INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIY A, M.A.

The outstanding event in international affairs in the four months under survey is undoubtedly the effort made by India at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to bring about peace in Korea. By the time the Assembly met the cease-fire negotiations between the parties reached a deadlock on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war, although on all other issues agreement was arrived at. It was a source of disappointment to almost all nations that disagreement on this one issue should have become a formidable obstacle in the way of peace. India’s efforts therefore at removing the deadlock were welcome. The resolution which was originally introduced by the Indian delegation underwent certain modifications in the course of the debate in the Political Committee, and in its final form it provided for an immediate cease-fire. In regard to prisoners of war it laid down that their release and repatriation should be carried out in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949, and that force should not be used to prevent or bring about their return to their homelands. It also provided for a Commission consisting of Poland, Switzerland, Sweden and Czechoslovakia to take charge of all the prisoners, and it left to the subsequent decision of the United Nations the final destination of those who did not wish to return to their homelands. It was a most sane and humane proposal that India made. After a lengthy debate it was passed in the Political Committee by fifty-three votes to five (the Soviet bloc), with only nationalist China abstaining; and it was subsequently approved by the General Assembly.

But it produced no practical effect whatever, as it was not accepted by Soviet Russia and by the Communist Governments of China and of North Korea. A resolution which was endorsed by fifty-three out of the sixty nations on the United Nations, and whose purpose was to bring peace to a troubled world, failed in securing its objectives because of the opposition primarily of Soviet Russia and secondarily of China.

The opposition came primarily from Soviet Russia and the opposition from China was only an afterthought. And it is this point that has to be kept in mind. For, it was subsequently made clear by the Government of India and by her delegate, Mr. Krishna Menon, that the Government of China was consulted before the resolution was moved in the United Nations and that there was nothing to indicate that China was opposed to it. It was this indication that encouraged India to proceed with her peace-effort. It was not as if China was ignorant of the resolution. But when in the course of the debate at the United Nations the Russian delegate asked for Chinese views, the Indian representative had to sit back unable to give them out openly, as they “were private views expressed to the Indian Government by China.” It came therefore as really a shock to the Indian representative when the Russian delegate expressed that the resolution was not acceptable to China. There was a feeling that India was let down by that country. But it could not be helped. Every one then knew that it was the pressure from the Soviet that influenced the Chinese attitude.

The complicated situation in the Far East arises out of the fact that China is not prepared to pursue like India an independent line of foreign policy. She has become a member of the Soviet bloc and she thinks that on ideological grounds she should continue to be a member of that bloc. There is need for India and for the world outside to understand this aspect of China’s policy. China cannot be influenced directly. It is only through the Soviet Government that she can be influenced. This is the one inescapable conclusion that one has to arrive at from the changing attitude which she adopted towards the Indian resolution.

It will be a serious folly to ignore the bond that keeps China and Soviet Russia in the same camp. In a famous address which Mao-Tse-Tung delivered “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1949, he stated clearly and emphatically as follows: “The forty years’ experience of Sun-Yat-Sen and the twenty-eight years’ experience of the Chinese Communist Party have taught us to believe that, in order to win and consolidate the victory, we must lean to one side. The experience of forty years and twenty-eight years respectively, show that, without exception, the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist. We oppose the Chiang-Kai-Shek reactionary clique who lean to the side of imperialism; we also oppose the illusion of a third road. Not only in China but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is mere camouflage and a third road does not exist.” He proceeded further and observed: “In the era when imperialism exists, it is impossible for the true people’s revolution of any country to win in its own country without assistance in various forms from the international revolutionary forces, and it is also impossible to consolidate the victory even when it is won. The great October Revolution was thus won and consolidated, as Stalin has told us long ago. It was also in this way that the three imperialist countries (Germany, Italy and Japan) were defeated and the new democratic countries established. This is and will be the case with the People’s China at present and in the future...Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the U.S.S.R, and we can look for genuine friendly aid only from that front, and not from the imperialist front.”

