President Nixon: Confrontation or Negotiation

Mr. Richard Millhaus Nixon won the American Presidency. Mr. Hubert Humphrey, the outgoing Vice-President, lost the race rather narrowly. The widespread disappointment with the Johnson Administration’s Vietnam policy seemed to have given the Republican candidate the edge over Mr. Humphrey. However, a few observers did predict that Mr. Humphrey’s ‘liberal’ politics and Mr. Nixon’s reputation for conservatism, especially in the matter of socio-economic policies within the United States, would lead to Mr. Humphrey’s success. But those predictions were belied. Incidentally, in his survey for the previous issue of this journal, the present author himself hinted that Mr. Humphrey would be the winner. The author is now compelled to chew his hat! The deep dissension in the democratic party, consequent on the estrangement between Mr. Humphrey and Mr. Eugene Macarthy, the rivals for the democratic nomination, partly account for Mr. Humphrey’s failure. Mr. Nixon succeeded in projecting the image of a self-confident, mature and knowledgeable leader, and his committal to a policy of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam as also his approval of the need to continue the ‘detente’ with Moscow, made up for his reputation for conservatism.

Yet it is still an open question as to what extent Mr. Nixon will change the present trends in American foreign policy and through it the world scene itself. Before a brief analysis of the future shape of things under Nixon could be made, one observation may be emphasised. Thanks to the balance of power in nuclear arms, no policy-maker, either in Washington or in Moscow, however conservative or revolutionary he may be, can seriously think of a deliberate departure from maintaining the tempo of the existing thaw in the cold war.

During his campaign and even before, Mr. Nixon, expressed his opinion that the cultivation of cordial relations with Moscow, should go on. It should be remembered that even before the announcement of his candidature for the Presidency, he undertook a private visit to Moscow and had talks with some of the Soviet leaders. He seemed to share the conviction of other Western and non-aligned statesmen that the Russian protestations for peace are sincere and that the West could trust them. The reaction of Moscow to Mr. Nixon also underwent a marked change. Though the Russian press did occasionally refer to his past record of crusading anti-communism, on the whole, no vituperative hostility was evidence this time. Time was when the Russian press used such epithets like ‘Tricky Dick’ to characterise Mr. Nixon. Such references have been conspicuous by their absence during the recent elections. Even after the elections, no adverse reference after Mr. Nixon’s victory as enmical to Soviet-American relations appeared.

The best indication of Mr. Nixon’s desire to keep up the dialogue with Moscow is to be found in the speech he made at Miami, Florida, while accepting the Republican nomination. He stated, “And now to the leaders of the Communist world we say, after an era of confrontation, the time has come for an era of negotiations.” If this be regarded as the cardinal principle of his foreign policy, then one can predict that the ‘detenate’ will continue.

Yet Mr. Nixon’s statements on armaments do reflect a posture less sympathetic to disarmament, which is but an aspect of the ‘détente’. During the election campaign, he firmly advocated a policy of strengthening further the military potential of America as a pre-requisite for meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union. Thus, apparently, he is harping on the idea of ‘negotiating from strength.’ In fact, in his acceptance speech at Miami, Mr. Nixon qualified the eloquent statement quoted above, and said “where the world super-powers are concerned there is no acceptable alternative to peaceful negotiation. Because this will be a period of negotiations we shall restore the strength of America so that we shall negotiate from strength and never from weakness.” A revival of the slogan of ‘negotiating from strength’ implies a reversion to cold war semantics, and what is worse, it puts a premium on re-armament, with all its implications for the future of the ‘detente.’ In the immediate future this would mean a set-back to the proposed negotiations between Moscow and Washington on the limitation of offensive and defensive missiles. However, it is a matter for gratification that the new President is very anxious that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty should be ratified by the Congress.

