INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

With the commencement of the year 1954 it may be said that a new stage has arrived in the cold war between the United States and the U.S.S.R., a war which has been the most disturbing factor in the international world for the last seven years. This stage is marked by a clearer crystallisation of the policy of the United States and a definite change in the moves of the U.S.S.R. in consequence of it. This does not mean that the cold war has come to an end. There is however a clear sign that the Soviet is revising its tactics in carrying it on and there is also a prospect of greater recourse to negotiation in realising the objectives with which the cold war was undertaken.

The policy of the United States has been undergoing a gradual evolution during these years. Its objective was primarily the containment of the U.S.S.R. and Communism within the limits which they attained by 1947. To realise this objective the United States began to create what its governing circles called “situations of strength” round the periphery of Soviet Russia. In accomplishing this task it was able to rally round itself the States in Western Europe bordering the Atlantic Ocean, States like Italy and Greece in Southern Europe and Turkey in Western Asia, which all became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The Organisation was primarily a military alliance. Such an organisation was possible because the States which became its members felt that all of them had to face a common danger–the danger of Soviet aggression and the forcible establishment of a Soviet-controlled Communist regime within their borders. They were therefore willing to accept the economic aid granted to them under the Marshall Plan, with all the conditions and all the limitations on their sovereignty which the acceptance of the aid brought along with it. In a sense they agreed to become the satellites of the United States, as they found this the lesser of the two evils. This was in a way a diplomatic triumph for the United States. The Organisation enabled the Americans to secure military bases in all the countries which were members of the Organisation.

This was only one of the instruments devised by the United states to gain her objective of containment of the U.S.S.R. At the same time she forged other instruments also. One of them was to enter into similar alliances with even non-democratic and totalitarian States like Franco’s Spain and Tito’s Yugoslavia. Another was to re-arm Western Germany, even though the Second World War was fought to disarm that country. It was the same policy that led her to organise the Pacific Pact with Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. This was also at the back of her Peace Treaty with Japan which resulted in a move for Japanese re-armament and re-industrialisation. The move therefore to create situations of strength meant for all practical purposes the re-armament of as many countries as possible in the non-Communist world with American aid.

It was this policy that was also responsible for the aid which the United States gave to colonial powers like France and England in their fruitless efforts to retain their colonial possessions. There was a time when America herself was a colony of Britain, and Americans look back with a natural pride to the way in which they fought their war of independence and won freedom from the British yoke. Americans also are anxious to be regarded by the world at large as a nation enthusiastic in the cause of other nations struggling to free themselves from foreign rule. But in their determination to fight Communism and the U.S.S.R. they have been instrumental in perpetuating the colonial rule, especially of the French in Indo-China and in Africa, in spite of the fact that the people in these areas have been waging an unceasing war in some form or other against their foreign rulers. The upholding of the French colonial rule has thus become as much a part of American foreign policy as the organisation of military alliances like the NATO and the Pacific Pact.

The only area where the Americans have not succeeded in this part of their task is the Middle East and South-East Asia. Here the new States that have come into existence in the post-war period–States like Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India etc.–are so very much afraid of losing their hard-won freedom that they are not prepared to enter into any alliance with the United States or any other foreign Western power, however economically attractive the terms offered may be. They have preferred all along to stand on their own legs in military and political matters, and their acceptance of economic aid is subject to the condition that no political strings are attached to it.

It is against this background that the real significance of the proposed military aid by the United States to Pakistan has to be estimated. Like other States in South Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan has all along been following a policy of non-alignment with either of the two power blocs. But she has now changed her attitude and is becoming as much a part of the United States defence organisation as the countries of the NATO and the Pacific Pact. This has caused Teal alarm among all the nations of the Middle East and South-East Asia, and the alarm is natural because of the fact that such alliance brings the cold war into an area which was so long keeping aloof from it.

It is here that the crystallisation of American foreign policy finds its most concrete expression. In spite of the protests of States like India, America is determined to bring within its sphere of influence as many South and West Asian States as possible. She is not prepared to abandon her policy of creating the so-called situations of strength, however disturbing the process may be to the peace and order of particular regions. She is not prepared to weigh the long-term consequences of such a policy. In her hurry to fight the U.S.S.R. and Communism, she is determined to make use of any and every kind of weapon of a military character.

