INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M. A.

Among the developments of the quarter, the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty at the San Francisco Conference, the oil crisis in Iran leading to the complete evacuation of the Abadan oil refinery by the British and its consequent closing at least for the time being the denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 by the Egyptian Government and the resort to military measures by Britain with a view to enforce the terms of the Treaty, the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty organization, and suspension of the truce talks in Korea for nearly two months and their resumption deserve to be noted. The quarter has also seen at one stage the probability of an actual war breaking out between India and Pakistan which, fortunately for all, has not become an actuality. There is no change in the general world situation. The crisis continues and atomic explosions are becoming as common in Soviet Russia as in the United States. The phenomena associated with the Atomic Age are taking a more and more definite shape.

The Treaty which forty-eight of the nations assembled at the San Francisco Conference signed on September 8, 1951 is an event of great importance for a variety of reasons. Japan has ceased to be an occupied territory and has once more resumed her place as a sovereign independent State though with reduced territory and resources. She lost all her dominions and dependencies, and even some of the small islands which for ages have been regarded as part and parcel of the Japanese State have been taken away. Two criticisms have been directed against the terms of the Treaty–one that it was too severe and one-sided and another that it was too lenient and that the terms should have been harder. But both criticisms are highly unrealistic. It is true that Japan has not in consequence of the Treaty become really independent and sovereign. The Treaty provides for the stationing of the American forces in and around Japan, the lease of military bases to the Americans and the virtual continuance of the American hold over the country–the hold which was obtained by the victory gained in the second world war. All this means that Japan is as much a satellite of the United States as is Romania, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia are of Soviet Russia. Critics therefore ask, where do the independence and sovereignty of Japan lie? The question is relevant and one has to confess that the Treaty itself is based on the American view that Japan should serve as her satellite so far as her foreign policy is concerned, and that she should not be in a position to remain either neutral or work on the side of the Communist bloc in the cold war that is now going on. The Japanese are conscious of all this, but they considered this position to be much better than the continuance of American military rule and have reconciled themselves to it. There is also the large amount of internal freedom that they can enjoy as a result of the Treaty. The argument that the Treaty is too soft and that it enables Japan once more to become a great military power and a source of aggression to the neighbouring countries, also contains some truth though there is no fear that all this will happen in the very near future. Though no limits have been placed on the extent to which Japan might rearm herself, it will take a long time for her to become a source of threat and aggression to others. With the loss of her empire she is not in a position to get the raw materials needed for her industrial expansion, and without a high degree of industrialisation she cannot hope to become an aggressive military power. That she is bound to rearm herself goes without saying. This is the very purpose of the Americans in bringing about the Treaty. It is their determination to use the potential military resources of Japan in any future war with China and Soviet Russia that has brought about the Treaty, and such a purpose will not be served if Japan is kept completely disarmed. Another reason why the Treaty has been regarded as too soft is that it has not provided for the payment of any reparations by Japan to the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and other countries which suffered damage at her hands in the war. Here again American pressure and influence have brought them round–except Burma which has not signed the Treaty. They can, if only they are loyal to the United States, get any amount of economic aid–much more perhaps than what they can expect from a defeated and economically ruined Japan.

Among those who did not sign the Japanese Treaty are India, China, Soviet Russia, and those States in Central and Eastern Europe which are included in the Soviet bloc. There is no need to go through the arguments put forward by the Government of India against the terms of the Treaty. But there is a real difference between her attitude and the attitude of the Communist States. India is prepared to enter into bilateral Treaty relations with Japan, and negotiations for this purpose have already been commenced. Though India had serious objections to the terms of the Treaty, and though she did not sign it, she is quite willing to recognise its results and adjust herself to them. But this is not the position of the Communist States. They do not want to have any kind of friendly relationship with a Japan which for all practical purposes has become, in their view, a dependency of the United States. Here is what a Chinese newspaper has to say about the Treaty: “The people of South-East Asia realize that the Peace Treaty with Japan worked out unilaterally by the United states and Britain holds in prospect for the peoples of South-East Asia not peace but war. They understand that only the unanimous support of the proposals advanced by the Soviet Government, their discussion by representatives of all countries which participated in the war against Japan, and the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan based on the declarations of the United Nations, the Cairo declaration, the Yalta agreement and the Potsdam declaration will make it possible to ensure peace everywhere in Asia and will answer the aspirations of Asia. The Peace Treaty signified still more intensified remilitarization of Japan and her conversion into an instrument for carrying out the criminal policy of war and aggression pursued by the American reactionaries in the Far East.”

