdly, when the
Maharaja signed the accession document, Mountbatten persuaded India to make a
unilateral declaration that the accession was temporary and was subject to a
plebiscite to be held when peace was restored. Fourthly, when Mr. Jinnah
insisted that the plebiscite should be preceded by the suspension of the
administration of Sheikh Abdullah to ensure an impartial plebiscite,
Mountbatten suggested that the United Nations should be invited to supervise
the plebiscite to ensure its impartiality. Fifthly, when India and Pakistan
could not agree on the terms precedent to the plebiscite, Mountbatten suggested
that the dispute should be referred to the United Nations as a third party.
Sixthly, when the United Nations side-tracked India’s main complaint that
Pakistan was guilty of aggression and concentrated attention on the conditions
for the plebiscite and appointed the Kashmir Commission, Mountbatten persuaded
India to accept it.
Why
was Mountbatten so particular that in the case of Kashmir alone the Ruler
should consult the people before making up his mind about accession? He did not
insist on such consultation in the case of other Indian States. It is obvious
that he was not influenced by the democratic sentiment that the people alone,
and not the Rulers, should decide the issue of accession. Did he anticipate or
fear a difference of opinion between the Kashmir Ruler and his people? If so,
would he have backed up the Ruler or his people? Were Mountbatten and the
Maharaja unaware of the overwhelming influence of Sheik Abdulla in Kashmir or
of his preference for the secular democracy of India as against Mr. Jinnah’a
two-nation theory and Islamic Pakistan? Were they not aware that Abdulla had
politically chased Jinnah out of Kashmir, and Jinnah wept bitter tears over his
expulsion? Knowing Jinnah as they did, were they unaware that one, if not the
main, reason for Jinnah’s cupidity for Kashmir was to avenge his defeat at the
hands of Sheik Abdulla? The Maharaja and Mountbatten could not have been in any
doubt that the prevailing representative opinion was that of Abdulla and he would
join India rather than Pakistan. If there were a conflict between the Maharaja
and Abdulla, it could only mean that the Maharaja wished to accede to Pakistan,
while Abdulla wished to accede to India. If such were the case, should not
Mountbatten have backed Abdulla as against the Maharaja?
According
to Campbell Johnson, India, with the full consent of Sardar Patel, put no
pressure on the Maharaja to accede to India; indeed, India went so far as to
assure the Maharaja that if he decided to accede to Pakistan, his action would
not be considered an unfriendly act. On the other hand, Pakistan was putting
pressure on Maharaja to accede to it, and even after signing the Standstill
Agreement, applied economic sanctions to that effect. All the pull was exerted by
Pakistan and none by India. If the Maharaja was himself inclined to accede to
Pakistan, there was nothing to prevent him, particularly when Abdulla was still
in jail. Nevertheless, the Maharaja would not make up his mind.
Campbell
Johnson blamed the Maharaja for his chronic indecision and noted that in the
three States of Hyderabad, Bhopal and Kashmir, which had not acceded, the
Rulers and their peoples belonged to different religions, as if there was some
correlation between the two. In so far as religion influenced the situation,
was it likely that the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir would have preferred to accede
to Muslim Pakistan than secular India, particularly when Muslim Sheik Abdulla
was himself in favour of the latter? Why, then, did Mountbatten use his maximum
influence, when be was still Viceroy, to prevent the Maharaja from making up
his mind about accession without a plebiscite? Did he anticipate that, in spite
of Abdulla, the Muslim majority in Kashmir would plump for Muslim Pakistan? Or,
did he desire it for other reasons? And did Mountbatten himself advice or
press the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan? There was a strong rumour in
Delhi at the time that Mountbatten had so advised the Maharaja, that the
Maharaja lacked courage to reject the advice and therefore marked time with a
Standstill Agreement. If this be true, it was Mountbatten, and not the
unfortunate Maharaja, that was responsible for the chronic indecision that led
to the subsequent tragic developments.
Events
subsequent to the transfer of power also indicate that the Maharaja was not
likely to be in favour of accession to Pakistan. On the 24th October 1947
Mountbatten was told in Delhi that Kashmir was invaded by raiders from across
the Pakistan frontier, and that they travelled along the Rawalpindi Road in
Pakistan. On the 25th a message from the Pakistan Army Headquarters notified
that about five thousand tribesmen were within thirty-five miles of Srinagar,
the capital of Kashmir, and more were following. The Maharaja sought the help of
India to repel the invaders. Pakistan was in a better position to help him, if
only by denying passage through her territory. Nevertheless the Maharaja did
not seek the help of Pakistan. He would have done so if he had any good feeling
towards Pakistan or was convinced that Pakistan was unconcerned in the tribal
invasion. He turned to India for help, though time and terrain made it more
difficult for India to respond.
Mountbatten
also must have realised that Pakistan was neither neutral nor friendly towards
the Maharaja. In fact, he came to know that Jinnah had ordered the Pakistan
army to march into Kashmir and was himself waiting at Abottubad to march in
triumph into Srinagar, and that he was prevailed upon by Gen. Auchenleck to
desist, because in the meanwhile the Maharaja had acceded to India and thereby
legalised India’s help to Kashmir.
