BY M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

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The problem of the evaluation of the individual is one of the most complicated and perplexing of the problems awaiting solution in the India of the present day. Its consideration is all the more necessary in view of the newer political and social conceptions that are now entering the field of public life in this country. Indian society has for long been a society of classes, castes, creeds and communities. During the past one century the whole of the social reform movement was directed to the discovery of the true value of the individual, irrespective of the caste, the community or creed to which he belonged. But there is unfortunately at present a reaction against this movement, a reaction in consequence of which the individual is again becoming completely and wholly identified with the so-called caste or community to which by accident he happens to belong. The political change through which the country is passing has given an increasing momentum to this tendency and it looks as if we are bringing into existence another stereotyped society against which the better type of mind has, since the days of Ram Mohan Roy, been carrying on a fearless and truceless war.

It may appear at the outset that there is nothing new in this reaction. It is only a continuation of the ancient tradition which has not lost its grip over us and which is now seeking to obtain an all-embracing hold. It is not merely the tradition of India but also of most other countries. But the tragedy of it lies in our thinking that we are fighting–and fighting successfully also–against it while, as a matter of fact, we are really perpetuating it. This is the pity of the self-delusion into which the moderns are falling.

The problem at issue is: ‘Is it safe to proceed to determine the value of the individual, his whole worth or his worth for any particular function or purpose, by reference to any one quality in him?’ The classical idea was that it was not only safe but that it was also the only possible and desirable course. The division of people into castes as understood in our Smritis proceeded on this basis. It does not matter very much whether birth (janma) or profession (karma) formed the basis of this division. The implication was that if one knew the caste to which an individual belonged one could know the whole of that individual’s worth for any and every purpose in life, public or private. Nothing else needed to be considered in this connection. Assuming for a moment that birth was the criterion of caste, it may be said that it was regarded as consequently providing a criterion for judging the individual’s inherent abilities, his talents, his tastes and aptitudes, the kind of training he ought to receive, the vocation he should pursue, the persons with whom he should have social intercourse, and the place he was to occupy as a citizen in the body politic. There was only one standard of value for judging everything about the individual. Even if it is assumed that it was not birth but profession that formed the basis of caste, the result from the standpoint under consideration was not different. It meant that everything about the individual could be determined by reference to only one aspect in his life, namely, his vocation or profession. Broadly speaking, within the fold of the ancient Indian society the question of religious creed or belief was not of much significance in this connection, as all followed more or less the same faith. The only deciding consideration was caste.

This was not perhaps the peculiarity of India alone. It was the case with the ancient Greeks, the Romans and the peoples of medieval Europe. Birth as a member of the Eupatridae or the Patriciate or the feudal nobility decided in the case of each individual his total worth–what occupation he should follow, whom he should marry, what relations he should have with others and what political rights and obligations he should have.

The classical idea may therefore be regarded as a totalitarian and a monistic idea. It derived all characteristics belonging to an individual from one principle or one feature in him. If in that one respect he showed a defect it was inferred that he had an all-round defect; and if in that he showed a merit it was similarly inferred that he had an all-round merit.

Islam brought along with it into India a new creed but not a new principle for judging the value of the individual. In place of birth it substituted creed as the standard of life. He who prayed with his face turned towards Mecca was for all purposes a more valuable individual than he who turned towards the east and offered his prayers to the Sun-God. Its idea was that there is only one true faith and that man becomes entirely and completely changed if he adopts it. He then becomes fit for ruling kingdoms, for commanding armies, for acquiring and managing landed property, for carrying on trade and for doing every other sort of work. Instead of saying, ‘Know ye a man’s birth, and you will know everything else about him’, it said, ‘Know thou a man’s creed and you will know everything else about him; nothing else matters.’ One principle is as tyrannical as the other. For no creed has a monopoly of spiritual truth; in every creed there are numberless superstitions; and no creed is capable of completely transforming a man and making a saint out of a sinner. Are there not rogues, criminals, plunderers, debased men and women among the followers of every creed? Does any creed profess to dispense with the need for a penal code even in respect of its own followers? What is true of Islam is equally true of every other proselytizing religion–for instance, Christianity–especially when persecution is an article of faith. It is because of this that all those who value man as man regard the introduction of religious tolerance as one of the greatest landmarks in the march of human progress. It is a step in recognising that the value of an individual for all purposes is not to be based on only one feature of his life, however dignified be the name you give to it.

