‘Federating
India’
BY Prof. N. SRINIVASAN, M.A.
(The Andhra University)
Dr. D. R. Gadgil’s Federating India is a
remarkable book. It is the finest study of the Indian constitutional problem
that has appeared in recent years. It is objective, closely reasoned and
suggestive. Perhaps the way out of the present political deadlock lies in the
adoption of the scheme here presented.
Dr. Gadgil begins by an examination of the
assumption of unity that is usual in constitutional discussions. None of the
factors, historic, geographic, economic or strategic, taken by themselves,
without reference to the prevailing sentiment of the people, necessitate the
establishment of a single federation of India. The basis of any State is a
sentiment of unity, and, in its absence, other factors lose force. There is no
presumption in favour of any particular form of federation or of its units. An
Indian Federation formed on a democratic basis must be built up on the free
consent of consenting units. This may involve the creation of more than one
Federation in the geographic area of India.
The primary federating units are, for us, of two
kinds: States and Provinces. These are, as at present constituted,
unsatisfactory as federating units. They lack homogeneity; they are not equal. Leaving
out the States, which are predetermined units which voluntarily come into the
Federation or stay out, we see that the first task in federating India is the
creation of fairly homogeneous, uni-lingual, primary units from out, of the
Provinces. This is necessary both from the point of view of setting up a
Federation and of making democratic government a reality in the country.
Democracy cannot be real where the Legislatures and Government use a language,
which the ordinary citizen cannot understand. In constituting the primary units
the first consideration should be the prevailing sentiment of the people.
One of the objects of creating Provinces on a
uni-lingual basis is to provide the different cultural groups in India an
opportunity for developing their distinctive characteristics. This object can
be furthered by the creation of Sub-Provinces where it is difficult for any
linguistic group to be organized in a Province of its own of a reasonable size,
or where a Province is, though uni-lingual, unwieldy for administrative
purposes. The device of the Sub-Province may also be used to create primary
federating units of a fair size from among the multitude of States which are
too small to constitute federating units by themselves.
It is a vital principle of federation that its
units should be equal in status and powers. In this context the States
constitute a difficult problem. In the Government of India Act of 1935 they
have been accorded a privileged position. Their entry into the Federation is
voluntary; the powers surrendered by them are fewer than those surrendered by
the Provinces. The differences in the system of government are so profound that
a common outlook at the center is inconceivable. To induce the States to come
into the Federation, the Centre has been rendered so weak as to make it
ineffective.
Inequality between the federating units is
“intolerable”. The entry of the States into the Federation should be on the
same conditions as the entry of the Provinces. The two groups should be treated
as absolutely equal. The alternatives before the States under these conditions
are three:
(i)
Becoming members of
the Federation on these terms;
(ii)
Setting up as
independent States;
(iii)
Forming one or more
Federations of their own.
The last alternative does not exist, as the States
are neither homogeneous nor contiguous. The second exists only for a few of the
larger States. The vast majority of the States must come into the Federation
and cannot stay out.
These States must be re-grouped, on some basis of
common interest, with the neighbouring Provinces or States. The Sub Province
idea may serve to effect the merger of the smaller States. No unit of the
Federation should for any reason be accorded a privileged position. “It would
be far better to exclude such units from the Federation and proceed to organise
without taking them into consideration than to introduce into the Federation
elements which must lead to a lack of cohesion and effective action.”
The main obstacle to federation, apart from the
States, is the separatism of the Muslims. Muslim culture differs from the
culture of the Hindus; their religion is very different from Hinduism. Their
political aspirations have begun to diverge from those of the Hindus. They
demand the division of India and the establishment of separate independent
Muslim States. Even the ‘national’ Muslims insist on the ‘autonomy’ of the
federating units. The autonomy they claim can hardly be distinguished from the
‘sovereign’ independence claimed by others.
A Federation cannot be imposed by force. A
Federation of unwilling partners will lack cohesion and can only lead to
disruption. Can the assent of the Muslims be won to a Federation? Perhaps a
Federation of India can be established; but the concessions to the Muslims will
have to be large. Weightages and reservations in the Legislatures, Executives,
in the Judicial and Public Services, and Defence forces, and, on top of it all,
a weak Centre which will be almost no Centre,–these are the possible
concessions which might win Muslim assent to a Federation. It should be noted
that the Central Government would have to be so weakened as to render it
incapable of vigorous action. It cannot frame economic policies needed to
improve the country’s standard of life or intended to build up its defence
strength; it cannot again pursue a vigorous foreign policy. It has been the
experience of the War and the famine in Bengal that the Center needs not less,
but more, power than it has even under the Act of 1935. A strong Centre is a sine
qua non of the very existence of the people, not to speak of effective
defence and economic progress.
