INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

 

VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE

 

PROF. R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO

 

            The conclusion of the cease-fire agreement on Vietnam in Paris on January 26, brings to an end the longest war of this century and one of the fiercest of all times. It is impossible to imagine two more unequal antagonists than the United States and the North Vietnam who were the main contenders in the war. Though considerable arms supplies flowed from Russia and China into Hanoi and from there to the Vietcong in the South, in military potential the communists were no match to American might. If ever there was a David-Goliath situation, this was it. And in this bloody carnage the worst sufferers have been the people of Vietnam. Terrorised by the communists, tortured by the Government forces and ‘pacified’ by American napalm bombs, the poor peasants of the Vietnam plains withstood the worst that politics could bestow on the unpolitical. Cessation of war anywhere on the globe is always welcome and the cessation of this particular one is a thousand times more so.

 

Historical Background

 

            Following the Second World War, France’s futile bid to re-occupy its Indo-China possessions was worsted by the communist-led nationalists of Vietnam and the curtain on French colonial rule in this part of the world was wrung down with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. At the Geneva Conference that followed, it was decided to temporarily partition Vietnam with the communists keeping the northern part where their writ had been in force even by then. The Southern region was to remain separate. As the French began evacuating, the Americans stepped in. As if yesterday’s French follies became today’s American novelties, the Americans decided to defend the state of South Vietnam against communism. The American involvement began in June 1953 as Ngo Din Dien became the first President of South Vietnam. A team of U. S. agents, to engage in “paramilitary operations” and “political psychological warfare” against North Vietnam, was sent into the South, even before the Geneva Agreement was formally signed in June 1953. As international opposition to the Dien regime got built up and he, with American blessings, refused to co-operate in the holding of elections throughout the country as was stipulated by the Geneva Agreement, President Eisenhower had sent 350 more military personnel as ‘advisers’. By early 1962 the number of these ‘advisers’ rose to 3200 and by the end of that year it stood at 11,300. The euphemism of advisers was by now dropped. By this time North Vietnam’s support to the Vietcong in the South had also mounted up. The question whether the problem was one of a civil war between the American propped regime and the communists or one of aggression from North Vietnam, was never clear from the start, and eventually got even more mixed up. The Johnson Administration took a headlong plunge into a major escalation of its involvement by persuading the Congress to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which pledged full support for American forces in Vietnam. After this the American President exercised virtually uncontrolled power over the war in Vietnam. Shortly thereafter the U. S. bombing of the North began and American forces in the South increased to 27,000. The following two years witnessed the Greek tragedy of increasing American commitment with the ostensible purpose of quickly ending communist aggression and getting themselves out. The process of ‘saving’ South Vietnam from communism resulted in savage bombings of the very land and its people with the result that the entire country now lies desolate. The period was interspersed with feelers for peace from either side which only ended in mutual recriminations and bloodier hostilities. By the end of 1966 there were nearly 40,000 U. S. soldiers in Vietnam. Finally in 1968 the U. S. and North Vietnam agreed to open talks in Paris in which the Government of South Vietnam and the Vietcong’s political wing, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, also took part. In fairness to late President Johnson it must be noted that it was during the last days of his term that these talks opened in Paris, which were later continued by President Nixon. As the talks took to their tortuous course, the slaughter in Vietnam continued unabated though under what came to be called the Nixon Doctrine, substantial amounts of American troops started leaving Vietnam. The American President’s avowed desire to withdraw from Vietnam coupled with his pursuit of detente with China prompted fresh negotiations between the Americans and the North Vietnamese also, at a level higher than the Paris talks. Hanoi came out with a nine-point peace proposal calling for total American withdrawal, the ouster of Thieu regime and the installation of a coalition government in Saigon and a cease-fire immediately, thereafter. Even though the Americans did not accept some of these conditions, this proposal formed the basis for a series of talks between Dr. Kissinger and Lee Duc Tho of North Vietnam which ultimately bore fruit in January 1973 in the shape of the Paris Cease-fire Agreement signed by the U. S. North Vietnam, the South Vietnamese Government and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

