INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY
By
Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.
All
tensions arise out of the difficulties experienced by individuals or groups in
adjusting themselves to changing situations. Man is a creature of habit, and
when he is called on to change his habits – physical, emotional or intellectual
– in response to changing situations, he has to overcome a great deal of
resistance. It is not in his nature to do this easily and quickly. A period of
tension therefore becomes inevitable in the lives of individuals as well as of
nations. It is utopian to expect perpetual peace in the history of mankind.
Tensions are like the waves of the sea.
WHY
TENSIONS?
The
two world wars have brought about a revolutionary change in the global
situation. Two aspects of it are of great significance. One is the awakening of
Asia and the other is the disappearance of all other powers in the West except
the U.S.S.R. and the United
States and the intense rivalry between them.
States like England, France, Holland etc., which wielded a large
amount of influence in the past are finding it difficult to adjust themselves to a world where there is acute rivalry between
Soviet Russia and the United
States. Are they to merely yield place to
these giants? And if they are to take sides, which side should they prefer –
the Soviet or the American side? The West is also finding it difficult to
adjust itself to an awakened Asia. For nearly
four centuries it exercised ascendancy over this vast continent. It regarded
this continent as weak, powerless and uncivilised.
Today the situation is different. China has become a great power. It
has been able to check the American armies in Korea
and to check the American allies in Indo-China to whom large aids have been
coming from the United
States. It is in a position to create
trouble in Malaya, Siam,
Indonesia and the Philippines.
Given time it can become a still greater power. The same is the case with India. She is
even more mature than China
in the realm of politics; she is more highly industrialised;
she occupies a more important strategic position in the Indian Ocean; she has
been able to gain the goodwill of Burma
and Indonesia
and her leadership has been recognized–though informally–by several of the
Asian and African peoples. She is sure to become a greater power in course
of time. Besides China and India there is Japan. It is true that she was
defeated in the second world war and that she was
deprived of all her imperial possessions. But the country is being
reconstructed. In any case no power on earth can suppress her for all time. Her
revival has been found necessary by the United States. She is bound to
become an important Asian power within a short period. Though in point of
numbers of her population she does not occupy the same place as China and India, she has a superior role in
the sphere of industry and in point of military efficiency. In another forty or
fifty years’ time the Asian continent is bound to become the political center
of the world just like Europe in the
nineteenth century. There is then every possibility of the United States
losing all that political importance which she possesses today. The tensions
with which the contemporary world is faced are thus the outcome of the
difficulty experienced by the nations of Western Europe and by the United States in reconciling themselves to an
awakened Asia. The difficulty is all the
greater as they have to face the prospect–which is not very remote–of an
awakened Africa.
It
may be incidentally noted that in contrast with these States of the West,
Soviet Russia is in a favourable position. She is not
an entirely European country, Her hold over Siberia is
the result of natural expansion very similar to the expansion of the United States
from the Alleghenies steadily towards the Pacific. Soviet Russia can therefore claim to be one of the
Asian powers–like India, China and Japan.
THE TENSION IN EUROPE
The
outcome of the second world war was a great
disappointment to the United States
and Great Britain.
They were, of course, interested in destroying Hitlerism and preventing Germany from
again becoming a great military and industrial power. But they were not
prepared to welcome the establishment of Soviet suzerainty over Europe. This was in their view a
much more dangerous phenomenon than the suzerainties attempted by Spain, France
and Germany
over that continent in the past. Territorially it had the
possibility of bringing all Europe under the government of Russia, a thing which never happened before, and
this would have enabled the Soviet to establish ascendancy over America also.
In addition to this there was the Communism with its dictatorial and
totalitarian form of government, and with its denial of the
fundamental, freedoms and rights as understood by the democracies of the West which
was bound to accompany Soviet suzerainty. To such an
outcome the British and the Americans were not prepared to reconcile
themselves.
Much
of the international politics of the post-war world consists in the efforts
made by the United States, in collaboration with Britain, to prevent the
establishment of Soviet suzerainty over the whole of Europe and to limit it to
the countries of Eastern and Central Europe which, owing to the
shortsightedness of President Roosevelt, were left at the mercy of Stalin.
