BY B. PATTABHI SITARAMAYYA ¹

I. WARDHA

When for the first time Gandhi appeared on the scene of the Congress as a full-blown leader, he was, by the towering height of his personality, head and shoulders above the rest of the Congress notables, leaders and chiefs of the day. There were secret rumblings in the inmost recesses of the hearts of one and all of these. The one man who could not entertain his accession to power with any feeling of jealousy, made way for him by departing this world on the 31st July 1920. Lokamanya’s strength and spirit passed into Gandhi and gave an added interest and weight to his cult of Non-violence which it was that invested his leadership with a halo–a new charm. From that day to this Gandhi has remained the acknowledged leader of Indian politics. It may be that Indian politics at one time centred round a no-vote campaign or a no-tax campaign, council-entry and deadlocks, salt Satyagraha and Round Table Conference, Provincial Autonomy and acceptance of office. Through all these variations of Raga and Pallavi and Alapana, the Sruti of the music of Indian Politics remained the same,–it was the constructive programme that gave a fundamental unity to the inevitable, but passing, changes in the complementary programme of aggression. This constructive programme was only Non-violence in action.

Gandhi’s philosophy, at this distance of time, it is easy for us to discover, had its background in the great European war of 1914-1918, its effect and sequelae on Indian affairs, and the rivers of blood that flowed in France and Flanders. The outbreak of the second European war within two decades of the last has come as a real complication of Indian politics. From the year 1927 when the Congress met in Madras up to date, there have been repeated and emphatic avowals that "India shall not take part in the ‘next war.’ " This long apprehended conflagration began on the 1st September 1939 in all its grim horror. The Congress lost no time in declaring its usual attitude and demanding a statement of war aims from the British Government. Was it to free Poland, Czechoslovakia and Danzig? If so, what should Britain do earlier to India, whose freedom has been outraged by her for over a century? Neither the Viceroy nor any British Statesman has so far paid heed to the categorical demand made by the Congress. On the outbreak of the war, having avowed the object of the war as the liberation of oppressed nationalities, responsible statesmen have since pleaded that their own war aims were not as yet determined, and later gently shifted the emphasis of those aims to Europe. His Majesty the King, combating the charge of Imperialism, said on the last Empire Day (May 24): "We, the free people of the world cast that word back in their teeth." Of course Imperialism affects only the slave peoples–not the free. Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Churchill and Lord Halifax specifically confined the war aims to Europe and the maintenance of freedom for the nations that are the denizens of that continent. India was nowhere. What was worse, India was declared to be a belligerent country without consulting the Indian Legislatures or the Indian political organisations. The Congress was a little concerned over this cold neglect, yea, this wanton affront meted out to her.

Month after month, nay fortnight after fortnight, its Working Committee met and passed various resolutions and took suitable steps to implement them. The insolent refusal to answer the Congress demand of a statement of war aims left it no alternative but to advise the Congress Provincial Ministries to resign. That was a great step, doubtless. Although at first the British appeared to shed tears over it, yet they soon became openly callous and took full advantage of the fissiparous forces of in the country, whose reconciliation, they urged, was a condition pre-requisite to the conferment of freedom on India.

While thus matters were dragging on their weary course. France fell on the 17th June ’40 and the news reached the Working Committee of the Congress by the Radio. It looked as though the situation was changing almost every minute. What would happen to Britain, when after the rape of the freedom of Czechoslovakia, Danzig and Poland, after the conquest of Norway, and the surrender of Denmark Holland and Belgium–when, on the top of all these events, France raised the white flag and sued for a cessation of hostilities?

The prospect of internal disorder and external invasion darkened the political sky, and a sense of the proximity of war in all its reality and horror loomed before the Working Committee and gave rise to conflicting thoughts, programmes and policies. The Government of India had just then promulgated a scheme of Civic Guards, without however publishing the details. There appears to be a widespread resentment of the scheme as a slow, but substantial addition–though under the guise of Defence,–a scheme really of war effort. This led the Bombay Government to announce that for some time to come intending entrants had better not send in their applications. The belief that the scheme itself might be withdrawn or suspended began to take possession of men’s minds. In any case the issue before the Working Committee was whether the Congress should participate in the scheme. Gandhi was not clear that it should be summarily rejected. He would rather await publication of details, for the scheme was ostensibly one of Defence, and Defence was one of our duties. But Defence–what kind of Defence was it to be? Armed?–then, no; non-violent? then the Congress had a great opportunity of organising India’s Defence on non-violent lines and prepare the country for the abolition of the Army under Swaraj. Swaraj itself was no distant contingency. Whatever might happen, the Empire, as such, was doomed and India should prepare even from then to rely upon her own resources, determine her own direction of progress, frame her own attitude and develop her own technique of defence.

In this view Gandhi initiated discussion with the question of non-violence and made the problem before the Working Committee single-pointed–not merely because the Civic Guards would be unobjectionable, if from the Congress side they were only an enlarged edition of the Congress Volunteers, subject to Congress Pledges–notably of non-violence,–nor because of the future Swaraj and its Defence organisation on non-violent lines, but because the plea of co-operation, re-acceptance of office and possibly participation in a Central National Government would be out of court, if our Ministers were going back to Government to conduct the war,–the war as such with all its sanguinary destructiveness, its confusion and carnage.

