INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA M.A.

In his broadcast from London on January 12, 1951 Prime Minister Nehru observed thus: “Of my generation many have lived the greater part of our lives and only a few years remain to us. It matters little what happens to our generation but it does matter a great deal what happens to hundreds of millions of others and to the world at large. Today these hundreds of millions all over the world live under a kind of suspended sentence of death. And from day to day an atmosphere is created in people’s mines of the inevitability of war.” The tragedy of the world today is in truth this suspended sentence of death under which the millions of the people of all countries are made to live in consequence of the game of power politics in which the rulers of Soviet Russia and the United States, added by their allies and satellites, are indulging.

In the survey for the previous quarter it was remarked that with the crossing of the South Korean and the United States’ forces into North Korea beyond the thirty eighth parallel the Korean War became an aggressive war the aggressor being the United States. It was against this aggression that the Chinese moved their forces. The move was not a sudden one. Notice of it was given in the speech delivered by Chow-En-Lai, China’s Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the celebration of the first anniversary of the establishment of Communist Government in China. Prime Minister Nehru conveyed to the Government of the United States that what the Chinese Foreign Minister stated should not be regarded as an empty threat or boast but should be taken seriously and he advised the United States not to cross the thirty eighth parallel. No heed, however, was paid to his sage counsel with the result that the Korean War became transformed into a war between the United States on one side and China on the other. The danger now is that it might develop into a global war unless the United States takes a commonsense view of the situation.

In the early stages of the Chinese intervention there was some uncertainty as to what the real objectives of Communist China were in sending her forces into Korea. Was it merely to defend her frontiers and to prevent the hydro-electric works in Korea which supplied energy to her industries in Manchuria from being destroyed or from falling into the hands of the Americans that she intervened? No clear-cut answer was forthcoming to these questions. But as time went on and as the military situation developed more and more favourably for her the answers also became clearer although some of these answers were found in the speech of Chow-En-Lai referred to above. Every one now understands that China has a number of objectives before her and that she is determined to fight until she realises all of them. To liberate Korea from the aggression of the United States and to unify it under a Communist Government are not the only aims that she has before her. More important than these are the securing of recognition as a great power from the United States, consequently of a seat in the Security Council and in the United Nations Organisation, the establishment of her rule over Formosa which she claims to be a legitimate and lawful part of her territory, the liberation of Indo-China and Malaya from the yoke of the European colonial powers and the introduction of Communism into these and other countries of South-East Asia–Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China, Indonesia and Philippines. The first three are her immediate and short-period aims and the past two the long-period ones. She will carry on the struggle with the United States until all these aims are secured. They are all of them intimately inter-related.

The campaign in Korea has been an unprecedented triumph for her–a triumph even far greater than what Japan won against Czarist Russia half a century ago. Obtaining Formosa and a seat on the Security Council depend very much on the attitude of the United States, An invasion of Formosa is not so easy as the intervention in Korea. The primary difficulty here is the absence of a navy. While Communist China has inexhaustible military forces at her disposal–and this has been at the basis of her victory so far–she has no navy with which she can fight the American navy guarding the waters round Formosa. In this respect her position is similar to that of Napoleon in his wars with the British. The only alternative therefore left for her is to create trouble for the United States and her allies in other parts of Asia in which they are vitally interested–prominently in Malaya and Indo-China. That this will be her next move if in the meanwhile diplomacy doesn’t succeed in bringing about a truce or an armistice has already become clear. Forces are ready for undertaking an invasion of Indo-China and for strengthening the Communist Government of Viet-Nam under Ho-Chi-Minh and it will be an impossible task for the French even with more substantial help from the United States to resist these forces. In addition to this the Government of China has protested to the British against the alleged persecution of the Chinese settlers in Malaya and this is regarded as a preparatory step for sending help to the Communist Guerillas fighting there against Britain. If naval weakness prevents China from invading Formosa it will only encourage her to make the fullest use of her superiority in land armies.