GERMAN REARMAMENT
There
is no need to tell here the story of these efforts. The topic is referred to
here as it is this that has made the discussions on the rearmament of Germany to
become crucially important. The United States and Britain, along with most of
their allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, were agreed that unless
German armies became a part of the defence strength
of Western Europe, as against any aggression from Soviet Russia, there was no
chance whatever of such aggression being defeated. It was for this purpose that
the European Defence Community was thought of. But
here came the opposition from France.
There was nothing surprising or unnatural in that opposition. Germany and France had been enemies for a
thousand years. Till about 1860 France
took advantage of a politically disunited Germany, inflicted many defeats on
her and occupied several German regions. Things were reversed after 1860 when
by successive wars under the leadership of Prussia–the last such war being the
one waged against France herself in 1870-71–Germany became united under a
single government, highly centralised, efficiently
administered, with all attention concentrated on building the strongest
continental army and a powerful navy. It was this united Germany armed to the hilt that inflicted
disastrous defeats on France
in the first and the second world wars. A nation which suffered such severe
losses at the hands of Germans on three occasions within a period of eighty
years cannot be expected to forget the serious consequences of a unified and
rearmed Germany.
The
French were naturally in a dilemma. They were, it is true to some extent,
afraid of conquest by Russia
and the establishment of a Communist regime over them. They knew that they
could not save themselves from such a catastrophe out of their own
efforts and that they required the help of the United
States and Britain. But the price which the United States in particular
demanded for this help was French willingness to rearm Western
Germany to a limited extent at least. A compromise formula was
evolved for this purpose and it was on such a formula that the EDC was based.
But the French nation could not reconcile themselves
even to a limited rearmament of Germany.
There were many among them who felt that a rearmed Germany
would sooner or later embark on aggression–as was done by Hitler–and that France would
once more become a victim to it. They thought that the danger from Russia was
remote and that it may even be escaped by a policy of neutralism or nonalignment.
Even today the French are not completely free from this dilemma: which is to
them a greater danger, a Russian aggression or a German aggression? This was at
the root of their opposition to EDC and they naturally rejected it.
This
meant a severe blow to the United States
in the plan which she has worked out for four years for the defence
of Western Europe. It was equally a blow to Britain which felt that it might encourage
American isolationism and bring Russian suzerainty over Europe
nearer realisation. She, as well as the smaller States like Belgium and the Netherlands, knew full well that it
was only the American leadership of the NATO and the defence
strength that was built up with American help that checked Russian aggression.
Though they believed in diplomacy and negotiation to a far greater extent than
the United States
did, they knew from experience that diplomacy would succeed only when backed up
by effective strength. They were therefore resolved somehow to reconcile the
French to the idea of re-arming Germany
and at the Nine-Power London Conference, concluded in the first week of
October, decisions were taken on this issue and all these decisions were agreed
to by the French Premier Mendes-France.
These
decisions were subsequently ratified by the French National Assembly. The
French are therefore now committed to the West German Republic becoming a fully
Sovereign State, to her raising a defence force of
500,000, subject to certain limitations in the matter of arms manufacture and
equipment, and to her becoming a full and equal member of the NATO. What
induced the French to agree to these decisions was primarily the willingness of
the British to keep on the continent an arm of 100,000 as a part of the Defence force of Western Europe
for fifty years. In the opinion of the French this would be a guarantee of not
only the British acting at all times in full concert with the democracies of
Western Europe but also of their standing ready to stop German aggression. For
the time being at least the French have come to regard the
threat from Soviet Russia as much more serious than that from a revived Germany.
It
should not be inferred from this that the British are completely in favour of German rearmament. A certain section of the
people–especially among those belonging to the Labour Party–are against it.
They do not want to have the experience of Hitlerite
war repeated. But the majority of the British think that the Soviet threat is
more real and more imminent.
It
has been the policy of Soviet Russia all these years–and it is still her
policy–to create a split in the Western camp. She did much to influence French
public opinion. She has also done much to influence German opinion.
Curiously there is division even among the Germans on this issue of their rearmament.
Many do not like it. They are tired of wars. Many regard the question of the
union of Germany–which is
now partitioned into Western Germany leaning towards America,
and Eastern Germany under Soviet control–as
more urgent than rearmament, and if by giving up rearmament they can secure the
unity of their country they are prepared to reject rearmament. This is just the
policy to which Soviet Russia has been giving encouragement. She too, like France, is terribly afraid of a rearmed Western Germany. She is afraid also that a fully
Sovereign Western Germany with an army of her own, and contributing
substantially to American strength in Western Europe, would use force for
bringing East Germany into a united German State, and that would upset the
territorial settlement made by her in respect of Poland and Czechoslovakia,
There will be no end to the number of serious consequences that will
follow–according to Soviet Russia–from the rearmament of Western
Germany. She has therefore in recent days put forward fresh proposals for the
union of Germany, provided
that united Germany
remains neutral in any war between the East and the West.