The subsequent, pronouncements of Mao-Tse-Tung and the alliances concluded by his government were exactly on these lines. It may be that from the long-term standpoint China would gain more by coming nearer the United States than Soviet Russia, She has to get her capital equipment for her industrial and agricultural revolution from abroad, and Soviet Russia is not in a position to supply her with this. It is also possible that Russia may not be willing to hasten the pace at which China can set up new industries that will make her independent of key supplies from her. But there is no prospect whatever of China adopting today any such long-term view of her development; and it is wishful thinking to suppose that Mao-Tse-Tung will become another Tito in the near future.

But it is not necessary for the purpose of this survey to analyse the forces and factors that influenced China to reject the Indian resolution on peace in Korea. What is needed more is to recognise that she is not prepared to separate her foreign policy from that of Soviet Russia, and that so long as Russia is interested in prolonging the war in the Far East the present Government of China will not be in a mood to listen to words of peace, even though they might come from a country like India which is outside the ‘imperialist’ bloc. It is now an established fact that Russia is determined to see that the United States is pre-occupied with the complexities in the Far East and be prevented from concentrating all her strength and resources in organising the West European Defence. There is therefore nothing to show that peace in Korea is nearer today than what it was four months ago.

This conclusion is strengthened by the results of the Presidential election in the United States and the coming of General Eisenhower to office in place of Truman. It is not that the new President is more war-mongering than his predecessor. As a matter of fact the policy pursued by Truman was a bi-partisan policy, approved broadly and on the whole by the Republican and the Democratic parties. It is only in matters of detail and in the tactics to be adopted that possibilities of differences existed. But these tactical issues have now, with the accession of the new President, assumed great importance and they are showing themselves in a number of directions.

Both President Eisenhower and Dulles, his Secretary of State, take the view that the situation in Asia is of as much significance as that in Europe and that the anti-Communistic forces in Asia should be strengthened to at least the same extent as those in Europe. Perhaps it will not be far from truth if one were to say that they attach a slightly more importance to Asia than to Europe in the current phase of the cold war. In the first statement on foreign policy that Mr. Dulles made, he pointed out that Japan was the central target of Russian moves in the Far East and that “if the Russians or Chinese Communists got control of Japan with its great industrial power, then they could use that to process raw materials which come from Asia, from Manchuria and from China, and to process them into arms and weapons for the manpower of China, and that if it happened, it would be a very serious thing for us.” He further stated: “Now the Soviet Russians are making a drive to get Japan not only through what they are doing in the northern areas and in Korea but also through what they are doing in Indo-China. If they could get this peninsula of Indo-China, Siam, Burma, and Malaya they would have what is called the ‘rice bowl’ of Asia...And you see that if the Soviet Union had control of the ‘rice bowl’ of Asia, that would be another weapon which would tend to expand their control into Japan and into India.” His references to the Middle East were more or less in the same strain.

It is clear from all this that there is a likelihood of the intensification of the war in Korea which has already cost more than two million lives and unprecedented destruction of cities, towns, villages and all sorts of property. This is the inevitable outcome of Soviet rejection of India’s peace-plan and of the Chinese Communist Government letting down India.

Not only is there a likelihood of the intensification of warfare in Korea but also of the further extension of war into areas outside Korea and the employment of more Asians in carrying on the war. Both these are implicit in the policy of Eisenhower. There is a widespread feeling in the United States that American lives are being disproportionately sacrificed in the Korean campaign. This has been given expression to by the new President and he has indicated more than once that it would be his policy to leave as much of warfare as possible in the hands of the Asians themselves. There will therefore be more South Korean forces fighting against North Korea and China; and above all Chiang-Kai-Shek will be given a free hand in making raids into the Chinese mainland and undertaking a campaign of reconquest of power. War in the far East will come to assume more and more the character of a civil war than of a war between Asians on one side and Americans on the other. This does not mean that American forces will be entirely withdrawn but that they will be getting increasing support from their Asian allies,–Americans concentrating more and more on naval and air arm.

