INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

 

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

 

All tensions arise out of the difficulties experienced by individuals or groups in adjusting themselves to changing situations. Man is a creature of habit, and when he is called on to change his habits – physical, emotional or intellectual – in response to changing situations, he has to overcome a great deal of resistance. It is not in his nature to do this easily and quickly. A period of tension therefore becomes inevitable in the lives of individuals as well as of nations. It is utopian to expect perpetual peace in the history of mankind. Tensions are like the waves of the sea.

 

WHY TENSIONS?

 

The two world wars have brought about a revolutionary change in the global situation. Two aspects of it are of great significance. One is the awakening of Asia and the other is the disappearance of all other powers in the West except the U.S.S.R. and the United States and the intense rivalry between them. States like England, France, Holland etc., which wielded a large amount of influence in the past are finding it difficult to adjust themselves to a world where there is acute rivalry between Soviet Russia and the United States. Are they to merely yield place to these giants? And if they are to take sides, which side should they prefer – the Soviet or the American side? The West is also finding it difficult to adjust itself to an awakened Asia. For nearly four centuries it exercised ascendancy over this vast continent. It regarded this continent as weak, powerless and uncivilised. Today the situation is different. China has become a great power. It has been able to check the American armies in Korea and to check the American allies in Indo-China to whom large aids have been coming from the United States. It is in a position to create trouble in Malaya, Siam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Given time it can become a still greater power. The same is the case with India. She is even more mature than China in the realm of politics; she is more highly industrialised; she occupies a more important strategic position in the Indian Ocean; she has been able to gain the goodwill of Burma and Indonesia and her leadership has been recognized–though informally–by several of the Asian and African peoples. She is sure to become a greater power in course of time. Besides China and India there is Japan. It is true that she was defeated in the second world war and that she was deprived of all her imperial possessions. But the country is being reconstructed. In any case no power on earth can suppress her for all time. Her revival has been found necessary by the United States. She is bound to become an important Asian power within a short period. Though in point of numbers of her population she does not occupy the same place as China and India, she has a superior role in the sphere of industry and in point of military efficiency. In another forty or fifty years’ time the Asian continent is bound to become the political center of the world just like Europe in the nineteenth century. There is then every possibility of the United States losing all that political importance which she possesses today. The tensions with which the contemporary world is faced are thus the outcome of the difficulty experienced by the nations of Western Europe and by the United States in reconciling themselves to an awakened Asia. The difficulty is all the greater as they have to face the prospect–which is not very remote–of an awakened Africa.

 

It may be incidentally noted that in contrast with these States of the West, Soviet Russia is in a favourable position. She is not an entirely European country, Her hold over Siberia is the result of natural expansion very similar to the expansion of the United States from the Alleghenies steadily towards the Pacific. Soviet Russia can therefore claim to be one of the Asian powers–like India, China and Japan.

 

THE TENSION IN EUROPE

 

The outcome of the second world war was a great disappointment to the United States and Great Britain. They were, of course, interested in destroying Hitlerism and preventing Germany from again becoming a great military and industrial power. But they were not prepared to welcome the establishment of Soviet suzerainty over Europe. This was in their view a much more dangerous phenomenon than the suzerainties attempted by Spain, France and Germany over that continent in the past. Territorially it had the possibility of bringing all Europe under the government of Russia, a thing which never happened before, and this would have enabled the Soviet to establish ascendancy over America also. In addition to this there was the Communism with its dictatorial and totalitarian form of government, and with its denial of the fundamental, freedoms and rights as understood by the democracies of the West which was bound to accompany Soviet suzerainty. To such an outcome the British and the Americans were not prepared to reconcile themselves.

 

Much of the international politics of the post-war world consists in the efforts made by the United States, in collaboration with Britain, to prevent the establishment of Soviet suzerainty over the whole of Europe and to limit it to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe which, owing to the shortsightedness of President Roosevelt, were left at the mercy of Stalin.

