INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY
DR.
R. V. RAMACHANDRASEKHARA RAO
Reader
and Head of the Department of Politics and
Public
Administration,
The
Paris Peace Talks over
The
talks commenced on the 12th May, the veteran
Thus
over the issue of the next step towards de-escalation there has been no
agreement for over two months. The teams do discuss other matters like
prisoners-of-war, neutrality of
To
handle such fruitless talks where each of the parties has to bear with the
other’s incessant repetition of ‘untruths’ and ‘lies’ (as it perceives) is
indeed a stupendous job.
It
must be emphasised that in spite of the frustrations
and provocations, neither side is prepared to bear responsibility for breaking
the talks. Though occasional adjournments are made for consultations with their
respective governments, talks do get resumed and the dialogue is well on its
way. The strategy of each of the parties seems to be aimed at extracting the
maximum possible concessions from the other. Even the communist adherence to
their stand that they need take no initiative in de-escalation need not be taken
too seriously. Only very recently did they disclose that in effect they slowed
down the pace of fighting and wanted that
However,
it is not too unrealistic to speculate about the possible shape of a political
settlement. The following conditions can be regarded as a must for any
settlement: 1. The future government of
The
Paris Talks, as already noted, seek a political solution for South Vietnam.
This goal is certainly narrower than the one envisaged by the Geneva Conference
of 1954. For this Conference the end-goal was a unified Vietnam through
elections. Of course, it was only a long-term goal. The point to be noted is
that now the issue of the unification of Vietnam is no longer even mentioned.
This change is an indication of the irrelevance of the Geneva Agreement to the
present context. No wonder, neither Washington nor Hanoi depend on these
Agreements. Russia and the U. K., the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, on
whom devolved the responsibility of giving effect to its decisions, do not
share common ground either on the implications of the Agreements or on the
interpretation of the post-Geneva developments. The failure of the British
Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart’s Moscow visit in May confirms the
ineffectiveness of the Geneva perspectives to the present times.
The
assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy in Los Angeles on the 6th June, by one Sirhan Bishara Sirhan, brought sorrow and dismay throughout the world. The
brilliant career of a very bright young man who raised hopeful expectations in
the minds of the poor and neglected sections in America and the poor and
underdeveloped regions outside America, has thus been cut short.
This
gruesome event following the murder ‘most foul’ of the Rev. Martin Luther King,
in April, once again brought to the fore the problem of the presence of a
persistent streak of violence amidst the glitter and glamour of American
affluence.
Conflicting
interpretations are given to the real motive behind the Senator’s murder.
First, there is the view that Sirhan, the assassin,
being an Arab and a former native of Jordan, simply reeked vengeance on the
Senator for his pro-Israeli stand, especially during the June ’67 war. Some
entries in the dairy of Sirhan and the fact that the
killing coincided with the first anniversary of that war, lend some credence to
this view. There is the second viewpoint that Sirhan
was in fact operating as an Israeli agent and that the murder was the result of
a conspiracy hatched by the enemies of the Kennedy family aimed at destroying
Robert Kennedy and discrediting the Arab States. There is yet another theory
that the assassination is motivated by the ultra-rightists against the
‘liberalism’ of the Kennedy line. It is difficult to divine the right motive at
this stage.
The
death of Kennedy meant a great loss for the Democratic Party, as its chances to
win the Presidential race were brighter with Kennedy as its candidate. Now only
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Eugene McCarthy are in the field,
though Senator McGovern of South Dakota may also enter the race for the
Democratic nomination. Humphrey, once rated as a ‘liberal’, was very forthright
on the issues of racial equality and the extension of governmental programmes
for the relief of the poor sections of the country, advocating a conciliatory
policy towards Russia and even communist China. All these are anathema to the
majority of the Southern Democrats. But unfortunately for Humphrey, his
association with the Johnson Administration’s Vietnam policy ruined his liberal
reputation and it is Senator Eugene McCarthy, who now projects the liberal
image far more convincingly. Yet it is precisely this liberal image that may
earn him the contempt and hatred of the Southerners, who, led by Governor
Wallace of Alabama, are seeking to form a third party. It is thus probable that
Vice-President Humphrey, with his experience in the Senate and the
Administration, might prove to be less unacceptable to the Southern die-hards
and this may prevail upon the Democratic Party machine to go in for Humphrey.
It is also significant that the Vice-President is trying hard to disassociate
himself from the wrongs of the Johnson policy over Vietnam in order to live
down the reputation earned during the last four years. His statement that
America has no right to behave like an international policeman, viewed in the
context of the Administration’s policy of containing communism in South-East
Asia amply illustrates his anxiety to project an independent line on foreign
policy.