The Americans, of course, rejected the proposal, as a neutral Germany is of
no value to them.
Though
the situation is still fluid there seems to be a certain prospect of Western
Germany becoming a fully sovereign and rearmed State allied to the United states
and fighting along her side, and along with the other members of the NATO, in a
war of defence against Soviet Russia. But history
shows that the line between defensive war and an aggressive
war is very thin. And it is this that gives significance to the Nine-Power
London Conference. The politics of Europe revolve round the problem of Germany, and
for the present the partial solution of the problem arrived
at in the London Conference strengthens the West in the cold war against the
East. What America
lost at the Geneva Conference has been partially gained at the London Conference.
TRIESTE: THE BALKAN ALLIANCE
Two
other events–though not of major importance–which have contributed similarly to
the strength of the West may be noted. One is the settlement of the question of
Trieste which has been for the
last Eight years a source of friction between Yugoslavia
and Italy.
Tito of Yugoslavia has been in these years coming closer to
the West, and this has not been in any way affected by the reversal of the
Soviet attitude towards him after the death of Stalin. The result is that both
he and Italy listened to the
advice from Britain and the United States and agreed to a partition of the
City–the North going to Italy
and the South to Yugoslavia.
This could have been accepted years ago, but human psychology requires the
healing force of time to adjust itself to new requirements. The other event is
the conclusion of an alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece
and Turkey.
Of these the last two are members of the NATO, and the consequence is that Yugoslavia will
get the help indirectly of the NATO forces in any defensive
war it is likely to wage.
PHYSICAL vs. MORAL STRENGTH
There
is an eternal controversy as to whether the enemy yields to superior physical
strength or to superior intellectual and moral argument. There is no decisive
answer to the question. History has very few examples of a State which
is strong yielding to the force of intellectual and moral argument. It is only
when such an argument is backed up by physical strength, in the shape of armies
and navies, that it has a chance of success. Very rarely does right triumph by
itself. For the victory of right, might is necessary. If Soviet Russia appears
today to be more conciliatory than in the days of Stalin, it is due to a great
extent to the defence plans of the United States and her allies in Europe. The London Conference, the settlement regarding
the question of Trieste,
and the Balkan Triple Alliance referred to above are of significance. from this point of view.
EGYPT
AND THE MIDDLE EAST
It
is a matter of gratification that the points at issue between Egypt and Britain in
regard to the Suez Canal Zone have been finally settled. Britain yielded to Egypt
on them and Egypt
also showed a remarkable spirit of compromise. The British
are now to evacuate the zone within twenty months; the military installations
however will be kept intact so that they can be used whenever necessary. Both
countries have agreed to employ civilian personnel–British and Egyptian in
fixed proportions–for this purpose. Egypt
also agreed to British reoccupation of the zone if Egypt,
Turkey
or any of the members of the Arab League are attacked. In regard to Iran she
remained adamant. Thus has been settled a longstanding question between the two
countries and this will prove to be a stabilising
factor in the Middle East. Stability will be
further increased by the measures taken by the French Government under
Mendes-France to grant autonomy to Tunisia. Both these mark important
stages in the withdrawal of the West from Colonialism.
AWAKENING
OF ASIA, INDIA AND THE U. S. A.
Reference
has been made above to the awakening of Asia and to the rise of China and India to the rank of great powers.
The West, however,–and especially the United States–has not reconciled
itself to this new situation. As between India
and the United States,
there are two fundamental points of difference. One arises out of the
inadequate recognition by the United
States of the force of Asian nationalism.
The help which she has rendered to France in the war in Indo-China is
an instance in point. Her policies–especially in the matter of giving aid to Pakistan,
bringing about a Turko-Pakistan pact (to which Iraq
now proposes to adhere) and her persistence in organising
a South East Asian Defence Treaty Organisation–have
naturally created the impression that America is trying to step into the shoes
of Western Imperial Powers (Britain, France etc.) in Asia. The situation is
just like that in Central and South America when, in the early part of the
nineteenth century, the colonies threw away the yoke of Spain and Portugal
but were being threatened with the establishment of the yoke of France and
other European powers which were still strong. It was then that America proclaimed her famous Monroe
doctrine, which for more than a century has safeguarded the independence of the
Central and South
American Republics.