 

GERMAN REARMAMENT

 

There is no need to tell here the story of these efforts. The topic is referred to here as it is this that has made the discussions on the rearmament of Germany to become crucially important. The United States and Britain, along with most of their allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, were agreed that unless German armies became a part of the defence strength of Western Europe, as against any aggression from Soviet Russia, there was no chance whatever of such aggression being defeated. It was for this purpose that the European Defence Community was thought of. But here came the opposition from France. There was nothing surprising or unnatural in that opposition. Germany and France had been enemies for a thousand years. Till about 1860 France took advantage of a politically disunited Germany, inflicted many defeats on her and occupied several German regions. Things were reversed after 1860 when by successive wars under the leadership of Prussia–the last such war being the one waged against France herself in 1870-71–Germany became united under a single government, highly centralised, efficiently administered, with all attention concentrated on building the strongest continental army and a powerful navy. It was this united Germany armed to the hilt that inflicted disastrous defeats on France in the first and the second world wars. A nation which suffered such severe losses at the hands of Germans on three occasions within a period of eighty years cannot be expected to forget the serious consequences of a unified and rearmed Germany.

 

The French were naturally in a dilemma. They were, it is true to some extent, afraid of conquest by Russia and the establishment of a Communist regime over them. They knew that they could not save themselves from such a catastrophe out of their own efforts and that they required the help of the United States and Britain. But the price which the United States in particular demanded for this help was French willingness to rearm Western Germany to a limited extent at least. A compromise formula was evolved for this purpose and it was on such a formula that the EDC was based. But the French nation could not reconcile themselves even to a limited rearmament of Germany. There were many among them who felt that a rearmed Germany would sooner or later embark on aggression–as was done by Hitler–and that France would once more become a victim to it. They thought that the danger from Russia was remote and that it may even be escaped by a policy of neutralism or nonalignment. Even today the French are not completely free from this dilemma: which is to them a greater danger, a Russian aggression or a German aggression? This was at the root of their opposition to EDC and they naturally rejected it.

 

This meant a severe blow to the United States in the plan which she has worked out for four years for the defence of Western Europe. It was equally a blow to Britain which felt that it might encourage American isolationism and bring Russian suzerainty over Europe nearer realisation. She, as well as the smaller States like Belgium and the Netherlands, knew full well that it was only the American leadership of the NATO and the defence strength that was built up with American help that checked Russian aggression. Though they believed in diplomacy and negotiation to a far greater extent than the United States did, they knew from experience that diplomacy would succeed only when backed up by effective strength. They were therefore resolved somehow to reconcile the French to the idea of re-arming Germany and at the Nine-Power London Conference, concluded in the first week of October, decisions were taken on this issue and all these decisions were agreed to by the French Premier Mendes-France.

 

These decisions were subsequently ratified by the French National Assembly. The French are therefore now committed to the West German Republic becoming a fully Sovereign State, to her raising a defence force of 500,000, subject to certain limitations in the matter of arms manufacture and equipment, and to her becoming a full and equal member of the NATO. What induced the French to agree to these decisions was primarily the willingness of the British to keep on the continent an arm of 100,000 as a part of the Defence force of Western Europe for fifty years. In the opinion of the French this would be a guarantee of not only the British acting at all times in full concert with the democracies of Western Europe but also of their standing ready to stop German aggression. For the time being at least the French have come to regard the threat from Soviet Russia as much more serious than that from a revived Germany.

 

It should not be inferred from this that the British are completely in favour of German rearmament. A certain section of the people–especially among those belonging to the Labour Party–are against it. They do not want to have the experience of Hitlerite war repeated. But the majority of the British think that the Soviet threat is more real and more imminent.

 

It has been the policy of Soviet Russia all these years–and it is still her policy–to create a split in the Western camp. She did much to influence French public opinion. She has also done much to influence German opinion. Curiously there is division even among the Germans on this issue of their rearmament. Many do not like it. They are tired of wars. Many regard the question of the union of Germany–which is now partitioned into Western Germany leaning towards America, and Eastern Germany under Soviet control–as more urgent than rearmament, and if by giving up rearmament they can secure the unity of their country they are prepared to reject rearmament. This is just the policy to which Soviet Russia has been giving encouragement. She too, like France, is terribly afraid of a rearmed Western Germany. She is afraid also that a fully Sovereign Western Germany with an army of her own, and contributing substantially to American strength in Western Europe, would use force for bringing East Germany into a united German State, and that would upset the territorial settlement made by her in respect of Poland and Czechoslovakia, There will be no end to the number of serious consequences that will follow–according to Soviet Russia–from the rearmament of Western Germany. She has therefore in recent days put forward fresh proposals for the union of Germany, provided that united Germany remains neutral in any war between the East and the West. The Americans, of course, rejected the proposal, as a neutral Germany is of no value to them.

