DEFECTIONS
AND
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
M.
C. CHAGLA
Former
Union Minister
All
of us who are interested in parliamentary democracy must give serious
consideration to what is happening in the country today. I will confine here
myself to one most important aspect of this problem, that
is defection. Again the matter of conscience and issuing whips or the
presidential form of government is also connected with this aspect. In my view
this is a very serious, important and vital question, a question which affects
the working of democracy and of parliamentary institutions.
I
have looked into the recent Report on Defections which is signed by some very
distinguished people, but I must confess that it strikes me as being extremely
sketchy and scrappy. I am surprised that people of such distinction should not
have given a little more thought to such an important subject and should not
have suggested proper remedies for putting an end to defections.
In
my opinion, crossing the floor may be the result of one or the other thing, and
we must judge it accordingly. It may be the result of a change of conviction,
or it may be the result of some temptation or some bribe given. If it is a
change of conviction, we must consider whether crossing the floor should be
allowed. If it is the result of a bribe offered or some temptation offered or
some reward offered, we must consider how that should be put down.
Matter of Conscience
In
my opinion, we cannot prevent people from voting against their party. If it is
a matter of conscience, they will vote against their party, and they should not
be prevented except in extreme cases, to which I shall presently refer. I agree
that for the working of parliamentary institutions we do need parties which are
more or less stable. I do not agree with the observations in this Report that
there will be freezing of parties if crossing of the floor is not permitted.
The so-called crossing of the floor or change of conviction should normally
take place at the General Elections. It is at the General Elections that the
electorate decides who should be its representative. And once these
representatives are sent to Parliament and to the legislatures, by and large,
there should be stability in the formation of parties or groups of the
Opposition. This constant change is not desirable from the point of view of
parliamentary institutions. Therefore it is incorrect to say that we will
freeze the situation if we try and prevent people from crossing the floor.
There is always the General Election. There is always the electorate. Let the
electorate decide. But once it has decided, normally
it is the duty of the member to respect the wishes of the electorate and
to remain in the party to which he has been elected.
Issuing Whips
I
think the members of the Congress Party–of other parties as well,–are
much too strict in issuing whips. On every subject a whip is issued, thereby
testing the loyalty of the member and
compelling him to vote with the party, whether he believes in the particular
matter which is before the House or not. I think whip should be issued
very rarely, and a party should not look upon a defeat in the House necessarily
as a vote of no confidence. Now, take the
And even there we should permit our members if they say it is a matter of conscience to vote against us or at least abstain. We know it is the usual Practice. Take the Labour Party; a member says: I do not agree with the policy. Serious attention might be taken if he votes against the party but he is permitted to abstain if he says it is a matter of conscience. Therefore we should not be in a hurry to take disciplinary action against members of the party because as a matter of conscience they do not see eye to eye with the party and they abstain or do not vote for the party.
The other remedy suggested by this Report
is that the Council of Ministers should not be as large as it is today either
at the Centre or in the States. Now, I am not one of those who believe that we
should have a proportion fixed with regard to the Council of Ministers. To me
it seems all absurd proposal that we must have 5 per
cent or 10 per cent or 15 per cent of the members of the legislature
constituting the Council of Ministers.
There is no principle behind it at
all. We appoint the Council of Mnisters to do work.
We must decide what the work is. We must decide how many Ministers we want,
among whom the work should be distributed. We must decide how the work will be
done efficiently. But why is it that we have such large Council of Ministers? Because nobody is thinking of work. Nobody is thinking of
administration. What we are thinking all the time is how to retain certain groups
and factions and each group and faction has to be represented in the ministry.
That is the curse of our country today. What happened in
The other thing I would say is this.
I quite agree with the Report that crossing the floor should not entail
disqualification. I see a suggestion was made that if a member leaves the party
on the ticket of which he had been elected he should be disqualified. I think
it is an impossible suggestion. We might amend the Constitution but it would
not be right. But what can be done? It is strong public opinion which should
condemn the action of a member who crosses the floor not out of conviction but
because he has been offered a ministership or offered
some bribe or some reward.
Recalling
I
am very much interested in the suggestion made about re-call. It is a highly
democratic process. It may be difficult to work it but this Committee should
have given some thought to it. Suppose a man is elected on the Congress ticket.
The electorate had selected him because they wanted a Congressman. If he
crosses the floor and joins the Communist Party or the Jana Sangh
or the Swatantra Party, why should not the electorate
be given the right to say, ‘We do not want this man; we want a Congressman’ or
they might say, ‘Now, our views are changed; we want our representative to be
Jana Sangh or Swatantra or
Communists.’ Therefore I think this suggestion of recall is a suggestion which
should be carefully considered. I know it is difficult: I know it might be
expensive but it is democratic, and it is one of the ways of preventing
defections which is what we need most.
I
do want to emphasize the fact that defections may ultimately lead to the
complete breakdown of parliamentary institutions. If we do not have stability
of Government, how can democracy function? I know of many States where the
Ministers have no time to attend to administration. Files are piling up all the
time while they are busy playing politics. Let us ask ourselves this
question–what does the average citizen in our country want? He wants an honest,
clean administration. He is not interested in politics; he is not interested in
parties. He wants, as I said, honest, clean administration. For heaven’s sake,
give it to him. But no; the Ministers have no time for it. There are other
things to do besides attending to administration. Therefore unless we stop this
crazy game, this foolish game, this mad game of having Ministries every six
months or eight months, of members crossing the floor, of defections, I think
parliamentary institutions will not be able to function in this country.
Presidential Government
I
have often suggested–and I know I have been criticized and condemned for
it–that we must give serious thought to the question whether at least in the
States we should have a presidential form of Government. The presidential form
of Government is as democratic as the parliamentary form of Government. The
advantage is that for five years, the President will not be constitutional
President but he will be the same as the Chief Minister. The President will
have his colleagues who will not be removed, who cannot be removed, and who
will attend to administration during those five years. They will not have to be
looking behind their back all the time to see whether there is a faction or a
group supporting them. For five years we will have strong, clean administration.
After all, the parliamentary form of Government is the most difficult form of
Government to work. We need certain requisites. We need a strong party in
Government. We need a strong alternative opposition to take over from the
ruling party.