INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY
PROF.
R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO
The
past months witnessed the emergence of contradictory trends in international
relations. The Brezhnev-Nixon summit and the European Security Conference in
Helsinki underscore the point that the process of ending the cold war in the
West is drawing to a completion. In fact the super-power summit is said to mark
the formal end of the cold war. But, paradoxically enough, in Asia Iran’s new
massive armaments programme has created a situation in which cold war attitudes
are bound to get sharpened and South-Asian politics, in particular, are apt to
get more intractable.
The
reiteration of Russo-American friendship at the Brezhnev-Nixon summit is in
itself nothing spectacular for the two super-powers have been according top
priority to their detente over other diplomatic objectives. It was true that
the abruptness of Nixon’s China visit did cast some doubts about the
credibility of these priorities and the Russians even feared that the Americans
are neglecting the detente with themselves. But the Nixon visit to the Soviet
Union soon restored the old balance. The present summit, the second in less
than two years, only further reinforces the super-powers anxiety
to establish a suitable framework of reduced tensions in which to pursue their
super-powers’ roles.
The
Summit confirmed the determination of the super-powers to end their
confrontation. The most important of the agreements signed, as only to be
expected, relates to this aspect. Significant among those was the agreement
under which the parties undertook to do everything possible to avoid nuclear
war not only between their two countries but also with third nations. They also
agreed on principles designed to limit nuclear weapons by the end of 1974 and,
meanwhile, to a further installment of limitation on strategic arms. The
conference achieved even more fruitful agreements over economic and scientific
co-operation between the two countries. More important than these formal
achievements are the informality and bon homie exhibited by the normally stern
and humourless Brezhnev. The Russian Communist Party Secretary went out of his
way not to take diplomatic advantage of President Nixon’s troubles over the
Watergate scandal. The cordiality and the mutual confidence exhibited by the
two leaders more than amply highlight their determination to
eliminate tensions.
This
determination, however, does not signify an unconditional and identical
committal to the emergence of new world order. Each of the two super-powers has
its own less than noble reasons in strengthening the detente. The Russians on
their part are anxious to convince the Americans of their bona fides so that
the cold war could be ended in Europe with the withdrawal of American troops.
In that eventuality they also hope to make their influence felt in Western
Europe, where since the solidification of the cold war in the shape of the NATO
and the Warsaw Pacts, Russian influence was shut off. Moscow seeks this
accommodation with the U. S. and the West not only to gain closer economic
contacts, but more importantly, to be free to concentrate on their
confrontation against their Eastern rival, China. Precisely for this reason the
Chinese are doing their best to throw a spanner in the works by trying to scare
the Western Europeans away from a detente with Moscow. Another important
objective of Russian policy is “to keep the structure of world politics
essentially in their existing bi-polar mould.” The Americans seek the detente
for quite different reasons. The economics that flow from a reduced arms race
are all the more crucial to the U.S. plagued as it is with economic crisis. It
is anxious to pull out of Western Europe and to accomplish this wide ranging
and reliable arms control agreements with Russia are a must. They also hope
that ending the East-West confrontation in Europe would lead to loosening of
the Russian stranglehold over Eastern Europe, to the advantage of the West. The
U. S. has the ultimate advantage of still being militarily the superior of the
two super-powers. It is this factor that makes the U. S. feel confident in
seeking firmer detente with the Russians.
The
Europeans both suspect and welcome the super-power summit. They fear that the
super-powers might come to a settlement at the expense of European interests.
There is also the resentment, as repeatedly voiced by France, that the
super-powers are out to deny the other powers their legitimate say in shaping
the future world order. There is also the European fear that though President
Nixon gives top priority in his diplomacy to the emergence of a strong Europe
as is evident from his designating 1973 as the Year of Europe, his anxiety to
cut his costs in Europe might make him pay scant attention to the viability of
Western Europe’s defence in the future. In view of Nixon’s “haste” in making it
up with the Soviet Union the question is asked how valuable is the American
assurance that it stands by them? Europe has also misgivings about Russia
observing all the arms control agreements it signed with the U.S., which Nixon
is citing as guarantee for West Europe. However, the Western European nations
also seek settlement with Russia on a permanent basis. This is because East-West
tensions put a heavy strain on their resources (both financial and emotional)
and deter the emergence of an order based on economic co-operation. Fortunately
a very significant event occurred in this direction too during the last months
in the shape of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation.