The danger which India
sees in American policies is similar to this. It may result in American
Colonialism (Dollar imperialism) being substituted for European imperialism.
The
other point of difference between India
and the United States
arises out of their attitudes towards international Communism and the means of
combating it. The Americans hate Communism as the greatest danger confronting
the ‘free’ world. They identify the Soviet and Chinese Governments with
international Communism and they are not prepared to come to any understanding
with them. They want to carryon a holy world-crusade against it–which means
against Soviet Russia and China,
and their foreign policy is aimed wholly at the accomplishment of this
objective. They are also not averse to undertake an atomic war for this purpose
and they have been preparing for it. India’s attitude, however, is quite
different. She does not regard Communism as such a great danger. She is also
not afraid of any country becoming Communist if it is the result of an internal
revolution. Moreover to her the issue in Asia
is not Communism versus Democracy. The issue is primarily the
eradication of poverty and a rise in the standard of life of the people. If
this issue is solved–and America
can contribute a great deal to its solution by concentrating on economic aid
without attaching any political or military strings to it–Communism will
automatically disappear.
Naturally
India is opposed to the
American policy of not recognising the Communist
government of China or of
seating that government in U.N.O. or throwing obstacles in the way of that
government conquering Formosa.
In India’s view America should reconcile herself to the
establishment of Communist government in China, just as in an earlier day
she reconciled herself to Communist government in Soviet Russia. Nothing would
be gained by being blind to reality. It would be most disastrous for America, for her allies, for China, for Asia and for the whole world for America to go
on piling up arms to frighten Communist China or to later on wage a war against
her. This will also bring China
and Soviet Russia closer together which ought to be to the interest of the free
world to prevent.
AMERICAN SUSPICIONS
But
why does America
persist in this holy crusade against Communism? Why do so many of the free
countries help her in this enterprise? There is no space to go in full detail
into this question. Reference to it has been made above in connection with the
danger of Soviet suzerainty over Europe. There
is, however, a smaller issue to which reference has to be made here. There is a
genuine fear in the United States, and this fear is shared by very many
sections of people in Asia, that if America and the West do not interest
themselves in the politics of South-Asia, the States here–the smaller ones
especially–which are not in a position to defend themselves will be easily
absorbed into China in the case of South-East Asia and the Far East, into
Soviet Russia in the case of the Middle East. They will become
satellites of these two big Communist powers. The withdrawal therefore of
Western or American imperialism will not mean their freedom, independence and
sovereignty but their dependence on China
and Soviet Russia–the
substitution of one imperialism by another. Such a fear is entertained in Thailand, in the Philippines
and also in Iran, Turkey, Iraq etc. The conclusion that follows is that unless an
understanding and an organisation of an international character came into
existence with which the independence of these small States can be guaranteed,
there can be no escape from Americans trying to fill in the power vacuum.
PANDIT NEHRU’S VISIT TO CHINA
It
is in this context that the visit of Pandit Nehru to China assumes world significance.
If he can get an understanding from China–an understanding of an effective
character–that she would never cast her eyes on Indo-China, Indonesia,
Thailand, Burma, Nepal and the Philippines, that she would not encourage any
subversive movements in them, that she would not use the ten million Chinese
residents in them to further her own purposes, there is then the prospect of an
Asian settlement. It is on these points that there is suspicion.
It may be argued that China had already given a
guarantee in respect of these matters by subscribing to the five principles
included in the communiques issued after her Prime
Minister’s talks with the Prime Ministers of India and Burma. In a world where
there is so much of disparity between word and deed, how are the nations to be
convinced of the practical utility of these principles? After all they are not
new. They are at the basis of the Charter of the United Nations to which sixty
nations have subscribed. But are there not many States who have violated them
and whose violations could not be remedied by the Security Council or the
General Assembly? It now rests with Pandit Nehru to bring back with him some
measures of a practical character under which the independence of Asian nations
is guaranteed, not only against Western imperialism but also against Chinese
and Soviet imperialism. This will place him among the greatest of statesmen of
all times.