 

            Not a little of the credit for this peace should go to the quiet diplomacy of Henry Kissinger and Lee Duc Tho. Their patience in the face of delays, provocations and insults that punctuated their talks has provided the world with a rare example of civility under stress. To President Nixon too should go a word of thanks, though not more than a single cheer is due. While he did achieve what his critics regarded as impossible–that of ending the war without sacrificing the tenure of the Thieu regime in Saigon–he secured this with a singular lack of grace as was evident from the resumption of savage bombing in North Vietnam in December 1972, when the Agreement was almost finalised. The ostensible purpose of this bombing was to force Hanoi to yield more concessions at the conference table but as the final accord does not reveal any substantial concessions from Hanoi, the bombing spree of December was nothing short of a vindictive and punitive venture on President Nixon’s part.

 

The Peace Agreement

 

            The Peace Agreement could be summarised thus:

 

            1. The war in Vietnam is to end as of midnight of January 27, 1972. The U. S. undertook to stop all military action against North Vietnam and to remove the mines it placed in North Vietnamese waters.

 

            2. The U. S. and its allies undertook to withdraw all their troops and other military personnel from South Vietnam within sixty days of the cease-fire. What is most significant is that there is no corresponding undertaking on Hanoi’s part to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam. Hanoi gave a private assurance of gradual withdrawal of its men.

 

            Pending their withdrawal the Americans and their allies are to remain where they were at the time of the cease-fire. A joint military commission of all the four parties to the Agreement is to determine the modalities of withdrawal. The presence of American civilian advisers in South Vietnam is not effected by this Agreement.

 

            The two warring South Vietnamese forces, those of the South Vietnamese Government and of the Vietcong, are also to remain in place and a joint military commission consisting of their representatives is to determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of the stationing of their forces. These two parties also undertake not to accept military aid in any form from outside.

 

            3. The parties agree to exchange all prisoners of war including captured foreign civilians. This also is to be completed within sixty days. By this provision the U. S. ensured the release of all American prisoners in North Vietnamese and Vietcong hands. The question of the release of the communist prisoners in South Vietnamese has, however, is slightly complicated. First, since there is no mention of North Vietnamese troops in the South, North Vietnamese prisoners in Saigon’s custody are only to be treated as Vietcong prisoners. This leaves the question of the so-called South Vietnamese civilian internees. The Thieu regime has put in gaol most of the communist neutralists. While these are not given prisoner-of-war status, the Agreement provides that they are to be released by arrangement between the two South Vietnamese parties, within ninety days of the cease-fire.

 

            4. The Agreement does not contain any indication about the type of political settlement in South Vietnam. It leaves this to be determined by the people of South Vietnam. Towards this, the U. S. and North Vietnam pledge to respect the South Vietnamese’ right to self-determination. The recognition of this right by Hanoi is regarded as a crucial gain wrested by the U. S. and as a set-back to the policy goals of Hanoi.

 

            The Agreement envisages that the two South Vietnamese parties should set up a tripartite National Council of Reconciliation and Concord with representatives of themselves and of the neutralist sections of the South Vietnamese public. This Council of Reconciliation has the crucial task of promoting the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement, the achievement of national reconciliation, the ensuring of democratic liberties and eventually the organisation of democratic elections to be held under international supervision.

 

            5. The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam (of the Thieu regime, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese) is also to be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties themselves.

 

            6. One of the most intricate balancing tricks the Agreement accomplished is with regard to the future of the state of South Vietnam itself. In reiterating in its very first article that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognised by the 1954 Gene.va Agreements on Vietnam would be respected by all, the present Agreement clearly envisages the unification of the two Vietnams. But, pending this, the accord guarantees the integrity and independence of the two Vietnams by providing that the military demarcation line between the two entities at the 17th Parallel (though recognised as provisional) be respected by all. There is thus a delicate compromise between the short term and long term objectives of ensuring South Vietnam’s continuation and the eventual unification of the two Vietnams. The Americans claim that Hanoi’s willingness to respect the independence of South Vietnam constitutes a major political victory to themselves. The implication of this concession will be examined later.