Weightages and reservations in the Legislatures
have been already carried to absurd limits by the Communal Award of 1932. What
is necessary is not a further extension of these but their withdrawal at the
earliest possible moment. Their extension involves gross injustice to the vast
majority of other communities in the country. Weightages cannot be accorded
to one community except at the expense
of other communities. They are not justifiable by democratic principle. A
settlement by means of weightages is necessarily impermanent, as the history of
the concessions since 1916 proves. Weightage is a system of special privilege
and there is no reason why others should acquiesce in it unless they feel
themselves to be permanently inferior. It cannot satisfy the Muslims, since the
Muslim grievance is not about the absence of safeguards for the Muslim
minority, but is the minority status itself which cannot be remedied by any
system of Weightage.
The nature and extent of the weightage claimed
should be noted. In the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, a representation
of 50% of the seats is claimed in the Executives a proportionate “authentic”
representation is demanded. To afford security to ministers drawn from the
minorities, a non-parliamentary and irremovable Executive is suggested. There
is no question of the abandonment of separate electorates, for, otherwise, the
“authentic” representation of the Muslims cannot be obtained. In the Public
Services a similar large share is claimed. The most dangerous extension of the
principle appears in the claim of Sir Sultan Ahmad that the Muslims should
constitute 50 per cent of the Defence forces of the State in all its arms and ranks.1
And Sir Sultan Ahmad believes a United India more advantageous to Muslims than
Pakistan.
It is obvious that concessions such as these cannot
be made without emasculating the Federation and gross injustice to the other
elements of the Indian population.
A further possible concession is the acceptance of
Regionalism and the Agency Centre suggested by Professor Coupland.2
Professor Coupland’s scheme of regionalism is an attempt to establish the
parity of Muslims with the rest of India in an All-India constitution by an
ingenious method. The scheme is a misapplication of regionalism. Regions are
administrative units of a larger political whole and are not the basis for the
establishment of independent States. The regions of Prof. Coupland are not in any
true sense regions; they are an artificial grouping of the Provinces and States
about the four river basins. The purpose of the scheme is the purely political
one of giving the Muslims a separate State, with an area that could not under
any justifiable principle be included in the Muslim zones of India:
“The demands of the Muslims create a situation where the only
alternatives seem to be, (i) concessions which will permanently render
impossible the building of a healthy democratic State, or (ii) the formation of
two federations. The obvious course for the non-Muslims is to state what appear
to them to be the fair and just conditions on which all elements could live
amicably in an Indian Federation, and. if these conditions are unacceptable to
the Muslims, then regretfully agree to separate.” (p. 92)
Separation, of course, has its difficulties. But
these must be faced. The first of these is the delimitation of the areas to be
separated. The claim of the Muslim League is that the present Provinces of
Bengal and Assam, Sind, Baluchistan, the N.W.F.P. and Punjab should be
constituted into Pakistan. Such a claim is untenable. The dominant loyalty of
the people of the area concerned should alone be considered in delimiting the
area of Pakistan; political affiliation should follow the wishes of the people:
“The democratic procedure further implies that all
inhabitants in an area have an equal vote in arriving at the common decision,
and that the voice of the majority should prevail…..No consideration of
geography, economics or strategic purpose should be allowed to alter such a
decision…..The demarcation should reach to the smallest regional unit, i.e.,
the village.” (85-86)
The great merit of separation lies in the fact that
it enables the building up of a federation based on inner cohesion. It would
satisfy the Muslims whose main grievance “is not so much the lack of guarantees
as a minority, but the fact of minority status itself.” “The formation of a
separate Muslim State should go far to remove that sense of frustration.” “The
Muslim minority in the non-Muslim zone would be reduced to comparatively small
proportions and it is likely to accept in that event the principle of majority
rule with greater readiness.” The problem, in other words, could be treated as
a simple minority problem.
An approach to the problem through the method of
agreement, either to unite in a federation or to separate, is essential if we
are to see the end of the deadlock. The alternatives to an agreement are not
pleasant. The first of these is the continuance indefinitely of British rule.
We cannot expect foreign arbitration to settle our political disputes. A
British award which is some times invoked will be a doubtful blessing from the
point of view of the achievement of freedom by this country. The MacDonald
Communal Award of 1932 was most unfair and a future award may well take the
form of the Coupland scheme of Regionalism. That would be disastrous for us. In
any case we cannot expect the British to give an award which will terminate
their rule in this country. A policy of concessions to the Muslims means that
we have to agree to a basis “which would prove fundamentally unsound for any
political organisation.”