It will be interesting to observe what attitudes Mr. Nixon will take towards Peking. Will he negotiate with Communist China without any pre-conditions? If the contemplated shift “from the era of confrontation to the era of negotiations” is to be taken seriously, the President should think in terms of starting a dialogue with Peking. If he resorts to this policy, he, a Republican, will have accomplished what even the Democrats did not do. But it is really doubtful whether the President-elect will be prepared to talk with China with a view to come to terms. Firstly, can Mr. Nixon now decide to drop Chiangkai Shek? Secondly, even if the Chinese are prepared to leave Formosa alone, any meaningful solution to the present impasse between Washington and Peking would necessitate an act of trust, involving at least a partial withdrawal of the American protective forces from the eastern areas. Would such an act of faith be forthcoming from Mr. Nixon? After all, there is a difference in the way Mr. Nixon looks at Russian Communism and Chinese Communism. In the case of the former, while he may harp upon negotiating from strength, he may nevertheless be prepared to compromise on the aspect of strength, if it becomes so necessary for progress in the area of negotiations. Would such compromise be possible in dealing with China? Further, the whole United States policy in Asia is built upon the assumption of a semi-permanent hostility of Peking towards the U. S. as also of the former’s expansionist designs over South-east Asia. And on this foundation are built a host of military alliances. Can the United States now repudiate these? for there cannot be any useful purpose served in negotiating with China, unless these avowedly anti-Communist alliances are withdrawn. These considerations alone make it improbable that Mr. Nixon would resort to any positive steps in negotiations with China. And then there is his own psychological conditioning, which makes him view communism, especially the Chinese variety, as inherently expansionist and aggressive. To spotlight this aspect of the matter, it is very important to refer to his recent article on, ‘Asia after Vietnam’ published in the quarterly Foreign Affairs (October, 1968). He does not believe that the schism in communism has blunted its votaries urge for old-style international communism. Such a view, to him, “Ignores, however, the fact that with the decentralisalion of communist control has come an appropriately tailored shift in communist tactics. National communism poses a different kind of threat than did the old-style international communism, but by being subtler it is some ways more dangerous.” Again, on the nature of regional co-operation in Asia, Mr. Nixon emphasises that efforts in that direction should have in view the Chinese threat and, what is most revealing, that such co-operation could not merely be confined to cultural and economic spheres but should envisage a military arrangement to contain China. Recommending the model of the American sponsored Asian and Pacific Council in this regard, he says, ‘Despite ASPAC’s present cultural and economic orientation, however, the solidifying awareness of China’s threat should make it possible to develop into an alliance actively dedicated to concerting whatever efforts necessary to maintain the security of the region. I do not mean to minimise the difficulties of winning acceptance of such a concept. In Japan, public opinion, still lags behind official awareness of military needs. The avowedly neutralist nations under China’s cloud would be reluctant, at present, to join any such grouping. But looking further down we can project either an erosion of their neutralism or the formation of their own loose associations, which might be tied into a militarily oriented ASPAC on an interlocking and co-operative basis. “Mr. Nixon’s convictions about an old-style western military solution to the threat of China cannot find a more eloquent expression. Therefore one cannot expect any major break-through in Sino-American relations in the forseeable future.

On the issue of Vietnam, there is again an ambivalence in the Nixon policy. He is fully committed to the peace-talks in Paris and indeed sounded impatient that the Johnson Administration did not do enough in this regard. Yet on present indications, it seems, he is going to be tough with the Communists at the negotiating table. He mentioned that there can be no compromise on the issue of American interest in South-east Asia, and, if this were to mean that he is going to be unaccommodative to the demands of the National Liberation Front, the Paris Talks will to that extent become less fruitful. The point is that, given the present irreconcilable positions taken by the government of South Vietnam on the one hand and the N. L. F. and North Vietnam on the other. Any Indiscriminate American support to the South Vietnamese Government may stall the negotiations. Further, there is the likelihood that the United States would interpret such failures in the talks as indicative of communist attempts to use the talks as a cover for their military operations in South Vietnam. This, in its turn, might result in a reversion to a policy of military solution. The appointment, by Mr. Nixon, of Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, as the Chief American Delegate to the Paris Talks is indicative of the President’s thinking in the matter. Mr. Lodge had been Ambassador to South Vietnam for two crucial terms and had been closely identified with the present regime, and especially so with Vice-Marshal Cao Ky, the Vice-President of South Vietnam, and the leaders of its delegation to the Paris Talks. So close are the relations between Mr. Ky and Mr. Lodge that the former is described as the adopted son of Mr. Lodge. And the world knows that Mr. Ky is implacably opposed to concessions to the N. L. F. The nomination of Mr. Lodge suggests that the new American President may choose to be tough with the Communists.