 

            8. As for the realisation of the eventual unification of Vietnam, the accord provides a step by step strategy of negotiations between North and South Vietnams without coercion or annexation by either party and without foreign interference. It is provided that these negotiations are to start immediately.

 

            9. The Agreement provides for a number of bodies to facilitate the speedy implementation of its provisions and help realise its ultimate objectives. 

 

            First, there are the two joint military commissions–the four-power joint military commission and the two-power joint military commission. The former comprises representatives of all signatories and its task is to implement the provisions of the agreement covering troop withdrawals and the dismantling of bases, the observance of cease-fire and the exchange of prisoners. This body is to be wound up after the troop withdrawals are completed in sixty days from January 27. The latter is formed by the representatives of the South Vietnamese Government and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Its responsibility is to maintain the cease-fire after the four-party commission gets disbanded. Its functions also include: the fixing of the positions of the Vietnamese armed forces in the South at the time of the cease-fire, the determining of areas controlled by each side, and arranging the exchange of civilian prisoners in the South. Decisions of the two commissions are to be made on the unanimity principle and cases of disagreement are to be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision comprising the representatives of Canada, Indonesia, Poland and Hungary. The implementation of the cease-fire throughout Vietnam, the withdrawal of U. S. troops, the return of war prisoners and civilian internees and the arranging of general elections in South Vietnam are the important functions that the Commission is to perform. The Commission is modelled on the lines of the International Commission that worked under the Geneva Agreements of 1953 with India, Poland and Canada as its members. The present Commission excludes India adding Indonesia and Hungary instead. Learning from the experience of the previous Commission, the Agreement provides that the Commission should have a sizable force of its own drawn from various States. It is also empowered to work through control teams to be located wherever the Commission feels it necessary.

 

10. The Agreement provides that an International Conference should meet within a month of the signing of the agreement to “acknowledge the signing of the agreements, to guarantee the ending of war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people’s fundamental and national rights and the South Vietnamese people’s right to self-determination and to contribute and guarantee peace in Indo-china.” The idea is to endow the agreement with greater legitimacy and to involve the great Powers and the U. N. in the task of maintaining peace in the area. This Conference was duly held in February in Paris and it passed a Declaration endorsing the Paris Agreement.

 

11. As regards Laos and Cambodia, where too fighting has been going on between communist insurgents and non-communist regimes, the Paris Agreement exhorts that the parties concerned “shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreement” and “shall put an end to all military activities” in the two countries. Here the implication is that the North Vietnamese have admitted the presence of their troops and that they agree to withdraw these. The old International Control Commission of India, Canada and Poland) remains in Laos, though its activities have been suspended in Cambodia since 1969.

 

            In pursuance of the Agreement a cease-fire has been reached in Laos and a tripartite provisional government with rightists, neutralists and the communists is expected to be formed, though from the start the project is beset with problems. The total withdrawal of North Vietnamese and American troops from Laotian soil is still to be hoped for. The Cambodian situation remains as bad as ever.

Who conceded what and why?

 

            The details about the provisions relating to withdrawal and the independence of South Vietnam disclose many interesting implications.

 

Troop withdrawal and the American climb-down

           

            It is the U. S. that undertook a total withdrawal of its troops including the military personnel associated with the ‘pacification’ programme, within sixty days of the cease-fire. The significant fact is that there is no corresponding undertaking on Hanoi’s part to withdraw its personnel from the South. This is a major triumph for the North Vietnamese who had all along denied the existence of their troops in the South. What is more, in this respect the U.S. suffered a major reversal of its policy objective of insisting on complete North Vietnamese withdrawal as a pre-condition for peace talks with Hanoi. In waiving this pre-condition, the U. S., in effect, conceded the point vis-a-vis South Vietnam. North Vietnam’s locus standi is of an order different from that of its own. In view or this implication one can once again reopen the question of the very legality of U. S. intervention. It should be remembered that since 1953 the American intervention was based on the premise of protecting the territorial integrity of South Vietnam not merely from internal rebellion but from aggression from the North. The implication of the troop withdrawal provisions is that the North had not invaded the South.