As a last resort we should be prepared even for
disagreement, on the question of the procedure of separation with the Muslim
League, and on the question of federation with the States. Dr. Gadgil writes:
“The only realistic step to be taken at such a time
is to try and form as large a nuclear federation as possible on an agreed
basis, which, while guaranteeing considerable autonomy to constituent units and
the protection of minority and other interests, yet leads to the formation of a
Federal Government strong enough to discharge the obligations of a modern
State.”(p. 93)
There should be no effort to induce the States to
join the Federation by weakening it.
These conditions, Dr. Gadgil concludes, will
provide us “an opportunity of building up a political structure with a secure
basis of principles which do not perpetually hamper future growth:” It would be
a natural growth. It is only a question of time for the nuclear Federation to
gain strength and expand. “Federalization is a process of continuous growth and
adaptation....To be capable of this, it is necessary that the formation of the
original nucleus and the process of later accession shall be both natural and
voluntary, and not doctrinaire and externally imposed.” “A forced unity today
makes inevitable disruption under conditions of stress in future. An agreed
separation today envisages the possibility of an agreed union tomorrow.”
Such in outline is the argument of the book. It is
not necessary to make an elaborate commentary on it. The first point that we
would like to emphasize is that it is based on a full and frank acceptance of
the democratic thesis. It is based on principle as well as fact.
A constitutional scheme must satisfy three tests if
it is to succeed. The first of these is that it must be based on the consent of
the bulk of the people. Matters affecting the constitution are fundamental, and
on these there should be broad general agreement. One may say that they must
secure the loyalty of the people. Minorities no less than majorities should
accept the constitution as intrinsically fair and assuring them the right of
self-expression.
A constitutional scheme, in the second place, must
set up a workable scheme of government. Under modern conditions a government
needs to be strong. It has to be simple, since the masses should be able to
understand its working. It should be related to their vital, social needs and
adapted to their political condition. It should be framed in a way that the
political virtues that make democracy possible naturally grow from its working.
A constitutional scheme should, further, be capable
of growth. It should not be marked by an undue rigidity. An expansion of the
duties of government, or the accession of new units in a Federation, for
example, should not be prevented by an allocation of powers between the
Federation and the Provinces that is appropriate to the 18th century. The
development of democracy or the welfare functions of the State should not be
rendered impossible by limitations in favour of vested interests.
Dr. Gadgil’s scheme has all these merits. It is
not, of course, fully sketched out; but on the basis of Dr. Gadgil’s
suggestions we can build a structure that satisfies these tests. A Federation
which we build must be a real federation, capable of planning our economic life
and defending our national existence. It must be democratically based and grow
from the voluntary consent of the federating units. The union of unwilling
partners cannot be the basis of a strong State. The vital need today is the
creation of a strong State. It is dangerous to pursue a phantom unity by a
policy of concessions, for, it would ultimately defeat its purposes.
One may question parts of the argument of Dr.
Gadgil which takes the division between the Hindus and Muslims as fundamental,
and regards their interpretations of foreign policy so different as to lead to
friction in a common Centre. One may even question the claim that Pakistan
could exist independently in the modern world. But if we accept the analysis of
the communal problem here presented, the conclusions of Dr. Gadgil would follow
naturally.
The present writer does not wish to add to what Dr.
Gadgil has so admirably and succinctly argued. The supreme merit of the book is
its practical reason. The scheme may be capable of modification in detail; but
on principles it is on solid ground. It reduces the complexities of the Indian
problem to manageable proportions. It faces squarely the issue of Pakistan by
the concession of the right of self-determination. It seeks to solve the
problem of minorities by a system of safeguards, which do not sacrifice the
just rights of majorities. It makes an efficient government such as we require
possible, by building it on consent. Its acceptance requires a revolutionary
change in the attitude of the majority who has shown an inexplicable disregard of
their own interests in the pursuit of an illusory unity. If the majority’s
profession of democracy is true, it must accept the principle of separation, if
that is the will of a minority, which can exercise its right of separation.
This approach is different from the approach of the Congress and of other
parties. It is an approach that enables the democratic forces in the country to
make a stand and not beat an eternal retreat before reactionary forces. It
presents a policy that alone seems capable of calling the bluff of undemocratic
political forces in the country.
1 Sir Sultan Ahmad: A
Treaty between India and the United Kingdom, 1944,
2 Sir Reginald
Coupland: The Future of India, 1944.