On
the Republican side former Vice-President Nixon won the nomination beating
Governor Rockefeller of New York and Governor Reagan of California. He had the
advantage of being a ‘proper’ Republican without any appreciable taint of
liberalism to be taunted with, which proved to be a great drag on Governor
Rockefeller. It must, however, be admitted that Nixon, with all the Republican
penchant for the Dullesian policy of massive
retaliation against communists, openly opposes the present policy over Vietnam
and is eager to end the war there. For the last few years he has been a
globe-trotter, meeting world leaders and making first-hand assessment of men
and matters. This acquired for him the stature of a world figure among the
ranks of the Republican leaders. While his moderation over foreign policy made
him not hostile to the ‘liberals’ among the Republican Party, his economic
conservatism and stoic silence over the race issue assured him the support of
the majority of the Republicans. Governor Rockefeller’s liberal reputation has
always been regarded as a disadvantage to him. He is the most outspoken
champion of Negro rights among the Republicans which assured him Southern
hostility. Governor Reagan of California was a former Hollywood actor with a
self-confessed mistrust for radical ideas and intellectuals. He was more in the
tradition of Barry Goldwater, the former Republican
rival to President Johnson. It is almost certain that the Republican Party
leadership, considered his conservatism too conservative to serve the Party’s
electoral interests. Evidently, in choosing Nixon, the Grand Old Party, as the
Republican party is popularly called, opted for a middle path shunning the
‘progressive’ Rockefeller and the ‘reactionary’ Reagan.
The
question about the final prospects for the Presidency is indeed a difficult
one. It is almost certain that the time is past when Americans will choose
anyone credited with too conservative an outlook. It is this fact that might
create difficulties in the way of Nixon. But he has to his advantage the
support of the Southern vote, which is most likely to support him rather than
the democratic nominee. If a third party is formed with the racist elements, it
will surely cut into the democratic vote, thus benefiting Nixon. On the other
hand, there are many even among the Republicans who regard Nixon with deep
distrust, suspecting that his real roots lay with the extreme Right in American
politics. To these, his criticism of Johnson’s Vietnam policy might appear as a
piece of calculated veneer motivated by cynical political opportunism. Perhaps,
one strong obstacle in Nixon’s path is that in times of crisis Americans tend
to vote for a ‘progressive’ candidate. If today Vietnam is dominating the
election, no rational American can be led to think that peace will be round the
corner any more with a Republican of the Nixon ilk in the White House than with
Lyndon B. Johnson there. It is this that augurs well for the Democratic Party.
Events
in Eastern Europe moved very fast during the last few months. A wave of
de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia seems to have eroded the communist foundations
of the political structure itself. Rumania continues to toe an independent
line, especially in matters of foreign policy, and together these two countries
have gone to the extent of declining an invitation for a Warsaw Pact meeting
recently.
In
Czechoslovakia, the election of the liberal communist Mr. Dubcek
itself implies a significant trend. Next came the edging out of the once
powerful President Novotny who, when confronted with a new dispensation openly
suspicious of his conservative leanings, reluctantly resigned. He is succeeded
by General Svoboda, a war-hero with no active associations with the Communist
Party. The newly-constituted Cabinet led by Premier Oldrich
Cernik consists of younger men pledged to carry on
the programme of democratisation and economic
reforms. It is significant that it includes many who had quarreled with the
former leadership and were in ‘disgrace.’ These are now committed to ensure
full intellectual freedom without prejudice to the ideology of the party. In
fact, the wave of liberalisation seems to have opened
the doors for criticism against the sanctity of the party itself. An eminent
philosopher and ex-party member Mr. Ivan Svitak,
boldly pleaded, in a recent article in a trade union daily, for the access of
other political parties to real power through free elections. He wrote, “The
leading role of the Communist Party as formed during the last twenty years in
Eastern Europe is a completely unsuitable type of political life and has
nothing in common with Karl Marx’s conception of the working class and
socialist society.” For the first time Press censorship was relaxed on a large
scale.
In
economic affairs measures of decentralisation in
industrial decisions, that were fanatically opposed under the previous regime are
now enforced along with a frank admission of the need for decentralisation
in the political set-up also. These events brought to the fore the long
suppressed anti-Russian feelings. Some sections of the party and Parliament
even made a hint at disengagement from the Soviet bloc.
On
the other hand a note of caution and even criticism against going too far is
bound to be voiced by conservative sections which are
surely there. Only very recently did Mr. Dubcek
escape a censure for his ‘adventurist’
deviations. He commands only a marginal majority within the party circles. This
consideration compelled these reformers to announce a halt to further
reforms in June.
Naturally,
the Soviet Union could not have regarded these developments without grave
misgivings. Internally, the Czech reforms as promised, and partly implemented,
constituted deviations from communist norms and in their external implications
these might endanger communist unity itself. To study the situation at first
hand Mr. Kosygin made an unannounced dash to Prague.
