INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS–A SURVEY
Developments in South-east Asia-Perspectives and prospects
PROF.
R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO
Few
events in contemporary times have occurred with such swiftness and decisiveness
as the fall of
Even
most of those who have misgivings of the Communist take over of
Now
that most of Indo-China has come under Communist control what prospects does it
hold out for the region as a whole?
First,
the unification of
The
immanent winding up of
What
about the so-called spectre of communism? The
simultaneous fall of
One
cannot get away from the fact that Indo-China has now become Communist. While
one can acclaim that the “little” men of Indo-China have worsted the world’s
mightiest power and that the combination of reactionary nationalism and Western
imperialism has been successfully defeated, yet it cannot be said that the “communisation” of Indo-China is an unmixed blessing of
But
of course the face of communism has now changed beyond recognition. The fall of
Indo-China has not created as much panic as it would have done in the past, say
a decade-and-half ago. It would be interesting to analyse
the reasons for this.
The
Sino-Soviet conflict is obviously the main basis for the optimism that the
Indo-China events are not a prelude to communist territorial expansion. This
conflict has not only eliminated a single nerve-centre for decision-making in the Communist world, it
created rival centres out to checkmate each other,
often times to the detriment of the Communist interest itself. Because of this
in Communist Indo-China itself pulls and counter-pulls
are patently visible. For example,
The
nature of the American readjustment to these changes should also be understood.
The Americans no longer see
The
point is that the Sino-Soviet quarrel has rendered even a Communist Indo-China
a least likely instrument of Communist expansionism. The attitude of the
South-east Asian nations them-selves confirms this.
Most of the members of the ASEAN (Association of South-east Asian States) have
now established diplomatic relations with
Notwithstanding
Outside the ASEAN, one has to examine Japan’s reactions. Here again, as only to be expected, a certain amount of uncertainty is visible, At one level, Japan began its adjustment with China since the traumatic Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971. Therefore the sliding of Indo-China into communism and the American policy of withdrawal do not cause any more of a surprise in Tokyo. Yet at another level of analysis Japan’s dependence on America should be recognised and on this score Japan shows some worry. For example, a few weeks after Saigon’s fall Tokyo announced that for its defence it still relies on American protection. Yet only a few weeks later the Japanese Government could not muster courage to ask its Parliament to ratify the N. P. T. which Japan had signed some years ago.
Tokyo does not fear a direct
Communist aggression. The present trends in detente and the Sino-Soviet quarrel
are indeed reassuring to the Japanese on that score. But the prospect of a denouement
in which Korea becomes Communist are scaring to Japan. The encouraging signs of
North-South reconciliation in Korea has now receded and a recrudescence of
hostility is once again evident. Japan apprehends that in this explosive
situation either Russia or China might try out a probing operation to test
American readiness to stand by its Korean commitments. In Tokyo’s calculations
the fall of South Korea is an unacceptable security risk. Hence it is eager to
diffuse the Korean situation. Reports are that U. S. and Japan are together
willing to sponsor a resolution in the U. N. to withdraw the U. N. forces in
Korea (which are there to check North Korean advance into the South) provided
both the Koreas agreed to a valid framework for the 1953 armistice agreement.
Coming from the U. S. and Japan this proposal is indeed far-reaching. North
Korea herself has been insisting for sometime on the withdrawal of U. N.
troops. She has secured the non-aligned support and there are reports the North
Korea has even sought non-aligned membership. The reported U.S.-Japanese move,
if true, will reduce the mileage that the Third-World would begetting out
of this issue. All this only highlights
the inherent complexity in the situation.
Apart
from the Korean issue, Japan is involved in a tight-rope walking exercise in
balancing her relations with the three major, powers–the U. S. A., U. S. S. R.,
and China. As between the latter two she has closer ties with China. But in
view of the significant change in South-east Asia, as a measure to counter the
Chinese ascendancy it is quite likely that Russo-Japanese relations would
register an upward movement.
With
the foregoing framework of the East Asian reaction to recent developments, let
us analyse the proposals for security in the region.
Mainly
two proposals have so far been canvassed. First, Malaysia in 1971 proposed a
plan for the neutralisation of the whole
region–a plan incorporated into the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November, 1971.
The idea is that neutralisation will insulate the
region both from super-power rivalry and Chinese domination. While the idea is
slowly gaining acceptance there are certain obvious snags. Because of the
developments in Laos–a state neutralised by
international agreement in the early sixties to keep it out of Vietnam-type
conflict - an attempt that proved abortive in the end some are scepctical of the solution of neutralization. Further any
viable neutralisation agreement should mean
great-power guarantees and here again doubts about the readiness of the
super-powers persist. Russia, in particular, has been un-favourable
to this plan from the start since this does not fit in with its own proposal
for an Asian security system. Predictably enough, China has given its support
to this neutralisation idea “in principle”. Peking
may have calculated that, after all the reasons of geography would obviously
place her in a favourable situation when once
South-east Asia is rendered out of bounds to the super-powers by neutralisation. It should also be mentioned that the
Malaysian Plan is again being actively canvassed. In view of the developments
of the last four months and on purely commonsensical grounds too the proposal
is most likely to acquire a ground swell in the corning months. Malaysia
and Indonesia are inviting both North and South Vietnam and Loas
into the ASEAN itself.