It is also important to note that Mr. Nixon appointed Dr. Henry Kissinger as his resource-man on foreign policy. Dr. Kissinger favours a policy of bilateral talks between Washington and Hanoi with a view to impress upon Saigon the need to be less intransigent with the N. L. F. and Hanoi. In an article prepared before he was designated as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and published in the January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Professor Kissinger advocated two-track negotiations, one between Washington and Hanoi, and the other between the United States and North Vietnam, and, by implication, recommends that the United States insist on Saigon scrupulously observing American commitments to Hanoi. The Kissinger-plan, thus, is against the United States giving all out support to the South Vietnamese at the Paris Talks. Viewed in this perspective, the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge as the Principal American Negotiator in Paris implies that the trend of Mr. Nixon’s thinking is at variance with the policy behind Dr. Kissinger’s recommendations.

Assuming that the Nixon Administration will do its best in effecting a settlement in Vietnam, What is going to be the President’s policy over South-east Asia? Certainly, there will not be a total withdrawal of American forces from the region. No American President, much less a Republican, would pack-up and leave the area in the context of the Chinese threat and especially so in the face of American commitments to South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. Mr. Nixon’s views on the reality of the Chinese threat and his continuing belief in erecting military defences against the threat, only confirm that an American withdrawal from Vietnam would not mean an American withdrawal from South-east Asia. Probably, they will cut their commitments in ground forces and may seek more of off-shore presence.

As regards American policy towards India, there is not likely to be any change. Mr. Nixon and the Republican Party in general are opposed to any excessive commitments in the nature of foreign aid. For that matter, even the Johnson Administration, during the last year of its tenure, has cut its foreign aid programme very drastically. It is also significant that, while Mr. Nixon pledged to continue economic aid, he insisted that the terms of foreign aid must be tied to the aims of American Foreign Policy. This language is reminiscent partly of the Dulles days. Though, to be honest, no government can ever divorce its investment in aid from considerations of its policy goals, there is also a marginal area within which aid can be detached from strings. In insisting explicitly on a linkage between aid and foreign policy, Mr. Nixon has been more than candid. One suspects that this norm might as well prove to be the thin end of the wedge in leading to an artless pursuit of a policy of aid with strings. There is also another aspect of the matter. Mr. Nixon is committed to a conservative position on economic policy and it is not unlikely that he might insist that aid-giving countries should have a say in the matter of spending the aid. There have been instances before of American-aid missions advising the recipients on the property of their plan priorities and of their methods of organisation. The Republican Administration will in all probability be more blunt in telling what types of economic projects they will render help for. On this score the prospect of misunderstandings between the U. S. and some of the developing countries cannot be ruled out.

The area in which Mr. Nixon may bring about a welcome change is West Asia. In contrast to the record of the Johnson Administration, which gave the impression of being partial to Israel, Mr. Nixon remained relatively uncommitted over the recent Arab-Israeli conflict. This affords him a better opportunity to press a solution on the parties concerned. Though he was one with the Johnson Administration on the question of American arms supply to Israel and approved the supply of Fanthom F-4 jets, as a counter to Russian arms build-up in the Arab countries, he has come but firmly against the Israeli claims to the territories it occupied after the June 1967 War. This stand alone should now make the Arabs distrust the U. S. less and respond positively to American persuasions for a settlement with Israel.

Immediately after the election, the new president despatched Mr. Scranton, the former Governor of Pennsylvania, as his personal envoy, on a fact-finding mission to West Asia. Mr. Scranton had, extensive talks with Arab and Israeli leaders and reports indicate that the Arabs evinced great interest in these exchanges. The Russians also are engaged in a sincere effort at suggesting a solution. There are indications that for quite some time Moscow has been telling the Arabs to reconcile with the existence of Israel. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, visited West Asia, and what came to be called the Russian proposals for the West Asian settlement are to be announced. Another hopeful development has also come about. Moscow has been appealing to the Americans to use their influence on Israel. Thus, Mr. Nixon’s attempts at trying to understand the Arab stand and Moscow’s anxiety for an early settlement together highlight a convergence of attitudes on the part of these crucial powers. In this, credit should go to the new President for having initiated negotiations with the Arabs in a manner which convinced them that the U. S. is not blind to their feelings and aspirations.

