BY DEWAN BAHADUR M. RAMACHANDRA RAO

The report of the Indian Franchise Committee has dealt very fully with the subject of the extension of franchise, but it has not devoted the same attention to the even more important subject of the methods of representation. After making a brief reference to the majority rule systems and minority and proportional systems in other countries, the Committee pointed out, as examples of the extreme form of the majority rule systems, the nation-wide constituency for the presidential election in the United States of America and in Germany, and also to the single-member territorial constituency in England. They then referred to the extreme form of minority representation–the separate electorates in which the minorities are registered on separate rolls and vote in separate constituencies, returning their own members directly to the Legislature. The terms of reference prevented the Indian Franchise Committee from dealing effectively with the whole problem of the methods of representation suitable to the varying conditions of India, and the result is that they have been obliged to say that "it is impossible for them at that stage to express any opinion as to which system should be adopted in the new Constitution, for the question lies at the core of the communal problem which is beyond their terms of reference." They therefore contented themselves by pointing out that "if separate electorates are adopted for any community, the constituencies so created must be single-member constituencies, as otherwise they would be quite unmanageable in size." If, on the other hand, any system of reservation of seats in joint electorates is adopted, the Committee expressed the view that it is impossible to reserve seats for members in single-member constituencies." Now that the communal award has been given, the question of methods of representation must be carefully considered. It is expected that the third R. T. C. will undertake a review of the report of the Indian Franchise Committee, and in the light of the conclusions of the R. T. C. in regard to methods of representation it is presumed that the Government of India will deal with the whole subject in consultation with the Local Governments and a special committee may, in all probability, be appointed for the purpose. It is, therefore, desirable that public attention should be drawn to a few salient points on the subject.

MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES IN MADRAS AND BOMBAY

In Madras and Bombay the system of multi-member constituencies had been adopted at the time of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In these two provinces the non-Brahmin communities claimed separate representation, but it was eventually decided that as they formed part of the Hindu community, protection to them should be given by the reservation of seats in multi-member constituencies. The request for the continuance of the multi-member constituencies has been supported by the Provincial Committee in Bombay and also by the Provincial Government, and the Indian Franchise Committee have recommended the continuance of the existing system. In regard to Madras, the Committee observed that experience had shown that the reservation of seats for non-Brahmins in Madras has now become unnecessary in practice. The continuance of the multi-member constituencies has been, however, pressed on the Committee by non-official witnesses. The majority of the Committee did not deal with this contention but the dissenting members (Messrs. S. B. Tambe, C. Y. Chintamani and R. K. Bakhale) recommended that the present system should be retained also in Madras. Now that it has been decided by the Poona Pact that the depressed classes should find their representation in joint electorates, not only in Madras but throughout India, the question of the creation of multi-member constituencies has become a necessity. Even apart from this aspect of the problem we are now at the threshold of a new democratic system in India and it is desirable that we should take stock of the experience gained in other parts of the world of the working of the electoral systems in force there and devise ways and means for the introduction of a satisfactory method of returning the representatives to the legislatures in the country.

THE SINGLE-MEMBER SYSTEM—THE BRITISH MODEL

Great Britain is the home of the territorial single-member constituency and the system of election prevailing there is the relative majority system. The advocates of single-member constituencies rely for support on the British model. It is, therefore, necessary to make a brief reference to the evolution of the single-member constituencies in that country and the results of the working of the present electoral machinery. The centenary of electoral reform in Great Britain was celebrated only the other day, and the experience of the last 100 years of the methods of representation came under review by eminent political leaders of the country. The Reform Act of 1832 is a turning point in the political history of Great Britain. It made secure the ultimate victory of popular as against aristocratic government. At the time of the Reform Act, the two-member constituency was the rule and there were at that time in England only 5 single-member constituencies. The changes made from that time were summarized by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems in 1910. They say:

"The Reform Act varied two-member representation in both directions. Seven counties received a third member, and 50 more single-member boroughs were formed, partly by direct creation, partly by depriving certain boroughs of their second member. The Representation of the People Acts 1867 (England) and 1868 (Scotland) continued the process by adding 47 single-member and 5 three-member boroughs. By such successive and piecemeal modifications, based on no theory beyond a rough endeavour to adjust anomalies caused by the drift of population, the distribution of members had become in 1884 highly variegated without being satisfactory. Thus, when the Franchise Bill of that year, which increased the electorate by 40 per cent through the assimilation of the country and borough franchise rendered a large measure of redistribution inevitable, the opportunity was taken to remodel the whole system. The basis of representation then selected was the single-member division, an electoral unit which facilitated the assignment of any desired number of members to any county or borough without creating constituencies of inordinate size. Till 1884 the five single-member constituencies had only existed because they were too small to be entitled to more than one member. From that date they became the unit on which all representation was to be calculated and all future schemes of redistribution must rest."