If
the Brezhnev-Nixon summit highlights the dynamics of the Russo-American
detente, the significance of the European Security Conference event lies in the
same direction. Here too Russia’s anxiety for a settlement with Western Europe
has been quite apparent for some years. The conference is the result of a long
felt need for a dialogue between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Even
though the threat of a nuclear war in Europe has vanished and the old cold war
confrontations now remain at worst as memories of nightmares, countries on both
the sides of the “iron curtain” feel still threatened, what with the formidable
concentration of conventional and nuclear arsenal kept pointed at each other.
As long as East and West Germany remained implacably hostile and Bonn and
Moscow refused to trust each other, the German problem remained a major trouble
spot of the world. But with the easing of tensions here and with the West
German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) Germany secured
the best of relations not only with Russia but with East Germany and other
neighbouring Eastern European nations too. Yet, while the major cause for East-West
confrontation in Europe has lost its hold, the very presence of troop
concentrations on either side of the curtain contributes to tensions which both
sides are keen to remove. Hence for quite sometime the convening of a European
Conference to evolve a formula for balanced and mutual troops reductions has
been talked about. The success of many disarmament negotiations between America
and Russia and phenomenal progress on other fronts of East-West relations made
this Security Conference a reality. The conference that finally met in Helsinki
(Finland) after careful preparatory meetings since November is called the
European Conference on Security and Co-operation emphasising not only the
security aspects of East-West relations but the need to develop a broader base
for mutual acceptance of European nations.
The
achievements of the conference are meagre in terms of tangible and tacit
agreements. It should, however, be remembered that the very coming together or
the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to discuss the creation of not only an
all-European security system but to prepare a blueprint for a new European
order based on closer economic and cultural contacts, is itself a considerable
achievement. The Russians offered a declaration on “the foundations of security
and the principles of relations among States in Europe.” But they were rather
equivocal on the point whether this implies a guarantee of
the territorial inviolability of Eastern Europe States. It is well known that
under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Russians claimed that Communist States could
collectively intervene in the internal affairs of any Communist
State to “save” it from counter revolution. This theory was propounded to
justify the Warsaw Pact States’ invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August, 1968. Since then Communist States like Rumania have been insisting on
the Soviet Union’s giving up this claim. At Helsinki too
the Rumanian delegate reiterated this demand. Even if the Russians are loath to
formally renounce their special hold over Eastern European States, it is a safe
guess that they (the Russians) are no longer sure about the tenability of such
special claims. Since they are more anxious to prove their bona fides vis-a-vis
Western Europeans they could not really be hoping for Western acquiescence
to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Thus whether the Russians formally renounce the
Brezhnev Doctrine or not they are very likely to relax their
existing hold over Eastern Europe.
This
is not to say that Moscow would consent to lose Eastern Europe as her sphere of
influence. In one sense “the Soviet Union sees this conference as a means of
winning the Western seal of approval over Communist dominions. There is thus a
paradox inherent in the Russian attitude. The West on its part though anxiously
looking forward to a dispensation wherein the Eastern part would be liberated
from Russian fold, is not quite prepared to challenge the status quo. In fact
while the Russians’ minimum demand is that existing social system and political
realities (the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, that is) should be
recognised, the Western leaders are keen on assuring that they have no desire
to bring down the social systems or Communist regimes.
Yet
because of distrust at the conference the Russians expressed reservations on
proposals relating to free exchange of information and
lifting of restrictions in various forms of international intercourse. Moscow
and her allies sense the danger inherent in being over-enthusiastic about these
and are therefore cautious. Gromyko thus came out in favour of a “suitably
organised international intercourse’ (emphasis added).
If
Eastern Europe has reservations, (on free flow of information and exchange
of peoples) their readiness to improve economic relations ant come to a
quick agreement over reducing their respective force is unequivocal. A desire
to benefit from closer economic contacts and trade with the West has been one
of the strong motivations for Russia canvassing the conference itself. West
German technology and know-how are almost indispensable to Russia.
On
the issue of arms reduction no tangible agreement was signed but here again
what is most visible is the Russian attempt to meet Western reservations and
the efforts at confidence building. Mr.
Gromyko promised to allow “observers from other states to attend military
manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions. This is the first time in the
long post-war history of disarmament negotiations that the Russians have
admitted the possibility of on-site inspection.” The West on its part is
equally ready to come to terms and cut their defence costs. Thus having
emphasised on the fundamental importance of East-West relations at grass roots
level, the conference adjourned to meet again on September 18th at Geneva where
real negotiations are to begin. Doubtless progress there would not be
spectacular, for misgivings on many counts are still endemic but it is certain
that the existing European detente is going to be consolidated. East-West
negotiations are going on simultaneously (over other issues too). There
are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the talks on mutual reduction of
forces in Europe are going on at Vienna. Firm agreements on these are likely to
precede those at the European Security Conference.