The foregoing analysis may give rise to the doubt about Mr. Nixon’s willingness to effect important changes in America’s dealings with the communist powers or with the under-developed areas. However, one important factor must be remembered. Mr. Nixon has shown tremendous capacity to grow as a statesman. No American President has come to the White House with so extensive a knowledge of the outside world, its leaders, peoples, and problems. What is more, most of this he acquired during the last few years. Perhaps no politician in recent times could manage to live down a reputation for crude anti-communism and jingoistic national selfrighteousness as he did. On some matters, he has shown an ability to alter his perspectives and it should surprise no one if the pragmatist in him were to achieve the target of bringing down the tensions in the world.

Neighbour in Turmoil - Events in Pakistan

The last quarter of the year 1968 may well prove to be the beginning of the end of President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. Ironically, only a few weeks after the President celebrated the tenth anniversary of his coming into power (October 16, 1958), unprecedented opposition developed against the regime. The last few months witnessed mounting tensions and an almost permanent state of emergency prevailed in the country. The most surprising development is the unexpected rise of opposition movements in the Western region, where the President all along enjoyed a solid base of support.

It all started with student agitations protesting against ban on students unions, which the Government imposed since long. It is, however, clear that the roots of discontent go deeper. The formation by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, with its policy of populistic socialism signalled the emergence of a centre around which popular discontent found a rallying point. The National Awami Party, under Mr. Wali Khan (son of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan), has been the other important opposition group in the west. Both these took up the cause of the students. Soon emerged yet another group, led by Mr. Narul Amin, the President of the National Assembly of Pakistan, who formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement and made common cause with the other parties in challenging the regime. The students’ demands in the middle of November were answered by repressive measures by the Government, leading only to the further enflaming of passions culminating in riots and the unprecedented attempt on the life of President Ayub himself. This, in its turn, led to the arrest of opposition leaders, including Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Wali Khan. The wave of mass arrests in November resulted only in the escalation of the disorder and ever since November, Pakistan has been plunged in civil strife. To this upsurge against the regime came the most unexpected support from no less a personality than Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the former C-in-C of the Pakistani Air Force.

The joining of forces by the former Air Chief added greatly to the stature of the opposition movement by virtue of his reputation, popularity and his freedom from the taint of political partisanship, and his apparently selfless motivation in opposing his former master. Mr. Asghar Khan levelled a studied and unsparing indictment against the regime. In an interview to the London Times, he described the whole political structure as ‘stinking,’ and attributed it to corruption in ‘very high quarters.’ Describing the existing electoral system as ‘highly controlled,’ he prophesied that the coming elections are not likely to be anywhere near satisfactory. On the issue of foreign policy, however, he held that the regime has not ‘bungled.’ Asked where he belonged in the political spectrum, the Air Marshal said: ‘I do not take a position, right, centre or left.’ The Air Marshal’s entry into the Opposition has been reinforced by that of Gen. Azzam Khan. The latter came out against the Ayub regime even during the last presidential election, and was all set to contest for that office, when he was persuaded to step aside in favour of Miss. Fatima Jinnah. Gen. Azzam Khan served as Governor of East Pakistan and earned the trust, gratitude and love of the people–a most surprising thing for a military general, and a Pathan at that, to achieve in East Pakistan. His coming into the picture might help the unification of the Opposition groups in the East and the West. Thus the anti-Ayub movement snowballed even in the western region, where hitherto President Ayub enjoyed substantial support. It is very important to emphasise that the attempt on the President’s life in November, and the manner in which the tempo of the opposition movement is sustained, indicate that a qualitative change has come over in the nature of the opposition to the regime. What till then had been a desperate struggle of relatively weak political groups against an entrenched regime turned into a formidable challenging force with the entry of the Air Marshal into the fray.

While it is this trend of events in the western region that makes the situation novel, the hostility to the Ayub regime has all along been intense in the eastern region. The Awami National Party, under Maulana Bhashani, though split into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions, has since long been hostile. The Awami League, led by Mr. Mujabir Rahman, with its less hostile attitude towards India, has been anathema number one to the regime. In fact, Mr. Rahman is now languishing in prison charged with treason, in what is known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The spontaneous upsurge in the western region, did not fail to attract the attention of other forces in the east, which have been lying dormant. Mr. Mohd. Murshid, an ex-Chief Justice of Pakistan, a Bengali, announced his support for the opposition ranks. Much respected and as untainted by part, politics as Mr. Asghar Khan, Mr. Murshid has the added advantage of being a distinguished civilian and thus free from the misgivings that the intelligentia may entertain towards the former. Mr. Murshid’s demands go far beyond those of others. He wants the system of basic democracy scrapped and a parliamentary type of government reinstated.

