INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

 

DR. R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO

 

Indian Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Recent Events

 

            “Two factors are likely to determine shifts in Indian foreign policy in the new year: Peking’s approach to Sino-Indian relations and the forthcoming non-aligned preparatory conference at Dar-es-Salaam in April.” And in both these aspects of our external relations important developments have occurred since January. Not that anything definite happened. All the same, significant modifications can be discerned in the postures of the diverse powers involved.

 

Sino-Indian Relations

 

            Though New Delhi eagerly looks forward to the prospect of unfreezing its relations with Peking, as yet there has been no firm indication of a thaw. So far the only change in Peking’s attitude is restricted to civility in diplomatic behaviour, which in itself is a definite improvement over the crudity and rudeness of Chinese past actions. Two other indications are also there. There has been a spurt in Chinese diplomatic activity disclosing a flexibility of approach in relation to many countries, especially towards the U. S., creating the hope that Peking may decide to make up with India too. These hopes are whetted to a great extent by the meeting between the Indian President, Mr. V. V. Giri and Mr. Kuo Mo-Jo, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China, at Khatmandu. This meeting of two top leaders from India and China is the first of its kind since 1965, though it was nothing more than a chance meeting at the wedding of the Nepalese Crown Prince. This meeting caused quite a flutter in the foreign chancelleries in New Delhi. But this aspect of the matter can be written off for the simple reason that Mr. Kuo Mo-jo’s exchange of pleasantries with the Indian President was more than compensated by his visit to Pakistan immediately after the Khatmandu visit. In Pakistan he was busy promising support for the ‘liberation’ of Kashmir (which not even the Muslim Shah of Iran did) and was profusely thanked by Pindi for China’s support in the 65 war. So much for the Giri-Kuo Mo-jo meeting.

 

            There are, of course, many reasons why the Chinese should want to see a thaw in relations with India. First, with the acquisition of their own deterrent and within sight of manufacturing long range delivery vehicles the Chinese are loath to remain as a power in the intermediate power range. In addition to acquiring these trappings of great power status, she is managing to converse directly and independently with both the superpowers. Yet she failed to make much headway in Asia and Africa and her cultural revolution of 1966-68 further cut her off from Afro-Asian contracts. Thus the Chinese may be anxious to make a gesture to the ‘Third World’. And cultivating better relations with India might make such a gesture more credible. More important is the factor relating to the Sino-Soviet relations. Peking is obviously looking forward to the prospect of cutting into Indo-Soviet relations. The last three months witnessed Chinese fears of a Russian preemptive strike increasing. Failure of the Sino-Soviet Talks begun in last autumn only partly underlines this development. Western analysts are convinced that the Chinese did regard a Russian nuclear strike as clear and immediate. The London ‘Times’ ran a series of five articles in March on this problem and the contributors are unanimous about the way Peking perceives the Russian threat. For example, Neville Maxwell wrote: “To say that China is preparing for war is true, but not precise: China is preparing to resist a Russian attack. The Soviet Union denies any such intention, but Russian troop movements and Russian threats gave reality to Chinese fears, and are reflected in intensified defence preparations throughout China.” (Neville Maxwell in “The Times,” London) Again, the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, in its to “Strategic Survey 1969” said that there was a “spectacular and unequivocal” increase last year in Soviet military activity along the 4150 mile Chinese border, where 62 Soviet divisions (658,000 men) are now deployed. The Chinese, the report says, enjoy a manpower advantage over the Russian (814,000 to 658,000) but in every category of weapons the Russian advantage is overwhelming. Evidence from within the Soviet Union also conforms to the state of the Soviet mind. It is by now well known that Brezhnev had last year made a devastating report to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on the desperate state of the economy. Acute observers like K. S. Karol of the “New Statesman” infer from this report that the reduction in Russian civil investment during 1969 was mainly due to diversion of investment to defence expenditure. Further, the recent visit of Brezhnev to Dvina in Byelo Russia, where top Russian Marshalls are engaged in military exercises is being interpreted as intended to “convey a message of caution from the bureaucracy he represents to those soldiers on whom he relies to settle the great China question as they settled Czechoslovakia.” Of course, in the event, 1969 passed without a war, and this was mainly due to the various pressures prevailing both on Peking and Moscow to restrain themselves and rethink. Yet the fact that Sino-Soviet relations reached the nadir of hostility and brought the two within sight of a nuclear holocaust should be recognised.