It is this numerical strength of the Chinese ground forces and the military equipment that they have been able to get from Russia that have been causing worry to the United States. These have been responsible for her defeats in Korea and they may result in her being driven out from that peninsula. She was never prepared to face such a situation. When MacArthur began his offensive in November he was under the impression that all Korea could be occupied in about a month and that most of his men could return to their homes for Christmas. So confident were he and his Government of a speedy victory that they refused even to consider the proposal made by the British to create a neutral zone in Korea bordering the Chinese territory and give assurance to the Chinese that the U.N. forces operating in Korea had no aggressive designs in China. Things however took a worse turn. Everyone in America grew hysterical and the President himself came forward with his formula that he would not hesitate to use the Atom bomb. It was this more than anything else that opened the eyes of the world to the seriousness of the situation and the need for all reasonable peoples to bring pressure on the United States to dissuade her against the use of the bomb. Prime Minister Attlee went all the way to Washington to make President Truman and his advisers adopt a more reasonable and balanced attitude towards China. This had some sobering effect although it required more blows from the Chinese and the North Korean forces to make the United States come down to the earth and view things in their proper perspective.

The stiff attitude of the United States in the days when her forces were being marched towards the Manchurian frontier and before they had to beat a hasty retreat to escape from complete annihilation was also illustrated by the treatment accorded to the Chinese Mission headed by General Wu which came to Lake Success to represent China’s case against the United States. The Mission was not given adequate opportunity to express its views and it had to return completely disappointed. This was to a great extent responsible for the unwillingness of the Chinese Government to enter into any kind of negotiations on the subject of cease-fire in Korea.

`During all these months there has been a contrast between the stiffness of the United States and the more conciliatory policy for which Britain stood. Public opinion not only in Britain but also in the other countries of Western Europe was averse to the United States becoming heavily involved in a war with China in the Far East. There was a general reason for it. It was the fear that it would weaken the defences of Western Europe. Russia had nearly four million men ready to march into Western Europe. The Atlantic Pact was formed to resist such a march. But so far not even a million men could be recruited for the purpose. There were internal dissensions regarding the control to be exercised over the armies to be raised. There was a feeling that after all nothing could save the West from the Soviet armies and that it would be futile to try to resist them. The will to fight has become considerably weakened in France and other countries. This was one of the reasons for the insistent demand that more and more United States forces should be stationed in these areas. Strategically also the idea gained ground that if Communism is to be resisted it should be done in Europe and not in Asia as the real protagonist of this faith is Russia and not China. One of the objects of Premier Attlee’s visit to Truman was to impress on him this view of the strategic situation. It therefore became necessary for the United States to reconsider the Korean affair in the light of this global strategy. So great has been the importance attached to concentration of all available defence forces in Western Europe that several responsible statesmen in the democratic States even went to the extent of telling the Americans that it would be best for them to withdraw from Korea without waiting as it were for being pushed out by the Chinese. It was the movement of West European opinion in a direction like this that was to some extent responsible for the growing willingness on the part of the United States to reconsider her policy towards China and to think of some kind of compromise.

The Chinese war has also been responsible for some other developments during the quarter. One such development was in regard to the problem of the rearmament of Germany and the rearmament of Japan. With the establishment of Communism in China nearly nine hundred millions of people have been included in the Communist part of the world. This meant all inexhaustible source of man power for Communism in its war with the democratic States. In contrast to this the peoples included in the Atlantic Pact countries and the Pan-American Union come to about only 500 millions. It therefore became plain that if Western Europe is to be defended against a Soviet onslaught the people of Germany should be made use of and that for arresting Chinese Communism in the Far East the people of Japan should be made use of. Discussions have been going as to how this has to be brought about and within what limits. The rearming of Western Germany and Japan will no doubt add to the military forces of the democratic States. But there is also a fear that it might prove dangerous in the long run. The world had already suffered a great deal at the hands of German and Japanese militarism and imperialism. There are therefore many sections of people in the democratic camp who are opposed to the revival of these militarisms. In addition to this another difficulty has naturally cropped. The Germans feel that opportunity has now come to them to dictate their own terms before willing to join the democratic armies and fight against the Communist forces. They are demanding complete equality with the other West European nations. They are prepared to become recruits only on condition that they are organised as a national army just like the other armies in Europe. Negotiations are now going on in regard to these various issues and it may perhaps become necessary or the nations of the Atlantic Pact to accept some of the terms at least as put forward by the Germans inspite of the risks involved.

