BY D. SANDILYA

Since the absorption of Austria. Czechoslovakia has become the most inflammable spot in Central Europe. Half-encircled by Nazi Germany and flanked on either side by pro-Nazi Poland and Hungary, her position is untenable. Inside and outside her frontiers the Germans are fomenting a war-scare. On the 21st May all but a clash occurred between the Czechs and Germans, and only the prompt action of the Czech General Staff and the strong protests of England, France and Russia saved Europe from a first-class war. And even now the lull in Central Europe may very well be the prelude to another series of week-end surprises from Berlin.

But if matters are allowed to come to such a pass it would mean the annihilation of the Versailles system and the final triumph of Nazi Germany. Czechoslovakia is the only stronghold of democracy east of the Rhine, and a blow to her would be the deadliest blow to democracy in Europe. If Czechoslovakia goes the way of Spain, the chances of survival for freedom and humanity and international morality would be remote. The barricades must be raised in Prague while there is yet time. The independence of Czechoslovakia at least must be made inviolable.

But the problems of Czechoslovakia, external as well as internal, are complicated and admit of no easy solution. She holds a pivotal position in Central Europe; she is the meeting-ground of Teuton, Slav and Magyar, the clearing-house for the east and the west, the only bridge-head between France and Russia. Her strategic and geographical situation lies at the root of the shifting politics of Central Europe. She commands the Danubian route into the Balkan peninsula; she under-pins Poland; she is a salient on Germany’s eastern frontier; finally she is the jumping-off ground for military offensives in the south and the east.

Germany has long coveted the control of this commanding position. If German advance towards the east is to be secure, this flanking fortress must be reduced to impotence. Only then would the wheat of Hungary and the oil of Rumania lie within easy grasp. Only then would the German industrial provinces of Saxony and Silesia be safe from invasion. Moreover, Czechoslovakia is a rich country and her economic resources would be of value to Germany. Her armament factories at Pilsen could be requisitioned; her forests could be turned into cellulose. It is vital to German interests therefore that Czechoslovakia should be in German hands or in the hands of a friendly power. In fact, hegemony over Bohemia has been the dream of the Germans. Frederick the Great and Bismarck, Imperialist Germans and Imperialist Austrians–all of them considered that the mastery of Bohemia would mean the mastery of Europe. And now the Nazis are following the old principle with a new audacity. As Hitler has said in his Mein Kampf, "We start where we left off six centuries ago. We reverse the eternal migration of the German people to the south and the west of Europe and look eastward." So Czechoslovakia must be immobilised or cleared out of the way.

For similar reasons France and Russia are interested in preserving Czechoslovak independence intact. Czechoslovakia is the centre-piece in the French system of alliances and security, the main bulwark against German expansion. France has learnt the lesson of Sadowa-Sedan; and she has no wish to learn it again. French credits and French counsel have laid the foundations of the Czech Republic. A permanent French military mission has been established in Prague. Russia is equally anxious to prevent a German domination in Czechoslovakia, for Russia would then be isolated from France by a cordon sanitaire and the road to the Ukraine and the Black Sea would lie open.

The smaller powers also cannot view with equanimity the destruction of the Czech State. Hungary might rejoice but Yugoslavia and Rumania and Poland would plainly see the writing on the wall. Even Italy in the final analysis cannot acquiesce in a German coup in Prague.

Thus the fate of Czechoslovakia is the concern of all Europe–and the Czechs realise it. They know that they have to pursue a bold and consistent policy if they are to avoid being mere pawns on the European chess-board. Isolated, they would be at the mercy of Germany; allied to France alone, they would be exposed to every phase of the Franco-German struggle. They have therefore striven for the support of as many powers as possible, who are primarily interested in maintaining the status quo. They have sought refuge in the rigidity of the Peace Treaties; they have adhered to the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all the powers concerned. They have tried to minimise the risks of war by insisting that every war should be turned into a major war. And they have pursued this policy with a consistency greater than that shown by any other power.

