INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

(April-June 1965)

PHILIP SPRATT

Mao Tse-tung once said that world capitalism rests on a single pillar: America. It is true that America is the principal obstacle to the expansion of the communist system in both West and East. Since America compelled Russia to withdraw her nuclear weapons from Cuba in November, 1962, it has been commonly thought that their conflict, the cold war, has come to an end. In consequence America’s European allies, who supported her when they feared Russian expansion in the West, have felt free to act in such a way as to weaken the alliance. They have tended to ignore the conflict in the East, where the principal communist power, China, has certainly not allowed the cold war to languish.

It might have been expected that America would receive general support in her conduct of the cold war. This was not so even, when the main theatre of the struggle was in Europe: the European public and governments always allowed themselves much liberty of criticism, while many governments elsewhere proclaimed themselves non-aligned. Now that the centre of the struggle is in Asia, Europe has almost become non-aligned, and perhaps in imitation, much of Asia persists in the same attitude. America is thus placed in the embarrassing position of saving people from a danger which they pretend docs not exist.

Mao Tse-tung has also claimed that his revolutionary method, guerilla warfare supplemented by political wirepulling, is capable of defeating America, and his claim is being tried out for the first time in Vietnam. The war in that country is therefore of key importance. During the period under review it has grown more intense, and America has sent many thousands of troops and officially allowed them to take part in the fighting. But the American President has also been greatly concerned to ward off the other prong of Mao’s attack, political wirepulling, and has acted on several occasions to meet criticism at home and abroad.

In response to an appeal by 17 non-aligned countries, on the 8th of April he suspended bombing for a day and offered to enter into negotiations without stipulating that the fighting must cease his only reservation was that he would not recognise the Vietcong as a participant. He also offered to help finance a plan for regional construction, which he suggested should cost a billion dollars. Russia, China and North Vietnam rejected the offer, and insisted that all American forces must withdraw from South Vietnam. Two weeks later, North Vietnam proposed a settlement on the basis of the withdrawal of America and the acceptance by South Vietnam of the programme of the Liberation Front, of which the Vietcong is the armed section. Again in the middle of May, when the Indian Prime Minister was in Moscow, Johnson suspended bombing for five days, apparently in the hope that India might induce Russia to give a favourable reply. The American Government welcomed the plan decided upon at the Commonwealth Conference on June the 17th, to send a delegation of the heads of five Commonwealth countries to intercede with the belligerents, but Russia, China and North Vietnam rejected the plan. At the same time North Vietnam refused to discuss the matter with a British Labour M. P., Davies, sent by his Government to Hanoi.

It was inferred from this attitude that North Vietnam and her backers were still fairly confident of military success. Nevertneless she has received little support from Russia or China, and the country is known to be suffering severely from the bombing campaign, which began in February. Serious unrest, culminating in local rebellions, has been reported. The morale of the North Vietnam guerilla force operating in the South is said to have shown some decline, and its offensive during the monsoon, begun in May, has been less successful than expected.

President Johnson probably did not expect his offer of negotiations and aid to be accepted immediately. They were intended mainly to answer the criticisms of his policy advanced in other countries, and by a growing body of opinion at home. Britain officially supported it, but was known to have reservations. France openly condemned it, as did India. Australia and New Zealand however, sent small contingents of troops to fight beside the American forces. Some of the crities pointed out that the Vietcong controlled half of South Vietnam, and inferred that the public supported them. The evidence, however, is that most people in South Vietnam are opposed to the Vietcong, who have established their control mainly by terror. Other critics argue that Vietnam is within the natural if sphere of influence of China and cannot in the long run be defended against her by a power exerted from many thousand miles away. But this ignores the possibility of a balance of power in Asia: Japan, India and the smaller Asian countries could hope to contain China and her communist and near-communist allies. Admittedly for the present India shows no interest in preventing China’s expansion in South East Asia, and accordingly appears to have no inclination to form such an alliance. Moreover, even if such an alliance were formed, India is for the present neutralised by Pakistan and thus could not exert the necessary influence. A balance of power in Asia could be maintained only if India were to change her attitude to China and achieve a reconciliation with Pakistan.

Towards the end of April a part of the army of the Dominican Republic revolted and overthrew the President, Cabral. He had been in power only 18 months, after deposing President Bosch shortly after his election in 1963. The new rebellion was intended to restore Bosch to power, but the army was divided and fighting continued, so he did not return from exile. The main part of the country is controlled by the Government of National Reconstruction headed by General Imbert, but a large part of the capital, Santo Domingo, is held by the Government of the Constitution led by Colonel Caamano, the chief of the rebels.

Again the United States intervened by sending troops. At first it was announced that the purpose was to save American lives; then it was declared that the rebels included a number of communists, who might be able to gain power for themselves should the rebellion succeed. Within a short time there were over 20,000 American troops in the island. Evidently the American authorities had in mind the way in a small group of communists had gained power by infiltrating the democratic revolution in Cuba. Bosch and Caamano are admittedly not communists, but the suggestion that the communists might gain power under their aegis appears plausible. The country is far poorer than Cube.

The intervention caused much protest. America asked the Organisation of American States to send a force which could take over from the United States forces and keep the peace. The first O.A.S. units arrived on the 3rd of May, but two months later the force was still too small for its purpose. The efforts neither of the U.S. nor of the O.A.S. have succeeded in reconciling the two factions, both of which remain in the field and from time to time engage in hostilities. The slow procedure of the O.A.S. supplies some justification for the U.S. action. The O.A.S. agrees that another usurpation of power by a communist party such as happened in Cuba must be prevented, but if it had been attempted in Dominica, the cumbrous machinery of the O.A.S., acting alone, could hardly have intervened in time.

