INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY
DR.
R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO
Welcome
advances in some fronts and ominous reverses in others have
been characteristic of trends in world politics in recent months. This has been
evident in the matter of East-West relations, in the affairs of the powers
within the Soviet sphere of influence as also in the matter of relations among
the Asian Powers themselves.
East-West Relations
Among
other indications of efforts to maintain the tempo of relaxation in East-West
relations, the developments over West Asia and
A solution to the problem is nowhere in sight and frequent engagements still remind the world of the explosiveness of the situation. Since last March no less than half-a-dozen engagements of considerable magnitude took place. Truly had an American cartoonist remarked that the June ’67, ‘six-day war is over 700 days old!’ Yet it is chastening to look at the U. S.-Russian efforts in this area, if only to realise that both sides are sincere in their efforts for concerted action for peace in the area.
It is well-known that the four major powers evolved
a plan for
As
for the two belligerent sides themselves,
This
bridging of the gap between Arab sentiment and American king was apparently
reinforced with the
The
American Plan became, as it were, the basis for the
big-power plan. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrei
Gromyko, was despatched
post-haste to
The Big-Power
Proposals
The
substance of the big-power plan lay in a formula evolved between
The
failure of the Gromyko mission should not, however,
detract from the significance of the Russo-American action in trying for a West
Asian settlement. It provides the satisfying thought that the ‘detente’,
after all, has come to stay.
This pattern of progress towards a solution and
reversion to a stalemate could be seen over the
First
signs of optimism appeared with the
These
two moves by Saigon and
A
little later, Saigon, which had all along rejected the Hanoi proposals, grew
even more flexible in announcing that she would never agree to a coalition with
the Vietcong. Though, apparently, the ‘never’ referred to an immediate
coalition, and not the possibility of long-term coalition, the tenor of
Saigon’s refusal suggested a significant step back from its previous offer of
allowing the Vietcong a political role. In fact, it was widely reported that
there was a clash between Nixon and Thieu, In view of
the fact that the Nixon Plan did visualise a
coalition coming about after the proposed elections, the Nixon-Thieu quarrel arose from the former objecting to any
coalition at all. Seen thus, President Thieu
accomplished a political somersault indeed. Reports of a Nixon-Thieu split gained added credibility when Nixon proposed a
meeting with his South Vietnamese counterpart at Midway Islands in the Pacific.
President Thieu sought clarifications on the Nixon
proposals of May l4th especially on the issue relating to future elections.
Presumably, he was worried about the implications of the Washington Plan. It is
difficult to say what exactly happened at Midway, but Nixon came out of it with
the announcement of a partial U. S. troop withdrawal, immediately after the
meeting. Though the number to be withdrawn was just 25,000 out of a total of
5,38,500 U. S. soldiers out there, even that is most significant. For,
hitherto, the U. S. refused to consider such a step on the plea that it was for
Hanoi to reciprocate Washington’s first step in stopping bombing raids in the
North. That the U. S. chose to take this further step in deescalating the
Vietnam war without waiting for Hanoi’s gesture is a measure of her sincerity
in trying to end the tragedy there. As if to meet Saigon’s fears of being left
alone to face Communist aggression, President Nixon repeatedly assured that the
U. S. would keep its pledges of supporting Saigon and that the ‘withdrawal’
could always be reversed if the situation so warranted. He proposed a continuing
review of the situation. In spite of these, Thieu
could not have welcomed the American proposals. It is a safe guess that
President Nixon had to concede something to get Saigon reconciled to his
decision. And the concession seems to lie in letting Thieu
talk tough about future elections and about the prospect of a coalition. This
is evident in the latter’s references about elections. President Thieu merely stated that if the enemy would talk seriously
and show good-will for peace “he would be willing to discuss when and how
elections might be held.” On the issue of a coalition in the short run, the
President’s statements are indeed provocative. He stated “from now on, those
who spread rumours that there will be a coalition
government in the country, wherever they may be, whether they may be in the
executive or the legislature, will be severely punished.” Thus, the price for
the U. S. decision to withdraw is to let Thieu get
away with his rejection of an immediate coalition. The U. S. position vis-a-vis Saigon is, in a sense, comparable, to Moscow’s vis-a-vis Cairo, over the West Asian affair. Over Vietnam
it was Washington’s turn to have failed in persuading its ‘protege’
to be more accommodative over the coalition issue, as it was Moscow’s misfortune
to have failed in convincing the Arabs to accept the big-power plan.