It was rumoured that it was as much a mission to warn
as one to understand. Apparently the Czech leaders reassured their guest of
their firm loyalty to the Communist bloc while asserting their rights to
re-define socialism. The members of the Communist bloc did not voice much
opposition to the events till late. In July, alarmed by the trends, a meeting
of the Warsaw Pact members was called. Prague declined the invitation to the
meet. The Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and East Germany gave a joint warning
to Prague not to betray communist principles in its enthusiasm for reforms.
Moscow followed this up by calling for a joint meeting of the parties of both
the countries for a show down. Mr. Dubcek could not
reject this challenge though he managed to shift the venue for the
confrontation from Moscow to Czech soil. The recent Russo-Czech meeting at Cierna and the conference of the Eastern European communist
parties later at Bratislava were regarded as deciding the fate of the
Czechoslovak developments. The outcome of these, however, proved to be not so
consequential. There has been no sign of a climb-down to conformity on Prague’s
part excepting an assurance that she would not sell her soul to ‘bourgeoise ideology’. That the Russian party later hailed
this assurance indicates that the Russians themselves did not expect Prague to
bow down to seek forgiveness for ideological errors. And as if to proclaim
their self-assurance the Czechoslovak leaders had sent a high powered team to
Yugoslavia to study the working of industrial reforms there. In spite of
persistent opposition from within, the Parliament itself seems to be fairly
solidly behind Mr. Dubcek. It is significant that
while the Russo-Czech talks were taking place the people of Prague demonstrated
their faith in the ‘leberalisation’, going to the
extent of cautioning their leaders from succumbing to Moscow’s demands.
While
Czech internal reforms cause enough concern for Moscow and others, the problem
of Czech policy towards the Warsaw Pact seems to precipitate a Moscow-Prague
confrontation.
The
Czechs demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet and Polish troops from their soil.
These troops were there under Warsaw Pact agreements. Though Mr. Dubcek demands a revision of the Pact, it is significant
that Prague did not so far as to hint at withdrawing from the Pact. Presumably,
Prague remembers the lessons of Hungary in 1956 when Imre
Nagy, riding the tide of de-Stalinization, announced his intention to opt out
of the Soviet bloc. This promptly brought the Soviet tanks back into Budapest
crushing the Hungarian Revolution culminating in the murder of Nagy himself.
Now even the Czech demand for Russian troop-withdrawal caused concern in Soviet
minds, enough to suspect American hand behind the affair. In June, the Soviet
leaders gave open warnings. The ‘hawks’ in Moscow pressed for sterner action.
The Czechs on their part persisted in their demand. Though ultimately the
Soviet troops withdrew, it was not before conflicting reports were set afloat that
the Soviet Union want to intervene in Prague for the restoration of Communism.
Is the Russian withdrawal an indication of Russian relation that it can no
longer dictate to its allies even in matters of foreign policy or has Dubcek assured the Russians of Prague’s continuation in the
Warsaw Pact? The most probable conclusion seems to be that Moscow, at best, can
insist that liberalisation should not cause loss of
face to her and that the preservation of the integrity of the Warsaw Pact is
the touchstone in this regard. Surely, what with the ‘hardliners’ warning Kosygin and Brezhnev of soft
peddling and China constantly upbraiding them of having ruined Communist
purity, the minimum required for saving Moscow’s face is the integrity of the
Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia has assured this much at the Cierna
and Bratislava talks.
The
conclusion of these ‘show-down’ confrontations between Prague and her
ideological allies with a mere whimper indicates that liberalisation
has come to stay. But the world may not have seen the end of the story yet. The
demands for futher liberalisation
and democratisation are on the increase and it is
uncertain whether the Communist leadership will decide to bend further or apply
the brakes. If it bends to the demands of the students, intellectuals and
others less committed to the party, the possibility of a Russian intervention
cannot be ruled out. Thus the curtain has not fallen on the Czechoslovak
‘affair’.
The
General Assembly of the United Nations has endorsed on June 12 with an
overwhelming majority the U.S.–Soviet Draft Treaty to ban the spread of nuclear
weapons. Ninety-five nations voted for. 4 against and 21 abstained, India being
one among the last category. The U. N. endorsement is only recommendatory and
formal adherence to the Treaty is required by willing nations affixing their
signatures and later getting it ratified through their respective
constitutional processes. The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is now open for
signature in Washington, London and Moscow. The Treaty will come into force
when the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, and 40 non-nuclear weapons
signatories have ratified it. The Treaty is of 25 years duration.
