INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

PROF. M. VENKATARANGAIYA

In answer to a question at a recent Press conference, Pandit Nehru is reported to have said that the two outstanding events of the year 1962 were the Chinese invasion of India on a massive scale and the averting of the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war on the question of Cuba. Everyone will agree with the view expressed by him. Both these appear to be turning points in the history of post-war international affairs, and they have in them the possibility of giving a new shape to it.

To take the Cuban crisis first. It was about four years ago that a revolution took place in the island of Cuba, which is only ninety miles away from the southern coast of the United States. It is this geographical proximity that explains to a great extent the concern of the United States in anything that may happen in that island. The revolution was aimed at overthrowing the dictatorship of Batista and it was welcomed by the United States; There were, however, two sections among the revolutionaries, one a democratic section believing in free elections and fundamental human rights and the other a Communistic one under Dr Castro’s leadership wedded to the doctrine of totalitarianism. The latter triumphed and Cuba came under the control of a Communistic government. This was the beginning of the trouble. It was the first Communistic State in the American continent.

By the end of 1959 all other political parties were banned. Many industries in which American capital was invested were nationalised and no compensation was paid to the former owners. By early 1960 the Castro regime entered into close economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. From that time on, the process of communisation proceeded at a rapid pace and most of the leading democratic citizens were driven to exile and to take refuge in the United States.

The conversion of Cuba into a satellite of the Soviet Union naturally irritated the United States. Ever since the promulgation in 1823 of the Monroe doctrine by the then President, it has been an integral part of the policy of the United States not to permit the establishment in the Western Hemisphere of the political control of any European State. The reduction of Cuba to the position of a Soviet satellite undermined the strength of this policy. More-over Cuba became a centre for spreading Communism into the other States of central and South America where there was and is a great deal of social and economic unrest. This had in it the possibility, of creating more Soviet satellites in that part of the world. Above all, there was the attempt to upset the balance of power in the American continent through the importation into Cuba of a large quantity of ballistic missiles, jet bombers and other up-to-date offensive weapons of a highly destructive character. Several missile sites were set up from which it would be easy for the U. S. S. R. to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States and destroy cities up to a distance of 2000 miles and more–cities like Washington and New York.

So long as the Soviet supplied only defensive weapons to Cuba, the American Government kept quiet. But when by October last it became quite clear that offensive weapons highly destructive in their nature came to be stocked in large quantities, President Kennedy was determined to take firm action. He announced a quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba and demanded through the Security Council the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of all missiles and other offensive weapons. This was a sort of ultimatum that he issued to Premier Khrushchev, and he was resolved on even risking a nuclear war in case his ultimatum was not accepted.

The point of view of the United States was best expressed in the speech on Cuba which her representative, Adlai Stevenson, made at the Security Council. He said: “For one hundred and fifty years the nations of the Americas have painfully laboured to construct a hemisphere of independent and co-operating nations–free from foreign threats. An international system far older than this one (the U. N. O.) the Inter-American system–has been erected on this principle. The principle of the territorial integrity of the Western Hemisphere has been woven into the history, the life and the thought of all the peoples of the Americas. In striking at that principle the Soviet Union is striking at the strongest and most enduring strain in the policy of this hemisphere. It is disrupting the convictions and aspirations of a century and a half. It is intruding on the firm policies of twenty nations. To allow this challenge to go unanswered would be to undermine a basic and historic to go unanswered would be to undermine a basic and historic pillar of the security of this hemisphere.” It was against this background that President Kennedy issued his ultimatum.

It was in the action which he took in answer to this ultimatum, that Premier Khrushchev showed the qualities of the highest statesmanship. A lesser man would have gone to war with the United States. The prestige of Soviet Russia, as a great power, was involved. But being a man of practical wisdom, he agreed immediately to dismantle the missile sites in Cuba and withdraw the offensive weapons, the jet bombers and the seventeen thousand Soviet forces stationed there. The only return he wanted was an assurance from President Kennedy that there would be no invasion of Cuba by the United States to put an end to the Castro regime. Such an assurance was given. It was enough to maintain the Soviet prestige. It was in this way that a nuclear war which would have destroyed a large part of Europe and America, was averted. The Soviet Union realised that the issues at stake in Cuba were not worth the cost of such a war.