In the context of “neutralisation” there is also talk of a purely regional security arrangement. But, of course, the problem with this scheme is: who would provide the teeth? It is possible that the Americans may have assured to underwrite any self-help arrangement. Curiously enough, the Chinese may not really object to any latent American presence of the Americans either. For example, in the European context they accuse the Russians of trying to “squeeze out U. S. influence there for its own ends.” One suspects that a similar fear is playing on the Chinese mind vis-a-vis South-east Asia. They certainly abhor a slow Russian penetration with the shrinking of American influence. Such Chinese apprehensions are strengthened by the phenomenal increase in the Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean area, the leverage Moscow now has in Hanoi and, most important of all, the Russian influence in South Asia, particularly India. brings us to the issue of the prospects of Russian policy towards the powers of the region.
It
is not unlikely that Moscow would also try to revive its favourite
project on Asian security. It may be recalled that since 1969 Moscow has floated
this idea though it has so far not given any detailed blue-print. In the
beginning some suspected that there was an anti-Peking ring round the proposal.
Moscow, however, demurred saying that even China is welcome to join the
proposed Asian security system. Now that the American prestige is at its nadir,
would not Moscow revive the theme in one form or the other? But the odds still
are against the Russians making headway as the attractions of the neutralisation plan to outdistance those
of a security plan which is designed to make a far away super-power play the
patron.
What would
be India’s reaction to the events? Her reaction to the fantastic success of the
N. L. F. in South Vietnam is, no doubt, one of unqualified jubilation. But an
element of perplexity in New Delhi’s reactions at the rush of events can also
be seen. India is conscious that the balance of advantage has swung decidedly
in Peking’s favour. The thing to be done is at least
to make the regional states recognise that some sort
of a new security arrangement is needed, even when from another analytical
standpoint these states may disavow any threat from China. New Delhi would not
like to project herself as surrogate for Moscow and therefore India’s endeavours would be to enter into the spirit of the region
and canvass the recognition of identity of interests via-a-vis
herself and the local states. This should take the shape of reiterating the
idea of self-reliance through mutual co-operation which is the same thing as
saying that the area must be free from great power influence. To do this
effectively, India should establish her salience in the region. It is here that
our foreign policy has been a singular failure.
During
the Nehru era our fundamentalist approach to non- alignment on the one hand and
the membership of many South-east Asian countries in the SEATO on the other,
created an almost unbridgeable chasm. Not even the Sino-Indian War of 1962
could alter the state of our relations with South-east Asia. India continued to
look at her SEATO neighbours through her non-aligned
perspectives. The result was a near total failure of communication between
India and countries like Thailand, Philippines and even Malaysia.
It
was in the late sixties that Mrs. Gandhi tried to project the Indian image as a
power of the region and her visit to some ofthe
countries in 1967 was in pursuit of that objective. This was the time when
rcgiona1 organisations like the ASEAN were formed.
But this deliberate effort to cultivate South-east Asia did not remain a sustained
one.
Even
after the Bangla Desh
affair, in spite of apparent India’s diplomatic ascendancy, she could not
persuade the generality South-east Asian states that a community of interests
does exist between itself and South-east Asia. Striking proof of this came in
the form of open differences in attitudes over the issue of great power
presence in the Indian Ocean area. While India joined with Sri Lanka in
sponsoring a resolution urging that the Indian Ocean area be made in a peace
zone, the other powers in the area are not fully convinced of the extent of
India’s commitment to this policy in view of the nature of Indo-Soviet
relations. Equally obvious are the differences over the issue of the
neutralization proposal. Here again the Indian support to the proposal has been
somewhat ambivalent.
In
fact during the first half of the seventies Indo-South-east Asian relations
assumed a low profile. In contrast, India continued to put its diplomatic eggs
in the West Asian basket. Since the October, 1973 Middle East War, this trend
became even more pronounced. For example, the last 20 months witnessed
phenomenal increase in visits to and from India and West Asia, ranging from
visits of heads of states and governments to those of official delegations
negotiating various types of agreements for trade and industrial co-operation.
Contacts with South-east Asian countries have been most infrequent. No doubt
the strategy of concentrating on West Asia is quite warranted. Considerations
of oil supplies and expectations of aid from Arab oil profits are only the
immediate motivations. More important is the long term consideration that since
the break up of Pakistan, India has to pay great attention to her Western neighbours. The emergence of Iran has a regional power with
colossal strategic potential and her ambivalent attitude to India since 1971,
made it imperative for India to give top priority to the West Asian front. In
fact India’s success in arriving at a modus vivendi
with Iran can be regarded as India’s major diplomatic achievement. Still
one -wonders whether the near neglect of South-east Asia has been wise. For one
thing the pay offs from the West Asia diplomatic investments have not been
optimal and one cannot be sure of the prospect of Indo-Iranian relations. Even
without these limiting considerations operating in relation to our West
Asian policies, the neglect of South-east Asia seems un-warranted.
Viewed
in the foregoing background the need for India reviewing its South-east Asia
policy is very urgent. Given India’s primacy of position in
South Asia, a meaningful dialogue between her and the smaller states of the
region can centre round the evolution of a close and
consultative relationship. Economic and technical co-operation could provide
the growth point in their relationship. Since everybody is agreed that the
optimum solution for the security problem is a viable defence arrangement among
the local powers, India could play a critical role. It is not impossible that
on the basis of a close understanding of each others perspectives informal and
mutual defence agreements can also emerge. As a matter of fact, the Russians
hoped that a series of bilateral arrangements between the South and South-east
Asian states could serve as an alternative to their proposed Asian security
arrangement. This still seems to be a viable arrangement. However, its
prospects would be brighter if the Soviet Union does not don the sponsors
mantle as the regional states are averse to achieve Russian interest in their
defence arrangements.