BY P. RAJESWARA RAO

Autonomy and responsibility should go together. Autonomy without responsibility is meaningless, and responsibility without autonomy has no existence. But the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935, regarding the nature and extent of responsibility in the provincial administration, are very intricate and give rise to more than one interpretation. Most of us usually think that provincial autonomy and parliamentary government are synonymous. Then it would imply that the Governor is the constitutional head of the administration who acts on the advice of his Ministers, who are drawn from, and are responsible to, the provincial Legislature. But the Joint Parliamentary Committee points out that there is wide difference of opinion with regard to the manner in which provincial autonomy should be exercised. The actual interpretation may vary from absolute despotism of the provincial Governor to the total responsibility of the provincial Government to the Legislature. Further, the formation of interim Ministries, which carried little weight and less support, at the very outset of autonomy had not only destroyed sanguine expectations but also engendered suspicion and mistrust. This had also made it abundantly clear that the Governor is not the titular but the actual head of the administration. The working of autonomy in the various provinces has thrown further light on the situation. At this stage, a thorough and critical examination of the various provisions of the Act that are directly concerned with the operation of the responsibility under autonomy will enable us to form a correct estimate of the forces that are at work.

It cannot be denied that there is some element of responsibility in the provinces. The members of the provincial Legislature are elected, with the exception of the few nominated members of the Upper House. The Ministers are chosen from these members, and their salaries are determined by an act of the Legislature. The votable items of provincial expenditure are submitted to the vote of the Legislature. The function of the Ministers is to aid and advise the Governor. The Governor has no other adviser nor any spokesman of his own in the Assembly. These factors present a picture which bears a resemblance to parliamentary government.

But there is also the other side of the picture. As there is no adult franchise the elected members of the Legislature cannot be called the representatives of the people, who include non-voters as well, in the real sense of the term. The Ministers are only to aid and advise the Governor and hold office at his pleasure. Therefore they do not constitute the final executive authority. This need not be regarded as a violent interpretation of the Constitution Act. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court came to the same conclusion in deciding the "Hindustan Standard" case. The host of safeguards and special responsibilities strictly restrict the scope for exercising responsibility. These restraints are not nominal, and can be invoked under some pretext or another. The Governor presides over the Cabinet meetings in his discretion. This is incompatible with the acknowledged traditions of responsible government. When the Governor acts in his discretion the Ministry has no constitutional right to advise. Again, when the Governor acts in his individual judgment the Ministry can of course tender advice; but the Governor is at liberty to accept or reject such advice. The legislative and vetoing powers of the Governor are without a parallel anywhere. The constitutional grip of the Secretary of State for India is still there, as the members of the superior Services who dominate the administration are not only his nominees but are also subject to his control. Thus the political impotency and constitutional helplessness of the Ministers is proclaimed in a thousand and one ways. The real responsibility for running the show is located at Whitehall. Besides, the Communal Award, by virtue of its differential franchise, has created several classes of citizens and they are expected to remain in water-tight compartments. The communal foundation of this constitutional edifice is its main source of weakness. The financial aspect of autonomy does not inspire any confidence. The items that are charged on the revenues of the province. e.g., salaries of the Civilians and expenditure on Governor’s establishment, cannot be touched by the Legislature. The number of such short-comings can be multiplied indefinitely. Further the excluded areas are outside the ken of autonomy. If all these brakes are applied simultaneously, responsibility is reduced to a nullity, and autonomy becomes an empty word. The whole affair looks like a clear case of a constitutional caricature.

The real question that confronts us is how far it is practicable to run the administration according to the strict letter of the Act. Written constitutions often fail to work according to the calculations and expectations of the authors. It is always essential to shift the centre of gravity from the heights of legalism to the plains of practical politics. When the Congress, with the backing of majorities in seven out of eleven provinces, demanded unfettered freedom to carry on constitutional activities, the British Government at long last had to concede the substance of the demand. The intervention of the Governor-General, regarding the right of the Ministry to release the politicals on their own responsibility, provoked a queer constitutional crisis in Bihar and in U.P. Again the Congress view-point had to be met half-way. When the Orissa Ministry successfully took a bold stand against the appointment of a local Civilian to the acting Governorship, Sir John Hubback, the permanent incumbent, had to cancel his leave in the eleventh hour. Mr. Brett, the then chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar, had to apologise for sending a circular to the District Officers asking them not to carry out the orders of the Ministry unless these were countersigned by the Permanent Secretary of the Department concerned. When questions were asked in Parliament regarding the removal of the Neil Statue to the Museum, the Madras Premier successfully contended that it was a breach of convention, and the Secretary of State for India endorsed his view. In the Central Provinces the Governor had to welcome the Ministers who were dismissed by him. Most of the radical legislative enactments have been passed without resistance. The apprehensions about the opposition of the Permanent Services have been belied. It had fallen to the lot of a European Officer to make the Prohibition experiment in Salem a success. From these instances we can easily infer in which direction the wind is blowing. These experiences, though short and inadequate to make any far-reaching generalisation, have sufficiently shown that statesmanship lies in adjusting differences and in effecting a workable compromise. The necessity for a juster estimate and generous appreciation of the changed atmosphere, and of the new policies and programme, is recognised in every quarter. If the present state of things continues, as all of us wish, it will not be unreasonable to think that the safeguards and special responsibilities will, for all practical purposes, remain in the background and may even fall into disuse.