 

Though the situation is still fluid there seems to be a certain prospect of Western Germany becoming a fully sovereign and rearmed State allied to the United states and fighting along her side, and along with the other members of the NATO, in a war of defence against Soviet Russia. But history shows that the line between defensive war and an aggressive war is very thin. And it is this that gives significance to the Nine-Power London Conference. The politics of Europe revolve round the problem of Germany, and for the present the partial solution of the problem arrived at in the London Conference strengthens the West in the cold war against the East. What America lost at the Geneva Conference has been partially gained at the London Conference.

 

TRIESTE: THE BALKAN ALLIANCE

 

Two other events–though not of major importance–which have contributed similarly to the strength of the West may be noted. One is the settlement of the question of Trieste which has been for the last Eight years a source of friction between Yugoslavia and Italy. Tito of Yugoslavia has been in these years coming closer to the West, and this has not been in any way affected by the reversal of the Soviet attitude towards him after the death of Stalin. The result is that both he and Italy listened to the advice from Britain and the United States and agreed to a partition of the City–the North going to Italy and the South to Yugoslavia. This could have been accepted years ago, but human psychology requires the healing force of time to adjust itself to new requirements. The other event is the conclusion of an alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Of these the last two are members of the NATO, and the consequence is that Yugoslavia will get the help indirectly of the NATO forces in any defensive war it is likely to wage.

 

PHYSICAL vs. MORAL STRENGTH

 

There is an eternal controversy as to whether the enemy yields to superior physical strength or to superior intellectual and moral argument. There is no decisive answer to the question. History has very few examples of a State which is strong yielding to the force of intellectual and moral argument. It is only when such an argument is backed up by physical strength, in the shape of armies and navies, that it has a chance of success. Very rarely does right triumph by itself. For the victory of right, might is necessary. If Soviet Russia appears today to be more conciliatory than in the days of Stalin, it is due to a great extent to the defence plans of the United States and her allies in Europe. The London Conference, the settlement regarding the question of Trieste, and the Balkan Triple Alliance referred to above are of significance. from this point of view.

 

EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST

 

It is a matter of gratification that the points at issue between Egypt and Britain in regard to the Suez Canal Zone have been finally settled. Britain yielded to Egypt on them and Egypt also showed a remarkable spirit of compromise. The British are now to evacuate the zone within twenty months; the military installations however will be kept intact so that they can be used whenever necessary. Both countries have agreed to employ civilian personnel–British and Egyptian in fixed proportions–for this purpose. Egypt also agreed to British reoccupation of the zone if Egypt, Turkey or any of the members of the Arab League are attacked. In regard to Iran she remained adamant. Thus has been settled a longstanding question between the two countries and this will prove to be a stabilising factor in the Middle East. Stability will be further increased by the measures taken by the French Government under Mendes-France to grant autonomy to Tunisia. Both these mark important stages in the withdrawal of the West from Colonialism.

 

AWAKENING OF ASIA, INDIA AND THE U. S. A.

 

Reference has been made above to the awakening of Asia and to the rise of China and India to the rank of great powers. The West, however,–and especially the United States–has not reconciled itself to this new situation. As between India and the United States, there are two fundamental points of difference. One arises out of the inadequate recognition by the United States of the force of Asian nationalism. The help which she has rendered to France in the war in Indo-China is an instance in point. Her policies–especially in the matter of giving aid to Pakistan, bringing about a Turko-Pakistan pact (to which Iraq now proposes to adhere) and her persistence in organising a South East Asian Defence Treaty Organisation–have naturally created the impression that America is trying to step into the shoes of Western Imperial Powers (Britain, France etc.) in Asia. The situation is just like that in Central and South America when, in the early part of the nineteenth century, the colonies threw away the yoke of Spain and Portugal but were being threatened with the establishment of the yoke of France and other European powers which were still strong. It was then that America proclaimed her famous Monroe doctrine, which for more than a century has safeguarded the independence of the Central and South American Republics. The danger which India sees in American policies is similar to this. It may result in American Colonialism (Dollar imperialism) being substituted for European imperialism.