After his visit to China in March, President Ayub Kl1an of Pakistan went to Russia in April, and at the Kremlin dinner on the 4th cordial sentiments and anti-colonial fervour were expressed by both sides. Before he returned to Pakistan on the 11th, it was announced from New Delhi that Pakistan troops had occupied posts in Indian territory in Kutch, and on the 10th they delivered a strong attack. Fighting continued sporadically for more than two months, involving on the Pakistan side some thousands of troops, who advanced, supported by American tanks, several miles into Indian territory. A dispute had arisen in 1960, and it had been agreed to demarcate the border, but the Pakistan officials did not cooperate and nothing was done. It now appeared that Pakistan claimed half, about 3,500 square miles, of the Rann of Kutch, on the ground that this alternately arid and swampy area should be treated as an inland sea.

The President of Pakistan had arranged to pay an official visit to America at the end of April, and the Prime Minister of India was to pay a visit at the end of May. On the 16th of April America asked both to postpone their visits to some time later in the year. The official reason given was that the visits would be more useful after the provisions for aid had been passed by the American legislature. Unofficially it was said that President Johnson was too busy to give proper attention to the visitors. Commentators guessed that what was intended was a rebuke to Pakistan for her dealings with China. India had, however, given America no comparable provocation, and the unilateral announcement of the postponement of the Indian Prime Minister’s visit was considered diplomatic bad manners. The Government of India expressed its displeasure, and declined the invitation to the Prime Minister to visit America later.

President Eisenhower had undertaken to prevent the use by Pakistan of American arms except against communist aggression or in legitimate self-defence. American spokesmen now admitted that they did not regard the action in Kutch as self-defence and said that they would take the matter up with Pakistan. The use of American arms had been announced a week before the postponement of the Pakistan President’s visit, and it is possible that this was one of the reasons for that decision. America’s disapproval of her policy in this matter, and also in relation to China, and a threat that aid might be reduced, may have influenced Pakistan to agree, at the end of June, to the British Prime Minister’s proposal of a cease-fire, for the agreement to cease hostilities at that point gave her an advantage which must have appeared too slight to compensate for her relatively big military operation. The attack in Kutch was the culmination of a series of border incidents which in the previous few months had become more frequent than ever before, while in May there were persistent reports of large concentrations of troops in East Pakistan. The observer receives the impression of an ambitious military plan abandoned soon after the start for unexplained reasons–possibly China’s failure to cooperate. It is too soon to say whether any permanent restraint has been imposed on Pakistan’s foreign policy.

In May the Indian Prime Minister began a series of visits to foreign countries. He was in Russia from the 12th to the 20th, and was treated with “informal cordiality.” However, the joint communique which was published at the end of his visit amounted to a statement of Russia’s policy on most topical controversies, including even the partition of Germany, and of course the Vietnam war, but gave India no support in relation to Pakistan or China; nor did it mention the Prime Minister’s project of a guarantee by the nuclear powers to the non-nuclear powers. It was announced a few days later that Russia would not give such a guarantee. The reference to Vietnam presumably expressed the Prime Minister’s pique at President Johnson’s treatment of him; the rest of the communique may be explained as an equivalent for the economic aid which was being negotiated at the same time.

Early in June the Prime Minister went to Canada, where the political conversations appear to have inclined the same way: the two parties agreed, in relation to the Vietnam war, to act in parallel “as they might otherwise give the impression of ganging up” against America, as a Press report put it. The Prime Minister again refused an invitation from President Johnson to visit Washington later in the year.

The following week the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London. The principal decision was to send a deputation of five of the Prime Ministers to Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and Saigon to try to bring about a cease-fire! The political proposal was that Vietnam as a whole should hold a supervised general election and form a joint government. Since North Vietnam is the larger and its voters are firmly under communist discipline, this plan would guarantee a communist government. However, Russia, China and North Vietnam refused to receive the delegation.

One of China’s plans to extend her influence was by exploiting the Indo-Asian Conference which was to be held in Algiers at the end of June, about ten years after the historic conference at Bandung. China planned to assume the leadership of the nations attending, and displayed great diplomatic activity in efforts to prevent the invitation of Russia and Malaysia, which would oppose her. In this she secured the support of Pakistan as well as Indonesia, but faced the opposition of India. It appeared that the opposition would be successful, but the conference had to be postponed owing to a Coupe d’etat in Algeria.

The President of Algeria, Ben Bella, was arrested on the 19th of June and threatened with a trial, and after several days’ delay a new Government was announced, headed by the former Defence Minister, Col. Boumedienne. The political character of the change is still uncertain: it is expected to bring a less vigorous foreign policy and perhaps a less “left” domestic policy. The event surprised the world, but ought not to have done so. Since 1954, when Ben Bella first joined it, the Algerian nationalist movement has been distinguished by its deadly internal feuds. Even before taking power, his party assassinated many thousands of their fellow countrymen whose nationalist politics differed slightly from their own, and Ben Bella had overthrown, exiled and liquidated many of his former colleagues. Such men usually suffer the fate to which they have condemned others.

It is not easy to understand the interest of political leaders–even, it is reported, of President Johnson–in the Afro-Asian Conference. Those who would have attended represent a very large part of mankind, but there was no prospect that they would act together on any policy they might adopt, nor that the leadership at which China aimed could have any practical significance. Their divisions would have deprived their expressed opinions even of propaganda value. However, it seems to be agreed that the postponement of the conference was a setback to China’s efforts, and her prospective victims are entitled to take a little comfort.

Back