INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

 

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

 

Armistice talks have been going on in Korea for more two years. It appeared at one time that they would end stalemate as a consequence of disagreement on the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war. But at long last this now been satisfactorily settled as between the two main parties–the United Nations on one side, the North Koreans and the Chinese on the other. It was settled between them that the prisoners unwilling to be repatriated should be handed over to a five-nation Neutral Commission presided over by India, that those who were opposed to repatriation even after being handled by this Commission should be made over to the Political Conference to be set up within ninety days after the conclusion of the armistice, and those who continued to be opposed to repatriation even after that should be finally disposed of by the United Nations. There is no need to go into all the details of this settlement. It is enough to observe that some settlement satisfactory to both parties was arrived at, and it was the expectation of the whole world that the armistice would be actually signed on 25th 1953, the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War.

 

But this did not happen, and at the time of writing there was no clear proof that the armistice would be concluded in the near future. This is due to a difficulty having cropped up in a most unexpected quarter. Dr. Syngman Rhee has taken on himself, as the President of the South Korean Republic, the responsibility to sabotage the armistice talks. Contrary to the settlement agreed to, he liberated from U. N. custody twenty-seven thousand prisoners who should have been rightly handed over to the Neutral Commission. He has not stopped with this. He has stated that he is against all armistice, that war should go on until the Communists are defeated in the field and Korea unified under his Government. He has even threatened to fight single-handed against North Korea, even if the U. N. forces were to withdraw from the scene of warfare. All this is due to the fact that in the execution of the American plan to make Asians fight Asians, they put in the possession of Dr. Rhee a Korean army of half a million well-trained and well-equipped men, and these now constitute nearly seventy-five per cent of the U. N. forces fighting the North Koreans and the Chinese.

 

The question therefore that arises is whether the Communists would agree to an armistice under circumstances like these. Their hope that the prisoners of war, now unwilling to be repatriated, could after being handed over to the Neutral Commission be persuaded to favour repatriation is now gone. It is quite possible that even those who are now in the prisoners’ camps may be liberated before the actual armistice is signed. All this would mean the Communists losing face in regard to a question on which they put up a determined fight for two years. They may also begin to feel that, with Dr. Rhee as the Head of the South Korean Republic, there was no guarantee that the terms of the armistice would be kept. The conduct therefore of Dr. Rhee has placed the North Korean and the Chinese Governments in a dilemma.

 

It is no doubt true that, after the death of Stalin and the reversal of his policies by his successors, there is a real desire for peace in the Communist camp. The Korean War has not brought victory to them. It has only ended in a military stalemate. There is no prospect of their being able to secure control over South Korea through a military campaign now. Even if they think of war later for achieving this objective, they must have time to recuperate their strength. Then there are also the larger and more important issues. The war has cost them two million casualties. It has been a drain on the resources of China. The Chinese Government feels that continuance of war will make it more dependent on Soviet Russia, and that it will delay the industrialisation of the country and the general economic reconstruction on which it is bent. It is therefore quite possible that, influenced by considerations like these, they may reconcile themselves to the treachery of Dr. Rhee and sign the armistice.

 

They may be persuaded to do so by Soviet Russia. The Soviet embarked on the Korean adventure in the spirit of a gambler. Unfortunately the gamble led to unwelcome results. Not only was there no victory in Korea but the Korean crisis has led to the increasing domination of the United States in Western Europe–the one result which the Soviet authorities wanted to prevent. It was the Korean crisis that strengthened the Atlantic Treaty Organisation and brought under its control a well-organised and well-equipped army commanded by a United States general. It laid the foundations of a European Defence Community, of which a revived and restored Western Germany with its human and material resources is to be an integral part. It has led to British and American rearmament on a large scale, so that today the American bloc is from a defence point of view much stronger than what it was before the Korean crisis. The Soviet gamble has failed and the Soviet statesmen are now anxious for peace in Korea, so that they may be free to achieve their aims through diplomacy and through negotiation. There does not seem to be any doubt as to the sincerity with which they are making their efforts for a peaceful solution of outstanding issues, and this is sure to make the Communists in North Korea and their Chinese allies sign the armistice.

 

Such an armistice seems to be all the more necessary for Soviet Russia from other standpoints also. The situation in Eastern Germany is not today so bright as it was before the death of Stalin. The new rulers of Soviet Russia feel that pure Communism cannot be a success there. They have now abandoned some of their essential social and economic policies in that region and made the Communist regime, which they set up there, issue statements to the effect that it committed errors in the past. Private capitalist enterprise is now being encouraged. Collectivisation of agriculture has peen stopped. In spite of this the situation in East Berlin and Eastern Germany has become volcanic. There have been labour strikes on an unprecedented scale. If a comparison has to be instituted, the situation in East Germany today is just like the opposition to Napoleon which started in Spain when he was practically at the height of his power and which was the beginning of the collapse of his empire. East Germany may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of Soviet Russia.