No
doubt it can be expected that those who voted for it in the U. N. will become
signatories to the Treaty. The NPT will, thus, be backed by more than
three-quarters at that. The Russo-American sponsoring indicates that it cuts
across ideological and world power political barriers.
The
provisions of the Treaty may be summarised as
follows:
1.
States possessing nuclear weapons cannot transfer nuclear arms or other nuclear
devices to non-nuclear weapons states.
2.
Non-nuclear weapons states cannot receive such weapons.
3.
The non-nuclear weapons states agree to accept an inspection system to be
worked out with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
4.
Research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, except
for the development of nuclear explosive devices is guaranteed to all
non-nuclear weapons states.
5.
The possession and application of nuclear explosives will be made available to
non-nuclear weapons states through an international body.
The
implication of the Treaty in a nutshell is that with the exception of the U. S.
A., the U. S. S. R., the U. K., France and Red China, no new state will be
permitted to ‘go nuclear.’ Thus the Big Five will continue to enjoy nuclear
monopoly. One need not condemn this treaty merely for this reason. Any effort
at disarmament can be initiated only by preventing the further spread of
weapons. The contention that the nuclear powers should have imposed on
themselves nuclear disarmament by destroying their present arsenals is not
realistic. The logic that the less the number of nuclear powers the less the possibility
for small brush fires leaping into nuclear holocausts is impeccable. A
self-abnegation of nuclear weapons also means considerable saving on the
economic front for the weaker nations. These indeed are very strong grounds
where the Treaty should be regarded as a step in the right direction. Yet
countries like India hold it as entirely unsatisfactory. Mainly two reasons can
be given in support of India’s objections. First, the Treaty leaves individual
signatories to nuclear blackmail by any of the ‘monopolists’. And in view of
the Indo-Chinese conflict–more so in the context of China’s absolute freedom
from restraints of international law–India is more likely to become a victim of
such blackmail. This objection could be met if international guarantee could
assure automatic nuclear protection in the event of a nuclear threat. The
Americans and the British talked some time before of a nuclear umbrella for
India. But on questions as to when the umbrella would unfold, at whose
instance, and whether it would be free from foreign policy considerations or
the guarantors, the suggestions remained non-committal. But the sponsors alive
to the fears of the small powers made a fresh effort by offering ‘security
assurances’ in the event of aggression. They pledged themselves to seek
immediate Security Council action in the event of nuclear aggression against a
non-nuclear state that becomes a signatory to the NPT. The Security
Council endorsed this proposal in a resolution of June 20. But this
assurance, it must be emphasised, is limited only to
those non-nuclear powers who sign the NPT. India vehemently objected to this
resolution as inadmissible under Charter, as its discriminatory character
violated the principle of sovereign equality of the members. To deny the benefit
of nuclear protection to some of the UN members on the ground that they did not
choose to sign a treaty seems rather odd. In any case, the point is that even
if the guarantee is extended to all it does not meet the fears of members like
India, who are sceptical of such guarantees being
enforced when need arises. The Indian Government, thus, feels justified in not
committing itself to a self-denying ordinance in the absence of a tangible and
dependable nuclear backing. Further would not a nuclear equilibrium as between
the ‘haves’ act as a deterrent for anyone of these going to the rescue of a
non-nuclear power? Why should, for instance, Russia or America risk nuclear
retaliation from Peking in going to India’s rescue in the event of an
Indo-Chinese war?
The
second objection to the NPT is bound on the absence of any obligation on the
part of the nuclear powers to limit their nuclear capacities. This makes the
treaty a document legitimizing the existing division between ‘nuclear swans’
and ‘non-nuclear geese’. The great powers are not blind to this. Kosygin, in fact, suggested just a few days ago a
nine-point plan for total disarmament, including a ban on the use of nuclear
weapons and an end to the missile race. For the past few years the Russians and
the Americans have been concentrating on evolving defence
systems against possible attacks by each other’s missiles rather than
developing more effective offensive missiles. The reason is that none of the
offensive missiles could be depended upon to be optimally offensive! Crash
programmes for erecting anti-missile systems around industrial regions and
cities means colossal cost. And hence the Kosygin
plan. But it cannot be denied that the plan is also designed to assure the
small powers of the great powers’ readiness to effect disarmament among
themselves. But even this would not satisfy the feeling among some nuclear
powers that while the NPT demands immediate renunciation of nuclear ambitions,
the Great Powers are only talking about what limitations they should observe.