At the time when these reforms were carried out, no importance was attached to minority representation though it was not overlooked. We have the authority of the minister who drafted the bill for saying that "minority representation, in effect, either for the whole or for part of the United Kingdom, was considered and rejected; proportional representation, though well-known in literature had made little impression on politicians."

SUPPRESSION OF MINORITY OPINION

The natural result of this omission was increasing dissatisfaction ever since with the whole electoral system. It was not long, however, before minorities, religious, political, racial or economic, claimed that the system of majority rule was unduly crude in its operation, and was unfair to important sections of the community , having opinions or interests of their own, which, under the single-member constituency system, had no chance of securing direct representation in the legislature. Every general election in Great Britain made it clear that in addition to the nature of the franchise and the character of the constituencies, a third factor exercised an all-important influence on the composition of the House of Commons. That factor is the method of election. In Great Britain the franchise has now reached its widest limit, but it is admitted by all political parties that election from equal single-member constituencies has failed to produce a representative Parliament. In recent years, criticism has become more insistent, and since 1900 the method of electing the House of Commons has formed the subject of no less than three official inquiries.

ROYAL COMMISSIONS

The first of these enquiries was the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems in 1910. This Commission came to the conclusion that "they were unable to report that a case has been made out for the adoption of the transferable vote here-in-now for election to the House of Commons." Six years later, in 1916, a Conference on Electoral Reform was appointed. It included members of all parties from both Houses of Parliament with the Speaker of the House of Commons (Lord Ullswater) as Chairman. This Conference unanimously recommended that proportional representation should be applied in all densely populated areas. The seats affected numbered some 200. This was a great advance upon the views expressed by the Royal Commission of 1910. The third enquiry was held in 1930. As in 1916, it was a Conference of members of the three main political parties, and it was again presided over by Lord Ullswater. But the members of this Conference did not approach the question of reform from the same non-partisan standpoint as did the members of the earlier Conference. Members voted to a large extent as members of a party reflecting party wishes and no unanimous decision or compromise was arrived at. Nevertheless, this Conference, by a majority (13 votes to 8) resolved that "any change in the present system of Parliamentary elections should include the adoption of proportional representation with the single transferable vote"; and they further decided, also by a majority, which included most of the Labour members, against the application of the alternative vote in any constituencies which might remain as single-member constituencies. Early in 1931, an Electoral Reform Bill was introduced which proposed the general adoption of the alternative vote. This Bill did not, however, become law. Even under a two-party system the single-member constituencies gave no assurance of majority rule. Since the advent of the Labour party, the confusion has become worse confounded and tri-cornered fights in the constituencies have resulted in a minority of voters returning the majority of representatives in Parliament. That system has failed to ensure fair representation to minorities. In these circumstances there can be no surprise at the statement made by Lord Parmour in the recent debate on the Electoral Reform Bill that the present system gave "a grotesque and utterly untrue representation," and that "it was a great constitutional blot on Great Britain:" The result of this brief survey shows that in Great Britain where the single-member constituencies are in operation, it has been found by experience that the successful candidate is very often returned by a minority of the votes cast, thereby defeating the majority principle. As pointed out by the Lothian Committee, it is possible under the system in vogue in Great Britain for the legislature to consist largely of members returned by a minority of votes cast (as was the case in the British Parliament in 1924). The second ballot, the alternative vote, and the proportional representation have been discussed for years to rectify the serious defects of the single-member system, but no conclusion has, as yet, been reached. All attempts at reform have been opposed and political parties have not been able as yet to take a dispassionate view of the electoral system.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN INDIA

With this experience of the working of the single-member constituencies in Great Britain, we have now to consider whether the creation of single-member constituencies and the abandonment of the present system of multi-member constituencies wherever they exist would be a sound step. I have no hesitation in answering this question in the negative. Even in a country with a homogeneous population like Great Britain the single-member constituencies, as a method of returning members of Parliament, have been found to be a failure.