After the traumatic events in the western region, the President tried out a visit to the eastern part and it proved to be a disaster. A series of black-flag demonstrations led to the arrest of most of the Opposition leaders, dragging Mr. Asghar Khan himself to the Court for violating a prohibitory order in Dacca. The wave of protests continued in the western part throughout December. Demonstrations by lawyers, protests by journalists and even by Vice-Chancellors of universities, shook the establishment. It is clear that the agitations can no longer be handled as a simple law and order problem. Though prohibitory orders, mass arrests, prolonged detention of Opposition leaders and other ruthless measures to put down riots are adopted, here are indications that President Ayub Khan will seek negotiations with at least some of the leaders. Actually, he proposed a meeting of some of these leaders, though later events further attentuated the schism foreclosing scope for negotiations.

The corruption in the administration and its repressive character account only partly for this unprecedented tide of opposition. But it should be remembered that these factors have been there for quite sometime. The arrival in the ring of so many personalities at this particular moment is more accountable to the coming elections in the country. Under the system of Basic Democracy, elections to the Basic Democracies (the primary electoral colleges) commence this year and these primary units elect the members of the National Assembly and the President. Till now, only Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Murshid seem to be aspiring for the Presidency. Mr. Asghar Khan’s candidature cannot be ruled out. But, so far, the Opposition parties could not arrive at an acceptable choice. Mr. Bhutto, while being an articulate leader with an unbeatable record of India-baiting, suffers from the sin of long association with the Ayub regime. Further, his new-found populism only makes him suspect in the eyes of the moderates. Mr. Murshid has the advantage of being a distinguished judge free from the odium that naturally accrues to politicians, and his civilian image and the moderation of his views might make him more acceptable to the different groups in the Opposition. Mr. Asghar Khan has not offered himself vet. He is quite new to politics and his army background might be unacceptable to certain sections which are disillusioned by a decade of army rule. Yet, it may be that he alone can counter effectively the image of Ayub Khan. It is probable that if President Ayub were compelled to go, he might decide to support an army man like Mr. Asghar Khan and definitely not a demagogue like his former foreign minister, or an intellectual like Mr. Murshid. A very influential Pakistani correspondent, Mr. Z. A. Suleri, writing in The Pakistan Times, a newspaper fully controlled by the Ayub regime, analysed that establishment in Pakistan not only does not mind the 47-year-old Air Marshal replacing the Field Marshal, but, perhaps, expect the change-over to take place sooner than expected, in any case, not later than the next presidential election, in 1970. Further, if the tide of revolt against the establishment is seen as unabating, even the Ayub supporters might plump for Mr. Asghar Khan, as capable of upholding the values for which they depended on President Ayub. Mr. Asghar Khan is a Punjabi (neither Mr. Bhutto nor Mr. Murshid is), has not frightened the upper crust of the public with any populistic rhetoric, has approved the existing foreign policy, and has not offended even the orthodox Muslim sections of the country. Other leaders, like Mr. Wali Khan and Maulana Bhashani suffer, because their popularity is limited to certain regions only. The former has no base of support in the eastern region and his Pakhtoon platform, as also his not too rabid anti-Indian stand, qualify his hold even over the people in the West. Maulana Bhashani’s sway is confined only to the eastern part and his zealous propagation of the rights of the Bengali Muslims lost him the image of a national figure.

Of course, it is extremely doubtful whether the Opposition can defeat President Ayub, even if they agree on a single nominee to challenge the President. Analysts say that the electoral system is such that the incumbent is almost sure of his re-election.