One effect of the move of the democratic States to rearm Germany is seen in the correspondence that is going on between Soviet Russia on one side and the United States, Britain and France on the other on the desirability of the revival of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference which actively functioned in the settlement of treaties with Italy and some of the other enemy States in South Eastern Europe but which fell into abeyance in consequence of the growth of acute and irreconcilable differences between the two blocs into which the great powers came to be divided from 1946. The proposal for the rearmament of Germany has created alarm in the minds of the Soviet leaders. From their standpoint this amounts to a revival of Hitlerism especially in view of the fact that in working out the proposal some of the ex-German generals are being consulted. Soviet Russia is therefore anxious that the problem of Germany should be considered in the conference of foreign ministers on the basis of the war-time agreement concluded at Potsdam. The democratic States are not very hopeful the outcome of such a conference and they have put forward the view that if at all a conference is convened it must be convened not merely to discuss the German problem but all the other issues which have become the source of dispute between themselves and Soviet Russia. It is to be hoped that Russia would agree to such a demand.

Similar are the problems that have emerged as a result of tile proposal to rearm Japan. It is not merely from the Soviet camp that opposition to this proposal has emanated. Even Australia and New Zealand are opposed to it. As there is no likelihood of agreement among all the countries interested in the issue the United States is determined on entering into a separate peace treaty with Japan. In view of the dependence of Australia and New Zealand on the United States in all matters of defence it looks likely that they may not persist in their opposition to the rearmament proposals.

It was to consider all these international problems that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers held a conference in London from the 4th January for a period of ten days. There was free and frank discussion among them. One of the aims of the conference–although it was not explicitly stated–was to bring the combined weight of the opinion of all the members of the Commonwealth on the United States and induce her to revise her policy towards China. The question of the recognition of China naturally occupied a prominent place in the discussions. Britain and India which along with Pakistan and Ceylon had already recognised Communist China tried their best to prevail on Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand to do the same. But they have not succeeded in their attempts. Prime Minister Nehru was emphatic in asserting that China had no aggressive designs, that she was not a satellite of Soviet Russia and that independently of questions like these it would be most unrealistic to refuse to recognise the fact of China now being under a Communist Government. These assertions have not however been able to convert Australia and other members of the Commonwealth. This does not however mean that the conference was fruitless. It is not usual for the conference to arrive at any decisions. Its main purpose is to create a better understanding among the members and the present session has succeeded in this.

It had also produced an indirect result. The trend of discussions at the conference and the views expressed by Nehru and Bevin have been able to influence the attitude of the United States towards China. For sometime before the conference and during the days when it was holding its session there was a move on the part of United States to have China declared by the U. N. as an aggressor. Nothing would have been gained by such a declaration. On the other hand much would have been lost. It would certainly have embittered still further the relations between China and the United States. Fortunately the United States had given up the move and has agreed to have all the issues between her and China–including the issues of seating China in the Security Council and the future of Formosa–being discussed in a conference representing Soviet Russia, Communist China, Britain and herself provided that China agrees to a cease-fire in Korea. This willingness on the part of the United States to sit along with a representative of Communist China and discuss issues with him is an indication of the influence that the deliberations of the Commonwealth conference have been able to exercise on her. It does not follow from this that China would agree to a cease fire in Korea but it is a reasonable inference from all this that the United States is now disposed to take a more realistic view of the situation in the Far East which has emerged from the establishment of the Communist regime there. This is a step in the direction of world peace and away from the global war with which mankind is being threatened. Many more steps however will have to be taken before the threat disappears completely.

The world is now passing through a most critical stage. The crisis has been developing for the last six years. But it has reached an acute stage as a consequence of the rise of China as a united country under a strong Communist Government. This need not have intensified the crisis if the United States had reconciled herself to the emergence of this new power in Asia and on the borders of the Pacific. But she has not done so as yet. She is suspicious of Communist China and her suspicions are being strengthened as a result of the close ties that have come to be established between new China and Soviet Russia. There are certain forces and factors especially those represented by the statesmanship of Nehru and the mature political experience of Britain which are striving hard to bring about this required change in the attitude of the United States. And the future of the world depends on the success of these attempts. (15-1-51)

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