The
even more objectionable part of the NPT is its subtle limitations on the scope
for research on nuclear energy even for non-military purposes. The prohibition
of research for the production of all nuclear explosive devices would include
any attempt to put nuclear energy for such purposes as, say, boring underground
tunnels. The ostensible reason for this provision is that the line separating
the use of nuclear explosive devices for war purposes and their use for
peaceful uses is pretty thin. But while this may be so, it cannot also be
denied that this single provision in the Treaty effectively stifles the freedom
to explore peaceful use of nuclear energy. The compensatory provision that an
International Agency will make available such information to non-nuclear
weapons states is indeed of very little consolation. The nuclear weapons powers
would be the ultimate arbiters even in this regard, for how on earth are the
non-nuclear weapons states to know what is going on in the field of research on
nuclear explosive device when once they are forbidden to venture into this area
under the terms of the Treaty.
The
above objections are indeed powerful. In short, the fear of an unscrupulous
China on the one hand and a realisation that the rest of the nuclear powers
cannot be depended upon to extend nuclear protection on the other, together
determine India’s attitude, to the NPT. We could scarcely have reasoned thus
had we not been confident of having acquired the know-how and of possessing the
technology to make a nuclear bomb. A British scientific periodical estimates
that India can manufacture a bomb at the rate of one a week. Yet, neither this
fact nor our refusal to sign the Treaty does in any way mean a departure from
our policy not to manufacture the bomb? It is just that India does not want to
forego the right to make one to face any future provocation. Critics are not
wanting even against this limited show of hard-headedness in defence policy. These advocate an unconditional adherence
to the Treaty. The moral argument derived from the Gandhian
imperatives that we should have no truck with a sinister thing like a nuclear
weapon constitutes the main plank for this. Others less prone to be
sentimental, advance the argument that we can ill-afford to divert massive sums
towards a weapon which, after all, is not intended for actual use, because the
theory is that it will only serve as a deterrent. On the whole, the Government
of India’s stand seems to be justified; but whether it can afford to remain
un-compromising on this issue, if the U. N. comes forward with more effective
guarantees against nuclear threats, is to be seen. Recently, Secretary General,
U Thant called for a meeting of all the non-nuclear
weapons states to discuss what type of guarantees would satisfy them. If any
tangible agreement comes out of this, India will have to reconsider her
stand seriously. But, of course, there will be many who will be reluctant to
see India forego her right to make the bomb till Communist China comes within
restrains of international agreements.
South-East Asia:
Possible New Power-Alignments
The
withdrawal of the British from South-East Asia, part of the Labour Government’s
policy to wind-up British military commitments East of Aden, has posed the problem
whether a power vacuum would develop in that region. While being yet another
indicator of the declining role of the British even in this once-exclusively
British sphere as also of Britain’s inability to maintain even a facade as a
world power, the British withdrawal would mean a new power-equation.
Firstly,
there is the imminent prospect of further American advance into this region.
Even though President Johnson’s move to de-escalate the American involvement in
South Vietnam was interpreted in some quarters as prelude to the U. S.
departure from Asia itself, such does not seem to be the U. S. intention. The
American commitments to form South Korea, Thailand and their own conception of
their vital interests in the area make them tarry long. In fact, the Vietnam
experience taught the Americans to depend less upon land-committed troops and
to look increasingly for facilities for off-shore presence. Malaysia would
positively welcome enhanced American commitments, as Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman has repeatedly
stressed the reality of the Chinese threat. Nor would Indonesia pose
objections. The Suharto regime’s hostility towards
China and dependence on the U. S. make them accept any American more in this
direction. In fact, there have been some reports that the Americans have
actually secured a naval base somewhere in the Indian Ocean area to the East of
the Indian Peninsula. What would be the Indian reaction? We are, no doubt,
opposed to any theory of regional ‘vacuums’ to be filled by big powers. Time was
when we were most allergic to American solicitations for another country’s
military security. Even now our opposition to the American policy over Vietnam
discloses the persistence of such attitudes. Yet an acute awareness of the
Chinese threat makes us ill-afford to oppose with any conviction the forging of
an American protective shield. The repeated references by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, during her tour of the countries of this
region early last summer, to the need to contain China, belies any Indian
objections on this score. The point is that prior to 1962, even when we did not
credit China with a war-like disposition we drew comfort, albeit silently, from
the British presence. Now that we are certain of China’s expansionistic designs
we certainly dare not object to the American presence. No doubt, we have our
non-aligned conscience to satisfy. But this can easily be taken care of, if the
Russians can be brought into the picture. The Russians themselves are staking
claims for a naval role in the Indian Ocean. They have been more than willing
to augment our naval forces (in spite of their balancing-act of supplying arms
to Pakistan). It is a fair guess that in our anxiety not to appear to be
relying on an American naval shield we might have welcomed at least a nominal
Russian entry into the area. Already some Western experts are suspecting
whether the Russian naval supplies to India did not involve a quid pro quo in
the shape of India extending shore facilities to the Soviet Union. This may not
be true. Even if the Russians are worsted in their efforts at securing a
footing it is unlikely that they would seriously object to the implicit
dependence of India on the U. S. naval shield.