If
she wind of change in Europe (once the cockpit of world power-conflict) has
been reassuring and refreshing, the Asian continent, particularly South Asia,
has come under a spell of foul political weather since the last few months. It
was thought that the two-year-old Sino-American detente ensured the end of cold
war rivalries in this part of the world too. The emergence of Bangla-desh and
the concomitant reduction of Pakistan along with China’s adoption of a softer
attitude in her diplomatic relations with others, raised further hopes for a
peaceful Asia. In such a state of affairs came the news of the
massive arms programme of Iran. The magnitude of this
programme is simply staggering.
Iran
is acquiring around 400 phantoms and transport planes costing from 2.5 to 5
million dollars a piece, 400 helicopters at an estimated expenditure of 500
million dollars, 800 Chieftain tanks costing 480 minion dollars and its Navy is
being doubled in size and already includes the world’s largest Hovercraft fleet.
Another billion dollars are to be spent on new bases and this expansion is
going to involve an investment of 2-3 billion dollars a year to go on for quite
a few years. Nothing short of a new military phenomenon would be emerging in
the Middle East with close access to South Asia also. Their new military growth
point, as it were, cannot but disturb the power balance in the region.
The
ostensible purpose of this military programme is candidly explained by the Shah
and his reasons for converting Iran into a major power in the area could be
summarised thus: (1) The need to control the Persian Gulf to safeguard the flow
of oil from different parts of the country; (2) The defence of Iran from
insurrectionary forces within and outside; (3) The protection of Iran from
allegedly aggressive neighbours like Iraq and (4) To make Iran strong enough to
help its friends like Pakistan from being threatened by others. Normally these
objectives cannot but be regarded as quite unobjectionable and even honourable.
And Iran has certain genuine problems like foreign inspired insurrectionary
movements against which it is entitled to defend itself. However there are
other implications to the programme which cause concern to others. The Shah is
known to be rather ambitious with designs of playing hegemonic roles in the
region and to make matters worse there is evidence of the hand of the
super-powers, the U. S. and China behind the Shah’s aspirations. Pakistan is
obviously delighted about the new trend.
The
fact that Iran is one of the allies of the U. S. is only one of the reasons
that make the latter the major beneficiary of the new development. Iran’s new
overlordship over the Persian Gulf when linked up with the American bases in
Southern Indian Ocean area, affords the U. S. a decisive opportunity to outwit
the Soviet Union in this area. Already Central Russia is vulnerable to
submarine based American missiles stationed in these American bases. Iranian
arms, therefore, introduce a factor directly intensifying the jockeying for
power that is going on between the U. S. and USSR. The Russo-American detente
seems to be a misnomer in so far as easing cut-throat competition for strategic
advantages is concerned. In fact, the Americans in arming Iran and in
augmenting the Pakistani potential are reviving cold war attitudes. The best
illustration for this is the recent meeting of CENTO where it was noted that
the existence of the Indo-Soviet Pact, and Russo-Iraq Pact warrant the CENTO’s
adopting of a more vigilant posture. It is well-known that the relevance and
respectability of treaties like the CENTO and SEATO has been on the decline for
nearly a decade now and Pakistan had practically withdrawn from these. But now
it has decided to activise its membership in a reactivated CENTO. It is
undoubtedly Iran that has now become the fulcrum of this grouping with the
American backing. The curious fact is that China, partly against whom the CENTO
was created, should now welcome the recrudescence of the CENTO in the shape of
a massively armed Iran.