What exactly is it that the Japanese Peace Treaty registers in relation to the world as it is situated today? Japan has entered the American bloc as against the Soviet bloc. The Treaty has added to the strength of American defences in the Pacific. Taken along with the pact which America has entered into with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand and also along with American control of Formosa, it has given to the United States an unbroken line of fortified territories in the Pacific on the Asian side into which it will be difficult for the Soviet bloc to enter. This completes in a way the steps taken by the United States to build up her Pacific defences. There is no question of right or wrong in this connection. The cold war is a fact. It is a fact that there are two rival worlds. And the Japanese Treaty is an inevitable step that the United States could not but take to strengthen herself in the cold war.

Everyone realises that the Treaty has not brought real peace in the Far East nearer. It has not solved any of those questions which have created tension there. The dispute regarding Formosa and the representation of the Communist Government of China on the Security Council are still there. Above all, the war continues in Korea. It looks as if the truce talks will be resumed. But will they lead to a permanent settlement of the Korean question? This is doubtful. Neither party is anxious for a negotiated peace. Each believes in a military triumph. Peace based on undisputed military strength and irresistible armaments has now become the watchword of the Americans. Rightly or wrongly they have come to the conclusion that right and justice do not prevail out of their inherent strength. They must be backed up by force. So a peace in Korea will be possible only when a complete victory is obtained in the battle-field and this will take a long time.

A new crisis has meanwhile developed in the Middle East or the Arab world. Iran has driven out the British from the Abadan refinery: and the nationalisation of the oil industry which has been the cause of dispute between Iran and Britain is now an accomplished fact. Oil is the main source of wealth for Iran; but its exploitation has rested with the British Oil Company all along. The Company no doubt has been paying large royalties to the Iranian Government. It was even willing to recognise the nationalisation of the industry and share half and half of the profits with the Iranian Government. But the Government wanted to make the industry a wholly national concern, and reduce the British technicians to the position of Iranian employees, paying them the salaries they wanted, it is true, but controlling the whole concern themselves. The British at one stage threatened that they would fight to defend what they considered to be their legal and legitimate interests; but wiser counsels prevailed and they did not resort to arms, which would have meant the flaring up of war not only in Iran but in the whole of the Middle East–a war which would have converted it into another Korea. There are in England many critics of the Labour Government who feel that war should have been resorted to, and that the Government made a mistake in appeasing the Iranians just as Chamberlain appeased Hitler at Munich. It is their view that British surrender in Iran is today responsible for the crisis in Egypt and in the whole of the Middle East.

In understanding the situation in the Middle East two or three factors have to be kept in mind. In the first place all the countries of the Middle East–the whole Arab world–are now dominated by nationalism. People there are not prepared to tolerate any kind of external control or influence. They want to get rid of the last foreigner–the last Englishman in this case–having any influence whatever. The English know this; so also the Americans. But why do they still want to exercise control over these countries? It is mainly for strategic reasons. In the cold war between them and Soviet Russia, they cannot afford to ignore the strategic importance of this area. If they leave it–as the nationalists want them to do–a power vacuum will be created and it will be immediately occupied by Soviet Russia. Communist Governments will be established throughout this region and this would be a decisive victory for Soviet Russia and an equally decisive defeat for the Anglo-American bloc. Something is added to all this tension by the presence of the State of Israel in the midst of the Arab world. It is a State whose existence is anathema to the Arab States. They are not yet reconciled to it. And if the Anglo-American influence is wiped out completely from this area, and if Soviet Russia takes their place, no one can say exactly what will become of Israel.

It is thus clear that, in the strategic defences that the Anglo-Americans are building up with a view to prevent further expansion of Communism, the Middle East occupies a dominant position. If the Middle East is lost everything else is lost.