The peaceful settlement of the Cuban issue had other consequences. It meant that the Western Hemisphere should not be an area of conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. It should be left to itself, and no attempt should be made by the U.S.S.R. to establish Communism there by her direct or indirect military effort. This was a great gain to the easing of world tension and to the cause of peace. It also created the hope that the U.S.S.R. would not embark in future on a policy of adventurism, a policy on the pursuit of which Communist China is so keen. There was also the further hope that other international issues–Berlin, the Nuclear test ban and general disarmament–which have divided the two great powers might also be peacefully settled. That there is some ground for such a hope, is brought out by the private talks that are now going on between the representatives of the two States on the subject of the nuclear test ban, on which no agreement was possible in the Eighteen Nation Geneva Conference, even though it had been debating on it since March last. There are many indications to show that the two great powers are coming closer together, and this creates the prospect of a reduction in the tempo of the cold war between them. It is in this sense that the Cuban settlement may become the starting point of a new stage in the history of international affairs.

On the whole, Premier Khruschchev appears to be in a more chastened mood. Not that he has abandoned the ideal of World Communism. No Marxist-Leninist would do so, and least of all Premier Khrushchev. He continues to be a staunch believer in Marxism-Leninism which says that, in the predetermined historical process, Capitalism is bound to collapse and die and Communism is bound to triumph. He, however, does not believe in war, or even in a threat of war, being an effective instrument in achieving the objective of World Communism in this nuclear age. As Cuba has shown, the United States is prepared to answer the threat of a nuclear war by an equally strong counter-threat. Such threats and counter-threats result only in armament race, which-is proving prohibitively costly even to a rich country like the Soviet Union. Even economic aid to non-aligned countries may not lead to the spread of World Communism. No recipient of Soviet aid has so far taken to Communism. A balance-sheet of the gains and losses of Communism, after the close of the Second World War, shows that no new country has become Communistic through the efforts of Soviet Russia. From all this, Premier Khrushchev seems to have come to the conclusion that no great purpose is served by adhering to a policy of keeping up world tensions in the name of World Communism and that it would be best to ease them, so that he may concentrate his efforts on increasing the production of consumers’ goods in his country and raise the standard of living of his people. War and threat of war necessitate the concentration of the nation’s effort and capital on heavy industries and on industries producing defensive and offensive weapons. What the soviet citizens are now asking for, is more and better food, clothing, house-room, boots and shoes and other ordinary comforts of life. It is in the direction of providing these things that Premier Krushchev’s mind has been working for some years, and if this objective is to be achieved, the principle of peaceful co-existence should be given a practical shape. This is the key to an understanding of the conciliatory policy which he has adopted in respect of Cuba. Communism can, according to his present view, be made more attractive to the world if Soviet Russia shows by her example that under her system the people’s standard of living can be raised. At the last meeting of the Soviet Parliament he went to the extreme of saying that there is much which Soviet Russia can learn from capitalist countries.

This peaceful settlement of the Cuban issue is also responsible for widening the ideological rift between Moscow and Peking. Peking has accused Premier Krushchev of abandoning Marxist orthodoxy and following a policy of what it calls modern revisionism. It has ridiculed him for becoming frightened by the American paper-tiger though he has rewinded it that the paper-tiger possesses nuclear teeth and taunted it for not having the courage to direct its war-effort against Hongkong, Macao and Formosa. In the Communist Party Congresses, held in recent weeks in Bucharest and Rome, Peking was hotly denounced by almost all the European Communist parties for her war-mongering. Since then, the ideological battle is being fought with greater ferocity on either side. China is against Soviet Russia extending any aid to non-aligned countries like India. She wants that whatever aid the U. S. S. R. and the East European Communist States are in a position to render, should be rendered only to her. The rift has now become so wide that Soviet Russia has withdrawn all her technicians from China, all her consulates in China were closed, and the shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia has been stopped. Trade between Communist Europe and China has dwindled. All this goes to show that the ideological conflict has invaded the economic and the political field.

It is, however, difficult to foresee the consequences of this growing rift. If China becomes completely separated from the European Communist fold, there is a possibility of her pursuing her policy of adventurism without any kind of restraint and endanger the cause of world peace to a far greater extent than she is able to do at present. There is also the possibility that, in such a situation, there may be a sort of reapproachment between the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance against Chinese expansionism. But all this is a distant possibility. If, on the other hand, the European Communists succeed in bringing round China to their point of view, the less rigid and the more liberal outlook which now characterises the policy of Premier Krushehev, may come to prevail in the whole Communistic world, and this may help the easing of world tension. But even this seems to be a remote possibility. What we can now say is that the rift between Moscow and Peking which has become widened as a result of the Cuban crisis is bound to have considerable amount of influence, in one way or another, on the course of international affairs in the coming years.