The
Chinese Foreign Minister was in Iran recently and welcomed the new role that
the Shah is donning. No doubt the Chinese welcome the new friends because these
seek to contain the Soviet Union too, at the same time aiming at neutralising
(or threatening the Indian power in the region. Thus nothing short of a revival
of the ominous cold-war attitudes is in the offing in West and South Asia. Two
sets of blocs have emerged: one consisting of a close partnership between Iran
and Pakistan with the U. S. and China actively supporting the move and on the
other powers like Iraq, Afghanistan and India having bilateral relations with
Russia
Implications for India
The new Iran certainly becomes an important factor in the politics of the sub-continent. Not only has Iran been pro-Pakistan and on the whole anti-Indian, but its reaction to the emergence of Bangladesh has been one of uncompromising hostility towards India. In fact, the Shah unhesitatingly blamed India for conniving at the bisection of Pakistan. He is now pleading that it was the world’s silence towards the events culminating in the disintegration of Pakistan that prompted him to resort to the present armaments programme in order to be able to protect his economic interests and borders. The Shah also made it clear that the new strength of Iran would be put at the disposal of Pakistan for its ‘defences’. Iran has not only pledged full support for Pakistan against threats but it is also helping Islamabad in dealing with regional autonomy movements like the one in Baluchistan. It is the repeated vehemence with which the Shah alleges continuing threats to Pakistan (presumably from India) and his enthusiastic committal to defend Pakistan that should cause concern for India. Not that Iran and Pakistan would mount an attack against India to settle past scores. But a clever use of an explosive situation on the borders, (fomented by Pakistan) may be used as a pretext and some territorial nibbling in Kashmir or on the West Coast may be the result. Iran’s naval base on the Straits of Ormuz is too close to our West Coast to be ignored as a potential threat to Indian security. For it is not very difficult to “engineer” or “manage” a so-called threat to one’s own security and blame it on others as its “real” instigator. Pakistan’s war in 1971 is itself an example of this. Thus the probability of a covert Pak-Iranian axis to over-react to internal threats and see in them the hands of external powers cannot be minimised. The Iranian armaments programme cannot but lead to India seeking arms from the outside powers. Before the arms race gets going speed, it will be to the advantage of all to de-fuse the tense situation in the sub-continent first.
India
has made commendable efforts to arrive at a settlement with Pakistan.
The spirit of accommodation shown at the end of the Indo-Pak War of 1971 was
manifest throughout and the Simla Agreement under which
Pakistan agreed to settle all outstanding disputes through bilateral
negotiations gave rise to many expectations. First we thought that Pakistan
would recognise Bangladesh: from this it was expected that the intense hatreds
existing between Bangladesh and Pakistan would gradually come down. Pakistan’s
recognition might well have made Dacca cool down over the issue of the trial of
POWs for war crimes. However in the event, President Bhutto proved to be
unpredictable and the vicious circle of Pak refusal to recognise Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s insistence on the war trials and Pak rejection to repatriate Bengalese
struck-up in Pakistan (and take back the non-Bengalese from Bangladesh) is
still to be broken. India on its part, along with Bangladesh, offered the
three-point formula under which almost all the Pak-POWs (nearly 95,000) are to
be released in return for the release of all the Bengalese from Pakistan and
the taking back of the non-Bengalese from Bangla. The only point of insistence
on the part of New Delhi and Dacca is that the latter would try
195 of the Pak POWs for war crimes in Bangladesh. This offer was
rejected by Pakistan and it went to the World Court contesting India’s right to
hand over the 195 POWs to Bangladesh and challenging Bangladesh’s right
to hold the war crime trials. This Pak move was in violation of
the Simla accord under which Pakistan agreed to settle all problems through
bilateral negotiations. India successfully contested the
jurisdiction of the court as the grounds on which Pakistan initiated the
proceedings needed prior consent of India to subject itself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
In
spite of Pakistan’s irritating tactics of blowing hot and cold at the same
time, India has been persevering for peace. Recently a high official level
meeting was held in Rawalpindi and though nothing tangible came out of it
certain possible approaches to solving the impasse emerged. Pakistan seemed to
have relented from its rigid stand of not accepting responsibility towards the
non-Bengali Muslims in Bangladesh. India on its part was prepared to take up
with Dacca the issue of the postponement of the trial of the POWs so that scope
for rethinking on the issue would not get foreclosed. Meanwhile the exchange of
the 90,000 Pak prisoners and the Bengalese in Pakistan could be accomplished.
Indian and Pakistani officers are to meet again in the middle of August and it
is to be hoped that a solution to these problems would emerge.
Observers
say that the apparent toughening in the initial attitude of Pakistan at the
recent talks is the direct result of confidence injected by Iran’s new military
avatar. Some even fear that Rawalpindi may exploit the existing confusion
within borders to involve India and escalate the situation to another military
confrontation. Desperation partly and Iran’s help partly could provide the
cause for such a Pak adventure.
India
is right in realising the immediate need to impress on world opinion its
sincere wish to send back the POWs. What the niceties of International Law may
be, the incarceration of over 90,000 soldiers is certainly a source of
diplomatic embarrassment. There is public acknowledgement now that India is
prepared to advise Bangladesh that too uncompromising a policy towards the
trial of POWs may ultimately be of disadvantage both to Dacca and Delhi. That
India is prepared to advise a postponement of the trials is itself a
good sign. While India cannot afford to forget the long term consequences of
Pak military revival via Iran, in the short run the final settlement of the
issues flowing from the 1971 war is an immediate necessity. Hard postures, even
if warranted on moral grounds, need to be given up by all the parties.