Accordingly Gandhi began to pour forth his soul into the discussions and charge the proceedings of the Working Committee with a tension, which baffled its ready judgment. Time was flying. Press correspondents and the public were impatient. What was the secret that had to be so carefully guarded? Political secrets like those of lovers, which appear to require careful guarding at one time, become public property ere long and create a wonder all round that they should ever have been kept under lock and key for so long. The secret of Wardha between the 17th and 21st of July, which was sedulously guarded from the Press, has since become public property,–in that Gandhi has been absolved from all decisions of the Working Committee relating to the protection of the land from internal disorder as well as external invasion. It would be just as well, therefore, for the public to realise that this request of Gandhi for absolution was the one secret of Wardha. He has made his demand for non-violence in emphatic and unambiguous terms, and the Wardha resolution of the Working Committee is now not only a chapter of history but the very pivot around which all discussions in a critical period centred for over four weeks.

Gandhi claimed at Wardha that the Congress had been able to present to Europe, wallowing in the mire of violence, a weapon to take the place of brute force in the arbitrament of international disputes. He divided the non-violence of the day under two heads, one as a weapon of the weak, and the other as a weapon of the strong. Hitherto the Congress had employed the former. Now came the opportunity for it to employ the latter,–at a time when there was imminent danger of internal disorder and external invasion. If Congressmen could have tested the efficacy of non-violence in their struggle against Britain and as a result thereof created an unprecedented awakening of the masses, if at the same time they had not met with like results in internal disorders and internecine strifes, the blame rested at their own doors, and the non-violence that had to be employed was the non-violence of the strong. Here lay, therefore, the parting of the ways. Would the Working Committee shirk the responsibility and betray the trust reposed in them at the psychological moment, or sustain its proud record of two decades in spite of the dangers and difficulties incidental to the choice? The question of acceptance of office, Gandhi thought, was inseparably connected with this problem, and he was clear that power should not be sought once again until the Congress had acquired non-violent control over the masses. Accordingly it followed that the Congress would discard the use of arms in repelling foreign attack and create a peace army, which would become ‘a living wall’ against the invader. This, in short, was Gandhi’s lead, this his theme at Wardha. It raised a new issue for the first time, created a certain consternation and demanded an immediate decision. The Wardha resolution was the result.

The developments at Wardha have taken people by surprise. Friends ask in real wonderment why the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress should have spent five days in metaphysical discussions when the claims of politics were obviously overriding. Is this the time for philosophical discourses and debates on the place of non-violence in the coming polity of India, when France has had to surrender and acquiesce in an abject truce, when the fate of Britain herself is hanging in the balance, when no one knows where India will be led after once she has hitched her wagon to the star of England, when the question of office re-acceptance was believed to be the burning topic of the day, when, too, the parrot utterances of Mr. Amery and the effete oratory of Lord Linlithgow should have been taken up in deadly earnest and torn to pieces? Who really initiated this argumentation on the issue of non-violence?

No apology is needed for not dealing with the goody-goody political pronouncements of the day. The fate of India does not hang on them. As Byron said, ‘in native hands and native swords’ lies the only hope of the nation. The sword of Greece might have been of steel but that of India is Satyagraha based upon truth and non-violence. The fact is that, as Gandhi said at the Second Round Table Conference, he is "under no illusion that liberty could be obtained by argumentation or even by negotiation." It is not as if the Working Committee had no sense of actualities at Wardha. But the problem before the country had to be approached from multiple standpoints. Office resumption is all very well. We need not be detained by the constitutional or the politico-legal issues involved in the event. What is of real importance is the plan and purpose of future administration.

The Indian Congress has all along suffered from unpreparedness. It was not ready with its programmes and personalities to take up the Ministry three years ago. We stumbled into it and had to fumble through it. Tomorrow the Central Government will have to be handled. There is a talk of Provisional Government, some would say parallel Government. The Congress has indeed been a parallel Government, as it were, for some years in the country. Dealing with the charge that Congress was trying to run a parallel Government, Gandhi said at the Second Round Table Conference that "well would he endorse the charge if it could be run by non-violence, eschewing the dagger of the assassin, the poison bowl, the bullet and the spear."

When therefore Gandhi raised the question of non-violence at Wardha, this must have been at the back of his mind. He had stated his position clearly in Delhi in September 1938 at the time of the Munich Pact, saying that he would not be serviceable to the Congress if the Congress was thinking of utilising the war for striking a bargain. In 1939 he made it still more clear that the co-operation he was offering to Government was moral, not material. Today, in the situation that is before us, we see that we shall be called upon to take large decisions in the near future. Even in 1931 Gandhi said: "Whilst there is yet a little sand left in the glass, I want you to understand what the Congress stands for. It stands for liberty–call it by whatever name. A nation of 350 million people does not need the dagger of the assassin, the poison bowl, the sword, the spear, or the bullet. It needs simply a will of its own, an ability to say ‘No’ and the nation is today learning to say ‘No.’"

And, in concluding, Gandhi said in London: "India will not be baffled. For heaven’s sake, give me, a frail man 62 years gone, a little bit of chance. Find a little corner for me and the organisation that I represent."

