BY DR. P. T. RAJU. PH. D., SASTRI,

In an interview I had with Professor F. W. Thomas of Oxford at Waltair, the question was put to me whether the Brahman of the Upanishads can be called by the name Absolute. Unfortunately the interview could last only for a few minutes, as the person in whose charge Professor Thomas placed himself had no place in the programme for such things, and the question could not be discussed. But having come from a man of his position, it shows that, though comparative philosophy is old enough in India and Europe, there are still people who believe that the Brahman of the Upanishads cannot be compared to the Absolute of Western idealism. Whether Professor Thomas believes in the impossibility to compare the two, and if he does, for what reasons he believes in it. I do not know. But the belief in some may ultimately be due to the view that ‘East is East and West is West and the twain can never meet’; that the two philosophies, being born in different environments and having their roots in two different cultures, can have no similarity of outlook. Western idealism, especially the German which is the source of inspiration for almost all idealistic systems that appeared in the other countries of Europe and America, has an absolutistic trend in one form or another. And the question is whether Indian philosophy, especially as represented by the Upanishads, has such a trend. The question is a question not only of philosophical but also of cultural significance.

In this connection, one may be tempted to mention the names of writers who used the term Absolute while referring to the Brahman of the Upanishads. But in a subject like philosophy in which difference of view is the rule and agreement an exception, and where it is so easy to dub a philosophy which one does not understand as worthless and unworthy of study, such a course will have little weight as an argument. There are certainly reasons to believe that, hidden in differences of terminology and in religious and other discussions promiscuously mixed with the metaphysical, there is a groping for the Absolute in Indian philosophy as a whole. Some go even still further and assert that every philosophy is a quest for the Absolute. Calderwood in his Vocabulary of Philosophy writes: "Philosophy is ultimately, by its very nature, a search for the Absolute–first for Absolute Truth, as distinct from mere appearance, and afterwards for the Absolute Being, as the source and explanation of all dependent existence, ens realissimum,-ens summum,-ens entium." One may object that a philosophy like the Nyaya or the Vaiseshika in India or the pluralistic and realistic philosophies of the West are not absolutisms. But in one sense they may be regarded as absolutisms, in so far as they are quests for the ultimate stuff of the universe. The word Absolute means what is not relative or dependent. In the above work Calderwood gives the meaning of the Absolute as "independent,–undetermined by relations." "The Absolute is the Self-existent, Self-sufficient Being, the Uncaused, restricted neither in being, nor in action, by anything the universe contains." The term Absolute is the correlative of the Infinite. Its proper significance is well indicated in Spinoza’s definition of Substance, "That which exists in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that the conception of which needs the conception of no other thing by which it may be conceived," If a system postulates a plurality of such independent reals, even that would be absolutism, for each independent real is an absolute. Spinoza indeed postulated only one such real, and called it Substance, but a pluralist may postulate a plurality of such reals. Every philosophy tries to find out the ultimate constituents or stuff of the universe, and these constituents or stuff may be a plurality of independent reals or absolutes.

In Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology we find that "that which is not relative is the Absolute; and the ultimate principle of explanation of the universe is the Absolute." "The Absolute, as a substantive has three connotations in the great philosophical systems: (1) as all-comprehensive, i.e., including all possible distinctions, the universal; and (2) as immediate, i.e., escaping all possible distinctions and definitions; ………and (3) as world-ground, first cause, primum movens, natura naturans..." In these senses, of course, a plurality of absolutes is not possible. In the first sense, there can be only one thing which is all-comprehensive; in the second, as the Absolute is to transcend all distinctions, it cannot be many, for many implies distinctions; and in the third, if we take the world as a whole there can be only one ground for it, and even if there is a plurality of reals which forms the ground, these have to be taken together as constituting a whole or one in their activity in order to avoid conflict between them. In fact, the objection against a plurality of absolutes is that if they are a plurality they cannot be independent, but must have mutual dependence and concern in their activity; or from the side of logic, we cannot understand how any real which is limited by other reals can be absolutely indifferent and unaffected by their natures. Yet so far as calling a system by the name absolutism is concerned, the postulation of a plurality of reals does not disentitle it to that name.

What now is the nature of the Brahman in Indian philosophy? Etymologically the word is derived from the root brhi with the suffix manin. Brhi means to grow, expand etc. Brhati vardhate niratisayamahatvalakshanavriddhiman bhavati (Sabdartha-chintamani). Brahman is that which possesses unrivalled expansion. In other words, it is the all-comprehensive. Naturally, what is all-comprehensive is self-dependent, self-sufficient, un-caused, and unlimited. In this sense there can be no objection to calling the Brahman by the name Absolute. It is certainly the highest universal, for the reason that it is the most comprehensive.