Newspapers definitely expected out of the Midway meeting something spectacular
by way of Nixon moulding Thieu
to a more reasonable frame of mind apropos a viable political settlement in the
near future. Judged from these expectations Midway had not seen much headway.
Moscow, with characteristic scorn pooh-poohed the conference by likening it to
a “mountain labouring to give birth to a mouse.”
The
Midway decision was dismissed as a propaganda gimmick by the N. L. F.
Obviously, what irked it most was that the U. S. decision was coupled with
Saigon’s total rejection of any political participation of the N. L. F. in the
near future. As a result, the N. L. F. proclaimed itself as the Provisional
Government of South Vietnam getting immediate recognition from the Communist
bloc, as also from some of the Afro-Asian group. Countries like India chose not
to recognise the revolutionary government. No
material alteration in the situation occurred by this Communist move except
that, at the Paris Conference table the name of the N. L. F. delegation, from
henceforth will be different. No doubt, to some extent, it gets the status of a
parallel government, a status enough to spite the Saigon Government for its
refusal to treat the N. L. F. as representing even a considerable section of
the South Vietnamese. The Americans have also very prudently let the change
take place without any sharp rejoinder at the Paris table.
Thus,
the world is as far away from sighting a settlement in Vietnam as before. The
hopeful point is that the Americans decided to go a bit farther in their search
for a way out of Vietnam.
Other Indications
If
the moves in the West Asian and Vietnam problems disclose the readiness of the
two major powers to co-operate and conciliate, there are other indications in
this direction too.
A
development indicating Russia’s anxiety to project a non-belligerent image
occurred during the May Day Celebrations in Moscow this year. For the first time
since the cold war, the annual May Day parade went off without the show of
Russian military might. That not a single armament was put on show that day
discloses the uniqueness of the event. As if to confirm this symbolic symptom, Brezhnev in his speech on the occasion played up Moscow’s
peaceful predispositions.
Attitudes
among the Western powers showed similar determination not to dilute the
‘detente.’ President Nixon’s European visit soon, after his assumption of
office, was intended as much to tell his Western European allies that he will
have to have a free hand in negotiating with Moscow, as it was to assure them
of America’s continuing interest in European unity and security.
Events
within the communist world also exhibit an admixture of progress and
regress from the point of view of respect for the autonomy of the States within
the Communist State system. And on balance the regressions are more
conspicuous.
Mr. Dubcek Goes
The
fall of Mr. Dubcek and his close associates from
power in Prague is a rude reminder that the Russians never forget past
‘wrongs’. It was in June, ’69, that Mr. Dubcek
formally asked to be relieved of his party post and himself proposed the name
of Mr. Husak, who was reported to be Moscow’s man in
Prague. It was evident since the rape of Czechoslovakia last August that Mr. Dubcek was marked out for an early ouster, and it is a
measure of the influence he wielded and the affection he commanded in the party
and outside that the Russians took so long to get him out. Like all ‘realist’
liberals, Mr. Dubcek had to play the unenviable role
of carrying out the ‘diktat’ of the overlord while trying to salvage,
wherever possible, the gains of liberalisation. Even
this degree of compliance was not enough for the Russians who were
smarting under the humiliation of being compelled to expose the uglier side of
their nature in sending troops into Prague last August. Rumours
of Mr. Dubcek’s dismissal were frequent since
then. And his departure now constitutes the culmination of the process begun
last year of systematic and remorseless undoing of the democratisation and liberalisation
in Czechoslovakia. Howsoever foreseen and inevitable it may be, this event
underscores Moscow’s spirit of revenge and should make one beware that the
Kremlin is never too far from reverting to the Stalinist ‘mores’.
The Red Summit and
Russia’s Road to Reaction
The
Conference of the World Communist Parties, summoned by the Russia and
vehemently opposed by China, opened on the 3rd of June, in Moscow. Altogether
parties of 75 countries took part. The significance of the event cannot be
underestimated for it is the first in nearly a decade to be organised
by Moscow to discuss the problems facing the communist movement. Since the
Sino-Soviet rift itself had its early manifestations around the year 1958-59,
the Moscow Conference is the first to be held after the rift assumed the shape
of an irreconcilable contradiction within the communist movement.