 

            The curious part of the situation is that while Hanoi refused to admit the presence of its forces in the South, it did admit privately the presence of 1,45,000 soldiers, and undertook their withdrawal gradually. But Mr. Kissinger himself stated that a part of this force is likely to remain for a long time when he said that the North Vietnamese forces in South “should over a period of time be subject to considerable reduction.” Even more significant is the U. S. Government’s admission “that the troops (North Vietnam’s) will be needed to defend the Vietcong enclaves against possible attack from Mr. Thleu’s forces’ (Bernard Gwertzman’s assessment of the Cease-fire Pact, “International Herald Tribune”, January 29, 1973).

 

Hanoi’s diplomatic reverses

 

            If the non-insistence on North Vietnamese withdrawal is an American climb-down, Hanoi too on its part had to yield a most crucial concession on the issue of the continuation of the Thieu regime in Saigon. It had insisted right from the start that cease-fire would be possible only when the American supported Thieu Government is replaced by a coalition in which the PRG figures. Hanoi gave up this demand only in October 1972 when it first announced the draft of the cease-fire agreement. In this both the Chinese and the Russians have played their part in persuading Hanoi to come down. Given this, the Americans could legitimately claim that they substantially kept their pledge to protect the Thieu regime in Saigon. But, even here a closer examination of the facts shows that the American claims are rather exaggerated. The U. S. was only just able to salvage the Thieu regime and that too temporarily. The Agreement specifically envisages the constitution of a broad-based government as soon as possible.

 

            The Americans also claim to have wrested another crucial concession from North Vietnam in making the latter recognise South Vietnam as an entity and to respect its sovereignty. The concession is buttressed and further fortified by the provision under which Hanoi undertook to respect the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams.

 

American Diplomatic Gains–More a Mirage

 

            While the above two points warrant some jubilation on American’s part on closer analysis it will be clear that the claims are exaggerated.

 

            Firstly, except that President Thieu is not displaced, the American victory on the issue of the Thieu regime is only a little more than technical. The cease-fire pact specifically envisages the formation of a broad-based political regime–a National Council of Reconciliation and Concord–consisting of all the three segments: the present regime, the PRG and the neutral sections of the South Vietnamese public. This Council is nothing short of a coalition government which Hanoi and the Vietcong were demanding. It is interesting to note that President Thieu and the U.S. Government refuse to regard the proposed National Council of Reconciliation and Concord as a coalition. In fact one of the so-called concessions that America extracted from Hanoi relates to the fact that whereas the Draft Agreement of October 1972 referred to a three-party administrative structure to be set up in the South after the cease-fire, the phrase administrative structure is omitted from the final accord of January 1973 since in Vietnamese translation the phrase suggested a disguised coalition government. This is perhaps no more than a terminological consolation for it is hard to see how the contemplated National Council of Reconciliation and Concord differs from a coalition government.

 

            The best argument against the American claim of having rescued the present Vietnam’s regime is that the South Vietnamese Government is not mentioned anywhere by itself in the entire cease-fire Agreement. While it refers to the South Vietnamese peoples, it does not at any place allude to any South Vietnamese Government as such. On the contrary, wherever it intends to refer to the South Vietnamese Government, the text invariably uses the words “the two South Vietnamese parties.” The implication is unmistakable. The Thieu regime is not recognised to be the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people.

 

            Coming to the question of the sovereignty or South Vietnam, barring one single mention of this word, every other related provision in the accord puts a discount on South Vietnam’s sovereignty.