The
possibility for any regional alliance based on the principle of self-help seems
to be remote. By themselves the powers of the S. E. Asia do not add-up to much,
and the slightly mote potential countries like ourselves, are averse to reverse
our disinclination to enter into formal military pacts. This is not to say that
our perspectives on S. E. Asia have not changed. With Malaysia our notions have
changed for the better and with Philippines too we are anxious to improve our
relations. The fact that Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s visits
to these countries and Australia and New Zealand constituted the first ever of
an Indian prime Minister’s visit, shows how keen we are to impress upon these
that we are one among them and that we should be counted for in any South East
Asian framework. Primarily, the Prime Minister’s visit was an attempt to meet
the criticism that India for long had neglected to cultivate the good-will
among the people of the region and failed to impress upon them that India
belongs to this region. Some Indian newspaper men were sceptical
about any lasting effects of the visit. These advocated an active initiative on
our part for a military arrangement aimed at containing China. This alone,
these contended, would amount to a tangible proof of India’s readiness to stand
forth as a S. E. Asian power. In other words, it just will not do to merely
claim the courtesies of a major power, unless we assume the responsibilities
also. But the Premier did not go beyond talking about closer economic ties and
pledging sympathies in our common plight in facing an unscrupulous neighbour like China. Thus, beyond initiating a polite
dialogue with these powers no immediate blue-print for common participation in
S. E. Asia had emerged. A purely regional alliance is possible only in the
event of a complete American withdrawal which is highly unlikely.
The
Russian decision to sell arms to Pakistan is certainly a letdown for India, and
for Mrs. Indira Gandhi in particular. For the
country, this means that Moscow no longer gives us a special place in its
calculations. Such a special position was the characteristic of Kruschev’s policy which Messrs Kosygin
and Brezhnev are not too anxious to continue. For
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who inherited the legacy of her
father’s policy, and who is her own Foreign Minister, the loss of India’s
preferred status means a personal loss in that the only tangible benefit of
non-alignment is no longer there. There were rumblings in the Cabinet and in
the Congress Party, not to speak of the indignation in the non-Communist
opposition circles. It is no surprise that the CPI itself is trying to playdown the significance of the event as it cannot hold
Moscow to be ever in the wrong.
If
the Tashkent spirit requires that India and Pakistan should do nothing to
aggravate their present quarrels one wonders whether the very creator of that
spirit should resort to an act that directly engenders adventurism in Pakistan.
That the Russians are firm that Pakistan should not use these arms against
India need not be doubted. But such conditions can rarely be enforced. The
Americans gave similar assurances to India when they supplied arms to Pindi and these did not prevent President Ayub Khan from undertaking a costly adventure. And the
Russians know this only too well. But having said this one should also realise the compelling reasons that prompted Moscow to
adopt the line it did. The desire to veer Pakistan away from Washington and to
prevent further flirtations with Peking, are the two main reasons. Since the
Moscow-Washington detente and Pakistan’s diplomacy of hunting with the hounds
and running with the hare, Moscow began to feel it unwise to leave out Pindi in its diplomatic calculations. Even the issue of
arms supplies has not cropped up overnight. For quite some time it was on the
anvil. It figured during Kosygin’s visit to Pakistan
early this summer, and the wishful thinking of our External Affairs Ministry
notwithstanding, the proposal was agreed to in principle during this visit.
Later, the Russian Premier wrote to Mrs. Indira
Gandhi informing her of the Russian readiness to consider favourably
Pakistan’s request for arms and requesting her not to misunderstand the
decision. Finally, came the official announcement on the eve of President Zakir Hussain’s visit to the
Soviet Union.
While
the event is certainly a setback for our diplomacy, one should not exaggerate
the effect it would have on Pakistan’s military potential. After all our defences could not have been so marginally balanced as to
be upset by this new source to Pindi. It should also
be realised that the Russians are ready to augment
our potential to counteract possible Chinese intrusion in the Indian Ocean. The
Russians seem to have no objection to helping us against China but are not
prepared to consider our objections against their help to Pakistan too. It
cannot be denied that the Russian readiness to strengthen us vis-a-vis China to a great extent vindicates our
non-alignment. Yet here again to what extent is the Russian stand dictated by
genuine concern for our security and to what extent is it motivated by a desire
to settle scores with Peking? If the latter is the major consideration there
can be no talk of India being rewarded for her non-alignment. In fact, the
Russo-American detente has made non-alignment no longer relevant. The situation
is so changed that in all probability the Russians themselves would not mind
our seeking American collaboration for defence
against China in S. E. Asia. There have been rumours
that the Russians will seek a bridge-head in the Indian Ocean area with Indian
help and that a sort of competitive co-existence of the two super-powers will
be in the offing in this strategic area. But the Russian disregard for Indian
feelings do not augur well for any possible Indo-Russian venture. This being
the case, turning to the U. S. A. for arms seems most probable. The visit of
the American team led by Mr. Katzenbach to examine
our requirements is very suggestive in this regard.