Though the opening session was conspicuous by the absence of anti-chinese speeches, pro-Moscow delegations later took up the theme which soon reached a ‘crescendo’ in the shape of a scathing Russian invective against Peking. Yet it is portentious that the conference did not pass any resolution against the Chinese. The politics behind this development are very revealing indeed. Originally, the Russian leaders intended to censure China but in the face of opposition from some leading parties, such as the Italian and Rumanian, they had to drop the item from the agenda to get the conference held at all. But as the conference progressed the anti-Chinese mood suddenly flared up as news of new clashes between Russia and China near the Sinkiang borders spread. The prospects for the passage of an anti-Peking resolution looked certain indeed. And yet, the Russians did not press for it for fear that it might add too much fuel to the fierce fires already raging at the conference.
But
the Russians did score a point in another area. They managed to get a majority
of the delegations to pass the main document of the conference –the one
relating to the item: “unity in the struggle against imperialism.” The point
about this document is that while it does not specifically endorse the infamous
Brezhnev thesis of limited sovereignty, with which
the Kremlin sought to justify the Czech invasion of last August, it contains
the sinister implication. The Brezhnev declaration
announced: “…..when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to
turn the development of a given socialist country in
the direction of a restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat
arises to the cause of socialism in that country–a threat to the
security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole, this is no longer merely a
problem for that country’s people, but a common problem – a concern of all
socialist countries.” Reading this along with the ominous phrase, “the international
duty of Communists,” which comes in the document on “unity,” the sinister
implications of the letter become evident. This cannot but be regarded as a
warning that Russia might not do to other socialist countries what it did to
the Czechs. Thus, plainly, the Russians, given up whatever inhibition they may
have had (since the days of de-Stalinisation) about
interfering in the internal affairs of other parties. Even Rumania,
which so vehemently opposed the Russian attempts to condemn
China at the meet and was pursuing much too independent a line
in foreign policy to the liking of Moscow, was made to accept the document though
she did express its misgivings about it. Viewed thus the Red Summit
accomplished a reversal of a welcome trend.
There
is, however, a consolation. For, the Russian victory is only a victory of
sorts. The Kremlin leaders ardently wished and surely expected that the
document would receive the unanimous imprimatur of the conference. In the
event, it was approved of only by a majority–albeit a large majority. That the
apparently innocuous words of the document might conceal frightening potentialities
was made plain by its critics. One delegate stated it in so many words when he
denounced that the document “does not say clearly that each communist party
should have the right to judge and decide for itself when internal questions
are at stake.” It is even more noteworthy that the discussions over the
document should occasion a reopening of the debate over the Moscow-led Czech
invasion. Apart from constituting the requiem to Czech liberalisation,
persistent referenccs to the Czech episode clearly
imply a bitter attack against the Brezhnev doctrine
itself.
On
the whole the Communist Summit is being as having brought a setback to the
autonomy of the members of the Communist brotherhood.
Whither Russian Policy
The
moves in the Czech scene and the shotgun passage of the document on unity, seem
to have provided the basis for recent Western assessments of Soviet attitudes.
Significantly enough, it is the liberal press in England and America that has
come out with the conclusion that there is a right about turn in the Kremlin’s
policies under Brezhnev and Kosygin.
Mr. Anatole Shub of the Washington
Post, returning from a three-year stint in Moscow, published a series of
articles, characteristically captioned: ‘Russia turns back the clock.” To him, the
post-Krushchev leadership has reluctantly continued
the liberal line in foreign policy. He rejects the idea that the internal
struggle in the Kremlin is one between ‘moderates’ and ‘conservatives.’ It is
much nearer the truth, says, Mr. Shub, to say that
there is in-fighting amongst the conservatives and reactionaries themselves.
This he infers from the Russian decision over Czechoslovakia–the gravity and
implications of which suggest that only a conservative and reactionary team
could have taken such a plunge. He contrasts the liberal foreign policy of the
early and mid-sixties (Cuban missile withdrawal, Test Ban
Treaty, Krushchev’s thesis of peaceful economic
competition with capitalism, etc.,) with the Russian role in instigating the
Arabs to the costly misadventure of June 1967 and, more important, with their hatchetman mentality in dealing with the members of their
ideological bloc. The Economist of London was even more forthright. “No
partnership with him”–was the title of its
write-up on the leadership of Brezhnev. Referring to
the recent summit and the passing of the document on unity, it says: “It is too
simple to say that the post-Krushchev regime in
Russia has reverted to the habits of Stalinism. The Romans, after their
relative relaxation under Claudius, did not get a return to tiberianism.
They got Nero. Mr. Brezhnev’s Russia has much in
common with Nero’s Rome: not least in the fact that the dominant interest of
its ruler has become the preservation of an impossibly inflexible
power-structure.” Very powerful indictment indeed.
