By DR. R. V. RAMACHANDRASEKHARA RAO

Andhra University

Ever since Khruschev’s 20th Congress destalinisation speech, the non-communist world, in general, considerably changed its attitude towards Russia. This may not have made them relax their caution. No spectacular demonstrations of faith in the Soviet Union, like the scrapping of the NATO, have occurred. All the same, there is a feeling, however small, that a welcome change of heart has come about in the Kremlin. The comparative humaneness of the regime in dealing with party renegades and the inimitable protestations for peace of the Soviet Premier are regarded as pointers to this change.

These protestations have led liberal statesmen to believe that communists have shed their orthodoxy of world communism and that ‘Socialism in a single country’ will not develop far beyond the stage of ‘Socialism in some countries.’ What with the delicate balance of terror an Armageddon is now regarded as unnecessary and impossible. Russian talk of peaceful coexistence is regarded as sincere, while the periodic predictions of the inevitable success of communism in taking over the world, albeit peacefully, are explained away as the ritualistic chantings, on ceremonial occasions of a high priest, who knows that they mean nothing.

Western powers are under pressure from their own societies to change and reorient their policies. And the uncommitted nations welcome this change as confirming their faith in co-existence and an “I told you so” attitude is discernible in each of these neutrals.

But recent thinking in well informed quarters questions the warrantability of such optimism. These quarters hold that professions about the inevitable march of communism must be taken at their face value and that it will be dangerous not to treat them as sincere and credible.

Mr. Richard Lowenthal, in his International Commentary entitled ‘the Dangerous Year,’ in the Encounter (June, 1961), analysing the nature of the Russian leadership and its ideological foundations, holds that “the ideological belief in world revolution is not just an edifying forecast of the millennium which has been inherited from the distant past and to which lip-service is paid on national holidays–it is an essential part of the legitimation for continuing the monopoly of the ruling party inside the Soviet Union, and of the cement which holds it together. ‘He goes on to emphasise the necessity for Russian leaders to hold the banner of world revolution.’ Soviet society as it exists today could well discard much of its official ideology and of the traditional ties binding it to revolutionary movements all over the world. But the ruling Communist Party cannot do that without renouncing its right to exist, and Khrushchev cannot do it without losing his title to rule. Only because of this fact have the Chinese been able to exert pressure on Soviet foreign policy by raising the ‘ideological’ question of international revolutionary solidarity. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Soviet hierarchy have had to respond to that pressure and to reassert their authority in the world communist movement by pointing to their increased ability to support revolutionary struggles every where without open involvement in war–thanks to the edge they now claim to have in the world balance of power.”

That the ‘Guardian’ of London commented editorially upon this article, indicates the far-reaching implications of this view. The implication that Russian designs of world conquest are never kept out of sight by its policy-makers and that, if not by force, even by competitive co-existence, the communists would strive to make the world safe for communism, is also the view of other publicists. In a review article appearing in ‘Problems of Communism’, Mr. G. F. Hudson of Oxford, expressed the same view. The pro-American bias of this publication is in itself no reason for not taking the views of Mr. Hudson seriously. Surmising the trend of the books reviewed he says: “What, then, is the meaning of peaceful co-existence? The consensus of opinion of the books listed, with the exception of Deutscher’s, is that it is really the cold war under another name. It is peaceful in so far as it involves on the Soviet side a genuine fear of nuclear war; the bitter controversy with Mao Tse-Tung–who appears to have clung to Stalin’s belief in the secondary strategic importance of the nuclear arm–is evidence of the reality of this fear, and indeed we may give Khrushchev credit for recognizing the unwisdom of playing with atomic fire. The new co-existence is praceful also in that the cold war is now more than ever before carried on with economic weapons; the Soviet Union today can export capital tools and technical advice on a large scale to underdeveloped countries as instruments of its political activity. This is certainly peaceful competition, and a case can be made for regarding it as ultimately beneficial to all concerned, since the underdeveloped countries stand to gain from the bidding for their favour and the West is put on its mettle to increase its productivity and improve its methods of rendering aid.

“But the new emphasis on economic diplomacy does not imply any spirit of co-operation from the Soviet side; it is economic warfare directed to a political end which remains fundamentally the same as in the days of the Comintern or the Cominform. What remains constant is the basic hostility of the Soviet Union and of all Communist States towards the entire non-communist world, a hostility due, not to any particular resentments or grievances but, to the ideology by which alone the rulers of communist countries justify their right to govern.”

If such an approach to Russian policies is correct the policy of the uncommitted nations may have to be reviewed. What interpretations can we give and what conclusions can we arrive at, regarding our uncommitted policy in the light of the above views? It is proposed

here to answer these questions.