Thus
a new arms race between India and Pakistan is bound to be on and this is just
no good either for us or for the superpowers.
The
Arab-Israeli conflict remains where it was. Since June 1967, many flare-ups, of
which the recent one between Jordan and Israel is the latest, occurred, keeping
alive the issue of basic insecurity in the area. A major flare-up is usually
followed by the ritual of a Security Council meeting where uncompromising
attitudes are tried to be glossed over with pious platitudes, culminating in
the passing of an innocuous resolution.
The
Jarring Mission, appointed by the U. N., to mediate between the Arabs and the
Israelis and bring them to a conference table, has for all practical purposes
failed. The Israelis are all set to talk about normalisation
of relations but brook no mention of vacating the Arab territory and the Arabs
on their part refuse to recognise the Israeli
conquests. Curiously enough, it was announced in April of this year that both
sides had accepted the Security Council Resolution of November ’67, requesting
the parties to revert to the status quo prevailing before the June ’67
war and negotiate on the basis of the recognition of the territorial integrity
of all the states in the region. But soon it transpired that Israel accepted
only the ‘spirit’ of the Resolution and that it was not prepared to vacate the
areas conquered.
While
the Resolution thus remains ignored and the odds are against any immediate
prospects even for a move in the direction of conciliation, three significant
and welcome developments have occurred. The first is the indication that
influential sections in Israel, led by Mr. Yigal Allon, a member of the Israeli Cabinet, are advocating the
vacating of the Arab territory. The fact that only a little more than a month
ago, Mr. Allon had been promoted in the hierarchy of
Mr. Ishkol’s Cabinet, is further proof that a
conciliatory gesture may come from Israel, in spite of the militant postures of
some other members of the cabinet, led by Defence
Minister Moshe Dayan. The second development is even
more welcome. Egypt announced, in a surprising turnabout, that it is prepared
to take back the U. N. Peace Keeping Forces. It was the Egyptian demand for the
withdrawal of these in May ‘67, and their subsequent withdrawal, that marked
the beginning of the unfortunate war and an Egyptian readiness to have the U.
N. forces back signifies that Nasser has changed his views on striking at
Israel at his convenience. This development, in fact, led to a renewed attempt
on the part of the British, American and Russian Governments to effect a
lasting solution, though nothing has come out of these as yet.
The
third development comes also from Egypt, whose Foreign Minister, Mohammad Riad, announced early in July that Egypt is prepared to recognise the reality of Israel’s existence. But as if to neutrallse the spirit behind this statement, Nasser himself
reiterated during his Moscow visit the Arab pledge to regain the lost areas.
Yet the very fact that Egypt’s Foreign Minister made the statement at all
indicated a change in the perspectives of the Egyptians vis-a-vis
Israel. Properly viewed, there is no contradiction between Riad’s
statement and Nasser’s Moscow statement. The Arabs are probably ready to put up
with Isreal on the condition that Israel helps to
wipe off the humiliations of the June ’67 war. And it is in this context that
the implications of the Allon Plan can contribute
most for West Asian Peace.
But
one cannot be oversanguine about these expectations.
Nasser’s prolonged visit to Moscow in July and again in August and Moscow’s
assurances of arms support have rather bad implications. Increased supply of
Russian arms may only culminate in another Arab military gamble. While the
Russians owe it to the world not to encourage the Arabs to war, the American
responsibility is no less. Neither during the ’67 war, nor since then have the
Americans restrained the Israelis from annexing the conquered territories.
Indeed in over-all terms, the flow of American arms and money, (both from
governmental and private sources) and the failure of America to restrain
Israel, may be regarded as constituting a more direct encouragement to war than
the Russian arms supply to Egypt. Even the recent Russian decision to step-up
arms deliveries to the U. A. R. must be seen in the context of the Washington
announcement of missile supplies to Israel. This was most unfortunately timed
to coincide with Nasser’s visit to Moscow in July. It is well-known that Moscow
wanted to persuade its guest to agree to a comprehensive West Asian Disarmament
Scheme and that a new Moscow initiative for peace was at hand. In fact, the
initiative was the result of Kosygin’s talks with Mr.
Gunnar Jarring, who went to Moscow only a few days
before Nasser’s arrival. To what extent the U. S. decision to supply missiles
to Israel compelled the Soviet Union to talk less about peace with Nasser and
hear more about arms from him, it is difficult to assess. But, surely, in the
absence of the Washington announcement the Soviet Union could have exerted far
greater pressure upon Nasser to see some way of making it up with Israel.