 

            1. The very chapter dealing with South Vietnam as an entity also adverts specifically to the point that “the military demarcation line between the two zones is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary.”

 

            2. The very first article of the cease-fire pact states “that the U. S. and other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognised by the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam.” This clinches the point that on the whole the Agreement endorses Hanoi’s stand which seeks the eventual unification of Vietnam. It should also be remembered that the Americans had all along been averse to endorse the Geneva accord which they now endorse in the opening lines of the Paris Agreement.

 

The Prospects

 

            The protracted negotiations behind the accord and the sacrifice of humanitarian considerations for the sake of extracting concessions that turned out to be mutually incompatible, only underscore what a quilt of patches the accord is. Andre Fontaine of the Paris Le Monde has given expression to the misgivings that many entertain about the accord thus: “The cease-fire agreement is merely the product of juxtaposition of forces, used optimally, and with total disregard of moral or legal considerations, by that chess master Henry Kissinger. It may well put an end to hostilities, but the hostility remains. Reconciliation, the one thing that could realty ring the final curtain down on the tragedy, still remains a very remote prospect.” Thus, given nearly a quarter century of bitterness and hostility between the Vietnamese, words like reconciliation and concord seem mere rhetoric.

 

            The implementation of the cease-fire itself remained a thorny problem. The South Vietnamese and Americans are already alleging that thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks are still infiltrating from the North to the Vietcong hands. The Vietcong on its part accuses that Americans are still operating in the guise of civilian advisers. The scale of fighting between the Thieu forces and the communists has not abated at all. Since the ceasefire in January more than 18,000 deaths and more than 40,000 rounds of artillery firings a day are reported. Paradoxically enough, the long-term goal of democratic elections in South Vietnam itself puts a premium on a desperate scramble for control over as much of South Vietnamese territory as possible. The point is that nothing effective exists to compel the two South Vietnamese parties to seriously try for reconciliation and eschew the temptation to settle scores now that foreign troops have withdrawn. The four-power joint military commission has not been wound up and the task of facilitating the observance of cease-fire between the two parties in the South, the delimitation of areas in effective control of the parties and the starting of talks on the future political set up are to be discharged by bilateral negotiations between the two sides. If the cease-fire implementation is itself so precarious, the prospect for an agreement over the proposed National Committee of Reconciliation which is to be realised by the end of April seems remote indeed. Yet the consolation is that representatives of the Thieu regime and of the Provisional Revolutionary Govt. have started negotiations in Paris.

 

            The International Commission of Control and Supervision can only supervise and identify the defaulters but has not much of power to enforce things. Under these conditions a quick political settlement is out of the question. Yet too much of pessimism is also unwarranted. While cease-fire violations may increase, neither side can afford to ignore international opinion for ever. It is in this context that the work of the ICCS becomes crucial. Its supervisory and reporting roles constitute the levers that influence, even if only marginally, the behaviour of the two parties. There is any amount of speculation as to what the U. S. would do if the Vietcong do not behave by keeping to the Agreement. A return of American troops is ruled out. But large scale bombing of communist strong-holds and of North Vietnam might in all probability be resumed. If this happens the situation will be back where it was, if not worse.

 

Scope for subdued optimism

 

            It is unlikely that North Vietnam would incite the Vietcong to continue struggle for there is a limit to their ability to keep the supplies pouring into the South as also to their capacity to ignore Russian and Chinese advice for restraint. The fact that both China and Russia stood aside as dumb spectators when North Vietnam was pounded by the Americans in December (and that at a time when a cease-fire agreement was reported to have been finalised) speaks volumes of the impatience of these communist powers to get the Vietnam problem out of their ways. It is also on record that Moscow refused to supply Hanoi certain types of rockets which it has been giving to Egypt. The Thieu regime on its part knows it cannot gain a straight military victory over the communists. Hence, even if the war continues for sometime in utter disregard of the ninety-day deadline within which bilateral agreement on the shape of the future governmental set up is required to be finalised, an eventual agreement is not unlikely. Subdued optimism on this score is not out of place.