But, before we proceed, one further point. Even if the conclusions of Mr. Lowenthal are erroneous, as the ‘Guardian’ argued in its editorial, the following analysis of our foreign policy–though viewed in the light of Mr. Lowenthal’s analysis of Russian policy–would nevertheless remain pertinent. The analysis will show the implications of our stand in the context of communist intentions of expansion; but it shows something more. The analysis holds good even if we dismiss the credibility of such intentions. Because, even when we do not take into serious account the theory of communist domination, surely we have to estimate for our strong neighbour, China, endangering our security. If we accept this, then, what implication can we draw from our policy? The analysis attempted in the following lines answers this question as well.

Russian policy, thus, is one of awaiting the opportune moment to help to bring about the inevitable communisation of the world. Peaceful co-existence is a process of managing the cold war to the eventual advantage of the Soviet Union. By definition a hot war is kept out of consideration, at least as long as the going is good.

If this conclusion is a correct one, (its tenability can only be discounted at great risk) what does it imply from the point of view of our uncommitted policy?

Certain propositions can be ventured:

1. Communist world domination has for its targets all non-Communist States–committed or uncommitted.

2. Consequently, Russian policy towards the uncommitted nations, however friendly and gentle, is a variation on the theme and the theme will have to be struck later, if not, sooner.

This is at fundamental variance with the ostensible basis of Indian foreign policy. We seem to be convinced that the cold war can be ended by growing understanding of the inevitability of peaceful co-existence. The role of the uncommitted nations, we imply, is to keep out of the prevailing tension. The more the participants in this bi-polar struggle, the more is it accelerated; hence the more the number of uncommitted nations the less the scope for acceleration of the cold war.

As is obvious, such thinking is dangerously unwarranted if the, aforesaid view of the Russian intentions is even remotely true. It is quite probable that Delhi is more aware of the real intentions of Moscow than our reading would suggest. Before enquiring into the ways of Delhi’s thinking it will be necessary to examine the possible aims of Russian policy towards us, granting its higher aim of world domination.

1. Friendship with newly liberated countries will help Russia discrediting the nations of the West. The liberated as well as the aspirants for liberation have a chip on their shoulders and the process of mutual adjustment between ex-colonies and ex-colonists often results in estrangement. It is at this point that communism stands forth as the patron saint of the oppressed.

2. Success to the policy of neutrality is the best investment for the Russians. To make neutrality the rallying point for newcomers is an achievement of the first magnitude for their policy. Piety and profit are together realised at one stroke. This is the Russian counterpart of the Western policy of containment. There is one difference though, as containment, in this case, may only be a prelude to contain them subsequently within the communist orbit.

The benefits that this policy confers are significant. In the first instance there is the negative benefit of foiling additions to the Western camp. Secondly, since there is no danger of these nations getting militarily strong, nothing is lost ultimately in supporting them, by words, or even by deeds like economic assistance.

3. It may also lull these small powers into a false sense of security, thus preparing the ground for an Anschllus, either through outside force or through internal party machinery. Soviet leaders appear to be a bit ambivalent about the latter prospect. Iraq, to some extent, and Cuba, ideally, serve as examples, wherein local Communist Parties have gradually assumed control exploiting the name of leaders like Kassim and Castro. But on the other hand there is the adroit hand of President Nasser which takes Mr. Khruschev by his hand and the Egyptian Communist Party by its throat. In India the Communist Party is extremely embarrassed because of the cordial relations between Nehru and the Soviet leaders. Thus the policy of ultimate conquest through party tentacles appears rather uncertain, at least in some cases.

Then, how about the prospect of an Anschllus? Here it is important to stress upon another feature of the un-committed nations’ policy. They are passionate in their concern for economic development. Indeed, the prospect of military commitments eating away their resources is one of the arguments for their non-involvement. And this talk of ‘leave us alone to concentrate on economic development’, assumes a tone of self-righteousness. Defence spending gets, at best, a second priority and we pride ourselves all the more on it, as indicative of our peace loving intentions in contrast to Pakistan wasting American aid on military equipment. It is this aspect that is very significant. The point is whether in the context of the alleged motivations of Soviet policy, this total pre-occupation with internal economic development at the expense of defence is wise. It may, of course, be retorted that in any case Indian defence would not be even one-hundredth of a match to Soviet might in case it were to erupt over India. This, no doubt, is true. But Soviet might may not erupt itself. It may encourage minor eruptions elsewhere and even this may not take the form of a total conquest but gradual encroachment. Are our defences adequate to meet this challenge? Curiously enough, if that should come, we cannot even ask for help from outside, without much loss of face, because it has been yet another dictum in uncommitted policies that ‘local wars must be kept strictly local.’