The less rigid policies that are being pursued by Premier Krushchev have also produced some effect on the Western alliance and the NATO, though this effect may not be solely due to those policies. There is now less willingness to accept the leadership of the United States by the States of Western Europe–especially France. There is also a large amount of resentment in Britain on the ground that in the skybolt affair she has been completely let down by the United States. At the same time, President Kennedy is determined to more effectively assert his own country’s leadership in the Western alliance. In the Cuban affair, and on several other matters, he has not cared to consult his European allies. In Congo he has been pursuing a policy to which there is a large amount of opposition in Britain and France. But the Western allies are too weak to do anything against him and the United States. They may be able to make their influence felt to a greater extent if the question of Britain’s entry into the Common Market is settled amicably and rapidly; but, owing to the opposition of President De Gaulle and, to some extent, of Chancellor Adenauer, all sorts of obstacles, are being placed in the way of this settlement. What these leaders are anxious about is to come closer together and to create a sort of federal union in Western Europe into which they are not anxious to admit Britain. Britain is afraid of becoming isolated, both economically and politically. She does no. Want to be reduced to the position of a mere satellite of the United States. These are all the new factors that are emerging in Western Europe. It will be some time before one can say how they will shape the future relations between Western Europe and the United States on one side, and between Western Europe and Soviet Russia on the other. The fact is that the reduction in the tempo of the cold War is giving a new shape to the international situation.

It is too soon to say what will be the likely effects of the Chinese invasion of India on the course of international affairs. The unilateral cease fire and the subsequent withdrawal of the Chinese forces from NEFA have created a puzzle. It has become difficult to guess what could have been their original objective in undertaking the massive attack on NEFA unless it be to inflict a humiliation on India. Of course there is the interpretation that its purpose was to bring heavy pressure on the Government of India to agree to come to the conference table and arrive at a final settlement of the border issue so far as Ladakh is concerned. But they have not so far succeeded in this. The Government of India has made it clear that it is not prepared to enter into any parleys with the Peking Government unless the Chinese withdraw to the line as it was before Sept. 7, 1962 when the massive attack began. In this situation, what is it that China is going to do? Will she resume her attack for which she seems to be preparing? Reports from Tibet indicate that she is concentrating a large part of her troops there. Is all this a prelude to a second massive invasion? Will she stop this time–whether it be in the middle sector or the eastern sector–at the foot of the hills or enter the plains and start a major war? If she does so, India will have to enter into a closer alliance with the West. She cannot fight a major war with China single-handed. She cannot also look for much help to Soviet Russia. In spite of the growing ideological rift between Russia and China, the former will not go to the extent of aiding militarily a non-communist country in a war with a communist country. This is the reason why, in a major war or a long war with China, India has to depend on the West for all the military help she requires.

The next question is, What is the extent of the help that the West–especially the United States–is prepared to render to India in such a war, and what conditions will it impose before granting such aid? Will the United States insist on India making a free gift of Kashmir to Pakistan on the ground that, from the point of view of military strategy, the sub-continent of India and Pakistan forms a single unit? Will Pakistan be satisfied with this or demand other territorial and other concessions as a condition of American aid to India? These are all questions which have to be answered before one can say how the international situation is likely to be affected by the Chinese aggression on India. There is no space here to answer them. We must take another occasion to do it.

One point, however, may be made clear even at this stage. The United States will be making a great mistake if she, in any way, links up her aid to India with India granting concessions to Pakistan. Pakistan does not regard China as the common enemy of India and herself. Moreover, in recent months she has been coming closer to China, which makes it doubtful whether she will, at any time, undertake a War against that country in defence of India. She has also been threatening to leave the CENTO and the SEATO military pacts. She has sent missions to all the countries of the West to persuade them not to extend any military aid to India. Under these circumstances, no purpose will be served by the United States bringing pressure or India to accede to the demands of Pakistan. She cannot be relied upon to fight with China. Moreover, it has all along been the policy of the United States to contain Chinese Communism. India is now prepared to fight China whole-heartedly. There is thus a larger amount of common interest between India and the United States than between Pakistan and the United States. It will be the path of wisdom for the United States to extend to India all the aid that she needs in her war with China. Her foreign policy, as well as the foreign policy of India, should be reoriented to achieve this objective.

14-1-63.

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