It may be argued by some whether the substitution of creed for birth as the criterion is not in itself a great achievement. There is not much to be said in favour of this view from our present standpoint. In a sense it is as easy to defend birth as a criterion of value as creed, if one looks at either from a transcendental standpoint. For, when in ancient India man was judged according to his birth, it carried a certain number of implications along with it. In its ideal form it gave facilities for a particular sort of bringing up, education, training, a standard of life, outlook and so on; so that an individual belonging to any caste was in a sense a member of it not merely in virtue of his birth in it but equally in virtue of his being brought up in a particular manner, with a view to enable him to discharge his duties and responsibilities towards the larger community of which his caste was a part. Birth meant not a mere label which a man put on himself but the prospect of a particular kind of growth and its fulfillment. If caste is to be judged it must be judged in this spirit. It stood not merely for superiority due to birth but for superiority resulting from particular kinds of growth accompanying birth. Caste degenerated when the latter principle was ignored.

There is not much more to be said in favour of creed. If creed is merely the putting of one label in place of an existing one, it does not by itself–any more than caste or birth–form a better standard for judging the individual’s worth. It is only the assumption that there is a true conversion,—and not the sprinkling of the baptismal waters–that there is a scrupulous training in the articles of faith and a strict adherence to the rules of conduct imposed by the faith,–it is only these assumptions that constitute the basis of the doctrine that the value of the

individual is to be determined solely by reference to his creed. But in the large majority of cases these assumptions have no real foundation. Otherwise there would have reigned perfect peace on earth and goodwill among men. For there is no creed which does not advocate peace and goodwill. The truth, however, is that the implications entertained when one is said to follow a particular creed are of the same transcendental category as those associated with training and bringing up in the case of caste. In most cases the creed is as much a name as caste, and it is not consequently a more perfect standard for the evaluation of the individual.

It is not, however, the object of this paper to discuss the relative merits of caste and creed as criteria of value. The object is to lay bare the absurdity of applying a single standard for discovering the real worth or ‘worths’ of the individual. In this respect the new forms of social and political organisation now obtaining dominance in many of the countries and labeled as Fascism and Communism are to be regarded as thoroughly reactionary and as taking us back to barbarism. Under Communism as taught and practised in Russia, the worth of an individual for all purposes is judged solely by his capacity and willingness to do manual work. Manual labour is the one standard of all values. Other kinds of work or attainments have no meaning or significance. Even though it may be plausibly argued that this is a natural outcome of the pre-Communistic age, when idleness under the high-sounding name of leisure was the standard of value, it only explains the origin of the Communistic view and is irrelevant in estimating the truth in Communism. In Italy it is the membership of a corporation of employers or employees to which admission is strictly restricted, that has become the basis of value. If one is qualified to be a member of a corporation he is qualified to be a citizen, to enjoy political privileges, to exercise freedom of thought and expression, and do anything and everything else.

In those countries like England where Capitalism still rules, the situation is not very much different, There it is property which constitutes the basis of value, property is identified with industry (which is one of the constituent elements in value) even though there are many idle rich; it is identified with intelligence and capacity (which are some of the other constituent elements in value), though many propertied people are dullards and many among the poor are extraordinarily intelligent. It is regarded as a satisfactory standard for measuring the ability of a person to become a legislator, a diplomat, or a cabinet minister. ‘Know a man’s property, and you can know everything else about him.’

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When we speak of the worth of the individual it is always ‘worth’ with reference to a particular situation There is nothing like general worth, It is therefore fallacious to judge the individual’s capacity to do a particular kind of work, or for occupying a particular position in society or the State or the economic order, by his capacity for doing some other kind of work or by reason of some one characteristic of his. The sort of intelligence, ability and talents required for work in one field is different from the sort of intelligence etc., required for work in another field, The competency, i.e., the worth of an individual is never a general worth but is a totality–even a mechanical totality–made up of particular worths. No one is good in general; no one has value for all things. A successful general is not necessarily a successful statesman; and if he is successful as a statesman also, it is not the result of his being successful as a general. A great captain of industry need not necessarily be an equally capable administrator of a University. A Scientist and an inventor need not necessarily be an efficient man of business. For each one of these functions a particular kind of worth is required. It is true that an individual may possess abilities different kinds–and it is the theme of this paper that we must recognise this truth–and it is not right to conclude that one who is a success in one field cannot be a success in another, or one who is a failure in one field will be equally a failure in every other field. Unfortunately, however, man is a lazy and ease-loving creature. He is also proud and intensely vain. The result is that, unwilling as he is to take trouble to think, he mistakes ability in one sphere for equal ability in other spheres. Those who enjoy the privilege of choosing people for various stations in life are too lazy to discriminate between reputation obtained in one sphere of life and fitness of the same individual for occupying another station. We have, therefore, many square men in round holes and vice versa. Similarly those who have obtained reputation in one sphere are so vain that they think that they have a right to occupy prominent places elsewhere and that they are competent for it.