 

            Viewed in this context it is easy to see that China may be fearing a joint Indo-Soviet military action against herself, much the same way we were fearing a simultaneous Sino-Pakistani attack. Now, this in itself is enough to warrant Peking’s overtures to New Delhi.

 

            Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the very same prospect of a Sino-Soviet war, which might make China soften towards India, seems to have made the Soviet Union less warm towards India. This is because of the need to wean Pindi away from Peking’s side. Thus, to isolate Peking, Russia may be more than anxious to appease Pakistan and in the process moderate its enthusiasm for India’s susceptibilities. In fact, sometime back Moscow did write to New Delhi hinting at Moscow’s intention to establish closer contacts with Pindi and telling New Delhi not to misunderstand. In other words, the so-called “special relations” between Russia and India have ended.

 

            While Moscow thus gives notice to India to settle with Pakistan because of her (Moscow’s) desire to cultivate Pindi, Washington seems to be eager that India and China end their dispute, because of its anxiety to work for a ‘rapproachement’ with Peking. This could be inferred from recent Washington attitudes. Vice-President Agnew’s utterances during his Nepal visit last March afford interesting insights. He conceded that China had a special interest in Nepal; he asked Nepal to mediate between India and China; and, to top it all, he seems to have suggested that India should come to terms or negotiate across the table with China. But the question will be asked whether these represent the Administratio’s views. For, President Nixon only recently announced that his administration would work for closer cooperation between India and Pakistan. This is being interpreted to mean that the U. S. would encourage the emergence of a confederation between India and Pakistan as a bulwark against China. If this be true then the inference of America telling India to make it up with China seems to De all wrong. Yet there is no inherent contradiction in Washington seeking an early settlement of both Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani problems as these will clear the decks for a Sino-American ‘détente’. Further, that Vice-President Agnew made the point about India negotiating with China–a point which cannot but be considered rather unpalatable to New Delhi–makes it all the more credible. For, President Nixon has always been using the Vice-President to do the unpleasant talk on his behalf! Hence, it need not be doubted that the U. S. is keeping in its policy calculations the option of effecting a shift in its China policy. In this event, the Americans would certainly not care very much for Indian sentiments.

 

            To come back to the main theme of Indo-Chinese relations, the foregoing survey discloses that there are some grounds to expect friendly signals from China and equally valid grounds to think of our future stand.

 

            Yet, at the moment nothing is heard form Peking. In fact from other indications, one finds Peking’s intransigence and hostility remaining as they were. Its open support to the Naxalite activities in the country not only illustrates its hostile posture but makes one wonder whether any future softening on her part may not be designed to establish firmer and deeper contacts with the Naxalites, for obvious reasons. Further, China never let’s go a chance to malign India. She depicts India as eager to swallow the defenceless countries of South East Asia and that this calumny is not being wasted can be seen from vascillations and hesitations shown by Nepal for the last few years in her contacts with New Delhi. Nor is Chinese activity confined to propaganda alone: There was the recent expansion of an important air base at Phari Dzong in the Chumbi Valley that cuts Sikkim from Bhutan. Situated north of the Indo- Tibet border this base is now expanded to receive Jumbo Jets. This expansion is strategically important in that communications and logistics can be better served now for China. It brings sensitive North-East India targets within vulnerable reach of the Chinese aircraft. A few other important roads are also built by the Chinese. Even more ominous is the shift of certain missile installations from Sinkiang province into Tibet.

 

            These certainly demand great caution on India’s part. This said, however, New Delhi should also try to remain responsive to positive indications of change. After all, the probability of a Chinese assumption of an initial Indian attack cannot be brushed aside and that might explain the strengthening of defence establishments on the Tibet borders. Let us now survey what steps New Delhi has taken in its China policy. The Government has made some moves, two of which exhibit toughness. Another move cannot but be regarded as uncalled for backing out from an earlier stand. It is instructive to understand these moves.