These words he addressed to the English people in 1931. Today when he is over 70 years, he is addressing the very words to his countrymen. This patriarch of three score and ten sees a vision before him–one in which, after the slaughter of man by fellowman in Europe which claims to be more civilised than Asia, he has a chance of realising his long cherished ambition of carving out a State, not on the slippery foundation of violence but on the solid rock of non-violence and love and self-sacrifice. To this end he has been preaching the need of a ‘peace army,’ one that can throw itself before the onrush of the enemy and convert his heart and turn his victory into a defeat and its ‘defeat’ into a victory. That has been his advice–or at any rate, his wish in respect of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, France and England. How could Gandhi, who gives this advice to England, based upon the sight of these horrors–infructuous even so–of Europe, ask for, or be a party to, the formation of a Government of India based upon violence pure and unadulterated? We have turned a deaf ear during the past three years to his exhortation for a peace army. We have not responded to his call. The Congress had virtually suspended the revival of the Hindustan Seva Dal after 1934. There was a plea for its revival at Haripura and after. It was then that Gandhi pleaded for the peace army. The Congress that was indifferent to his appeal is enthusiastic today over the rehabilitation of the Congress Volunteer organisation. Look at the well-trimmed dresses of the youth who form the Volunteer Corps. The U.P. contingent walked into the President’s camp at Ramgarh and gave salute to the Rashtrapati. It made a great impression upon the youth of the country whose drooping spirits it helped to revive. Other Provinces have followed suit. The mind of the youth is still after adventure which is undisciplined and awaits sublimation. But on Gandhi’s part he has to face facts as he sees them. His mind works under the spell of visions. That is why he is able to work miracles. Practical difficulties and political standpoints do not baffle him. When he gets into grips with the fundamentals, it matters little to him what impediments are presented by the accessories.

This issue of forming the Government of India based on non-violence which is unadulterated and absolute, was raised therefore at the outset by Gandhi with a full sense of responsibility based, however, upon loyalty to his own principles. What should his colleagues say and do? They are men of affairs. They have to face their own facts. Ministers and politicians cannot live in a land of dreams. The Utopia is not for them, nor is the administration of a country an experiment in self-governance. Rather, it is self-government itself in conducting which the Ministers must stand or fall upon the vote of the demos. They fully appreciate the force of the step in evolution sponsored by Gandhi. Nor is the Congress the only body to reckon with. Although the Congress has claimed to speak for the whole nation–not merely by its composition but by its services to it, yet, at this very moment, the Congress would gladly wait to take other organisations with it in its march to freedom. Would these organisations acquiesce in this new experiment of a non-violent organisation of the Government of India? These are the various questions which subjectively any man of affairs would visualize before himself.

But there is another aspect of the matter. Even objectively viewed, the question can be presented on the side of the ‘mundane Ministers’ effectively. Dealing with the issue of regiments and armies, what did Gandhi say at the Second Round Table Conference in London in 1931, ask they. "The Congress," he asserted, "was capable of shouldering all responsibilities that flow from responsible Government, i.e., from a complete control of Defence and external affairs with, of course, necessary adjustments." "The Army," he pointed out, "was really an Army of occupation, and its members–no matter to what race they belonged–were all foreigners because he could not speak to them, they could not approach him openly, and they were taught to regard Congressmen as other than their own countrymen." "The whole Army must pass under Indian control in its entirety, but the Army would not accept my command, nor the Commander-in-Chief–nor the Sikhs–nor the Rajputs. India knew how to defend herself. Mussalmans and Gurkhas, Sikhs and Rajputs can defend India. The Rajputs are responsible for a thousand victories, not one." Was Gandhi thinking all the while of disestablishing the armies of the military type altogether? That does not appear to be the case. But well-nigh a decade has passed since the Round Table Conference sat, and while Gandhi’s mind and spirit have traveled over a century during this short interval, to his colleagues the decade appears as but a day and they have covered no progress in their ideas of non-violence. They fully endorse and wholly adhere to the view that, in our struggle with the foreigner, our abiding principle is non-violence, but they feel that, as practical politicians, they must discharge their trust according to their lights. This is the issue between the two sides, that was holding the field at Wardha.

Having studied in outline the different standpoints involved in the so-called crisis in the Congress, we must now proceed to answer some of the questions that have been raised by well-meaning friends of the Congress in this connection. Does Gandhi believe that the country is prepared for this experiment which really is the consummation and climax of his ideas? Have all people, in his view, imbibed his high spirit which alone can justify his experiment and without which it would be hazardous to contemplate it? One might as well ask when professors examine candidates and declare them to have passed the test, is it suggested that the candidates are equal to the professors in knowledge and learning? No; you pass your Matriculation examination if you get a certain percentage of the marks in each subject, and on the total, 35 per cent generally entitles one to a pass. That is to say, while the candidate’s knowledge is 35 per cent, his ignorance is 65 per cent. And even so only 22 per cent of the candidates are passing the test. There is therefore a heavy shortage in the number of passes and an equally heavy shortcoming in the measure of knowledge. Yet the Universities run, the professors examine, the parents educate, the boys struggle. Judged by the standards of a University, of which all of us are ardent votaries, where is anything wrong in urging that, if the Indian nation has passed its examination in Non-co-operation in 1920, passive resistance and civil disobedience in 1921, and graduated in Satyagraha in 1930 and 1932, it may attempt an M. A. or Honours Course in the self-same Satyagraha in 1940 or 1941? Should we not hurry up while yet the founder of this new University of Life is alive, while we can receive guidance and a post-graduate course from him? It is no use saying that, when the Satyagraha army of non-violence is not ready, we cannot dissolve and disestablish the ‘Duragraha’ army of violence. It is true that, even as nature abhors vacuum, politics too does abhor it and something must rush in to fill it. But if no attempt at all is made to prepare that something which must be the substitute, the dread of vacuum must always remain there. It is the old story of learning to swim without dipping into the waters. The two processes must go on pari passu. In fact both are the same process with but different stages.

