INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

BY PROF. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

At the time of writing this survey the news was published that full agreement on a peace-settlement in Indo-China was reached in Geneva where the debates and discussions on the subject had been going on for nearly three months. It is however with mixed feelings that one should look at this agreement. There may be some jubilation that eight years of unnecessary war, with all the horrors and losses associated with it, came to an end and peace is established in at least one area of the world. But there is also bound to be sorrow at the fact that Communistic rule has come to be established in one more tract of the world with the possibilities of its being extended to a larger area in Indo-China and perhaps South-East Asia. And for all this the responsibility lies in the main on the French and on the United States. The short-sightedness of both and their ill-liberalism are at the Source of this addition of one more State to the list of Communist States, and the tragedy of it lies in the fact that the purpose for which the United States proclaimed that it was aiding France–the purpose of ‘containing’ Communism–received a fatal blow here. What could have been averted by timely statesmanship was made inevitable because of the blindness of American and French statesmen. The French might have had some excuse for their folly–because they were called upon to give up something which they enjoyed with a sense of proprietary right for more than a century–but the Americans had no such excuse. If only they had from the start aided the cause of real democracy and freedom in Vietnam and brought sufficient pressure on their French allies to withdraw from the country, just as the British withdrew from India, and helped Ho Chi Min in setting up a real nationalistic government in 1947-48, there would have been in Indo-China as in Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon, a strong democratic government serving as a real bastion against the onrush of Communism. The peace settlement in Indo-China is a defeat for the United States. Will she learn a lesson from it and utilise her vast resources and her status as a world power in the cause of freedom instead of in the cause of reactionarism–colonialism, feudalism and medievalism? It is only when power is combined with wisdom that desirable results are produced.

We should remember that in 1946-47 Ho Chi Min was for establishing a broad-bottomed democratic State in Indo-China and that he was even prepared to keep an independent Indo-China as a member of the French Union, which would have meant a relationship like that of India in the Commonwealth. Promises on lines like these were first made to him by the French but subsequently they declined to fulfill them. It was this that drove him to a war against them; and for obtaining victory in the war he was driven more and more into the Communistic camp and enter into an alliance with the People’s Republic of China. He had to do this against his will and against the will of a large section of his countrymen. History tells us that the Viet-Namese never cherished any feeling of friendliness towards the Chinese under whose imperialistic domination they suffered for more than a thousand years in the past, and against whom they kept up continuously their spirit of rebellion and waged several wars of independence. The American aid to France strengthened the alliance between him and China. It will take a long time now for him to sever his connection with Communist China, and his Republic will have to remain a Chinese satellite.

But all were tired of this war in Indo-China–all with the exception of the United States. France lost more than a hundred thousand men in killed and wounded and the Vietnamese three to four times that number. But the French were not nearer victory. The British were averse to the continuance of the war because it produced unfavourable reactions in Malaya and it also affected adversely the defence organisation in Western Europe through the NATO, of which France was one of the principal members. So long as the French were preoccupied with the Indo-Chinese campaign they could not pay adequate attention to the problem of West European Defence. There was also the danger that with the Chinese playing a more active part in the war and with America sending more military aid to the French, the war might extend to a wider area and become a global one. The British were also anxious to open trade with China on a larger scale, as foreign trade was more vital too her prosperity than in the case of America. All this explains why Anthony Eden was so anxious to bring about a cease-fire in Indo-China at any cost.