This is the reason why the British have resolved on defending their treaty rights in Egypt at the point of the sword. There are two grounds of dispute in this area. The Egyptians think it derogatory to their national self-respect that any British army should be in occupation of the Suez Canal Zone which is a part of their territory. Secondly they want that the British should leave Sudan, and that Sudan should be incorporated in the Kingdom of Egypt. This is behind their cry of the unity of the valley of the Nile. The British are not prepared to yield on either of the two grounds. If the Middle East is important to them from the point of view of world strategy, they must fight for retention of control over it, even if such a course brings them into conflict with Egyptian nationa1 sentiment. Nationalism they know is a strong force and has to be recognised. But in the modern age extreme nationalism has its dangers. It is only some kind of co-operative nationalism that deserves to be encouraged. So they say that some device has to be adopted which will reconcile the Egyptian nationalism, which is opposed to the presence of foreign armies in their territory, and the nationalism of the British and the nationalism of the Americans which equally feel that, unless their armies are stationed in the Canal Zone, there is no prospect of their defending the Middle East against Russian aggression which, according to them, is not an imaginary fear but a reality. With a view to bring about such a reconciliation they have proposed to create a common system of Middle East Defence, in which Egypt would have the same place of equality with Britain, France, and the United States, and any army stationed in the Canal Zone would not be a British army but an international force organised for the defence of the Middle East area. It would be something like the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation under the command of the Americans, but consisting of regiments supplied by all the Treaty Powers. The Egyptians however have not accepted these proposals. They fear that this would amount to joining the Anglo-American bloc as against the Soviet bloc, and they do not like any such alignment. They would prefer an independent line of foreign policy. Of course the argument between the two sides can be carried on indefinitely. Can Egypt afford to pursue an independent line of foreign policy? Can she maintain her independence if threatened by Soviet moves in the Middle East? She could not even fight successfully against a small State like Israel. If the British withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone she might become independent of Britain, no doubt, but she would, the next day, become dependent on Soviet Russia. None of the small nations in the world can stand on their own legs with the two giants. Soviet Russia and the United States, striding over the whole globe. There is therefore no prospect of the British appeasing the Egyptians. They have already begun the war on the Canal Zone, and if in the general elections the Conservatives under the leadership of Winston Churchill come into office, more warlike efforts will be adopted to strengthen the Middle East Defences.

On Sudan also the British are not prepared to yield. It is a very important area for them from the economic as well as the strategic standpoint, and it is their argument that the Sudanese have to be consulted before they are incorporated in the Egyptian Kingdom.

There is one factor in the situation in the Middle East which has added to the inherent complication characterising it. It is the attitude of the United States. The Government of the American Republic has not taken any firm line of action in Iran or in Egypt. There seem to be misunderstandings between Britain and the United States if there are no serious misunderstandings, the United States is somehow hesitating to make its position clear. She must be prepared to shoulder the responsibilities which have so far been borne by Britain. If Britain withdraws and if Soviet Russia takes her place in the Middle East, the policy which Truman has all along followed to arrest the further expansion of Communism will be a failure. It is true that taking up the side of Britain in the Iranian oil issue would have created difficulties for the Americans in Saudi Arabia and other parts of Western Asia where they have similar oil concessions; but yielding to the Iranian Government would also mean encouraging the Government of other Arab States to put forward schemes of nationalisation. In this situation the Americans would have done well in adopting a more positive line of action in Iran and Egypt which they have so far failed to do. The sooner the Americans enter into an understanding with the British and the French on all the Middle Eastern issues the better it will be.

This is all the more necessary as supplementing the action which they recently took in admitting Turkey and Greece to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, though they are so far away from the North Atlantic. This was done in the interests of strategy. The next few months are bound to be critical. Everything depends on the course of the resumed peace talks in Korea and on the way in which the war situation in Egypt develops. If the talks fail or if the situation in Egypt takes a turn for the worse, the war area of the world will become more extensive and the hope of a better life for humanity will become more distant. There is an old saying that man’s life is controlled by unseen forces and that the triumphs which he seems to win by his intelligence are only seeming triumph. Perhaps there is a great deal of truth in this saying.

Bombay,

Oct. 24, 1951.

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