An analogy like this implies that there should be a give and take in the transitional period. Of course, there must be. The politicians can ask for the Police and relax the Military or vice versa. Gandhi himself is not against the Police for a while, and will perhaps be prepared to consider the question of Military as well as any interim measures, but the principle must be conceded in unequivocal language and unambiguous spirit. The resolution of the Working Committee has indeed attempted some such thing. It has re-affirmed its faith in non-violence and expressed its fears about the disestablishment of the Military. It is easy to describe this position in witty language as a person facing East but walking West. Parodying is a cheap pastime, particularly in politics, but spiritual advancement is not accelerated by sallies of wit or humour.

If the process of transition from violence to non-violence in national affairs is to be effected smoothly, you cannot get it by a kaleidoscopic shake so as to place all our strategy in a new design. We must therefore prevail upon Gandhi to view our failings with sympathy and exercise his judgment so as not to allow sternness of justice to stint its generosity. After all he is the Doctor and we are the Hospital. Without him we cannot get his treatment, without us he may pursue his experiments nevertheless, but not on the nation-wide scale.

During the few years left to him, it is his duty to give, and our right to get, his best for the world. Let us not exaggerate the effects of the Wardha resolution and get into a panic, saying that hereafter the constructive programme is doomed. The Working Committee has only hesitated to make a revolutionary change in its existing policy; it has not reversed its policy. Non-violence is still its cardinal pivot. The constructive programme is still non-violence in action. Panic always emanates from a spirit of exaggeration, and those who exaggerate their hopes or fears are those that ardently feel for a cause. It is the orthodox wing, therefore, that is apt to fall an easy prey to this self-delusion. Our failures in the past must be an added incentive to an augmentation of effort in the future, not to a feeling of despair, despondency or disdain. When the new programme was started, it converted the Congress to it. The higher rungs of this programme will doubtless take the Congress to still higher altitudes. But as Gandhi himself stated, there is a spirit of violence in the air. We know that, if chaos and anarchy ensue in the near future, the Congress Ministries, if in office, will have to resort to naked violence which would be destructive of our hopes once for all.

If the Congress means to build anew, it may have to build from bottom to top and therefore have to restrain itself considerably. The times are bad enough and worse times may be in store, and the very reason for taking up office to control anarchy may be good enough reason for not discrediting ourselves through office. Gandhiji is positive that the way to non-violence does not lie through office. It is his belief that, if we had had enough of non-violence, even the British could not have prevented a hearty understanding between the Hindus and the Muslims.

May we not humbly call Gandhi’s attention to the wise, the prophetic, words he had spoken at the conclusion of the sitting of the second Round Table Conference in London in 1931, in pleading for the recognition of the Congress organisation? "You distrust that organisation though you may seemingly trust me. Do not for one moment differentiate me from the organisation of which I am but a drop in the ocean. I am no greater than the organisation and if you find me a place, if you trust me, I invite you to trust the Congress also."

Descending to the cold light of reason from the warm heights of sentiment, people soon began to realise that, although the Wardha resolution stated that it absolved Gandhi in regard to decisions of the Working Committee on the Military and the Police, yet the absolution claimed would be an all-round one including leadership of Satyagraha. Gandhi could not lead the movement with such a resolution on record. What then would follow? Would no Satyagraha be possible unless the Congress was agreeable to the elimination of the Indian Army? It is true that even from then Gandhi began to feel, and everyone else began to feel, that India was independent, and, feeling so, she must order her affairs on a truly non-violent basis–not that Gandhi must say what he would do when he was in power–for he could not say that–but that we had all to make a beginning even from then, placing the matter before the people and canvassing their support for the new idea. If the Civic Guards were to be armed, they at any rate were to be freed from the pledges of Congress Volunteers–of non-violence.

Where then, was anything common between Gandhi and his dissentient colleagues?

After all, non-violence is a direction, not a destination. It is an atmosphere, not an attainment. There will be immediately no more perfect non-violence than there is of truth and purity, justice and generosity. These are perfect positives in a world of negatives, and all that we can do in our short lives is to leave the atmosphere purer and kindlier than we found it, in the humble view that all purification is corrosion one step removed, even as all science is ignorance one step removed.

The fact is that we are handling a new science. We are not acquainted with the elements of it. We are to solve problems which thousands of years and hundreds of experiments have not been able to solve.

Into our midst has come a new scientist and we have helped to constitute his laboratory. Let us labour together and make new discoveries which will yet save Europe from eternal perdition. Our scientist is not merely a man of science; he is a well-known expert in Art and it is thus that he has built this great work of Art called the Indian National Congress. We who have co-operated with him in raising this monument shall not be parties to its destruction. And if we desire the leadership of such a rare emanation of the Divine, we must deserve it. Let us therefore at this crucial moment indulge neither in despair nor in derision. There is no reason why with a little more patience on one side, and a little more forbearance on the other, the Congress may not be made the instrument it is destined to be, to carve out a new world hastening the realisation of the poet’s dream:

II. DELHI

The urgency of affairs based upon the surprises of the European war demanded a meeting of the A.I.C.C., and a confirmation of the new step taken by the Working Committee, coupled with a re-examination of the bearings of the problem in its many aspects-particularly in relation to the Ramgarh resolution. It was almost felt that the Working Committee had to sit from day to day, and, if it did not exactly do this, it met, within a fortnight of its dispersal from Wardha, at Delhi on the 3rd of July.