It is also difficult to assess the impact of the recent events on the foreign policy of Pakistan. The point is that the opposition groups themselves are hopelessly divided on this issue. Mr. Bhutto wants a further shift towards Peking and is impatient for a military solution to the Kashmir problem. In an important policy document of his party, he wrote: “Opportunities will arise in the future as they arose in the past. On three occasions Pakistan came close to finding an honourable solution. In 1948, we were at the outskirts of Srinagar; in 1962 during Sino-Indian conflict, there was another opportunity; in 1965 Pakistan came to the point of liberating the people of Jammu and Kashmir. No matter how great the obstacles, no matter how great the efforts, it would return to the brotherhood of Pakistan. This is the article of faith of the people of Pakistan and the supreme mission of the Party.” Mr. Murshid has not spelled out his policies, but it is likely that while he cannot afford to be too moderate in his views on Kashmir, he would not favour any adventurism in foreign policy. Mr. Asghar Khan clearly admitted that the basic tenets of the existing policy are quite valid. Over Kashmir, he emphasised the point that Pakistan need project a better face to the world and India, before it can press its case effectively. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the Air Marshal is not in favour of a military confrontation over Kashmir. In contrast to Mr. Bhutto, he is said to favour a pro-Western orientation. The other groups are also less vocal about a war with India.

Thus, on the whole, the Opposition’s thinking may not differ very much from that of the President. He has managed to keep the balance between Washington and Moscow. In recent times, he tended to improve contacts with Moscow, to the chagrin of Peking.

The arms deliveries from Russia and as also from the West illustrate his attempts to assert that he cannot be regarded as entirely depending on Peking. While India is justifiably irked by this apparent readiness of Moscow to rearm her hostile neighbour, it cannot altogether be denied that Pindi’s friendship with Moscow would also strengthen the influence of the latter over the former. For, to the extent that reliance on Peking is lessened, moderation in Pindi’s adventurism is assured. It is significant that Peking itself seems to be angry with President Ayub. While it formally congratulated the President for escaping unhurt in the recent attempt on his life, it was not prepared to condemn the violence and protests against his regime. There are also other indications that Peking is hoping that the pro-Bhutto wing of the opposition would succeed in Pakistan. But it is most unlikely that President Ayub would change his course to please Peking. The influence of Mr. Asghar Khan and Mr. Murshid is most likely to neutralise the pro-Peking pressures of Mr. Bhutto and it would seem that major groups in the Opposition assent to the current trends in President Ayub’s foreign policy.

President Ayub has been equally alert in maintaining the ‘front’ of the Islamic Powers, especially the Islamic Powers of the northern tier, i.e., Persia and Turkey. This is one aspect of the policy over which there is unanimity amongst all sections in the country. Recently a summit conference of the three powers was held and the solidarity of the group was reaffirmed.

The Ayub policy towards India is more ambivalent. He rejected the offer of a No-War Pact made by Mrs. Gandhi. Initially, he countered the offer by suggesting that he is prepared to sign such an agreement on the condition that India sign another pact detailing the manner in which both the countries would solve their disputes. India rejected this proposal. Obviously, Delhi fears that such an agreement might commit India to the reopening of the Kashmir issue. When Delhi turned down his conditional acceptance of its offer, President Ayub in turn rejected the original offer.

On the whole, the talk of settling the Kashmir problem by recourse to arms has been conspicuously absent in the Pakistani official rhetoric. This change in Pindi’s perspectives was well identified by Mr. Dilip Mukerjee in his perceptive series of articles in The Statesman, in October. He wrote: “It would be a mistake to infer….that Pakistan’s official stand has softened, or is likely to do so in the near future. There has nevertheless been a shift in Islamabad’s position which needs to be carefully noted...the situation eighteen months ago was that Pakistan would talk to India only on condition that a ‘meaningful’ discussion on Kashmir was a part of the agenda. But this Kashmir-or-nothing stance has now given way to explicit acceptance of the step-by-step approach.” Further, during the past few months, the negotiations over the Farakka Barrage scheme did proceed to schedule, even though in the earlier stages the Pakistani demands for the allocation of more quantities of water stalled the talks. Later, understanding was reached under which Pakistan agreed to supply more technical data to study the problem. It will be recalled that, in 1961, it was decided to conduct talks at technical level between the two countries on the eastern river waters issue. The very holding of the talks now and the fact that the current round of talks were allowed to ‘progress’ at all are indicative of the urge to resolve at least ‘other’ areas of disagreement in a spirit of good neighbourliness. So also negotiations held recently, between the governments of West Bengal and East Pakistan on the demarcation of boundaries did end successfully and one should not miss the cordiality with which both sides conducted these. Finally, it is most significant that the last few months passed without even a single border clash between India and Pakistan. Thus, not only in India, but in Pakistan also the disposition to keep the peace and make it enduring is present. If in Pakistan, invective against India is voiced frequently, it should be appreciated that their perspective on the Kashmir issue differs from that of India. Allowance should be made for their feeling that the status quo over Kashmir is to India’s advantage and that it fans to their lot to demand a solution and thus even sound bellicose and occasionally appear belligerent. It may be that the Pakistani demand over Kashmir is untenable, yet should this be attributed merely to an irreconcilable and permanent hostility towards India? If such an obsession is really at the root of Pakistani attitudes, then, it is difficult to explain over other matters.