The three axioms of Czechoslovak foreign policy have thus been: collective security; the solidarity of the Little Entente; and alliance with France and Russia. Czechoslovakia has been among the staunchest supporters of the League from the beginning; her statesmen have been the most intelligent exponents of its principles. The Little Entente arose out of bi-lateral pacts concluded in 1920-1 between the three succession States of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia and represents their external unity of interests. It has developed into a fairly compact union, with a Standing Council, an Economic Council and a machinery for frequent consultations between General Staffs. It has survived major and minor divergences of opinion among its members and is directed as much against German imperialism as against Hungarian irredentism. Finally, Czechoslovakia has allied herself with France and Russia. She concluded a treaty of alliance and friendship with the former in 1924 and a pact of mutual assistance in 1925. After the rise of the Nazi menace she reinforced these treaties with a pact of mutual assistance with Russia drawn up on the lines of, and contingent upon, the Franco-Soviet alliance. France and Russia and Czechoslovakia are thus closely linked together in a three-cornered binding agreement. The signatories are to come to each other’s aid in case of war with a foreign power without waiting for the League to establish the fact of aggression. That is why, if Czechoslovakia is overrun, a general war is more than likely to break out in Europe.

Externally Czechoslovakia is well insured against attack; but the danger of disruption may come from inside. Her internal problems are far more difficult than her external ones. Born in ‘exile,’ founded by a ‘triumvirate of savants’ (Masatyk, Benes and Stefanik), the rise of the Czech Republic was romantic. But she embodied at once the merits and defects of the Peace settlement. The Czechs were given the ancient frontiers of the kingdom of Bohemia, and they made one part of the old world safe for democracy. But the principle of nationality was flagrantly disregarded in the case of the vanquished who were included in the new State. Hence Czechoslovakia was left with tremendous minority problems. The rich districts of Silesia were attached to her; so disputes between Poland and Czechoslovakia were allowed to poison their relations, Finally, in order to encircle Hungary, Czechoslovakia was saddled with sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the most backward, destitute and unimprovable part of the old empire. Thus it looked almost as if the Allies in laying the foundations of peace built in the causes of war as well.

Nowhere in Europe are the alien communities larger or more important for international relations than in Czechoslovakia, Of her 15 millions one-third are minorities, Czechs and Slovaks number 9,688,943 (66.92%); Germans 3.231,688 (22.3%); Magyars 692,000 (4.78%); Ruthenians 549,000 (3.79%); Poles 82,000 (0.56%); Jews 186,000 (1.29%). The presence of these large groups has made it difficult for the Czechs to build up a united national consciousness.

Czechs and Slovaks themselves have a great many differences. Although they both belong to the Slav race, the Slovaks speak a different dialect, are more strongly Catholic and culturally less advanced. The Czechs when they raised the banner of independence in America promised complete autonomy to the Slovaks. But the aftermath of victory, the dangers of invasion and the possible weaknesses of federalism combined to make of Czechoslovakia a strong, centralised State, Slovak schools were established in Slovensko, and local government was handed over to the Slovaks. But Czech domination became more and more blatant; all the important offices in Slovakia were filled by Czechs; the individual character of Slovak language and life was ignored and even denied, A strong autonomy movement arose in Slovakia led by Father Hlinka, a remarkable country priest. Its programme, however, has not been separatist.

The Magyars live along the Hungarian frontier of Czechoslovakia and Ruthenia and consist mainly of peasants and small townsmen. They are dissatisfied with their present state, but with the exception of the United Magyar Party, they are in no mind to go back to Hungary. In 1935 an agreement was signed by the Hungarian leaders, as a result of which the bulk of the community voted for Benes.

The Ruthenians are of Ukrainian stock, and were the most neglected section of Hungary. Czechoslovakia has done much to raise the standards of education and social services for them; she has spent eight milliard Czech kronen in the last nineteen years. But the autonomy promised them has not yet been granted. The Polish minority is small but significant enough to make Poland take an unnecessary interest in Czech affairs.

But it is the German minority which represents the most outstanding internal problem of Czechoslovakia. The German community is the largest minority in any European State, save for the Ukrainians in Poland. The Germans occupy a strong geographical position and live in compact areas along the German and Austrian frontier. They have a high standard of economic cultural maturity. The bulk of the Bohemian industries is located in their districts; they were the privileged race during 300 years of Hapsburg rule. And now their economic and psychological readjustment to the new facts of the post-war world has been intensely difficult. They demanded union with Austria immediately after the war; they refused to cooperate in the making of the Czechoslovak constitution. They have been the most explosive element in Czech politics; they present Germany with an easy excuse for hostile interference.