In all this an important role was played by our own Government. The policy of non-alignment with either of the power blocs, to which India adhered during all these years, enabled her to mediate between the Communist and the non-Communist members of the Peace Conference at Geneva. For a variety of reasons India is much more interested in peace than any of these countries, and one aspect of her policy is to extend the peace area in Asia and in the rest of the world. She made it clear at a very early stage in the sittings of the Geneva Conference–although she was not directly represented on it–that no peace in South-East Asia would be possible unless it be through the goodwill and co-operation of Asian States. At the Colombo Conference and subsequent to it she laid the greatest stress on this aspect. There was a tendency in the United States to ignore the force of this view, and that was the reason why for some time she proceeded with, the idea of establishing a South-East Asian Treaty Organisation like the NATO in Europe, to arrest the progress; of Ho Chi Min in Indo-China and of Communism in general in South-East Asia. It was the British however that demonstrated to the shapers of American policy that no such organisation would work if it is opposed by Asian nations like India. A similar view was expressed by Casey, the Australian Minister for External Affairs. And when at New Delhi Nehru and Chou-En-Lai met in conference and issued a joint communique outlining the general policy according to which the free nations of Asia should regulate their mutual relations, the Americans felt that they would become completely isolated if they persisted in any line of action which was looked at with, disfavour by India and other democratic nations of South-East Asia. The conference between the Indian and the Chinese Prime Ministers still further strengthened the British in pressing their point of view before America. The Commonwealth is a reality to them and they knew that without India the Commonwealth would be nowhere. One item therefore that has to be registered as an item of progress is the realisation on the part of European and American Governments that in the settlement of Asian problems the voice of Asia cannot be ignored; and this realisation is to a large extent the outcome of the lead given by Pandit Nehru.

We may now turn to the question of what has actually been settled in Indo-China. The first point settled is that there should be a cease-fire in the country and that the line of ceasefire should be so demarcated that Ho Chi Min’s armies should confined to what may be called Northern Vietnam, and that Southern Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should remain outside Ho’s jurisdiction. This virtually means the partition of Vietnam. It reproduces there the situation as in Korea. To us here in India it is not necessary to refer elaborately to what partition of a State implies in point of human misery and suffering and the large number of economic and other problems which it creates. Ho’s Viet Minh Republic will consist of a population of nearly thirteen millions with vast agricultural, mineral and industrial resources; the rest of Vietnam will have a population of about nine millions. Laos and Cambodia are comparatively small States with two and four millions of population respectively. The Geneva Conference has therefore settled that there should be a partition of Vietnam. The second point it settled is that there should be free elections in the whole of Vietnam not later than the middle of 1956–i.e., before the lapse of two years–and the Assembly so elected should be regarded as the Government for the whole of Vietnam. This implies that the partition should be temporary and that the country would become united two years hence. A third point settled is that there should be a supervisory commission consisting of India, Canada and Poland, with India as the chairman, for seeing that the cease-fire and the subsequent armistice agreements are strictly adhered to by the parties concerned and that timely measures are taken for the holding of fair and free elections.

Three points have to be noted with respect to this settlement. The elections referred to are only in respect of Vietnam. There is no reference to what would happen in Laos and Cambodia. These two would remain separate States. The unification contemplated is not the unification of the whole of Indo-China but only of Vietnam. The settlement does not say anything about France’s position in Indo-China in the years to come. It is not known whether she will reconcile herself to peaceful withdrawal from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This is however a crucial problem. The struggle in Indo-China is basically one between colonialism and nationalism. No Indo-Chinese will tolerate the presence of the French in any shape or form. Unless complete independence is granted to these areas a national struggle will break out and the peace now concluded will be peace only in name. Those States interested in peace–India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Britain, Australia, China etc., should see that colonial rule is once for all put an end to. Any delay in this will mean civil war and the strengthening of the forces of Communism. A third point to be noted is that when elections are held in 1956 it looks as if Vietnam will be unified under a Communist Government. This will be the natural outcome of the existence of a larger population in Ho’s portion than in Southern Vietnam. The process of indoctrination, the suppression of all opposition and the regimentation of the electorate, characteristic of the Communist system of government, will be completed during these two years in North Vietnam. South Vietnam will continue to be an area–as it has been these seven years–ridden by numerous political parties and factions unable to offer a united front against the Communist Party. If Soviet Russia and Communist China agreed to a cease-fire at the Geneva Conference, it is this prospect of an easy electoral victory, over the whole of Vietnam in 1956 that influenced them. The interval will give their Communist ally the time and opportunity to consolidate his position.