The system does not make any provision for the effective representation of minority opinion–political, economic, or otherwise. Organised political parties on the British model do not, as yet, exist in this country and we cannot now visualise the course of events in regard to their evolution. But at the present time communal strife and communal feeling are so great not only among the main castes but also among the sub-castes, that they cannot be ignored. The undesirable state of things will be further emphasised by the creation of single-member constituencies. However regrettable, they have to be recognized for the present as a working factor in the elections. A Kamma for a Kamma, a Kapu for a Kapu, a Vellala for a Vellala, a Brahmin for a Brahmin, a Nadar for a Nadar, a Mudaliar for a Mudaliar, a Gounder for a Gounder–these and other slogans have come into vogue during the last ten years and it is difficult to say when they will disappear. We are eagerly looking forward to the day when these religious and class antagonisms will be eliminated from the political life of the country. In these circumstances, the creation of single-member constituencies in a country consisting of different races, castes, sub-castes and different shades of political opinion, and different political parties with different political and social programmes, is an unsuitable method of securing a proper representation of minority opinion and various shades of political opinion in the legislature. The single-member constituency would perpetuate the domination of the main caste or sub-caste in each electoral area, and the minority opinion will never have a chance of being represented in the legislature.

THE SECOND BALLOT AND THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE

It may be suggested that the expedients to correct the defects of the single-member system may also be tried here. The first is the system of second ballot under which, where any candidate does not obtain an absolute majority, a second election is held sometime later. As regards this method, the Indian Franchise Committee are unanimously agreed "that the delay and expense involved in the application of the device would be too great to enable them to support its introduction." As it is, in some provinces, elections are going to be spread over several days. "A repetition of the dislocation of administration involved would be intolerable. Any benefits obtained by the use of the second ballot would be counter-balanced by the ills bred of uncertainty and delay." In regard to the alternative vote the object is to prevent the minorities from gaining control of the legislature. The Indian Franchise Committee are also unanimously of opinion that for the franchise that they have proposed the alternative vote is out of the question. The working of the alternative vote in New South Wales has been unhappy, and the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems in 1910 drew attention to the fact that in Australia the opportunity for party intrigue and the gratification of personal ill-feeling, which are conferred both by the power of using and that of withholding preferences, have been found to produce regrettable results. Apart from these views, the exercise of the alternative vote implies the marking of ballot papers. The large majority of the voters are at present illiterate. On the findings of the Indian Franchise Committee, the expedients adopted elsewhere for correcting the defects of the single-member system are inapplicable to the conditions prevailing in this country. The introduction of the single-member constituencies without these expedients would create an intolerable situation for the minorities and for minority opinion.

THE LIMITED VOTE

For the solution of the problem of minority representation in this country, we must, therefore, fall back upon one of the minority and proportional representation systems that have been tried in Europe and in America. They all require multi-member constituencies for their operation. I should like to invite attention to some of these systems. The first of these is the limited vote, so called because the elector is only allowed to vote for a limited number of candidates, i.e., a number less than that of the seats to be filled. A party then cannot monopolise the representation of the constituency unless it has a very considerable majority. For example, if a constituency returns three members and each elector is only allowed two votes, the minimum majority of votes required to carry all the seats will be three to two. This system is in force in Portugal and in certain constituencies in Spain, and was applied in England to constituencies returning more than two members from 1867 to 1885.

THE JAPANESE SYSTEM

A variant of the limited vote is in force in Japan. In that country the constituencies for the Lower House of Parliament return several members, on the average about 3,4 and 5 up to 8, but each elector is allowed only one vote. Thus in an eight-member constituency, a party which can muster only 1/8 of the votes, can be certain of returning a member. The Proportional Representation Society, London, have sent a memorandum to the Indian Franchise Committee recommending that, in the conditions of this country, the Japanese system may be found satisfactory. In explaining the system, the memorandum says:

"The method of election proposed is that of the single non-transferable vote in constituencies each returning several members. It is the system in use in Japan, with manhood suffrage (at the age of 25) for the election of the Lower House of Parliament. The method was first introduced in 1900, and was confirmed and extended in its application by the Electoral Law of 1925. The distinctive element of the scheme is that each elector may exercise only one vote, no matter how many representatives are to be elected.

"Consider the operation of the Japanese system in a constituency having, say, 500 voters and electing five representatives. Each voter will have one vote only; there will, therefore, be 500 votes in play, and no more. If any candidate obtains 100 votes, he will be sure of election, for only four other candidates can obtain as many as 100 each from the remaining 400 votes. Thus, the system assures representation for minorities of any considerable size; one-fifth of the electors in a five-member area can secure one seat; two-fifths can secure two seats.