 

Implications to the outside world

 

            What are the implications of these developments to peace and security in general and that of South-East Asia in particular?

 

            In so far as direct American involvement has ended, one major trouble-spot with potentialities for global conflict has faded. This reinforces the prospects for peace in the world that have steadily been multiplying since the earning of the cold war tension for quite sometime now.

           

            The Americans have now discarded their dominos theory and no longer believe that Peking is out to forge into defenceless nations to her South. This is not because Washington has recently discovered the nicer qualities of cousin-peking. It has more to do with the realisation that the latter’s preoccupation with the Soviet Union rules out aggressive designs elsewhere. This American reading of the Chinese mind, however, has not convinced some of the South-East Asian States who feel jittery about American withdrawal from the region. Some like Thailand and Singapore are seeking assurances that existing American commitments would be honoured, and the U. S. is anxious to give these guarantees. In addition they say that the Seventh Fleet will continue to sail in Asian waters as a “ready power for peace.” Others like Malaysia are seeking a more lasting type of security in plans for the neutralisation of the whole region. Strangely enough, the level of Sino-American bonhomie has reached such heights that while the former on its part does no longer regard China to be aggressive, the latter in their turn do not seem to mind the presence of American troops in South-East Asia! Recent reports say that China wants “American armed forces including the Seventh Fleet to stay in the Pacific and the U. S. Air Force to remain in Thailand. The point was made in vague terms by two Congressional leaders after seeing Mr. Chou last summer, but it has reportedly been repeated by Chinese diplomats recently.” (Jonathan Steele The Guardian, London, February 24, 1973). The result of this mutual trust might well be that the smaller nations of the region may not have any cause to fear China. On balance this subtle Chinese gesture of reassurance would upset Russian efforts at co-opting some of the South-East Asian nations into its proposed security system. China has pulled the rug under the Russians’ feet in settling with Japan and now it may make Russia’s concern for the security fears of South-East Asian nations appear to be one of Supreme irrelevance. This is not to say that South-East Asia would come to trust China overnight. Indonesia and even Malaysia still have misgivings about China. But the Russians would not be allowed to cash in diplomatically.

 

            The Chinese rightly or wrongly are very much concerned about Russia’s designs and read in the proposal for a security system a strategem to encircle China. It is in this context that India’s growing relations with the Soviet Union are analysed by China. Peking is sure to checkmate even Indian attempts to cultivate the South-East Asian neighbours. Obsessed as she is with the Soviet intentions, it sees behind India’s diplomatic initiatives Kremlin’s promptings. The Americans have their own reasons to twit Indian diplomacy, not to speak of their interest to keep the Soviet Union away from South-East Asia. The exclusion of India from the new International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam is a good pointer to Sino-American intrigue against India. India is the only member of the old Commission to be ousted from the new. Both Canada and Poland remain the new body while Indonesia and Hungary are the new entrants. Reports say that North Vietnam very much wanted to have India on the Commission and that the objection came from the United States. There is also evidence that China prevailed upon Hanoi not to make Indian participation an issue with the United States. It is interesting to ask why the Russians did not press Hanoi to insist on India’s inclusion. The answer seems to be that in the horse-trading that went on behind the scenes about the composition of the Commission, the Russians were more concerned to see Poland and Hungary in, than to safeguard India’s claims.

 

            Thus while peace prospects in South-East Asia have definitely improved, there is a discount on Indian initiatives in the region. There is urgent need for India to strive to project itself as a South-East Asian Power in sympathising with the fears and supporting the projects for security canvassed by these nations. We have not so far come out unequivocally in support of the Malaysian plan for the neutralisation of South-East Asia though President Giri’s speeches during his recent Malaysian tour have to an extent improved India’s image in this area. It is also important that we should dispel the impression that our foreign policy is too Moscow oriented. Such efforts would not only endear us more to our neighbours but might also provide the needed breakthrough in the existing Sino-Indian stalemate.

 

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