When
the helpless and hapless Maharaja appealed to independent India for help to
repel the invaders, Mountbatten took the legalistic view that it would be
improper for India to send troops into Kashmir without the accession of Kashmir
to India. Without accession Kashmir was a neutral country, and if India entered
neutral Kashmir, Pakistan might plead the same excuse and enter Kashmir. He
seems to have overlooked the vital difference between the two. After the
transfer of power, and before accession, Kashmir was an autonomous State. Was
it not open to an autonomous State to invoke help of another autonomous State
in case of need, without any previous commitment or by a temporary alliance and
without accession? Further, India responded to a request from the Ruler of the
state, while Pakistan would trespass against the wish of the Ruler. North
Korean entry into South Korea was aggression, while American entry
into South Korea was a friendly act. Insistence on accession at that moment as
a condition precedent to help was perhaps unnecessary. Even if accession had
satisfied the legal conscience of Mountbatten and Auchenleck, it made no such
impression on Jinnah. It only provided him with a handle which he exploited to
the full against India and Mountbatten himself. Jinnah promptly repudiated the
accession as based on fraud and violence, and stuck to it, notwithstanding
Mountbatten’s protestations that the fraud and violence were on the side of
Pakistan, and not India.
Jinnah
was influenced, not by the legal implications of accession, but by the military
achievements of the Indian Army and Air Force. Incidentally, it may be noted
here that, according to Mr. Campbell-Johnson, both Mountbatten and the Army
High Command, mostly British, opposed on professional grounds the proposal to
rush help to Kashmir, but were over-ruled by the Indian Cabinet, which took
grave risk in doing so. But the events justified the civilian as against the
military view. Mountbatten gallantly acknowledged that the brilliant
performance of the Indian Army left his own SEAC operations standing.
When,
in order to satisfy the legal conscience of Mountbatten, the Maharaja acceded
to the Indian Union as a condition precedent to India’s help, Mountbatten
returned to his earlier insistence that succession should be conditional on a
popular plebiscite. But, as the rush of events did not permit of a plebiscite
preceding accession, it should follow it. And, according to Campbell-Johnson,
he persuaded the Indian Cabinet to volunteer the unilateral statement that
accession by the Maharaja was temporary and provisional, and was subject to a
plebiscite after normal conditions were restored. Neither the Maharaja nor the Indian
Cabinet suggested it or wanted it, but Mountbatten did. Campbell-Johnson was
positive that the legality of the accession was beyond doubt. Nevertheless,
Mountbatten threw moral doubts on it and persuaded the Indian Cabinet to do
likewise and walked into the parlour of Jinnah, who promptly seized on it and
exploited it to the full, to the discomfiture and disappointment of Mountbatten
himself. Mountbatten’s insistence on a plebiscite was a windfall in favour of
Mr. Jinnah, and his moral doubts of the validity of the Maharaja’s accession
was another. Foiled in his effort to conquer Kashmir by force of arms, Jinnah
turned to his special brand of diplomacy to secure the practical annulment of
accession by laying down conditions to that effect, namely, the withdrawal of
Indian troops and the suspension of Abdulla’s administration as a preliminary
to an impartial plebiscite.
Mountbatten
took yet another step to appease Jinnah, notwithstanding the latter’s
‘impossible’ diplomacy. He offered that the plebiscite would be
held under the supervision of the United Nations to ensure its impartiality.
But Jinnah insisted that Indian troops should be practically withdrawn and
Abdulla’s administration suspended. Mountbatten then realised that he was no
longer acknowledged by Jinnah as a benevolent, neutral, and judicial third
party with the necessary moral authority to compose differences between India
and Pakistan, that his mission as a bridge between the two failed, He appealed
to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, to intervene, but received a polite
refusal. Finally, he threw up the sponge and passed the problem to the United
Nations as the highest third party, with the reluctant consent of Nehru.
Mountbatten
suffered another defeat at the hands of Pakistan in the United Nations. The
original complaint of India that Pakistan had committed an act of aggression
which threatened international peace was side tracked, and attention was
concentrated on the plebiscite and its precedent conditions. Mountbatten was
disappointed with the attitude of Britain and America at the United Nations
which vindicated Pakistan and discredited him and India.
When
the United Nations ignored India’s complaint of Pakistan’s admitted aggression,
and appointed a commission to promote the Plebiscite, Nehru, indignant with
disappointment, declined to receive the Commission. Mountbatten persuaded him
to receive it. The commission left the problem worse confounded, and widened
the gulf between India and Pakistan.
With
regard to Kashmir, Mountbatten’s mission was to link accession with a
plebiscite and to keep the peace and prevent war between India and Pakistan. In
retrospect, it would seem that, if he had not been obsessed with the plebiscite
idea, and had not prevented the Maharaja from making up his mind about
accession without a plebiscite, the Maharaja would in all probability have
acceded to India well before the transfer of power. His conduct gave room for
the view that he had pressed the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan, much against
the latter’s wish. If even at the stage of the Maharaja’s accession, of the
legality of which he was satisfied, Mountbatten had not tagged on the
plebiscite and thereby thrown moral doubts on the validity and finality of
accession, his mission might have been more successful.
Jinnah
would have greatly hesitated to try an armed conflict with India then. Pakistan
was militarily weaker than India and would have suffered more by the withdrawal
of British officers. The brilliant performance of the Indian Army in flying
troops to Kashmir and rolling back the invaders at the nick of
time must have sobered Jinnah’s ardour for a military clash with India. Today
Pakistan is in a much better position; she is better equipped and has besides
the moral support of the Anglo-American bloc, and may even get their military
support if the United Nations frown on India.
Mountbatten
sacrificed himself, Nehru and India to appease Jinnah and Pakistan, and failed
to appease them either. It is easier to be wise after the event and speculate
on might-have-beens. But statesmen are judged not only by their intentions but
also by their prescience in anticipating events.