Many of their complaints are justified. The Agrarian reform worked largely against German landowners; Czech colonists were settled in predominantly German districts. The war loans of the Germans were not met by the Czech government. German firms were acquired by Czech banks; German contractors were cheated out of their business. Czechs filled an unduly high proportion of official posts; and their persecution was intolerable. On the other hand the Czechs gave the Germans all the rights of proportional and universal franchise. From the beginning the Germans were allowed to control the parish and municipal councils in areas where they were in a majority. German education was allowed in all schools. And in respect of higher education the position of the Germans was better than that of the Czechs.

But at the root of all troubles are economic facts which are largely beyond control. Czechoslovakia inherited 60% of the grain-producing area and 60% of the industrial equipment of Austria-Hungary. Her economy is an excellently balanced one. But her mineral and fuel resources make her a predominantly industrial country, importing raw materials and exporting manufactures. Before the war she could command the whole of the Danubian area as a single market; that area is now split up into several independent world markets which are choked by tariff walls. Czechoslovakia is thus exposed to every gust that passes over world economy. Moreover, Czechoslovakia has been caught in the grip of the movement for autarchy which has convulsed Europe. She has become self-sufficient in her basic food-stuffs and an exporter of wheat and rye. Her trade relations have thereby been seriously affected. She no longer imports the foodstuffs of the Balkan States; while the low purchasing power of these States and their partial industrialisation have combined to divert Czechoslovak export trade to other countries. Half of Czech manufactures have to be exported, and of these only 1/3 are consumed by the Balkan States. Germany till recently figured as the largest customer of Czechoslovakia. The Elbe route to the North Sea was one of the life-lines of Czech export trade. But since the depression of 1929-31 Germany has grown to be increasingly autarchic and a rival in the Balkans; and the loss to Czechoslovak export trade has not been compensated by the increase of her exports to France, Holland and Switzerland. Consequently, her output has been limited; many of her industrial districts have been turned into distressed areas unemployment has grown rife; and the already low level of wages has tended to sag still lower. On the other hand, her agriculture could not be increased; only 4% of the total land area is uncultivated, while the existing farms are of small or medium size and wholly unsuited to extensive cultivation. Since 1936 there has been a recovery, but the turnover of Czechoslovak export trade is still 45% below the 1929 level.

The political consequences have been terrible. The Germans have been the hardest hit economically and they have blamed the Czechs for all their sufferings. In fact it is economic nationalism and the economic depression that have exacerbated national sentiment and racial propaganda. For between 1919-1929 when the State was growing prosperous, the opposition of the minorities was clearly on the decline. In 1920 when Germany was in a financial chaos the Sudeten Germans turned to the new State and began to accept its existence. After 1925 when the Locarno treaty was concluded and the international situation brightened, the German Agrarian and the German Christian Socialists in Czechoslovakia–the ‘Activists’ even entered the Cabinet. In 1927 the Hlinka party also accepted office. And in 1929 even the German Social Democrats co-operated and formed a bourgeois-socialist coalition. Only the German Nationalists were uncompromisingly hostile.

But the depression put an end to all further developments at home. In the distress that followed, the minorities drifted away; bitterness increased; extremist and anti-democratic ideas began to surge up to the surface. A Czech Fascist party became active in 1932. The German National Socialist and Nazi parties were encouraged by the Hitler movement in Germany. In 1934 a devaluation had to be effected and it hit the German middle classes more acutely than the Czech. And the state of tension which followed was soon gauged by the elections in 1935 when Herr Henlein polled 70% of the German votes for his Sudetendeutsche Partei (South German party). He himself stood outside parliament and refused to co-operate, thus causing a dangerous deadlock.