4. Lastly and most probably, the Soviet Union has no definite policy regarding the uncommitted nations. Even if belief in the ultimate triumph of communism is fondly held and preparations are being made to help bring about the inevitable dialectical process, these may relate more to outmanoeuvring the Western powers in the short run and overpowering them eventually. As to what is to be done with the uncommitted nations, there may yet be no formulated programme at the Kremlin. After all, these can be sucked into the communist vortex at any time, when once the policy vis-a-vis the West goes all right. Probably these small powers could even be allowed to exist independently, for, their existence is not so much of a challenge to the predictions of Marx and Lenin.

Are we justified in inferring such an absence of policy? The plain fact in international politics is that statesmen, however gifted, are prone to decide policy at each and every step rather than resort to what we may term as, ‘time-table diplomacy.’ Even if the overall policy is well set as a goal, as world domination in the present case, one need not (or should not) infer that all the aspects of the policy have been worked out once and for all and safely deposited in foreign office drawers. Dr. A. J. P. Taylor has tried to demonstrate in his recent work: “Origins of the Second World War” that “Statesmen are too absorbed by events to follow a preconceived plan. They take one step and the next follows from it.” Thus, for all we know, the goal of world communism may itself be just a preconceived plan, not to be taken seriously, and even when we grant that its execution is a must for communists, we need not attribute a foolproof, all front plan to the Russians. Indeed their present policy, vir-a-vis the un-committed nations leaves one surprised about what the Russians have in view and whether they have anything definite in view.

How then are we to interpret Indian policy in the context of the foregoing analysis.

If Nehru’s policy is solely based upon the view that co-existence will eventually eliminate the cold war, it will be the height of naivety. But in spite of his moralising, which has in it a streak of naivety we will be doing less than justice to his historical sense and experience in state affairs if we attribute to Nehru such a simple-minded conviction.

Then, can we jump to the other extreme and say that he is very well aware of communist intentions and the tactics that are being adopted and that his policy is more subtle than their diplomatic strategy? It can be said that the dispute with China made him see the reality about the spectre of communism. His policy, it can be argued, is one of making the best use of a situation; making the best use of Russian pretensions while the going is still good. As for armed defence, since no amount of defence expenditure will make us good enough to withstand a communist army, why waste money and spoil the benefits that the ‘lull’ (before the storm) would bring us. Then how about saving the country from the storm, that is assumed here as imminent? Here comes the most crucial point. As an ultimate resort, perhaps, Nehru relies upon Western support to meet communist aggression. If a communist power were to threaten on a large scale our security, one can see no other way of protection but the prospect of Western intervention. This interpretation of our ‘uncommittedness’ may be dismissed as mischievous. But granting that the communists will attack and that our forces are too inadequate, what other alternative is there? There is, of course, one other alternative and that is surrender. Surely, we cannot take this seriously. Hence we rely on the Western powers. But it must be admitted that it will be extremely unwise to accept publicly, this “ultima ratio regum” of our policy. For, it would deny us opportunities that the ‘uncommitted phase’ would bring with it. Perhaps, it was this sort of interpretation that made Dulles characterise our neutrality as ‘immoral.’

A third interpretation is also possible: Nehru has no definite idea regarding communist expansion; he neither believes nor disbelieves in the sincerity of communist professions about the triumph of communism. An eclectic attitude combining his Gandhian associations, his altruism and ‘soaring idealism’ and sheer optimism makes him underestimate the roots of the cold war and overestimate the prospects of co-existence in which neither party will be worse off for that.

The initial unpreparedness when the Chinese have worsted us over Tibet and the subsequent realisation of the danger from the North and North Eastern quarter, to some extent, bear out the above reasoning.

Again, if we hold that Moscow itself has no definite plan vis-a-vis the uncommitted nations, it is but proper to regard that Delhi has neither vis-a-vis communist intentions. To apply, once again, Dr. Taylor’s convictions, Nehru is no exception to the general rule that Statesmen hardly have opportunity to formulate a long range policy; they go step by step. The situation becomes all the more indefinite if two statesmen have to formulate their policies depending upon each other’s intentions. Thus neutralism and co-existence may be considered the best courses adoptable, given the premise that communism would not resort to force. But quite occasionally, statesmen will have to change the premise itself. It can be said that Nehru is not so sure whether the erstwhile premise still holds water. And suppose it were to be proved that all along his premise was faulty, has he provided for no safeguard? What ultimate protection has he in mind? The question is not difficult to answer: the Western powers.

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