In Delhi the old difficulties presented themselves with reinforced emphasis. Gandhi again brought the question of non-violence to the fore. Pointed attention had been drawn by him to the confusion prevailing amongst Congressmen as to the interpretation of their last statement made in Wardha on 21st June. Certain newspapers and individuals, including Congressmen, had begun to believe that the Committee had given up non-violence as an integral part of Congress policy, in spite of two clear paragraphs in the Wardha resolution emphatically and unequivocally declaring that policy. Accordingly Gandhi felt that the Working Committee should re-state the position to the effect that it exclusively relied upon Congress Volunteers, pledged to non-violence and to Congress discipline, in order to deal with internal disorders to the extent that was possible, and all co-operation of our volunteers and Civic Guards with other similar organisations must be on a non-violent basis. On the question of meeting external invasion, Gandhi owned that the Working Committee never had any occasion to determine the Nation’s duty up till then, but, considering the proved futility of violence to defend the Nations of Europe, he felt that there was sufficient indication for the Working Committee for coming to a decision. But till that hour came he felt that the Working Committee must keep an open mind. In this view it followed that Congressmen must not have anything to do with Military training or activities calculated to make India military minded. And therefore the Working Committee, he felt, could not but view with grave alarm the attempt made in an organised manner to prepare India for military defence.²

In the opinion of Gandhi, if India were free and independent without any army, she would have no fear of external aggression, and the best defence that a free India could put up, if the people accepted the Congress policy, would be to cultivate friendliness with the whole world. To invest crores of money on men, money and munitions, however, would itself induce a foreign attack. The obvious fact was that the so-called preparations for the defence of India–costly and elaborate–were intended merely to help Britain and could not help India in a real sense. No secret was made of the Congress claim to be wholly friends with the British people. The very non-violence policy of the Congress demanded nothing but goodwill towards them. But to turn to account such friendliness and goodwill in the best manner possible, India must be free from her bondage and be made the master of her resources of men and money. It was on these lines that Gandhi initiated the Delhi discussions.

Here, however, we must invite attention to one important event which had transpired between Delhi (July 3) and Wardha (June 17), and that was the publication of Gandhi’s famous "Letter to every Briton." We shall revert to this matter presently, but now proceed to a consideration of the Delhi deliberations.

Delhi was but the continuation of Wardha. No one had suspected that a call would be sent to Gandhi by the Viceroy so soon after the Wardha meeting of the Working Committee. The interview with the Viceroy on June 29 was reported to be lengthy in duration and, therefore, must have been detailed in character. The discussions at Delhi were themselves prolonged, I but, really, when the last dice was to be cast in the game of politics, surely it will be agreed that the throw must be well deliberated upon.

The initial difficulty arose from the fact that Gandhi was very firm on his ideal of a non-violent State. The issue was to him no longer a theoretical one. India, in his view, could no longer be hitched to the star of Britain which was wedded to violence and warfare. If the Indians, after being disarmed from the year 1877–i.e., for over a generation–were to resume their long demanded weapons, their whole mind would travel along a future strewn with the blood of their enemies and themselves. Should India then choose a bloody path or a bloodless one? Her independence, to Gandhi, was not a remote or problematical issue.

A National Central Government was not a fib of optimistic imagination. If we paid the price of armed resistance to Britain for the acknowledgment of our independent status, the real position would be that India would be declared free, and a free India, out of her own unfettered choice and with eyes wide open, would be proffering military aid and participation in the war effort. What is enforced by Britain on India, what is exacted by Britain from India, might be dismissed as not coming from a free nation, but what is rendered by a free India would bind her for the future.

Gandhi all the while is not thinking of power. If anybody feared that he had missed or was missing power, it is his firm belief that, though one may get power by non-violence, one cannot retain it by violence. All that you could do is to touch power, and even if you mounted to power by non-violence, you will not be able to retain it by violence. He may for some time concede the Police, but he has no mind to concede the Military, although all that he asks for at present is that the nation should keep an open mind on the matter.

It is his belief that we must educate people non-violently. Once you introduce the Military, it is the military language that predominates, the military technique and the military remedy. This apart from the mechanical fact that you will not be able to train armies for twenty years to come. Once you use weapons of destruction, you bid good-bye to non-violence. Six thousand officers are about to be trained. What shall we do with them? But it is not the officers that worry him so much as the influence they would have upon the masses.

The logic of facts and events embodied herein, and ever so forcibly expressed by Gandhi, was irresistible. It was, for one thing, a test of the faith of his colleagues. But there was another aspect of the matter. A decision on this issue must be consistent with the resolutions of the Congress. The Congress in its creed only speaks of "the attainment of Swaraj by peaceful and legitimate means." Beyond answering those critics who queried whether India could observe non-violence after attaining Swaraj, by the statement, cryptic and clinching, that what she attains by non-violence she must be able to keep by non-violence too, the Congress never has so far applied its mind to the character of the Indian State in relation to non-violence.