During all these years the defence expenditure of the United States has been increasing by leaps and bounds. Her stock-pile of Atomic weapons has enormously mounted up. It is to this massive building up of her armed strength that President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles referred in recent weeks as making their country so irresistible that the U.S.S.R. would have to think twice before resorting to any act of aggression. They and their military advisers have come forward with the threat that, in case the Chinese and the North Koreans renew the war in Korea, they would not hesitate to use the Atomic weapons even though it might result in the killing of eight or ten millions of people. Thus the danger from the Atom Bomb has come much nearer in 1954 than at any other time during these seven years of the cold war.

It is in this atmosphere that the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and the United States are meeting in Berlin. And people are asking themselves whether there is any prospect of the relations between the East and the West becoming less hostile and more friendly as a consequence of this conference. Before this question is answered it may be necessary and desirable to know why Soviet Russia has agreed to such a conference. The last conference of Foreign Ministers of these powers was held in 1949, and though one or two attempts were subsequently made to convene such a conference they did not succeed. Even in the present case it appeared till a few days ago that it may not after all be held, as the parties could not agree on the exact site in Berlin where it should be held. To the neutral world it looks ridiculous that there should be so much wrangling about the selection of a site for the purpose, and it is nothing strange if the neutral nations feel that there is a real lack of sincerity among the parties who waste so much of their time and energy on a trifling matter like the selection of the conference site.

The main problem that will have to be discussed and settled at the Berlin Conference is that of Germany. There is the problem of unifying West and East Germany into a single State and there is even the more important question of re-arming Germany–whether united or divided. Other questions that will be brought up for discussion are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Defence Community Organisation which are now integral parts of the American policy of creating situations of strength. And all these complicated problems are expected to be solved within three weeks or so–the time fixed for the purpose by Dulles.

The Western Powers will agree to German unity if it is preceded by free elections. Free elections imply complete freedom for all parties–Communist and non-Communist–to organise themselves, to put up candidates and carry on their election campaign. All this is possible in Western Germany but not in Eastern Germany where the Communist Party is the only recognised party. There is no prospect of Soviet Russia agreeing to any change in this respect. A similar difficulty arises regarding the re-armament of Germany. Without German re-armament the Americans feel that it is hopeless to get the man-power needed to defend Western Europe against Soviet aggression. They know that it is not merely Soviet Russia but also France that is against the policy of German re-armament, and this has been the main reason why France has not yet ratified the European Defence Community Organisation. But in all their recent speeches American rulers have made it clear that, even if the French do not co-operate with them in this matter, they are determined on having a re-armed Germany. So great is the significance they attach to this. There is again the sentiment of the Germans themselves to be considered. The Parliament of Western Germany is already discussing measures for the re-arming of the country. Under these circumstances there can be no agreed basis for a compromise between the East and the West on this issue. And the West will not be prepared to scrap the NATO and the EDCO just to please Soviet Russia. The only thing that the Western Powers are prepared to offer is a non-aggression pact, but everyone knows from the history of such pacts in the years following the First World War that very little value can be attached to them.

If, therefore, in spite of dim prospects of success the Soviet has agreed to a conference at all, it is because the further use of the weapons hitherto used in the cold war may not yield any results in Western Europe, and they wish to test the utility of discussions in a conference. Such discussions will at least have some propaganda value. The neutral public may be made to feel that the Soviet is anxious to settle problems through negotiation. Neither party, however, feels confident of any problem being solved as a result of the conference. The division between West and East Germany is regarded by all observers as a settled fact for some time to come. If any change is to happen in this regard or in the position of Soviet satellite States, it must be consequent on the internal weakness of Soviet Russia and the strengthening of domestic opposition to the Communist regime.