 

The other point of difference between India and the United States arises out of their attitudes towards international Communism and the means of combating it. The Americans hate Communism as the greatest danger confronting the ‘free’ world. They identify the Soviet and Chinese Governments with international Communism and they are not prepared to come to any understanding with them. They want to carryon a holy world-crusade against it–which means against Soviet Russia and China, and their foreign policy is aimed wholly at the accomplishment of this objective. They are also not averse to undertake an atomic war for this purpose and they have been preparing for it. India’s attitude, however, is quite different. She does not regard Communism as such a great danger. She is also not afraid of any country becoming Communist if it is the result of an internal revolution. Moreover to her the issue in Asia is not Communism versus Democracy. The issue is primarily the eradication of poverty and a rise in the standard of life of the people. If this issue is solved–and America can contribute a great deal to its solution by concentrating on economic aid without attaching any political or military strings to it–Communism will automatically disappear.

 

Naturally India is opposed to the American policy of not recognising the Communist government of China or of seating that government in U.N.O. or throwing obstacles in the way of that government conquering Formosa. In India’s view America should reconcile herself to the establishment of Communist government in China, just as in an earlier day she reconciled herself to Communist government in Soviet Russia. Nothing would be gained by being blind to reality. It would be most disastrous for America, for her allies, for China, for Asia and for the whole world for America to go on piling up arms to frighten Communist China or to later on wage a war against her. This will also bring China and Soviet Russia closer together which ought to be to the interest of the free world to prevent.

 

AMERICAN SUSPICIONS

 

But why does America persist in this holy crusade against Communism? Why do so many of the free countries help her in this enterprise? There is no space to go in full detail into this question. Reference to it has been made above in connection with the danger of Soviet suzerainty over Europe. There is, however, a smaller issue to which reference has to be made here. There is a genuine fear in the United States, and this fear is shared by very many sections of people in Asia, that if America and the West do not interest themselves in the politics of South-Asia, the States here–the smaller ones especially–which are not in a position to defend themselves will be easily absorbed into China in the case of South-East Asia and the Far East, into Soviet Russia in the case of the Middle East. They will become satellites of these two big Communist powers. The withdrawal therefore of Western or American imperialism will not mean their freedom, independence and sovereignty but their dependence on China and Soviet Russia–the substitution of one imperialism by another. Such a fear is entertained in Thailand, in the Philippines and also in Iran, Turkey, Iraq etc. The conclusion that follows is that unless an understanding and an organisation of an international character came into existence with which the independence of these small States can be guaranteed, there can be no escape from Americans trying to fill in the power vacuum.

 

PANDIT NEHRU’S VISIT TO CHINA

 

It is in this context that the visit of Pandit Nehru to China assumes world significance. If he can get an understanding from China–an understanding of an effective character–that she would never cast her eyes on Indo-China, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Nepal and the Philippines, that she would not encourage any subversive movements in them, that she would not use the ten million Chinese residents in them to further her own purposes, there is then the prospect of an Asian settlement. It is on these points that there is suspicion.

 

It may be argued that China had already given a guarantee in respect of these matters by subscribing to the five principles included in the communiques issued after her Prime Minister’s talks with the Prime Ministers of India and Burma. In a world where there is so much of disparity between word and deed, how are the nations to be convinced of the practical utility of these principles? After all they are not new. They are at the basis of the Charter of the United Nations to which sixty nations have subscribed. But are there not many States who have violated them and whose violations could not be remedied by the Security Council or the General Assembly? It now rests with Pandit Nehru to bring back with him some measures of a practical character under which the independence of Asian nations is guaranteed, not only against Western imperialism but also against Chinese and Soviet imperialism. This will place him among the greatest of statesmen of all times.

 

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