On the other hand, when it was proposed at the Bombay session of the Congress in October 1934, that the words "peaceful and legitimate means" in Article I should be replaced by ‘truth and non-violence’, the change was stoutly resisted and it was this resistance that partly and finally accounted for Gandhi ceasing to be a four-anna member. In Wardha and Delhi, six years after this refusal by the Congress, Gandhi sought the support of the Working Committee for a non-violent State divested of all armies, a State which would resort to non-violence as the sole weapon against external aggression as well as internal disorder.

Again, tracing the progress of events chronologically, we note that the resolution of the Working Committee on September 14, 1939, embodied the principle of co-operation with Britain in war time on certain conditions. What was the co-operation contemplated therein? Let it be remembered that Gandhi had stated in his first interview with the Viceroy that he would offer unconditional co-operation, and later explained that what he offered was moral co-operation, not material.

It is just possible that on September 14, when the Working Committee passed its historic resolution on war,–i.e., hardly a fortnight after its outbreak–the Working Committee and Gandhi were thinking of different meanings of co-operation, for it was not till long after that Gandhi explained his proffered unconditional co-operation as moral in character, and that was in answer to a virtual challenge from a newspaper in London. It is evident now that Gandhi has all along been thinking of only moral co-operation, both for himself and for the Congress.

The point came up for clarification after the fall of France on June 14, so that the atmosphere had altogether changed by the time the Working Committee met on June 17 at Wardha. The question of non-violence assumed practical importance. The differences on the issue came out in all their polarity. In Delhi the question assumed an added importance by virtue of the practical bearing of the decision on the issue of the demand and the offer to be made, of and to, the British Government. Gandhi stood up for the demand of complete Independence being acknowledged now and here by Britain, and for the offer of moral support by India. The Working Committee agreed with Gandhi in respect of the demand but differed in respect of the offer.

The difference was really one based on a principle. It was not a difference based upon a personal element and the attitude of India towards Britain. All were at one in condemning the Fascism of the day as well as Imperialism. If Britain shed the latter, and proved the fact by acknowledging the Independence of India, she would be no longer guilty of Imperialism on the one hand, and, on the other, would be able to negotiate the co-operation and support of a free India. This sentiment was clearly expressed when Gandhi said on December 4, in a cable to the News Chronicle: "I am anxious as a friend of Britain, bound by many personal ties, that she should come out victorious–not because of superiority in arms but because of her will to be just all along the line."

It would thus be seen that, though they agreed that a free India meant well by Britain, yet they differed on the issue as to how a free India should be organised and equipped. Those who would concede the correctness of making the future free India a non-violent State, would still halt because the sanction of the Congress was as yet wanting. At the same time, everyone could readily see the urgency of the issue as visualized by Gandhi.

The issue of a non-violent State was certainly to be brought up before the next meeting of the A.I.C.C. at Poona–whatever may be the reaction of the British Government to the Delhi demand. If Britain agreed to it, the offer of active participation in Defence should be ratified by the A. I. C. C., though in one sense no such ratification would be needed because the statement of September 14, 1939, was clear. It ran as follows:

"If co-operation is desired in a worthy cause, this cannot be obtained by compulsion and imposition, and the Committee cannot agree to the carrying out by the Indian people of orders issued by external authority. Co-operation must be between equals, by mutual consent, for a cause which both consider to be worthy. The people of India have in the recent past faced great risks and willingly made great sacrifices to secure their own freedom and establish a free democratic State in India, and their sympathy is entirely on the side of democracy and freedom. But India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is denied to her and such limited freedom as she possesses taken away from her."

Even if the Delhi resolution did not for this reason require ratification, the fact remained that the position of Gandhi which concerns a vital issue would necessarily force to the front a consideration of the issue of non-violence in the organisation of a free India, as ‘a new matter’ emerging in the middle of the year. The matter was one of urgent public importance because, apart from the fate which the Delhi resolution might meet at the hands of Government. We had before us the question of organising our own Civic Guards and deciding whether they shall be wedded to non-violence like our volunteers, or whether they shall be free of this restraint, like the Civic Guards of Government. Altogether, then, the Poona deliberations were bound to be full of animation in that they would concern a life-and-death problem for India.

A note of caution requires to be sounded here. If the Britisher, or any anti-Congress Indian, supposed that fresh quarrels have broken out in the Congress camp, they would be wholly in the wrong. In the first place, whatever may be the differences on these finer details, the Congress acts as a single solid body and is particularly fortunate in that it has secured the full co-operation of Gandhi himself in respect of the Delhi resolution. This alone should be enough to give the quietus to all apprehensions and misgivings. It is to be hoped that other groups in India, the Muslim League and the Princes, will join their voice to that of the Congress in putting forward the Delhi demand, for the country would do well to remember the ancient couplet from the Mahabharata:

If we might summarise the crisis created in Delhi in one word, we must say that it arose from the irreconcilability of a world character having to lead a National movement of a dependent country. Few people realise that Gandhi had come into Indian politics only by accident. It was Edwin Samuel Montagu that had asked him in an interview in 1917, why a social reformer like himself meddled in politics. "For that very reason," said Gandhi in reply, "I had to get into politics." Here is a social reformer, a founder of a new faith and philosophy which is incidentally useful for the emancipation of India, but which in reality is meant for the uplift of the world. It was only such a character, free from all self and desire, that could venture to address a letter "To every Briton" to lay down arms, not in base surrender before the enemy, but in order that they might lead a higher, nobler and more exalted life, lifting all fight from the plane of violence to that of non-violence. Once having addressed such a letter, which the Viceroy conveyed to England though the Press would not, having tendered such advice to the foreigner, how could Gandhi give any other advice, more so a diametrically opposite advice, to his countrymen to take up arms as Civic Guards or in National Defence? That is why he initiated at Wardha this discussion on non-violence, for the historic "Letter to every Briton" had been drafted earlier than the meeting day, though it was published later. A chronological study of events is essential to a correct understanding of their logical and psychological bearings on the destiny of a nation.