 

            First, India raised the Tibetan issue in the United Nations for the first time. We at last picked up courage to indict China of “systematic destruction of the Tibetan race, language, history and culture, including their social and religious institutions.” It will be recalled that when in 1959 and 1961 the issue cropped up in the world body, India chose to abstain from voting. In 1965 India supported a resolution sponsored by others. This is the first time when New Delhi took the initiative itself. In this one can find our Delhi’s part a willingness to be tough.

 

            Another decision in this area is the announcement that India is no longer prepared to treat the Colombo Proposals as a formula for any future negotiations. This declaration is indiscreet. Of course, it is true that China from the start gave these proposals an unintended meaning and insisted that under these New Delhi should negotiate with it unconditionally. India had always maintained that talks with the Chinese can only follow the vacation of aggression over Indian territory. The divergence of attitudes has not altered over the years and one might say that it is just as well New Delhi takes a bold stand in declaring “outdated” a set of proposals for which China never showed any bonafide respect. Yet, India’s rejection of the formula, in a sense, would give the impression of India herself backing out of a commitment entered into implicitly with non-aligned powers. Further, it is widely held that on balance the Colombo Proposals are favourable to India and to throw away these at this moment, when a formula to negotiate with China may be needed in the near future, seems to be extremely shortsighted.

 

            If the above development, at least, appears to be an expression of our hard side, the second policy change underscores an almost shameful show of pussilanimity. Last March, the Minister for External Affairs publicly stated that India had no intention of wresting back Indian territory now under Chinese occupation. It will be remembered that Jawaharlal Nehru himself took a pledge to recover these areas. Of course, nobody would seriously suggest that the lost lands be recovered even by risking war. And yet to say that we are no longer determined to secure their recovery is indeed most irresponsible and unfortunate. Viewed in this light, one begins to doubt whether New Delhi’s rejection of the Colombo Proposals is not really a case of softening of its stand before meeting the Chinese at a table.

 

            As stated earlier, New Delhi could seize every opportunity to improve matters. A stalemate already 8 years old should be ended. A negotiated settlement over a dispute pertaining to a long border cannot but mean concessions on both the sides. In fact it is a safe bet that the Chinese have advanced claims over the NEFA area in addition to their claims over Ladakh area in order to have bargaining points. A realisation of this on the part of the various political parties in Indian Parliament is essential because the Government will have to feel free in the conduct of future negotiations with the Chinese.

 

            Meanwhile, defence against China cannot be slackened. India’s objections to military alliances make her rely mostly on building goodwill for her and even at this New Delhi till very lately had been singularly unsuccessful. To an extent the Prime Minister’s visits to East and South East Asian countries last year helped to project India’s claims for consideration as a major power of the region. To a considerable extent, still India’s defence consists of commanding diplomatic support from other nations which may act as a deterrent to aggression over our borders. India’s position among the non-aligned powers is of significance from this point of view also and her efforts in this area are of special relevance. The early 60’s witnessed the rise of a new species among the powers of the neutralist genre which was prone to be pro-Peking in its leanings. Indonesia, Ghana and Algeria were prominent among these. This resulted in splitting the non-aligned group. However, by the end of the decade with Sukarno and NKrumah out of power and Algeria more mellowed, the Chinese influence waned. This is an opportunity for India to reassert her position in the non-aligned world. Obviously this should not be overdone. India should exhibit a sense of realism and not act as a leader rubbing others on the wrong side or appearing to be imposing her views and prejudices on others. This brings us to the Preparatory Meeting of the Non-aligned Conference at Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania.

 

India and the Preparatory Conference

 

            The preparatory Conference is a meeting of the sponsors of the third meeting of the non-aligned nations. A month before the Dar-es-Salaam meeting, a meeting of the non-aligned countries of Asia was held in Colombo and the Dar-es-Salaam meeting in April is wider in composition in that a representative section of the non-aligned world as a whole participated in it. The relation of both the Colombo meeting and that of Dar-es-Salaam to Indian foreign policy changes consists in that at both these meets New Delhi sought to restrict the definition of non-alignment. The real reason for this stand on non-alignment was the intention to exclude Pakistan from the proposed non-aligned conference. Partly to settle scores for what Pakistan had done at Rabat, New Delhi has made it a foreign policy objective to exclude Pakistan. Towards this purpose it has even informed the other co-sponsors, like Yugoslavia that if the Preparatory Conference were to include Pakistan in the list of invitees, India will be constrained to stay out of the Conference itself. New Delhi now holds to the view that the criteria evolved in 1961 at the time of the Cairo Conference of the non-aligned should be applied even now in identifying non-aligned powers. These criteria were as follows:

 

            1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of States with different political and social systems and on non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy.