The
position now is that no definite initiative is yet forthcoming from either of
the parties and the commando raids of the Palestinian refugees in Israel cause
acute tension between Jordan and Israel. As for the U. N. Resolution, Tel Aviv
continues to dishonour it in spite of repeated U. N.
appeals. Still, it is not very late yet to hope that the expectations implied
in the developments mentioned above would be realised.
The
events of May in Paris shook the Fifth Republic to its foundations. There was
practically no government in Paris and many other major cities for days. It all
started with the police trying to oust some students from the campus of the Sirbonne University in Paris. The students alleged police
brutalities and the workers joined the students forces in full sympathy. With
Governmental efforts to quell the agitations leading to further worsening of
situation, the issue very soon assumed the shape of a workers’ struggle for
higher wages, better working conditions and more say in industrial
decision-making. Significantly, the workers’ dissatisfaction was at its most in
the state run Renault motor car factory. For a few weeks strikes, barricades
and pitched battles between the police on the one hand and the students and
workers on the other reduced Paris to a state of anarchy. More than 300
industrial plants were literally occupied by the workers, about six million of
whom went on strike. This came as a rude shock even to the all-time optimist,
President de Gaulle, who rushed back home cutting short a state visit to
Rumania. In a radio broadcast he offered to consider the grievances of the
workers, while at the same time sternly rebucking
them. The offer, however, elicited poor response though labour
leaders urged the rank and file to co-operate with the Establishment. A few
ministerial heads rolled in expiation of the Government’s mishandling of the
situation and of the police brutalities. This did not appease the angry
strikers and the state of affairs did not improve. In some cases, tri-partite
talks between labour, employers and the Government
were held but soon the workers disowned their own leaders. It looked as though
a bitter civil war was inevitable. At this state, even some of the Gaullists
demanded de Gaulle’s resignation. In sheer disgust and despair the Grand
General left Paris to his country-home in Brittany in Western France. Some said
that he went to sound some army units to prepare for a military show-down.
Others suggested that he really went home to decide whether
to bow out of office or to act. With characteristic determination not to
surrender, he returned to Paris within 24 hours and bluntly told the nation
that he meant business and that the workers had behaved worse than bums. Then
came his offer of fresh elections pending which he demanded of the workers
immediate return to work. This put the leftists and other parties supporting
the strike in a dilemma. If they refuse, they would put themselves in the wrong
of being more bent on destroying the State than on rectifying the wrongs. If
they agreed then it meant a return to work and the General’s triumph, at least
till the election day. De Gaulle’s gamble worked. The parties could not abandon
the elections and they advised the workers back to their factories. The
anti-Gaullist parties formed a united front to oust de Gaulle and Gaullism and
the end of the ‘Second Louis XIV’ seemed certain. Yet the elections returned de
Gaulle to power with the largest electoral victory of any party in French
history. The Gaullist Party captured 358 of the 487 seats and the Communist
strength slumped from 73 to 34. The question is: what accomplished this
miracle–for a miracle it was! Partly, popular disgust with anarchy, a taste of
which the people saw during the nights of the strong barricades and drawn
bayonets. Partly the effect of de Gaulle’s clever interpretation of the events as
subserving the cause of the totalitarian communists.
In other words de Gaulle reasoned that everyone opposed to him was
behind the ‘revolution’ and hence demanded that every one wanting to avert it
should support him. The failure of the communists is a case in point. In fact,
the party was against the continued strike by its own members and was not
interested in a revolution too spontaneous and amateur-led to its liking. Yet,
the General managed to identify the anti-Gaullist Communist Party as the
architect of the revolution. Whatever the reason, the overwhelming swing to the
‘right’ in the French vote confirms the general belief that in times of crisis
French vote always turns conservative. This happened after Napoleon, when
France welcomed the Bourbon restoration and again after the 1848 Revolution
when a more broad-based electorate returned the conservative Louis Napoleon to
power.
The
reference to the Revolution of 1848 is very apt indeed. The spread of students
agitation and the spontaneous and ideology-free attacks against all authority
during the past months in Europe can only equal the impact of the 1848
Revolution. Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Austria and even Communist Yugoslavia felt
the direct impact. Given the nature of their demands, the background of the
leadership and the fact that these rebellious cut across ideological frontiers,
the stock explanation of attributing all indiscipline to the
civil influence of the communists and anarchists, seems entirely inadequate.
Sociologists have attributed these developments to a
highly-developed sense of commitment and an almost fanatical refusal to
compromise with the accepted ‘gap’ between the profession and practice of human
values in all societies, communist or capitalist.