In this connection it is important to note how the Ministers are exercising their responsibility. So far as the Congress Provinces are concerned the Ministers are the creatures of the Working Committee, and they are responsible to the High Command alone. They are to abide by the directions of the zonal dictators, and act according to the instructions that are issued from time to time. The Congress hierarchy has established a new type of political morality. Dr. Khare, the axed premier of C. P., had to pay a heavy penalty for his disobedience in spite of his ‘constitutional’ behaviour. Of course discipline is necessary, and no one suspects the motives of the Congress High Command. They are no doubt actuated by noble impulses and have the welfare of the party and the province at heart. It is also contended that the Ministry represent the provincial electors, whereas the Congress represents the whole nation, and hence its power and authority should be respected. But this sort of centralisation of initiative is likely to result in inefficiency and in stagnation. It is a heavy price to pay for uniformity and co-ordination. Constitutionally it amounts to a negation of democracy and to a breach of Parliamentary traditions.

The situation in the non-Congress provinces is still worse. Though there is no external control, the coalition Cabinets are compelled to change their alliances every now and then to keep going. In Bengal it is more appropriate to say that the Cabinet is responsible to the European group. The addition of two Ministers from among the seceders did not bring about any improvement. The Cabinet cannot exist for a moment without the solid support of the Europeans. In Assam, till the recent formation of the Congress coalition, the Shadullah Cabinet had to abide by the wishes of the European planters in order to avoid breakdown. That is why the planters are anxious to torpedo the Congress coalition and lodge their old friends in power. The chronic instability of the Sind Cabinet stands in the way of real enjoyment of autonomy and real exercise of responsibility. They do not know where they stand and to whom they are responsible. The situation in Punjab is comparatively better. But the Premier and his colleagues are steeped in bureaucratic traditions and do not appear to be worried about autonomy or responsibility. In these provinces the communal cry is exploited to perpetuate a reactionary regime. But this game cannot succeed for all time to come, specially in these days of growing political consciousness. The prospects and possibilities of provincial autonomy can only be realised when a strong political party, with a definite programme and a clear policy, captures power.

Something has got to be said about the applicability of the doctrine of joint responsibility. There is no mention of it in the Constitution Act. But, under the Instrument of Instructions, the Governor is required to constantly bear in mind the necessity for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers. Obviously it is a piece of advice and not a definite instruction. Moreover, the Instrument of Instructions is a formal communication issued by His Majesty along with the commission of appointment. It only contains the desire of His Majesty concerning general lines of policy for the guidance of the Governor. It does not create fresh powers, for the Act provides that "the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that it was done otherwise than in accordance with any Instrument of Instructions issued to him." Further the following observation of the J. P. C. Report is significant: "The collective responsibility of Ministers to the Legislature is not a rule of law to be put into operation at discretion but a constitutional convention which only usage and practice can define and enforce." Until such a convention develops, the responsibility of ministers cannot be collective. Mr. Nausher Ali, the ex-Minister of the Bengal Cabinet, blankly refused to acknowledge collective responsibility, and the Ministry as a whole had to resign in order to get rid of him. During the Cabinet crisis in C. P., the Mahakoshal Ministers went one step further and refused to resign even after the resignation of the Premier. Then the Governor had to follow the unpleasant but indeed inevitable procedure of dismissing them. In spite of these regrettable lapses it is expected that the significance and the utility of collective responsibility will be realised and adhered to.

Having surveyed the operation of responsibility under autonomy in the light of experience gained so far, it would be interesting to know something about the trend of its future working. It is unwise to forecast anything dogmatically. But some observations can be made. "Democracy," to quote Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, "is on its last legs in the west." Whatever may be the conditions elsewhere, it is certain that in India democracy has an irresistible appeal. The psychology of the Indian mind and the present political atmosphere are conducive to its growth. But the experiment has begun with the initial disadvantage of a written constitution imposed from without, the rigidity of which does not permit automatic evolution. In spite of these constitutional checks and practical limitations, the tide of democracy is rising with a new vehemence and may soon overflow the bounds that restrict autonomy and responsibility.

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