It is this psychology that is behind the stalemate in Korea. Both parties are tired of war. It was considerations of prestige that unnecessarily prolonged the discussions on the terms of the armistice. Each party was conscious that no great change would result from its terms regarding the prisoners of War. The Americans were against forcible repatriation from the beginning and they did little to prevent Syngman Rhee from liberating a large number of them. Even after the remaining prisoners were placed in the custody of the Neutral Repatriation Commission over which India presided, no real effort was made to offer explanations to them as agreed upon in the armistice, with the result that the Indian Custodian Force decided on restoring them back to the respective commands. At the time of writing, the Chinese and North Korean Commands were reported to have refused to take back the few hundred of their old prisoners but the U.N. Command had no such hesitation. They took back the twenty-three thousand prisoners of theirs and have decided on restoring them to civilian status on the 23rd of January–the ninetieth day after the armistice. Such a restoration is declared to be illegal by the Indian Head of the Neutral Commission. It is his contention that their fate should be decided by the Political Conference which is to be convened under the armistice terms. But so far the two parties to the Korean War have not come to any agreement on the composition of the Political Conference. There is a complete stalemate on this subject and the stalemate is due to the conviction on either side that the Political Conference, even if it meets, cannot find a solution to the Korean question. There is no prospect whatever of Korean unity being brought about through peaceful negotiation. Both parties have reconciled themselves in a way to the present division of Korea.

It may therefore be concluded that for some years to come the status quo will be maintained in Germany as well as in Korea. There is of course the threat of Dr. Syngman Rhee that he would use force to conquer North Korea and bring about Korean unification. It is, however, doubtful whether the United States would permit him to do so.

What is true of Korea is also true of Formosa. The United States is determined on continuing the giving of aid to Chiang-kai-Shek in that island and preventing the People’s Government of China from conquering it. It is equally determined on not recognising that Government and admitting its nominee to the organs of the U.N.O. This in spite of the fact that the British are keen on admitting China to U.N.O. In a lecture which her permanent delegate to the Security Council delivered recently in the United States, he pleaded for American recognition of the People’s Government and the admission of its nominee to the U.N.O. He went to the extent of saying and in this he was echoing the view repeated so often by Pandit Nehru during the last three years–that such admission would have prevented the Korean War, and that in the absence of China the U.N.O. cannot claim to be a universal institution–the one claim on which its whole functioning is based.

In his State of the Union message to the Congress, President Eisenhower called for support for major strategic changes based on a “new military programme unanimously recommended by the joint Chiefs of Staff”. In it he stressed the need for increased, inter-allied Atomic co-operation, for man-power economy, for centralised strategic reserves, for improved living conditions, for trained military man-power, for an improved mobilisation base and for improved continental defence. He also said, “the U. S. military power continues to grow. This power is for our own defence and to deter aggression”. This reliance on military power has now become a part and parcel of American foreign policy and it is this that is responsible for the move to extend military aid to Pakistan and proposals for similar aid to individual countries in the Middle East.

This has created a strong reaction not only in India but also in several other countries of Asia. Statesmen at the helm of affairs in them do not like this growing emphasis on military power, the extension of military aid to Asian countries, and the possibility of their being threatened by a cold war which might become a hot war as in Korea. This dislike has given a momentum to an old idea of Pandit Nehru–the idea of creating what may be called a “neutral no-war area”. What South Asian countries are in need of is increased economic production. The enemy they have to face is not the U.S.S.R. or Communism. It is on the other hand hunger, nakedness, shelterlessness, ignorance and ill-health. They have to concentrate all their attention on attacking this enemy and getting rid of him as quickly as possible. This has to receive priority of attention.

It is therefore a matter of gratification to find this idea of no-war area having effectively appealed to the Government of Egypt and much more to Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Ceylon. The latter has invited the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia to a South-East Asian Conference to be held in Colombo in April or May, and there is every prospect of such a conference being held. He made it clear during his recent visit to Delhi that “with the world divided into two camps, the emergence of an Asian bloc which both sides may respect and heed, may well be the only means of averting a third World War”. He also declared that “the future of Asia cannot be built upon free-give-aways, foreign gunboat visits, and by the mass concentration of armed strength”. It is to be hoped that all the nations of South-East Asia and the Middle East will come together and create a real and strong no-war area, which is necessary not only for the maintenance of their political freedom and the development of their economic strength but also for the preservation of world peace. Unity among the six hundred millions of people in this area is an asset to international goodwill. Forces are moving in that direction and it ought to be the endeavour of all public-spirited citizens of these countries to strengthen those forces and make them effective. This is the lesson which they have to draw from the present International Affairs as they are being shaped by the rivalries between the United States and Soviet Russia.

Jan. 21, 1954.

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