III. POONA

The scene shifts to Poona. The stage is already set, only the curtain lifts; the music alters, but the characters remain unchanged, and so does the plot of the Drama. But, for the first time in the history of the Congress during the past twenty-five years, the drama has to be enacted without the principal character playing his part before the public from the Congress stage. His platform has become widened, his message has struck a deeper note, his jurisdiction has been enlarged. The popular cry and complaint that Gandhi has left the Congress carried no meaning to the enlightened mind. That is not a mere make believe to put courage into the flagging heart. In all times and countries we note how the pater familias becomes the patriarch, the father’s sphere of interest and attention widens, his share in the immediate duties to his sons and grandsons becomes steadily attenuated, as he is the monitor and mentor, the overseer and the care-taker of society.

Gandhi’s absence from Poona as the prime mover of the Congress did not detract from his new role as its philosopher, friend and guide. His absence in flesh and blood only helped to fill the whole atmosphere with his spirit and to impose a stricter sense of restraint, a sterner sense of discipline and a loftier sense of decorum amongst the members of the All-India Congress Committee. It greatly added, in one word, to their sense of responsibility. The Congressmen in Poona would have done anything to secure Gandhi’s presence, if only to sanctify the magnificent structure which they raised as the Congress abode in that great city. It was in this home of the Peshwas, at this scene of Gokhale’s life-long services to the nation and Tilak’s life-long sacrifices for the nation, it was in this centre of Indian renaissance that the Congress Executive met and made the demand for the declaration by Britain of the complete Independence of India. There is an admixture of a cultural bias and a certain military-mindedness in the atmosphere of Poona, and it was but appropriate that the A.I.C.C. should have met in this ancient and historic city to reconsider Wardha in part and ratify Delhi in full.

The Issues before the A.I.C.C. in Poona were clear as day-light. Those that objected to the ratification of Delhi asked in derision whether the Ramgarh Congress resolution on war was thrown to the winds. The reader cannot therefore do better than profitably spend a little time in a rapid survey of the resolutions of Ramgarh and those that preceded and succeeded it, for, the charge was openly made that, in Poona, we were going to content ourselves with a mere National Government and that we were ready to barter away the convictions of two decades for this mess of pottage. What should be the co-operation that India would, if at all, offer to the British Government in this war? How could India make it material in addition to moral? Did not Ramgarh say in so many words that

"Congressmen and those under the Congress influence cannot help in the prosecution of war with men, money or material"?

The Ramgarh resolution was the Bible of the Congressman’s faith, the charter of the Congressman’s freedom, the compass of the Congressman’s voyage on the high seas of Indian politics.

The Ramgarh resolution repays study. It is the habit of some to quote from documents the most striking passages and omit the less striking ones. That breaks the context and distorts the meaning. At Ramgarh we said:

"This Congress, having considered the grave and critical situation resulting from the war in Europe, and British policy in regard to it, approves of and endorses the resolutions passed on the action taken on the war situation by the A.I.C.C. and the Working Committee."

This is the key to Ramgarh. To omit this opening sentence and speak of withholding "help in the prosecution of war with men, money or material" is to fumble with the lock without the key.

The war broke out on the 1st of September, and within a fortnight thereof the Working Committee met at Wardha and passed its world-famous resolution wherein it stated,

"co-operation must be between equals by mutual consent for a cause which both consider to be worthy. India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is denied to her and such limited freedom as she possesses taken away from her."

Shortly after, Jawaharlalji joined the Working Committee and was made the President of the War Sub-committee of the Working Committee. He put all his strength and spirit into his utterances, comments and communications which appeared in the Press in India and in England. On the 29th of September he issued a statement in which the following passage occurs:

"But we must be convinced of that world freedom and we must see India in the picture of world freedom. Then only will war have meaning for us and move our minds and hearts, for then we shall be struggling and suffering for a cause that is worth while, not only for us but for all the peoples of the world. Because we feel that large numbers of British people have the same world ideals as many of us possess in India, we have offered them our co-operation in the realisation of these ideals. But if these ideals are not there, what do we fight for?"

"Only a free and consenting India can throw her weight for ideals that are openly proclaimed and acted upon."

On the 7th of October 1939 Pandit Jawaharlal sent a message to the News Chronicle from which the two following sentences are taken:

"India can take no part in defending Imperialism, but she will join in a struggle for freedom. India’s resources are vast, but even of greater volume is her goodwill and moral support for a worthy cause. This is no small offer that India makes, for it means the ending of a hundred years of hostility between India and England. Only a free and equal India can co-operate of her free will in this task. Till that vital change is made none of us have the power to make the people of India enthusiastic for a war which is not theirs.

"The first step must therefore be a declaration of India’s full freedom. This has to be followed by its application now, in so far as is possible, in order to give the people effective control of the governance of India and the prosecution of war on India’s behalf. Then only is it possible to create the psychological conditions which can lead to popular support. India wants to forget the past of conflict and wants to stretch out her hand in comradeship."

