INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA

Everyone is now asking the question whether the Geneva spirit is still alive or dead. Most people attached exaggerated importance to the ‘Summit Conference’ held last July at Geneva and ignored in their wishful thinking the limitations to the efficacy of the spirit displayed on the occasion. What the Conference did was to register a new view of the international situation which dawned on the minds of statesmen in the two leading States of the world and of those who were their responsible advisers in the organisation of defence. The piling of atom and hydrogen bombs had been going on for some time, but statesmen began to ask themselves what the consequences would be if in a global war between the East and the West actual use was made of such bombs. It became clear that it would destroy large areas of the world, including those of the belligerents, and that such a war would be suicidal. Enlightened self-interest showed that it would be madness to fight such a war. It was this realisation that made the leaders of Soviet Russia and the United States speak the language of goodwill and peaceful co-existence and it was to this view that the Summit Conference gave expression. There was not much in the deliberations of that Conference to show that this dislike of nuclear war would automatically lead to the disappearance of all causes of tension between the two blocks and to the immediate solution of all the complicated problems which kept them divided in the post-war period. Optimists as usual read too much into the deliberations of the Conference and have felt disappointed when, in the October-November meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Geneva, the cold atmosphere of the past made its appearance as usual in all its bitterness.

This meeting was expected to find a solution for three problems–the unification of Germany, disarmament, and increasing the friendly and peaceful contacts between the East and the West. The first was the toughest of the three problems. It was not the first time that the delegates of the United States, Soviet Russia, England and France tried to find a solution for it. It is now fashionable to swear by the principles of Pancha Shila and one of these principles is non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. The putting of this principle into practice would mean the withdrawal immediately of all foreign troops from both Western and Eastern Germany, leaving the Germans to settle their affairs in whatever way they consider best. Neither block, however, is prepared to do this. That a Conference of four outside powers should go on discussing among themselves as to what should happen to Germany, without any German representative being present at their meeting, is a clear proof of the wide disparity that exists between principles and practice. The so-called great powers have in reality arrogated to themselves the position of being arbiters of the fate of lesser nations, and this has as little justification as the claim of propertied people to settle the affairs of their poorer neighbours. We usually forget that in the international world the conflict is not so much between Capitalism and Socialism as between two power blocks. The sooner the world realises this the better it will be. It is true that Marxism is against concentration of wealth, but at the same time it is the worst advocate of concentration of power and it is this that is at the root of the tension between the East and the West.

The stalemate at Geneva was due to the fact that neither the East nor the West cared much for Germany or German unification. Each wanted to safeguard its own interests and looked at German unification from the point of view of its own security. There is nothing unnatural in this. This has been the way of the world all through; and it is bound to be the way–whether good or bad from the ethical standpoint-in the future, until a real United Nations Organisation capable of providing collective security for all States comes into existence. Historians have pointed out that Russia has been invaded again and again from the West in modem times–by Napoleon, by Wilhelm II of Germany, by Poland and by Hitler, and the one great problem for her is how to secure her western frontier from similar attacks in future. It was this that made her ruthless in adding, in the period of the second World War and in the years that immediately followed it, twenty, four million European people by annexing Estonia, Latvia, Ruthenia, Lithuania, East Poland, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, parts of Finland and part of East Prussia, and in establishing her political and military control over another eighty-seven millions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Albania. It was only an accident that prevented her from establishing similar control over Yugoslavia. When critics of Soviet Russia speak of her as a colonial power it is this that they have in mind.

A united Germany allied with the West is from her point of view a source of danger to her security. And this is the reason why at Geneva she was opposed to German unity based on “Free” elections. “Free” elections would mean freedom for all political parties–and not merely the Communist Party–to contest the elections by putting up their own candidates and carrying on propaganda on their behalf. In the controversies about German unity this has all along been a crucial issue. The West always pressed for it because it gave to the West the hope of a non-Communist Government being established in Germany. Such a Government would, it was hoped, opt for an alliance with the West and for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation–an Organisation which, in the eyes of the United States, Britain and France, was fundamental to providing for their security. Soviet Russia agreed to free elections at the Geneva Summit Conference but she subsequently changed her view and fought against them at the October-November meeting. She was not prepared for such elections in East Germany, her satellite, as such a course would deprive her of the prospects of security and control over the industrial products of that area.