 

It has long been the policy of Soviet statesmen to prevent the integration of Western Germany into the West European Defence system. This policy has not undergone a change after the death of Stalin. Only it is taking a new shape and form. They are now anxious that a United Germany which will keep aloof from the West European Defence system–a sort of a neutral or a buffer State in Central Europe–is created. They prefer this to forcible communisation of Eastern Germany which will be permanently separated from a democratic Western Germany. Their cry therefore now is German unity. Under the changed circumstances brought about by the reversal of their policies in Eastern Germany this cry is having its effect. It is weakening the hold of Chancellor Adenauer and his party in Western Germany and strengthening that of the Social Democrats who are not over-enthusiastic about West European unity. It looks therefore the Soviet rulers are anxious to have their hands freed from the difficulties in Korea so that they may pay more attention to the affairs of Europe. What they want is a sort of respite from the strain created by Stalin’s cold war. It is this that explains their friendly attitude towards Tito with whom they have exchanged ambassadors and the political assurances which they have given to Turkey in recent weeks. Their attitude towards Austria is also more conciliatory. All these may be taken as indications to show that Soviet Russia will persuade China and North Korea to sign the armistice in spite of the dishonourable behaviour of Dr. Rhee.

 

But what about the United States? The dilemma in which her Government is placed is much more serious. Of course the large majority of the people of the United States are anxious for an armistice. They do not want that more American lives should be lost in the defence of South Korea. But there is a section among them which sympathises with the stand taken by Dr. Rhee. It is the same section as has been sympathising with Chiang-Kai-Shek. They are not in the least perturbed by the idea of a large scale war against Communist China, with Formosa and South Korea as the military bases for the purpose. They are not without influence on President Eisenhower. The latter has now to decide whether in the face of the opposition of Dr. Rhee he should authorise his representatives to sign the armistice. This will depend on what he thinks of the possibility of Dr. Rhee giving effect to his threat to fight, North Korea single-handed to achieve the unification of the country. If in spite of the armistice Dr. Rhee starts such a fight, he is sure to be defeated. But will it be to the interest of the United States to see that he is defeated and all Korea brought under Communist control? This is why all efforts are now being made by the United States to somehow bring round Dr. Rhee to accept the armistice. He may be brought round, provided that the United States enters into a military pact with him guaranteeing all aid to him in case another effort at aggression is made by North Korea. Some such guarantee will have to be given to him, and it will be given as there is no other alternative. There is no prospect whatever of Dr. Rhee being replaced by any other Government in South Korea.

 

It may therefore be concluded that an armistice may soon become an accomplished fact in Korea. This view is further strengthened by the attitude of the other participants on the U. N. side in the war against North Korea. Almost all of them are in favour of an armistice. This was prominently brought out by the Commonwealth Premiers’ Conference held recently in London. All the Premiers welcomed the armistice. They also welcomed the suggestion of Sir Winston Churchill for a Big-Power meeting and talks to settle as many outstanding issues as possible. No one therefore is anxious to have the armistice talks break down.

 

It should not of course be assumed that the conclusion of an armistice in Korea will end world tensions and the cold war. As a matter of fact there are many Americans who feel that it may lead only to more dissensions, not only as between the East and the West but also as between the “free” nations outside the Communist bloc–tensions which are now lying latent because of the Korean crisis. A peace conference will have to be called and many issues will have to be solved. But on most of these issues the views of the United States are very much different from those held by some of her important allies–notably England and France–and by some of the important neutral States like India. There is a large section in the United States which feels that the open discussion of these differences may result in a breach in the defence system which they have been building against Communistic expansionism during the last seven years.

 

Among these issues is the admission of Communist China into the U.N.O. This occupies an important place among them. The Senate of the United States recently passed an unanimous resolution that there should be no such admission, and it would be difficult for the United States representative to vote for such admission when the question comes up before the Security Council. He will be compelled to veto it. The United Kingdom however is for admitting China. Of course India has always fighting for it.

 

There is next the question of Formosa. There can be settlement of the Far Eastern issues unless Formosa is incorporated in Communist China. But the United States is determined to oppose it. Here again England and India differ from the United States.