The Provincial Governments had passed in the month of October a comprehensive resolution moved by the Premiers of Madras, C. P., Bihar, United Provinces, Bombay, Orissa and the N.W.F. Province. In it occurs the following significant sentence:

"It is essential, in order to secure the co-operation of the Indian people, that the principle of democracy with effective safeguards for the Muslims and other minorities be applied to India, and her policy be guided by her people."

Finally came the very important meeting held at Allahabad of the Working Committee from the 19th to the 23rd of November 1939, at which a long resolution was passed, and we take from it the following passage:

"The declarations made on behalf of the British Government being inadequate, have compelled the Congress to dissociate itself from the British policy and war effort, and, as a first step in non-co-operation, to bring about the resignation of all Congress Governments in the Provinces. That policy of non-co-operation continues and must continue unless the British Government revises its policy and accepts the Congress contention. The Working Committee would, however, remind Congressmen that it is inherent in every form of Satyagraha that no effort is spared to achieve an honourable settlement with the opponent. While a Satyagrahi is ever ready for a non-violent fight, if it has to come, he never relaxes his effort for peace and always works for its attainment. The Working Committee will therefore continue to explore the means of arriving at an honourable settlement, even though the British Government has banged the door in the face of the Congress. The Committee must, however, resist by the non-violent methods of the Congress all attempts to coerce the people of India along paths which are not of their choice and everything that is against the dignity and freedom of India."

It is thus obvious that the Congress had offered conditional co-operation and that that co-operation is both moral and material.

Then we come to the next issue, that of Independence. It was contended at Poona that the Delhi resolution, and therefore the Poona one, betrayed the Ramgarh resolution. Turning back to the latter, all that we could glean from that long statement about Independence is this:

"Nothing short of complete Independence will be accepted by the people of India."

And this too as a preamble to the demand for a Constituent Assembly. The Ramgarh Congress, in the last paragraph of the resolution, authorised the All-India Congress Committee and the Working Committee "to take all steps to implement the foregoing resolution as the Committee may deem necessary." What has the Working Committee done now? As against the all-too-short and academic statement relating to Independence quoted supra in the Ramgarh resolution, the Delhi resolution states:

"The Working Committee are more than ever convinced that the acknowledgment by Great Britain of the complete Independence of India is the only solution of the problems facing both India and Britain, and are therefore of opinion that such an unequivocal declaration should be immediately made and that, as an immediate step in giving effect to it, a Provisional National Government should be constituted at the Centre which, though formed as a transitory measure, should be such as to command the confidence of all the elected elements in the Central Legislature and secure the closest co-operation of the responsible Governments in the Provinces."

People may or may not agree with this resolution. But it is not open to any critic to say that the Working Committee went beyond its authority in passing this resolution; and what the Working Committee has done has been approved of by the A.I.C.C. When, therefore, the Ramgarh resolution stated that India cannot supply men, money or material in the war effort, it only meant that she should not until certain conditions were satisfied. When it spoke of nothing short of complete Independence being possible of acceptance, it did not want to leave the idea as a vague, ethereal, impalpable concept. The Delhi resolution has demanded a National Government and provided a formula for the fulfillment of the demand for complete Independence, in return for which co-operation in Defence as envisaged in the various war statements and resolutions of the Working Committee and the All-India Congress Committee (Wardha-October 1939) prior to Ramgarh had been proffered. Those, therefore, who complain that the Ramgarh resolution has been thrown to the winds do themselves throw to the winds the first sentence of that resolution which confirmed all the previous statements and acts of the Working Committee in relation to the subject, as well as the last sentence of the resolution which authorised the Working Committee and the A.I.C.C. to take all necessary steps.

The train of politics does not run on fixed rails like a railway train; but it is like a motor running on a road, getting clear of obstacles, pursuing a tortuous course, at times negotiating hair-pin curves, now accelerating its speed, now relaxing it, but all along intensely related to, and affected by, not merely a knowledge of the ultimate destination and the direction leading to it, but by all the gradients on the way, the rises and the falls, the loops and the curves, the traffic, the bulls that keep to the left, with or without their driver, and the buffaloes that walk across the car and run their horns into its spokes, and have therefore always to be taken by the back. The automobile of politics is in living touch with the actualities of the incessantly changing world, and during the time of war such changes which complicate a set course are ever more sudden and surprising. If therefore Wardha, Delhi and Poona have at all re-aligned the course of the Congress, that much of deviation is but to be expected in the exigencies of politics in the first place and, more so, of politics during the period of a great war. If the leadership of the greatest man of the world appears to have been risked by the Congress, the fact remains that, though Gandhi is stern in justice, he is never stinting in generosity, and his synthetic abilities and the wide receptivity of his heart may easily be trusted to effect that reconciliation between Nationalism and Internationalism, between force as a passing measure during a time of unpreparedness, reluctantly agreed to in an emergency, and that universal love inspired by sacrifice and fostered by suffering which he wants to infuse into the war-weary nations of Europe.

We are not merely canonizing Gandhi, having deposed him as a leader, for, the sentiments expressed in the foregoing sentences have proved to be not merely hopes but anticipations by a day of Mahatmaji’s abiding interest in the affairs of the Congress, which he has chosen to express in the following words:

"If I retired from the Congress in Bombay in 1934, I did so to render greater service. Events have justified the retirement. The present isolation too has the same motive behind it." (Harijan-4th August)