It may here be said that the doubt as regards the comparability of the Brahman to the Absolute is not with regard to the etymological meaning of the word Brahman, but with regard to the Brahman as understood by the different Vedantic systems. Sankara understands it as a reality which is indeterminate and undivided, that is, as transcending all determinations and divisions. Ramanuja understands it as the Lord of the universe or Iswara, whose body all the finite souls and the world constitute. Madhva’s understanding of it is like that of the God of Theism. There are other conceptions of the Brahman which are akin to one of these three in one or more points.

To superficial observation it may appear that Sankara’s Brahman cannot be called the Absolute. For Sankara the Brahman only is real, this world is relatively unreal. One may have in mind the two terms, the Absolute, and the world as a whole, which are identified in many Western idealistic systems. And because Sankara’s Brahman is not the world as a whole,–for Sankara regards the world as unreal and the Brahman as real–it may be thought that his Brahman cannot be called the Absolute.

Before trying to meet this objection, it may be pointed out that, even if the objection is valid, there is another reason why we can call Sankara’s Brahman the Absolute. As we saw in the quotation from Baldwin’s Dictionary, the Absolute in European philosophy has the connotation of a real independent and beyond all possible definitions and distinctions. This connotation is possessed by Sankara’s Brahman. It is anubhavaikavedya and avachyam, amanogocharam and so forth; that is, it can be only experienced, but cannot be defined or made an object of thought. It is a reality that is not relative, and is the ultimate principle of explanation of the universe. The real is the traikalikabadhya, that cannot be negated as unreal in the past, present, and future. This is the nature of the Brahman, and in the light of its nature the reality or unreality of the finite world is judged.

Now coming to the objection, it must be pointed out that Western philosophers have noted an ambiguity in the use of the term, ‘the world as a whole.’ This ambiguity has been keenly felt by those who started the reading of idealism with realistic presuppositions. For ‘the world as a whole’ sometimes meant the phenomenal world given to us in our perceptions, but extended indefinitely by our thought, but still remaining phenomenal; but sometimes it meant something which is reality of which the phenomenal world is an appearance, so that the world as a whole meant something at the back of the phenomenal world. The same ambiguity was noticed in the use of the words real and reality which were written with the capital R. For example, Bradley started with the idea that the real is what is given to us in our sense and feeling, but when we come to his conception of the Absolute which he calls Reality with a capital R, there is little doubt that it is not the original real. Again, we find that Royce began with the idea of ideal extension (Muirhead: Platonic Tradition, p. 351), that is, the ideal extension of the present datum spatially and temporally, through the categories of causality etc., so that by this extension we can reach a concept in which the whole of the world is included. But when this extension is completed, it is doubtful whether the nature of the original datum which we presumed at the beginning to be real, remains the same, or rather whether the original datum remains as such. For the subject which is to know ‘the world as a whole’ must be co-extensive with its object, and must ultimately include itself in the object which is the world as a whole. Otherwise, so far as the subject leaves itself out from the object, the object cannot be the whole of the phenomenal world. Thus though we start with the idea of reality as the datum in a perception or given in feeling, the conception has to be changed in the result of our enquiry, and because the word real or reality is used to denote both, those who are not prepared to accept this change of connotation will find ambiguity in the meaning.

When we notice this changed connotation of the term, ‘the world as a whole,’ the objection to calling Sankara’s Brahman by the name Absolute becomes weak enough. If it is admitted that the original datum cannot remain as such in the Absolute or the world as a whole but changes its nature, that is, that its form disappears, we have almost reached Sankara’s position. He tells us that the phenomenal world is nothing but name and form, and these disappear in the Brahman. When so much is understood, if the objection is still pressed, it would be without reason, and may be due to prejudice of some sort.