On India’s part, there should be a more forthright appreciation that Pakistan’s ‘intransigence’ over Kashmir fans into a class by itself, and that this does not necessarily constitute the paradigm case of its stances on other areas of disagreement. It is in this context further, even over Kashmir, the question remains, whether India should not take some sort of an initiative. The Rajaji proposal of last December has behind it this type of feeling. It proposed that ‘Pakistan and India should agree to request America, Britain and Russia to take charge of Kashmir through an Official Board of Control appointed by the three powers and administer Kashmir for ten years. At the termination of that period this Board of Control should arrange to obtain the wishes of the people of Kashmir In respect of their future and retire in favour of the regime so decided.’ The proposal is a ‘mad’ one, as Rajaji himself characterised it. It envisages the ‘internationalisation’ of the dispute as also the holding of plebiscite, both of which India has firmly rejected. Assuming that an enduring solution would require the good offices of a third party, the group of powers suggested by Rajaji is most unsuited to the occasion. Firstly, even if Russia and America no longer view for Kashmir as a military base to guard against each other, the probability that together they might wish to encourage Kashmiri separatism in order to install a combined base against China cannot altogether be ruled out. The hostility of Moscow and Peking has reached a pitch to warrant the thought that the former would welcome a covert American presence near the eastern borders of China. This would mean that the Kashmir problem would now get embroiled in a new type of cold war–not the old problem of Anglo-American bases against Russia and China, but the new prospect of the Russians and the Americans together trying to carve out a sphere of influence in the valley. Secondly, the timing of the proposal is most unfortunate. Rajaji may have thought that the recent efforts of Moscow to win the confidence of Pindi make this moment propitious for a Russo-American good offices team in Kashmir. But if the Russians are now accepted as friends and well-wishers by Pakistan, has not the very trend of events meant a set-back to India? The point is, that two of the members of the team have always been regarded in India as of doubtful neutrality over the Kashmir issue and the third one seemed to have qualified its policy of active support for India only recently. To choose this moment to canvas for the Big Three intervention is sheer folly. The proposal has been rejected by almost all sections of Indian opinion. The Congress, the PSP and even the Swatantra Party itself, have sharply rejected it. Mr. Sadiq, the Chief Minister of Kashmir, ridiculed it and the Jana Sangh, of course, poured scorn over the idea.

While the Rajaji plan is thoroughly unacceptable, the spirit behind the proposal should not be lost sight of. As he himself later explained, it is inspired by the feeling that something should be done to evolve a solution with a broader consensus over Kashmir. India’s objections against plebiscite and foreign intervention are all quite valid. At the same time, a recognition of the fact that the present situation cannot seriously be regarded as the ‘solution’, in the absence of unimpeachable evidence of support from the generality of the people of Kashmir, has not come about. It is, in this context, that Pakistan acquires a say in the matter. Unfortunately there has not been much discussion in India over the matter and quite apart from official refusal to think afresh over the issue, even the public has preferred to remain silent. Rajaji has rendered signal service by forcing us to rethink about Kashmir. It is true his plan will not work, but if it leads to a new readiness on the part of the public to think about Kashmir, he will have succeeded. The point is simply this: legal niceties apart, the Kashmir situation warrants a solution that can either command the confidence of all the people there, or win the agreement of Pakistan. To achieve either of these ends, some concessions will have to be made. Admittedly, what shape these concessions can take and what procedures are to be adopted in implementing these, it is difficult to suggest at this stage. But there must be some effort at rethinking on these lines. Now that the No-War Pact proposals failed, it is to be hoped that the Indian Government will not slacken its efforts in reopening bilateral negotiations, where fresh and meaningful alternatives can be proposed and agreed upon.

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