 

Next is the question of Indo-China. There is no meaning in the United States asking Communist China not to help to Ho-chi-Minh in Viet-Nam so long as she continues to help Chiang-Kai-Shek in Formosa.

 

Above all there is the question of the unification of Korea and the establishment of a free democratic government there. Here again there is no prospect of any agreement between the parties. United Korea under a Communist government is an abhorrent to the United States as United Korea under a democratic government is to China and Soviet Russia. For some years to come Korea will have to remain divided.

 

All this means that even if an armistice is concluded, the world will have to wait for some years before there is a settlement of Far Eastern issues through negotiation and through the method of conference.

 

On the subject of the West European Defence system also there are divergent views–views which have so far delayed the ratification of the European Defence Treaties. Here the divergence is mainly between France and the United States. A rearmed Western Germany incorporated into the defence system is anathema to France, and the United States cannot think of such a system without Germany being a part of it. European defence against Soviet aggression and the spread of Communism has, in the view of the United States, no meaning unless German man-power is included in it. A United Germany as proposed by Soviet Russia is not from her viewpoint a more desirable alternative. Thus neither in the East nor in the West will world tensions be removed or even weakened with the conclusion of the Korean armistice. The cold war is bound to continue and every country will be pestered by the intrigues and counter-intrigues initiated by the two world powers.

 

It may be a point for consideration whether some Americans may not argue against armistice in Korea, if armistice does not serve the purpose of putting an end to the cold war and the hidden menace of international Communism of which they are mortally afraid. One should not lose sight of such an argument. They may be stimulated to support it on the ground that it may be left to Dr. Rhee and Chiang-Kai-Shaik equipped with American arms to fight it out, with the United States watching the situation from a distance. This was just what Soviet Russia did when on June 25, 1950 she encouraged North Korea to launch her attack on South Korea. It took three years for her to realise that this gamble was a failure. There will be nothing surprising if Americans now begin to imitate Soviet Russia in this respect and instigate their proteges–Dr. Rhee and Chiang, to try their strength against the Communists. A policy like this may be pursued even if an armistice is concluded between the U.N. forces on one side and the Communist forces on the other. One of the great discoveries of Stalinism was the effectiveness of Civil Wars in the march of international Communism towards world conquest.

 

There is nothing wrong or inappropriate if “Capitalism” takes to the same method and makes use of it.

 

Reference may now be made to the other tensions in the world. The situation in Indo-China shows no signs of improvement. On the other hand it has become worse in consequence of the activities of the King of Cambodia who is now actively demanding for the States in Indo-China–the so-called associated States of the French Union–the same status as India has in the Commonwealth of Nations. This is a legitimate demand, and without conceding it France will never be able to get on in Indo-China. It is time that the United States brings sufficient pressure to bear on France and tells her that no solution of the Indo-China problem is possible unless the independence of Indo-China is recognised. If what the United States wants is the “containment” of Communism, she can succeed in such a policy if she takes up the cause of Nationalism. Otherwise she will have to fight not only Communism but also Nationalism. The recent tour of John Foster Dulles round the countries of Asia must have brought this conviction to him, if his countrymen had not already been convinced of it. There is no meaning in a third rate power like France with a dwindling population twice defeated by Germany, trying to impose her authority on a people who are prepared to sacrifice everything for freedom, and the attempt becomes still more meaningless when her domestic situation is so disrupted that for weeks together she is not able to get a stable ministry. A graceful withdrawal from her colonial territories would prove doubly advantageous to her.

 

Similar is the situation in respect of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal. Egypt has now become a Republic with General Naguib as her first President. He and his revolutionary council are not prepared to yield even by an inch in their demand that Britain should evacuate the Canal. It is their faith that then alone does Egypt become really sovereign. The British are not prepared to evacuate, as they think that there is no other spot from which they can organise the defence of the Middle East against Soviet aggression. It is the British fear of Communist expansion that stands in the way of their coming to a friendly understanding with Egyptian nationalism. John Foster Dulles didn’t succeed in his recent visit to Cairo in bringing about reconciliation between the parties. Even the efforts of Pandit Nehru and Premier Mohammad Ali of Pakistan have not met with a better fate.

 

It is now becoming more and more clear that unless the neutral nations of the world–neutral in the sense that they ardently desire peace and non-intervention by the two great world-powers–form themselves into a third bloc and treat the so-called world powers as “untouchables” would wisdom dawn on those powers and make them see the folly of each of them preparing for war against the other. Concentration of power is much more dangerous than concentration of wealth. There is no freedom for small and middling nations so long as there is such concentration.

 

29th June 1953.

 

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