In was with great difficulty that the United States was persuaded to send a top-ranking delegate of hers to the second and final stage of the Geneva Conference. She feels that the French willingness to enter into peace on the basis of the partition of Vietnam is nothing short of surrender to force. This is of course true. It was the superior force of Ho that convinced the French Prime Minister that all fighting was futile. But what else could he do when the United States declined to help his country with men? Americans do not want to waste any of their lives in an Asian war. This is the one lesson they learnt from the Korean campaign. All that they were prepared to do was to send material To the French their declining population was one of the greatest problems, and human life became very precious in consequence. They could have trained an efficient Vietnamese army during these seven years but they did not do this, and those whom they trained had not the enthusiasm and will to fight for what they considered to be the perpetuation of French rule. There was now and then some complaint from the French that the Vietnamese could never be trained to fight, but this was a lie. Ho had during these years been able to produce a very fine army out of the Vietnamese. The idea therefore of the Americans that Asians should be made to fight Asians in the crusade against Communism would not work. The United States also tried to transform the Indo-China war into an international war under the auspices, if possible, of the United Nations. This idea also she had to abandon because the French were opposed to it and the British and other ‘free’ nations were not prepared to send their youth to fight in a war like this.

From the point of view of the United States the outcome of the Geneva Conference is most unsatisfactory. The one question which troubles her is whether South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia can be prevented from becoming Communist. She is not quite sure. The point in the Nehru-Chou-En-Lai communique, that they would respect the independence and sovereignty of other Asian States and will not adopt a policy of aggression towards any of them, does not appeal to her. Communist conquests are not made always through military aggression and war. They are in several cases the outcome of the revolutionary activities of native Communist Parties, secretly helped by the world Communist organisation behind which are Soviet Russia and Soviet China. There is nothing to prevent such activities in the non-Communist part of Indo-China in the near future. The argument, that in Burma and Indonesia democratic Governments were successful in putting down Communist activities, may not apply to these weak States in Indo-China. This is the intriguing situation which causes worry to the United States and to some extent to Australia. This is also perhaps the point of view of Thailand and the Philippines.

It is because of this that the United States is anxious to organise the South–East Asian Treaty Organisation. But will it be effective in preventing an internal Communist coup in the States of Indo-China? This raises all those complicated issues which are often discussed in this connection and for which there can be no satisfactory answer–questions like (a) What if Communism spreads and new Communist States come into existence? (b) Why should outsiders interfere if the Communists get into power through a coup? (c) If under-developed areas of the world are to be prevented from becoming Communist, what is the better way of accomplishing such an aim–is it through military or economic aid or through both? There is also the other big issue. What will be the effect of Communist expansionism on the future of Australia? One cannot separate this from the expansion of the power of China. The two are closely tied up and they will continue to be closely tied up for a fairly long time to come. The Australians were terribly afraid of Japanese imperialism in the past. It is a Chinese imperialism that will threaten them in future; and the resources of China in men and material are very many times larger than those of Japan. The establishment of Communist Governments in Indo-China is not a matter about which Australians can be indifferent. This only leads to the conclusion that while peace in Indo-China is welcome to most people, it does not mean an atmosphere of complete security. The answer to the question whether Communist and non-Communist States can co-exist, and under what conditions they can do so, is still to be discovered.

Now that peace has been established in Indo-China the ‘great’ powers are turning their attention to the solution of other problems. The setting up of an organisation to maintain peace in South-East Asia and the role in it of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Formosa on one side, and of States like India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia on the other, is one such problem. It was only four hundred years ago that the process of Europeans immigrating into America and colonising it, partly through peaceful means and partly through conquest, began, and today the whole contitnent is Europeanised. Australia is a big continent with a small population. It has large vacant spaces. There are in Asia countries like China with large populations who have just awakened from their long slumber and have also become conscious of their having been exploited for more than a century by the White nations of the West. Their attitude towards Australia and the islands in its neighbourhood rouses the suspicion of the Whites there. What then will be the reaction of China to a South-East Asian Treaty Organisation dominated by the United States, Australia and Britain? What is the right and just solution for the problems arising out of ‘White’ Australian policy?