Implicit in this new policy of Eisenhower and Dulles is the increasing application of the doctrine of disruption of Communism instead of the doctrine of containment. Both these schools of thought have been for some time in existence in the United States, but it was the school of ‘containment’, with its emphasis on restricting Communism to the regions already subjugated by it and preventing its further expansion that had the upper hand. It now looks as if this policy of disrupting Communism and of reconquering areas in Asia and Europe which have become subject to Communist rule will be pursued. The first indication of the new policy is the move towards giving a free hand to Chiang-Kai-Shek’s forces to invade the mainland.

It is to be remembered in this connection that, two days after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, President Truman ordered the seventh fleet to protect Formosa and also to prevent Chiang’s troops from raiding the mainland. This was done with a view to localise the Korean War. The seventh fleet, it is now reported, will not act as a check on Chiang and he will consequently be free to invade the mainland if he has the necessary resources for the purpose.

It is not possible or desirable at this stage to describe what all the consequences of such a move will be. It is being undertaken to weaken Chinese resistance in Korea. But whether it will result in Russia giving more direct help to China and make of the war in the East a Soviet-American war, is a possibility which cannot be ignored. Some of the leading statesmen in the world–including Mr. Churchill–have recently been saying that the danger of a third global war has receded and that Soviet Russia is not yet ready for it. This may be true. But if the policy of disrupting Communism replaces the policy of containment in the Far East, the situation may not be far from that of an impending global war.

Indo-China has found a prominent place in the policy statement of Secretary Dulles. This is the logical sequel to a resolution passed at the last meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to the effect that the war which the French have been waging in Indo-China against Ho Chi Minh’s rule in Vietnam should be regarded as a part of the war of NATO against Communism in general, and that the members of the NATO should be prepared to share with France the responsibility for fighting it. If subsequent to the passing of this resolution America has been giving increasing military aid to France, and if this aid is being still further strengthened at present, it is because the Americans feel that there is a possibility of the Communist Government of China coming to a larger extent to the help of Ho Chi Minh. It is true that in the alliance concluded between Ho Chi Minh and China such help is to be granted only under certain contingencies. But if with increasing American aid, and with the increasing co-operation of Bao Dai’s Government, the French achieve real victory the Chinese may find it necessary to extend their help to their ally, and the whole of the Far East from Korea to Malaya may become one continuous theatre of warfare.

The situation in the Middle East has not shown any signs of improvement in the four months under survey. Iran broke off her diplomatic relations with Britain. But this has not helped in any way to improve the internal conditions of the country. Premier Mossadeq has been given more dictatorial powers. He is free now to resort to any drastic measures which he may consider necessary. But here again the power has not been of much use in working the oil wells, refining the crude oil and marketing the finished product. Alternative sources for the supply of oil have been exploited in Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait. The world is able to get tolerably well without oil from Iran. And it will be a problem for Iran to get back her old market. In spite of this the Government of Iran has not seen the wisdom of settling the issue with Britain. The deadlock here is as bad as it is in the truce negotiations in Korea.