The
two assessments given above confirming the trend towards neo-Stalinism, can be
accepted only in so far as they relate to Moscow’s attitude towards other
communist countries. If, however, these Western perceptions imply a general
switch back in the foreign policy style of Russia then, serious objections crop
up. For, in fact, in recent times Russian foreign policy has taken to
unorthodox ways, departing even from basic principles of communist ideology.
Witness the most surprising proposal to come out of the Kremlin: the proposal
for creation of a defence alliance for the balance of
power in South-East Asia. Even if Moscow did not envisage defence
pact aimed at encircling China, the very suggestion that some South-East Asian
countries, particularly India, Pakistan, Cambodia and some others, should join
in a collective security arrangement, indicates that the Kremlin does not feel
inhibitions any longer to don the mantle of the supervisor of the world order,
eager to see that no maverick–even if it be a
communist maverick–disturbs the present
world order. Indeed, the stages in the evolution of this proposal are very
suggestive.
It
was first mooted in an article in the Soviet Government daily, Izvestia, at the end of May. The article
referred to the threat from “Mao and his henchman,” and envisaged a collective
security arrangement with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia and
Singapore as possible members. Then, in May, at the Communist Parties Summit in
Moscow, Brezhnev himself made a mention of the need
for collective security “in areas of the world where the danger of another
world war is concentrated,” specifically mentioning Asia
as one such area. However, later on, the Russian leaders denied that they had
the Chinese threat in mind in proposing the defence alliance. There, later, Russian
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, it is difficult not to infer
that the Chinese threat is very much in Kremlin’s calculations. For the
magnitude of the Sino-Soviet rift has assumed staggering proportions
The Recent Armed
Clashes
The
Sino-Soviet border clashes on the far-eastern borders of Russia,
in March, are only symptoms of the intense hatred prevailing among the leaders
of these top Communist powers. The incidents occurred in the area of Nizhnemikhailovka border post, commonly known as Damansky island, in the Ussuri
river, to the North of Vladivostok. For quite
sometime there has been persistent haggling, as to whom these border areas
belong. Under the treaty of 1860, the Chinese were made to give away large
chunks of these area, as also other territories on their Western borders (Sinkiang), to the Russians. It is well-known that the
Chinese were compelled to sign many such treaties with the European powers –
treaties invariably to the detriment of China, and
hence characterised the ‘unequal’ treaties. That
Communist Russia should continue to profit from these unscrupulous gains by the
hated Tzars is certainly ironical. The Chinese now
demand that the Russians vacate these regions. Tension on these regions has
been mounting proportionate to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet cold war,
and on previous occasions border patrols did confront each other in menacing
postures. But never before last March, these confrontations result in armed
clashes involving casualities. But in these recent
clashes, it seems, it is not the Chinese who were in the wrong, for the site of
the engagement was on the Chinese side of the Ussuri
river. Whether the Chinese provoked the Russians to enter into Chinese soil,
one cannot say. The Russians alleged such provocation while the latter accused
the Russians of starting the trouble first. That both the sides chose to make a
public issue out of it is even more significant. Some analysts read in this an
attempt on Mao’s part to reinsure his claims over these areas. It should be
mentioned that negotiations over the border claims ended in failure in 1964.
Apparently, the Chinese say that the Russians have not only been in illegal
possession of their lands but have been indulging in provocative actions. It
will be remembered that this is but a carbon copy of Peking’s explanation over
its hostilities against India in 1962. Thus the Chinese do not distinguish the
Russians from the Indians as far as border claims go. The March clashes were
followed by one more major engagement on the Sinkiang border in June. Given this
background of confrontation, it is not far fetched to interpret that the
Russian proposal for collective security was aimed at with the ‘yellow peril’
in view.
The
Russian anxiety to preserve peace in this area also underlies the other
proposal to strengthen regional economic co-operation. This was Mr. Kosygin’s contribution during his visit to India, Pakistan
and Afghanistan. His suggestion that consultations between Russia, India,
Pakistan and Afghanistan should immediately be initiated for the opening up of
an overland trade route between these countries is of great import.