 

            2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for national independence.

 

            3. The country should not be a member of a multi-lateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.

 

            4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a great Power, or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.

 

            5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.

 

            Obviously Pakistan being a member of SEATO and CENTA, does not qualify itself for the Conference under these criteria. Three points arise out of India’s stand; (1) Should India be over-occupied in excluding Pakistan? In fact, observers conclude that Delhi has lost its image by the way she went about canvassing in Afro-Asian capitals. The Pakistani presence may mean an active anti-India lobby at the Conference. But surely she should not be frightened of a meeting simply because it may mean having to face bitter criticism. (2) The mores of non-alignment have, in fact, changed and the mere presence of a power in a military pact does not necessarily make it a crusading partisan in the cold war. For one thing, the concerned military alliance (or alliances) might have lost its relevance, for another such a power may have developed friendlier relations with a power against whom a particular military pact may have been originally intended. CEATO and SENTO have both become museum pieces. Even the United States does not put much store by them and Pindi seems to be closer to Peking and Moscow than to Washington. These are the existential realities of non-alignment. The point is that India herself seems to have recognised this challenge and is reported to be ready to adopt a pragmatic approach to the issue of the criteria for non-alignment. Yet suddenly it has reverted to the old concept. It would seem that we are still smarting under the Rabat humiliation. (3) The stand India has now taken has a bearing on India’s attitude to the so-called Brezhnev Plan for Asian security.

 

            The Brezhnev Plan for Asian security was mooted last summer. For a long time details of it were not forthcoming from the Kremlin and for that matter officially no details of the plan have come out even so far. Yet the outside world has now some idea from a speech given by a prominent Russian Professor of International Law. Doctor Gueorgui Petrovich Zaborojhnyi addressed a meeting in Tokyo where he outlined a scheme for collective security in Asia. In the context of the situation it can reasonably be inferred that the Professor was deliberately trying out the official plan with the Asian nations.

 

            The plan envisaged a regional grouping as Pan-Asian collective security organisation which would have on its membership both the United States and the Soviet Union and all Asian countries including Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam. The organisation would have military teeth with all member-countries going to the assistance of anyone of them against whom aggression is committed by another state. Once the Asian collective security organisation is set up, all existing regional security arrangements, both Communist and anti-Communist, would be done away with. As for the structure of the proposed new organisation, it would broadly be an Asian Chapter of the U. N.

 

            It is doubtful whether the Russians are all that serious about the plan or about its feasibility. Perhaps they accept and indeed like that only the erstwhile non-aligned members join it in addition to the Moscow-led Communist countries.

 

            The Indian Government merely stated that its own views on Asian security are very much in line with those of Mr. Brezhnev. But there is no indication that the Government took cognizance of the plan as elaborated by the Russian Professor in Japan. If the plan were to be canvassed, and supposing the U. S. refuses to sponsor it, would India join? If it does, then certainly the old classical norm of non-alignment (which India now swears by) will have been left to the limbo. If a joint Russo-American initiative is forthcoming then apparently India should have no objection. But it should be emphasized that even then India cannot escape from a criticism of being inconsistent, for the Russian plan is a blueprint for regional military alliance and India did at one time regard not joining any military blocs as the sine qua non of non-alignment.

 

            Most probably Delhi is still construing the so-called Brezhnev Plan as a scheme for regional co-operation in Asia not necessarily involving prior military commitments. It is not probable that India would favour a security pact with Russia alone as the major guarantor. As regards the Americans co-sponsoring it, this looks as unlikely. Washington is serious about keeping doors open for a break-through with Peking and an Asian Security Pact with Soviet Union in it would certainly not brighten matters in this regard.

 

            One should have serious reservations in holding that Russia will give top priority to the Brezhnev Plan. Moscow is toying with various options to meet the “great Chinese question” and this plan is only one among many such. An important section of the Kremlin leadership is for a negotiated settlement with China and the Brezhnev Plan may, after all, end up in the Kremlin archives.

 

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