Even in Egypt, which is the other centre of disturbance in the Middle East, there has been no settlement of the outstanding differences with Britain. Internally a dictatorial form of government has been established. General Naguib, who has dissolved all other political. parties, has placed himself at the head of the ‘Liberation Front’, the only surviving party. To rid the Nile Valley of all occupation forces and to promote the unification of Egypt is the main objective of the party. In announcing this assumption of power he accused all other political parties of having exploited power for their own private ends and those of their relatives, that nepotism and corruption characterised their administration, that King Farouk entered into a league with them in robbing the people of their wealth and their liberty, and that the new liberation Front would work for the poor and the weak. He has already demanded the unconditional evacuation of the Canal Zone by the British who, it is said, have invested so far £700,000,000 in fortifying it. At the same time, he has come to certain understandings with the political parties in the Sudan on the basis of complete self-government for that country.¹ The British however have not yet reconciled themselves to withdrawal from the Canal Zone and to surrender their privileged position in Sudan. It is their argument that the defence of the canal is not merely a domestic Egyptian question or even a question between Egypt and Britain, but one in which all the nations who have interests in the security and stability of the Middle East are concerned. It has been their argument that they are prepared to evacuate the Canal Zone, provided a Middle East Defence Organisation is created with Egypt and other Middle East States along with Britain and the United States as members. They do not want to leave a vacuum, as it were, behind them. General Naguib does not deny the need for a Middle East Defence Organisation but he is not in a mood to make it a condition precedent to British withdrawal. The Britsh ought to realise that a graceful withdrawal is much better than a forced one. In the mood in which General Naguib and his Front are today, it will not be a difficult task for them to cripple completely the military value of the troops in the Canal Zone for the maintenance of which Egyptian labour and Egyptian goodwill are absolutely essential.

It is in this environment that one has to take note of the report that Britain has invited Pakistan to become a member of the Middle East Defence Organisation. This invitation is fraught with serious consequences. If it is accepted it will, as Pandit Nehru put it, bring the cold war to the very frontiers of India and create numerous other complications. It is therefore a move which requires careful watching. It is not the part of statesmanship to widen the area of warfare.

The contest for power has always been one of the sources of the world’s troubles. The feeling among the people of the United States, that Soviet Russia is determined to adopt all sorts of aggressive policies and tactics to extend her power into almost every part of the globe, has been responsible for the huge American expenditure on armaments, on the defence of Western Europe and on aid to Greece, Turkey and several other States. During recent months the attention of the world has been drawn to a number of political trials in Czechoslovakia and to a number of charges against doctors in Soviet Russia. The majority of those that were involved in these accusations and who were sentenced to death happened to be Jews. World public opinion is therefore asking itself whether there is a new wave of anti-Semitism in Soviet areas. Anti-Semitism was a characteristic of the rule of the Czars in Russia and of almost every government in Central and Eastern Europe in the past. It reached its worst and most brutal form under Hitler. It was with a view to escape from this traditional brutality that the Zionist movement was started,–a movement which culminated in the foundation of the State of Israel. The anti-Semitism which is now breaking out in Soviet Russia and in the States controlled by her has been explained in a variety of ways. There are those who say that it is being resorted to with a view to attract the Muslims of the Middle East who are bitter against the State of Israel. In the view of the Soviet, Israel is a sort of bourgeoise State. In any case there is need for establishing Soviet influence in that part of the Asian world. It is quite possible that by persecuting the Jews–who are almost all of them Zionists-the favour of the Muslims can be obtained. This may be a shrewd move. It is also interpreted as a move for entering into some kind of alliance with the Nazi groups who are active in Western Germany. These groups are anxious to regenerate Germany on Hitlerian lines. Some of their leaders have been recently arrested by the British occupation authorities. They hate the occupation regime. They also dislike the democratic system as led by Dr. Adenauer, the Chancellor. There was a time when Stalin and Hitler became allies and worked together against Britain, France and other Western democracies. There would be nothing strange if today Stalin wishes to get the help of the Neo-Nazis in the war against the Anglo-American-French forces. Anti-Semitism, which has an appeal to the Nazis, may attract Stalin to them. Other interpretations also of the new wave of anti-Semitism have been given. The fact is that there is such a wave today in Central and Soviet Europe. The Communist parties in Britain and other democratic countries have been bewildered by the trial and condemnation of many leading Communists in Czechoslavakia and other countries and the purges to which they seem to be a prelude. The bewilderment among others is very much greater.

Thus move on the contradictions in man, the strangest being in creation,–a being who indulges in deliberate planning for the destruction of his kith and kin, even though he becomes conscious now and then of the nobility of his being and the spiritual heights to which he can rise.

February 1, 1953.

¹ This was written before the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan. –Ed. Triveni.

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