Now that there was less danger of an atomic war, she felt that she could afford to wait. Dr. Adenauer, the Chancellor of West Germany and a sincere ally of the West, was growing old and was bound to disappear in a few years, and there was the possibility of lesser men succeeding him which would make it easy for Soviet Russia to get from them the terms she wanted. Waiting therefore was sure to bring considerable dividends in the form of a new “Rapallo Treaty” or a new “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”. Now that she had her own ambassador at Bonn with a West German ambassador at Moscow, direct negotiations would be easy. Germany united under a Communist Government is what Soviet Russia will welcome most. The next best thing from her point of view is a neutralised Germany just like the neutralised Austria. The West is not yet prepared for such a contingency and the Geneva meeting consequently broke down.

Naturally the question is being asked if this failure at Geneva would bring about the continuance of the cold war. It looks like that to a great extent. There is not the least idea of either party abandoning the Hydrogen bomb tests. There was something sardonic in the two distinguished Soviet visitors to India giving the largest amount of publicity to the explosion of a new Hydrogen bomb in Siberia–the most powerful of its kind. This was followed by the British announcement that there was no question of their discontinuing the tests which they were contemplating about. There is also the latest announcement by the United States that early in the year she would explode in the Pacific the most powerful H. Bomb so far known to the world. It has also been announced that research is being carried on by Soviet Russia in the manufacture of “inter-continental ballistic missiles” capable of travelling from Moscow to Washington or vice versa within thirty minutes and at fantastic heights; and the United States does not want to be left behind in this matter. What is happening now is not a suspension of the cold war but the adoption of a new strategy in carrying it on.

It is Soviet Russia that has taken the initiative in devising this new strategy. It has taken three forms. One is to intensify the propaganda against. “Western Colonialism” and Western system of military pacts and alliances, to which there is a large amount of opposition in India and in many of the countries of Asia and Africa. The purpose of this propaganda is to alienate these countries from the Western bloc and to keep them neutral in the cold war. The propaganda has been able to achieve much success, because India and other Asian and African countries know only about the colonialism of the West under which they suffered for a long time, and know little of Soviet colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe or in Central Asia. If colonialism means the domination of one country by another, Soviet Russia should today be ranked among the great colonial powers. Moreover while Western colonialism is on the decline Soviet colonialism is on the ascendancy. During the last ten years the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Palestine and Indo-China, which were previously subject to the West, secured freedom and became independent sovereign States. Sudan has also become independent a few days ago. Negotiations are being carried on to give self-government to Malaya, to the Gold Coast and to several other British dependencies in Africa. It is not be long before the French colonies in North Africa become free. Western colonialism is on its retreat and it is the Soviet Communistic empire that is expanding. Peoples of Asia and Africa have not yet been taught to notice these happenings and it is no wonder that they have become victims to Soviet propaganda. Unfortunately the United States has contributed in her own way to the strengthening of Soviet propaganda, partly by her taking up the cause of colonial powers like France and Portugal, and by the diplomatic blunders committed by her leaders like John Foster Dulles, whose statement on Goa did more than all that Soviet propaganda could have done to alienate India from her. The day will have to arrive when Asians and Africans can clearly see that Soviet Russia is as much a “colonial” power as the countries of the West were till recently.