The other problem to which the ‘great’ powers will direct their attention now is that of Germany. It has been a cardinal principle of American policy of ‘containing’ Communism to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation through the creation of a powerful army in Western Europe, to serve as a bulwark against Soviet conquest of countries to the west of East Germany. But no such strengthening is possible unless proper use in made of the military potentialities of Germany. The French, however, have always been opposed to German rearmament, and their opposition is not less strong today than in the past. It was to allay their legitimate fears that the EDC (European Defence Community) Treaty was entered into, under which there would be no separate German army but a number of German divisions incorporated into a European army, alongside of similar divisions from other countries in Western Europe which are parties to the treaty. This was regarded as a fair compromise–the initiative in regard to this came from the French themselves–but the treaty, though ratified by the Parliaments of West Germany, Belgium, Holland etc., is still awaiting ratification at the hands of the French National Assembly. The French have been hesitating in the matter and one excuse for the hesitation has all along been their pre-occupation with the Indo-China war. Now that peace has been established the question cannot be postponed any longer. The Americans are impatient. They want to know finally whether the French are for or against the EDC. This was one of the questions that came up for discussion at the conference held at Washington recently between President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill. A sort of ultimatum has now been issued to France by these two that, unless the EDC is ratified at a very early date by the National Assembly, West Germany would be recognised as a fully sovereign State, the allied armies of occupation would be withdrawn, and the West German Government would be given complete freedom to rearm to any extent it likes. It looks as if this will become an accomplished fact by the end of the current year. It is true that there is a section in Britain–especially in the Labour Party–which is as much opposed as France to German rearmament. But the question is whether the British Government can withstand American pressure in this matter. If for any reasons the NATO and the EDC lose the value which Americans have been attaching to them these four or five years, it is quite possible that they will enter into a separate treaty with West Germany. An American alliance with a rearmed Japan in the East and with a rearmed Germany in the West seems to be in the process of making. Preparation for war has always been one of the major industries of governments, and peace in Indo-China will give greater stimulus to this. No one takes disarmament seriously. In a world where the ‘great’ powers distrust and suspect each other in the way in which Soviet Russia and the United States are doing today, and where efforts at collective security through the United Nations Organisation have ceased to be fruitful, regional defence pacts and preparations for war have become inevitable. “The brotherhood of man and the federation of the world” are becoming empty dreams.

A few days ago Sir Winston Churchill announced in the course of Commons that the time for the withdrawal of the British forces from the Suez Canal Zone has come. This was a welcome announcement, coming as it did from a Conservative Government. It is therefore unfortunate that, when the talks on the subject were reopened, the parties could not settle their differences, even though those differences related to matters which do not appear to be of great significance except in one case. Britain wants two years to complete the evacuation, while Egypt wants it to be completed in fifteen months. Britain wants that the new agreement to be entered into in regard to the re-occupation of the Canal Zone under certain circumstances should be in force for ten years, while Egypt wants it for only seven years. Britain insists that the Zone should be re-occupied by her forces when Turkey, Iran or any Arab country is attacked, but Egypt objects to the inclusion of Iran. The first two are minor points and it will do well for Britain to yield on them. Even in regard to the third it is best for Britain to agree to Egypt’s terms, as, when once friendly relations are established between the two countries there is every likelihood of Egypt taking a realistic view of the problem of Middle East Defence and becoming a party to any Middle East Defence Organisation. The removal of this long-existing tension between Egypt and Britain is necessary if the Egyptian Government is to devote a larger amount of attention to internal development and to raise the stanqard of living of the peasant population of the country.

One other source of friction in the Middle East is being removed. The question of Iranian oil has at last been solved. An agreement has been entered into between the Iranian Government and the Consortium of eight oil companies to market Iranian oil. The Abadan oil refineries are to be opened. For every ton of oil the Government will get over two pounds sterling and the production is expected to be 13 million tons in the first year, 20 in the second year and 27 in the third year. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company will get a compensation of about thirty million sterling. It is quite possible that extreme nationalists may resent the idea of foreigners coming once again to work the oil mills of their country, but they will all have to realise that foreign technical skill and capital are necessary for the economic development of under-developed countries. What is needed is a strong democratic Government in the country which will utilise the revenue from royalties for the improvement of the condition of the masses, and the people should direct their efforts to democratise their political institutions.

On the whole the area of peace has widened as a consequence of the happenings of the last three months.

July 20

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