All this is the result of our failure to analyse the total worth of the individual into its constituents–negative as well as positive. This in its turn is due to our continuing to adhere to the worn-out totalitarian principle according to which one feature of man is taken as the only feature worth consideration, whatever be the angle from which the individual is looked at and examined.

The revolt against caste and class differences which has been going on in our country in recent years is a protest against this totalitarian view. Reformers did not say that an individual was uninfluenced by the caste or class to which he belonged; but they stated that no individual derives all his characteristics from his class or caste. He has in him elements of worth–capacity to feel, to understand, to act, to organise–independently of, and irrespective of, his class. A man’s fitness to receive education, for instance, should not be judged by the caste in which he happens to be born. Those who are born in the so-called ‘lower castes’ have as much innate intelligence and capacity to profit by education as those in the higher castes. You should not judge the capacity of a man to enjoy the ordinary amenities of life–access to sources of water-supply, to markets, to court-houses, to places of amusement, to festivals, etc.,–by the caste to which he belongs. Similar ought to be the attitude to be adopted as regards the other capacities of the individual.

This was truly a national awakening. But it was, alas! too short. For in its wake there has come a reaction which is producing effects that are bound to prove fatal. Once more, the attempt is being made–and the attempt is considered most laudable by those that have the power to shape our fortunes–to judge the individual by reference to one particular aspect of his life. What is now known as ‘communalism’ is only another name for it. It is an application of a false standard of value. It is trying to stereotype a new kind of rigid system in place of the old which we thought was crumbling to pieces.

I am to be a citizen and as such I have to bear my portion of civic duties and share my portion of civic privileges. My weight as a citizen ought not to be artificially determined by a standard alien to the civic sphere. The test to be applied to discover the extent to which I deserve to be recognised as a citizen ought to have nothing to do with the religious community to which I belong. Because I look to Benares and not to Mecca, I ought not to be made to cast my political lot in a constituency the members of which share nothing in common with me. I must have the privilege to obtain my political salvation in the company of individuals–be they Muslims, Christians, Brahmins or non-Brahmins–who share my political views. It is, however, considerations of community and creed that are now dominating the whole outlook on life in our country, depressing the individual in everything that he has to do.

This is all the more regrettable at a time when caste and community have ceased to be of any significance in themselves. Caste has ceased to have any meaning. It is now only a name. It does not stand for any particular tenets or mode of life or outlook. And after all, the individual is not responsible for his caste and in most cases for the religious community to which he belongs. While staying that birth or religion should not stand in the way of individual progress, we are as a matter of fact making it stand in the way of that progress by still trying to find out to what caste or religion a man belongs before determining the position which he deserves to occupy in our political, social and economic system. It is the result of the misconception that the value of man is exhausted by one aspect alone of his life.

The individual is a plurality of worths and values. He has worth as a householder, as a bread-winner, as the follower of a creed, as a citizen, as an artist, as a philosopher, as a scientist, as a club-goer, as a dice-player, etc., etc. Even a whole catalogue of all the capacities in which he has worth does not exhaust the elements of individuality in him. There is something over and above all these, something which cannot be measured or discovered by any objective standard. When the individual is so complex, deriving each element in his complexity from a large variety and multiplicity of sources–heredity, environment, associations, education, etc.,–why set up the view that you can deduce everything about him by looking at only one of these elements, and that perhaps the least significant? Clarity of thought is what is most required at the present day and it is the duty of the true philosopher to climb down to the world of facts and realities and be of help in bringing light and hope to the individual who, after all, is the ultimate unit in all life.

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