Even in respect of the military alliances like the SEATO, the Baghdad Pact etc., the situation is being exploited by Soviet propagandists. Asians–and especially India–are averse to these alliances as they give opportunities to the Western powers like the United States to interfere in Asian politics, and may ultimately lead to the re-establishment of Western colonialism in a new form. It was a great diplomatic blunder that the United States committed when she organised these alliances and pacts in the face of the opposition of leading countries like India. She must have waited till opinion in these countries had time to settle itself and take a more objective view of the general international situation. As it is, the governments and peoples of most of these countries have not yet seen that these military alliances are a reaction to the far more significant alliance between Soviet Russia and Communist China which is in a position to mobilise more than eight hundred millions of people in any future war with a single stroke of the pen. The SEATO and the Baghdad Pact are pygmies when compared with the Sino-Soviet pact. Moreover these regional pacts are the outcome of the failure of the United Nations Organisation to provide for collective security and to realise the other aims and objectives of the Charter. The primary duty of every nation is to defend itself against aggression; and it has to devise some means for the purpose–regional or military alliances–when there is no world organisation to which it can effectively appeal when attacked by a hostile State. It will take time for Asian opinion to realise that military alliances formed by the United States and Britain are replies to the Sino-Soviet alliance and that all such alliances should disappear if there is to be real peace. Meanwhile Soviet propaganda is able to exploit the emotional attitude of the Asian peoples.

The second feature of the new Soviet strategy is to supply arms to the countries in the Middle East and other under-developed areas of the world and establish closer relations with them. She has supplied arms to Egypt and to some other Arab States. She has promised to supply them to Afghanistan, Burma etc. This has been responsible for the tense situation in the Middle East today. Here again the purpose is to weaken the influence of the West in this area and strengthen her own influence. It will also lead to a war between Israel on one side and some of the Arab States on the other. The Arabs have not yet reconciled themselves to the establishment of this infant Jewish State in their midst, and Russian arms will enable them to fight out the issue once for all. Events in Jordan and other places in this area show that the tension there is between those who have received arms from the United States and Britain on one side, and from Soviet Russia and her satellites on the other. It may be noted in this connection that, though the great powers are afraid of a nuclear war, they are not against small local wars like the Korean war, the Indo-China war etc., if such wars have a prospect of serving their interests. It is quite possible that a war between Egypt and Israel might be of use in establishing Soviet influence in the Middle East and in securing for her a place in that area equal to that hitherto occupied by Britain.

The third feature of the new Soviet strategy is the grant of economic aid to the backward Asian and African countries. In the past it was the United States that came forward with such aid. Now Soviet Russia has also entered the field in the name of what has come to be called “Competitive Co-existence”. It is often asked by Westerners whether Soviet Russia is in a position to extend such aid when her own citizens are lacking in a sufficient supply of consumer goods. But there doesn’t seem to be much doubt about it, as the aid which she will extend to these countries will be in the form of either capital goods like machinery and tools or of technologists of which she has a surplus. Investments in heavy industries have been made on a large scale in Russia and there is need for finding a market for her surplus machines. After a certain stage every industrialised country–capitalist or communist–has to find an outside market for her goods and this is the position of Soviet Russia today. One incidental advantage that she will secure is the employment of large numbers of her technicians, without whose help neither her arms nor her machines can be effectively used by the backward countries. This will bring her numerous political advantages also.

All this new strategy of Soviet Russia has created an alarm in the minds of the American and the British statesmen. Just as they reacted to the Soviet explosion of H. Bomb in November by arranging for a more powerful H. Bomb explosion in the coming months, they are trying to counteract the effects of Soviet economic aid by extending still further their own aid to Asian countries. This is the crux of the new policy announced by President Eisenhower. American statesmen now feel that, whatever justification they had for forming military pacts in Asia, their consequences have been very much different from what they expected and that they have only contributed to the decline of their influence in these countries. Anti-Americanism has become a strong force in several of them. They have therefore decided in changing their policy. They are now resolved on substituting large-scale and continuous systematic economic aid for military aid. Whether this policy will be more of a success remains to be seen.

Here again there are two or three things that have to be kept in mind by the Asian public in appreciating the nature of this aid, whether it is offered by Soviet Russia or by the United. States. The first is that the aid is not always a free gift. If Russia supplies arms to Egypt or some other goods to India, it is always in return for some commodities exported from these countries. This is true of much of the aid from the United States also. If any free gifts are made, the United States is in a better position to do it than Soviet Russia. The second thing is that even in granting economic aid to Asian countries it is best for the United States to take into her confidence countries like India. Otherwise the traditional suspicion that the West wants some-how to re-establish her domination will remain. Thirdly there are countries which feel that taking any aid from abroad is detrimental to their self-respect and it should therefore be clearly understood that no strings should be attached to any aid that is granted.