It
is also curious that the U. S. A. and Russia should show equal concern for
South-East Asian security, knowing full well that it is not their rivalry that
is likely to disturb the peace. Now that they have decided to withdraw from
Vietnam, the Americans are eager to leave behind a compact alliance to contain
China. The Russian design for collective security in the area, can be read as
no less motivated by an identical concern. No wonder the Chinese had burst
forth into a blaze of picturesque indignation at the Russian proposal. They
called it “the Soviet revisionist attempt to rig up a system of collective
security in Asia” based on an idea “picked from the garbage-heap of the
notorious war monger John Foster Dulles.” Even if one rejects the Chinese
charge, the transformation of Russian policy from ideological considerations to
considerations of power-politics cannot be denied. Time was when Moscow in its
role as the leader of the Communist world refused to think in terms of balance
of power, had little time to think about the security of non-Communist neighbours and, above all, thought it a sacrilege even to
dream of containing an ‘ideological ally.’ Apparently, the Kremlin has now shed
these norms. In a sense this change could be seen in Kremlin’s role over the
Indo-pakistani hostilities in 1965. Tashkent showed
that apart from the Chinese angle, the simple desire to maintain peace in the
sub-continent became the concern of Russia.
Of
course, it is equally probable that the Russians are to compete with the
Americans in forging an alliance in the area and that the recent Russian
proposal confirms a struggle between the Kremlin and the
Pentagon for supremacy in the region. In the absence of Russian clarification
of its objectives it is difficult to ascertain its motivations. Perhaps the
vagueness of the proposals is indicative of a deliberate decision to withhold
elucidation until the reaction of Asian capitals is carefully sifted. On the
face of it a mere look at the names of the countries mentioned in the Izvestia article, raises doubts about the
feasibility of the proposal.
India and East Asian
Security
The
Indian Government’s reaction to these proposals is consistent with its previous
stand on the issue. It is opposed to joining any military alliances–American or
Russian sponsored–and has politely expressed its opposition to a military
security system. To proposals for regional economic security, New Delhi reacted
with alacrity. In fact, long before the Russian plan was canvassed, India
started cultivating better relations with East Asian countries. While India, no
doubt, is concerned with Chinese expansionism, as much as any other power in
the area, her search for allies is restricted to alliances in the non-military
spheres. Mrs. Gandhi’s recent visit to Japan and Indonesia is an effort in this
direction. Japan’s attitude, in particular, seems to augur well. Prime Minister
Sato is opposed to committing his country to any military arrangement and he
has openly differed with the United States’ efforts in giving ASPAC (Asian and
Pacific Council) a military orientation. Yet, Tokyo knows full well the need
for non-Communist Asian powers to team together. The obvious alternative, then,
is co-operation in the technical and economic areas. All the same, on closer
analysis, it is doubtful whether intimate economic ties could be a real answer
to external military threats from a strong power. It is all very well to talk
of self-reliance but if self-reliance to be backed by an inarticulate major
promise of outside help, is worth asking the question whether such self-reliance
is more prudent than committal to a long-term military alliance. Perhaps, Mrs.
Gandhi herself was thinking of closer economic ties as capable of bringing
together countries psychologically together and thus paving the way for
bilateral agreements even over defence matters.
In
any case, since the summer of 1968, there have been attempts on India’s part to
project herself as a South-East Asian power and the starting of a proper
dialogue with some of the countries in the region is itself a welcome sign.
If, without actually colluding, Russia and America are working for an identical goal: that of containing China–this very same motivation is leading them to woo Pakistan in a manner causing grave concern to India. The Russian policy in this regard is extremely interesting. In deciding to supply arms to Pindi she has put India and Pakistan on parity in her estimates. In his recent visit to the sub-continent Mr. Kosygin exhibited how necessary it is for him to keep Pindi in good humour. To top it all, Moscow announced that she no longer regards Pakistan as aligned to the West, meaning thereby that the latter is as much non-aligned as India is. The reason for this is not too far to seek. Even though General Yahya Khan did not show a pro-Chinese zeal immediately after assuming office, this cautious mood has disappeared of late. Pindi–Peking contacts have been growing rapidly and the Russians are anxious to do something to restrain Pindi. Hence the Russian anxiety to appease Pakistan. The Americans have been pursuing since a long time a policy of not hurting Pakistani feelings. No wonder that Washington has so far refused to firmly commit herself not to resume the supply of arms to Pindi. Thus the curious situation of Pakistan remaining very close to Peking and still getting arms from Moscow and Washington–remains unaltered to the great chagrin of India. Delhi’s persuasions in this regard have singularly failed. The super-powers have apparently forgotten that Pakistan might in a fit of bravado smash the fragile structure of peace erected in the sub-continent since Tashkent. As for Peking, she is eagerly waiting for this prospect.