"The system would assure representation to the majority communities and all minorities which are considerable numerically–the Muhammadans, the Depressed Classes, the Sikhs in the Punjab, the Hindus in the provinces where these are in a minority, and the Indian Christians In Madras.

"The Japanese system differs very materially in its working from the system of joint electorates with reserved seats. The report of the Minorities Committee contains this comment on the latter system: ‘Doubts were expressed that, whilst such a system of election might secure the representation of minorities, it provided no guarantee that the representation would be genuine, but that it might, in its working, mean the nomination or, in any event, the election of minority representatives by the majority communities.’

The Japanese system–the single non-transferable vote–acts in a different way; each community or section, majority or minority, can elect its own representatives by its own votes; indeed, it secures its fullest share of representation, each community or political group must vote for its own candidates; representation will be genuine; no majority can deprive a minority of its full share of the seats."

THE CUMULATIVE VOTE

Another expedient is the cumulative vote. Under this system the voter is given as many votes as there are seats to be filled, but he may spread them over several candidates or accumulate them on one, according to his preference. The power of accumulation enables a numerically weak party, by the concentration of its voting power on its own candidate, to secure at least one seat against far more powerful opponents. The cumulative vote is in much use in the elections of school boards in England and Scotland and it was proposed for adoption in political elections in Great Britain in discussions of the Reform Bill in 1867, but unsuccessfully, and is not used for such purposes in any country at the present time. The Indian Franchise Committee have, however, recommended the use of the cumulative vote in multi-member constituencies. They considered that as between the restriction vote (as under the Japanese system) and the cumulative vote, they preferred the cumulative vote as giving an opportunity of exercising a broad choice to the voter, and not reserving his attentions solely to those of his caste or creed if he so desires. They believed that the cumulative vote would give a less narrow outlook to the voter and render the divisions in the community less stereotyped. These are weighty considerations but in present circumstances the cumulative vote will result in "plumping" all the votes for the candidate of the voter's own community. The voter will not exercise, in present circumstances, his vote in favour of other candidates. This will aggravate the present situation. I think, on the whole, that the limited vote where the voter is restricted to the exercise of his vote in favour of two candidates, would perhaps be a better system. I suggest, therefore, the creation of at least three-member constituencies where the voter is permitted to exercise only two votes.

THE ELECTORAL UNIT

At present the district is the electoral unit for the elections to the Legislative Council in Madras. I would prefer that the unity of the district for electoral purposes should be preserved also for the future. The allotment of certain number of seats to the district as a whole would enable the voters to come to some understanding and there will be a variety of representation, both political and communal, from the district which might cause far less friction than the single-member constituency. It may also be necessary to adopt the district as a unit for the purpose of conducting the primary elections for the selection of candidates from the Depressed Classes under the Poona Pact, and for the reservation of seats for them. If, however, the district is considered as too unwieldy, it may have to be divided into two electoral areas, each returning at least three members. In that event the reservation for the Depressed Classes may have to be made in one of the two electoral divisions of the district. It is understood that the Madras Government contemplate the creation of each revenue division into a single electoral unit returning a single member. As I have already pointed out, this system would altogether ignore the fundamental requirement of the minority representation and would be wholly objectionable. More-over, it is necessary to draw into the Legislative Councils men who have achieved at least a district reputation. The smaller the unit the greater is the chance of the election of inefficient representatives. On all these broad grounds, it is inadvisable to unduly reduce the size of the electoral area. There is some indication that the Muslims are also thinking of joining the general electorates with reservation of seats. In this event the case for the retention of the district as a unit becomes still stronger.

A good deal has been said about the expense involved in the elections to the legislatures and about the inordinate size of the present constituencies. It may be admitted that there is some justification for this view. It is a matter of common knowledge, however, that money power in politics is asserting itself and that the illegitimate expenditure in the elections is becoming larger and larger than the legitimate expenditure. One sometimes hears the most astounding stories of the sums spent in the elections to the local bodies in this province. The smaller the unit the easier it is to corrupt the electorate. The area of two revenue divisions of a district is not unduly large as a unit for elections to the legislature.

In conclusion, I beg to express the hope that public opinion may be fully ascertained in regard to all proposals relating to the questions now awaiting solution. The tentative proposals of the Government in regard to the methods of representation, the distribution of territorial areas and other matters should be published beforehand and criticism may be invited. The widest publicity should be given so that all the interests may have an opportunity of being heard.

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