The fact of the matter is that a new balance of power has come into existence in the world today. It is the outcome of the position that Asia has come to occupy in world affairs. There is no prospect of any policy succeeding–however good and just that policy may intrinsically be–unless it has the willing co-operation of Asian countries. And among these countries India has come to occupy a leading place. Her stature has grown immensely under the lead of her Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru. Almost every country in South Asia looks to her for guidance and leadership. American statesmen should realise that, unless she co-operates with them, even the policy of economic aid may not be a success. And they will be blundering fatally if, while the Soviet leaders even go out of their way to flatter Indians and their achievements, they unnecessarily irritate Indians’ susceptibilities as Secretary of State Dulles did in his uncalled-for statement on Goa. The great problem for American statesmen is not so much how to counteract the influence of Soviet Russia in Asia but how to secure the confidence and the willing co-operation of India. On this hangs the future not only of Asia but also of the whole world.

As a neutral, India has played a very influential part in the international world in recent years. Her policy of non-alignment has so far been a success. It will be a bad day if Americans, influenced by the subtle propaganda of Soviet Russia, begin to entertain doubts about the neutrality of India and identify her with the Soviet bloc. It is also equally necessary that India should now come forward–to a greater extent that she did in the past–to negotiate between the two blocs and put an end to the cold war. This is a role which India alone can fulfill at the present day.

The breakdown of the Geneva spirit, the resumption of the cold war, and the adaptation of a new strategy in carrying it on–these have been the more essential features of the international situation in recent months. The only other development that requires reference is the admission of sixteen new members to the United Nations Organisation through what has come to be known as the “package deal”. There were sixty members in the U. N. O. by 1949. Some States applied for membership before 1949, and some others after it. The Charter has laid down only two qualifications for membership. One is that the applicant must be an independent Sovereign State, and the other that it must be peace-loving and be able to discharge the obligations of membership. Because of the outbreak of the cold war the applications were not considered on their merits. States which were non-Communist had to face the veto of Soviet Russia, and those which were Communist, the veto of the United States and other Western powers. No State could be admitted a member unless its application was recommended to the General assembly by seven out eleven members of the Security Council, and among these seven must be the representatives of the five great powers–Soviet Russia, the United States, Britain, France and China. As there was not agreement between Soviet Russia and the other powers, the applicant States could not secure admission all these years.

The situation became so silly that in the last session of the General Assembly, Canada introduced a resolution recommending the admission of all the eighteen applicants. It was passed, but no action could be taken unless in accordance with the rules of the Charter the recommendation came from the Security Council. The problem was whether the great powers would pay heed to the resolution of the Assembly. As usual the Council showed its petty-mindedness when China (represented farcically by Chiang’s nominee) vetoed the admission of one Communist State, followed by Soviet veto on the admission of several non-Communist States. It was then that Pandit Nehru used his influence with the distinguished Soviet visitors to India–Bulgarian and Khurushechev–and the situation took a dramatic turn. Soviet Russia agreed to the admission of sixteen States. She vetoed the admission of Japan, simply because the admission of her satellite, outer Mangolia, was vetoed by China. It would have been more magnanimous if Russia had agreed to the admission of Japan also, as there is no comparison whatever between Outer Mongolia and Japan. The world has however to be thankful for “small” mercies. The admission or sixteen new members to U. N. O. has given it the character of universality to a great extent. It is sure to produce other effects. Most of the new members belong to the Asia-Arab group neutralist and anti-colonial. This will lessen the influence of the United States. It will reveal also what the U. N. O. can accomplish and what it cannot. It will not be in a position to enforce peace through collective security. It can serve as a forum for exchange of ideas and it will have to be content with this role for a long time to come.

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