It is unfortunate that the word maya or bhrama, ‘illusion,‘ is used by Sankara referring to this world in its relation to the Absolute. Hegel said that the concept first emancipated itself from existence in Greek thought, but in Indian thought it was still immersed in existence. This attachment or adherence to existence, (though not true in the sense in which Hegel makes the remark, that is, in the sense of the contemplation of life-less and non-spiritual existence, for Indian philosophy did rise to the conception of purusha or person and in the Nyaya and Vaiseshika philosophy could postulate pure universals even apart from things, at least during the time of pralaya or deluge is true in this respect which, whatever advantages it may have, has this disadvantage, viz., ideas of concrete existence, were used for certain logical relations. so that associations which those relations had when referred to concrete existence, were apt to be carried over to the logical relations. Sankara wanted a concept to connote the relation,–whether that is a relation in the ordinary sense is a question,–between the eternally present Absolute and the finite world. When the finite being realises the Absolute, he ceases to be finite and realises that he was really the infinite even during his finitude, and that his finitude in truth did not exist. An example of such a logical relation in the phenomenal world is the case of illusion. For the illusory object does not affect the eternal presence of the true object even during illusion. For the illusory object, though actually perceived as existent during illusion, is known to be non-existent even during the time of the illusion when the mistake is realised. Only this much of the significance of the relation between the illusory object and the true one is to be transferred to the relation between the Absolute and this world. But because the word bhrama is used in both cases, we transfer more than what is warranted. It does not imply that the finite individual should treat the phenomenal world as lightly as he treats the objects of his dream and illusion. In Indian philosophy there is a general tendency, when any concept is formulated or principle postulated, to demand for an instance of it in the empirical world itself. Otherwise, the concept or principle is said to be apprasiddha or out of the way. This practice is justified to the extent that it prevents the postulation of uncouth hypotheses. But it has the disadvantage we have noted in the case of bhrama or maya. We cannot, indeed, say that this tendency is completely absent from Greek philosophy. For Plato’s cosmological explanations in terms of mythology or myths, are certainly cases of understanding logical processes in terms of concrete images, which are more or less formed on the basis of our empirical experience. Had a new word been coined by Sankara to denote only the logical relation between the Absolute and the finite world and between the illusory object and the true one, there would have been little occasion for misunderstanding and adverse criticism.

There is still less difficulty in pointing out that Ramanuja’s Brahman can be called the Absolute. He does not accept the principle of maya, the world is not called unreal by him. It forms, along with finite souls, the body of Brahman, and so even the conception of the Absolute as ‘the world as the whole’ applies to it. But we have to notice that the Brahman is not merely equal to the world as a whole, but is more than it, for it forms only his body. He is the soul of the world, its spiritual and moving principle. We cannot certainly attribute to Ramanuja the view that a person is merely the organic body. The Brahman is the Absolute in the sense that it has unlimited power, is omnipotent, omnipresent, unlimited, and so self-dependent and so forth.

Madhva’s Brahman too can be called the Absolute, though not with the connotation given to it by Hegel. Indeed, even Sankara’s Brahman is not exactly the same as Hegel’s Absolute. For the latter is an identity in difference including in an organic relation all forms of the finite world as such. Sankara finds this concept to be logically indefensible inasmuch as the finite forms cannot be retained as such in the Brahman, and so called it non-difference. Yet Sankara’s Brahman, as we have seen, can be called the Absolute. Even in European philosophy the full connotation of the word is not the same in every system. And it is unreasonable to demand that it should be the same in Indian philosophy. But there is a common feature in all the Absolutes, viz., independence, self-dependence, infinitude, to be uncaused, etc., and this is found, not merely in the Absolutes of Hegel, Sankara, Ramanuja etc., but also in the God or Brahman of Madhva. For He is said to possess all the perfections that are attributed to the Absolute, though He is said to be different from the finite selves and the world. But it should be noted that these are regarded as not limiting the powers of the Brahman. Whether the idea is consistent or not we need not discuss now. But there is no doubt that Madhva’s Brahman possesses absolute perfection. One who is acquainted with Hocking’s book, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, will find that the attribution of absolute perfection to God is not at all uncommon and not always undesirable. In fact, the relation between the conception of God and that of the Absolute is very close. The Absolute is only the philosophical rendering or modification of God according to many. In the popular conceptions of God, He is treated as a separate entity from the creation. But the philosophical demand for an ultimate unity could not leave the sundered elements in their isolation, but unified them by making God comprehend the world, and turned him into the Absolute. Substance, for example, is the ultimate principle of unity in Spinoza’s system. But this Substance written with a capital S, was called God by him. But Hegel found this concept unsatisfactory, as he did not find in it the aspect of freedom that characterises spirit. Substance is merely the carrier of attributes, but spirit is what originates them. Hence Spinoza’s Substance was turned into the Absolute Spirit of Hegel. Thus in the history of philosophy we find that God and the Absolute are playing the role of the unifying principle in various ways. No wonder therefore that Madhva attributes absolute perfection and control over the creation to his God. Because of the extremely realistic and pluralistic trend of Madhva’s philosophy one may feel that the comparison of his God to the Absolute of Western Philosophy would be far-fetched. But one cannot reasonably deny that the Brahman either in Sankara’s or in Ramanuja’s system can be called the Absolute.

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