Herr Henlein’s party has roots stretching back to pre-war times; it derives its strength from the youth movements and the romantic conception of the ‘folk.’ Its political ideas are those of Othmar Spann–anti-democracy, anti-liberalism, anti- Marxism. When the German nationalist parties were banned in 1933 in Czechoslovakia, Henlein, a gymnastic instructor, a man of few ideas but an efficient organizer, formed a Heimatsfront and later united all the reactionary elements in the Sudeten party. But since the rise of Nazi Germany, Henlein has tended to become merely the tool of Berlin. He gets his orders from Nazi headquarters and is now the mouth-piece of German claims in Czechoslovakia. In February 1937 the Czech government negotiated an agreement with the Activists introducing proportionalism in offices, contracts and social services. But the Henleinists have vigorously attacked it because it did not go far enough or fast enough. Since the Anschluss they have been joined by the activists also and they now present a menacing front.

The Sudeten problem has thus become the gravest problem in Czechoslovakia. It no longer concerns the minority alone; it affects the relations between Czechs and Germans; it has become the problem of peace in Central Europe. It is true that the Czechs have done much for their minorities. It is also clear that these minorities are the best treated in Europe and that the legitimate grievances of the Sudeten Germans are few. But in the present position of Central Europe, and in face of a grasping Germany, it is of the utmost importance that no grievances should exist at all, legitimate or otherwise. The Czechs should be persuaded to make as many concessions as possible and as quickly as they could.

But on the other hand the demands of the Henleinists are clearly impossible of fulfillment. The Carlsbad programme of 19th May–the minimum programme–insists on racial corporativism and the right to secede from the State. Such a demand could never be granted. Further, so long as the Henleinists hold totalitarian beliefs, it would be difficult for the Czechs to negotiate or co-operate with them. Finally, there are technical obstacles which lie in the way of the granting of autonomy to the Germans. For the Germans live in eight compact areas, and if these are given autonomy, 909,841 Germans would be still living as minorities; and in those eight districts 10,458 other nationals and 440,561 Czechs would be reduced to the position of minorities. Czechs and Germans live too close to each other and the new frontiers would administratively be impossible. The only hope for Czechoslovakia is to become a Central European Switzerland, as Masaryk dreamed; but the times are out of joint, and democratic and anti-democratic communities cannot live in amity. The transfer of populations might be attempted as Greece and Turkey did, but economic questions would present insuperable difficulties.

The fact is that the Sudeten problem can be solved only at the expense of Czech independence. That is precisely what Germany is aiming at; and the Czechs realise it. The Czechs have offered to consolidate all minority charters and accelerate the programme of proportionalism. And the Czech premier has started negotiations with the Henleinists on these lines. But the Czechs are prepared for all contingencies, and in the event of the breakdown of the negotiations they will have their plans ready. Whether the attack comes from the Moravian gateway or from Linz, the Czechs will probably withdraw to a central quadrilateral and there engage the enemy. They are capable of an initial resistance for two or three weeks; and thereafter they are confident that their allies would come to their aid, Russia by air and France by land. By then the war would have spread, and even England would be compelled to take part. The events of 21st May showed how right were Czech calculations and how essential is the reconstruction of collective security for peace in Europe.

But perhaps Germany will not fight. Her officers corps is far from adequate; she still lacks raw materials; she has not yet digested Austria; and it is far from clear whether any war can be a war of quick decision. Moreover, Germany may not have to fight at all. She is now in an excellent position to put economic pressure on Czechoslovakia. She could close the Elbe route for Czech exports and make even the transit to Trieste difficult. Czechoslovakia would then lie largely at the mercy of Poland’s favours in Gdynia. Her economic situation would become untenable.

Stringent measures should therefore be taken in the immediate future. Hitler has been temporarily baulked; and while he pauses there is time for reconstruction and recovery. The Czechs should be persuaded to concede as much as they could without imperilling their position. At the same time concerted efforts should be undertaken to build up trade relations in Danubia with a view to making it a compact economic area. M. Hodza’s efforts should be steadily encouraged by England and France, and they should agree between themselves to take more of one another’s goods. And most of all, the democracies should form it solid axis and negotiate with Hitler. A great opportunity has presented itself and should not be lost; at any rate, the democracies should strive to clear their conscience and deprive Hitler of his moral strength by offering him economic concessions. Only thus could this breathing space be put to effective purpose. A great deal depends on the Henlein-Hodza negotiations; but far more depends on the ability of the democratic powers to present a united front to Hitler and make a lasting settlement.

BACK