BY "A SCHOLAR"

Some eminent Indians went to London to attend a Conference with the representatives of the British Parliament. Many of them had refused to put their case before the representatives of Parliament when they came out to India, because they came as a ‘Commission.’ Now the same politicians were willing to put their case before another body of representatives of the same Parliament, because now it is a ‘Conference’ which, by the way, has, though sheer perseverance, secured official recognition for the title of Round Table Conference. The Indian politicians and leaders went to London to demand ‘Dominion Status’ and they returned with ‘Responsibility at the Centre’, securely fastened with many reservations and safeguards.

The Congress leaders have been set free, and it is hoped that they will consider the Round Table Conference Scheme for the future Government of India. The following are the main prominent features of the Scheme:

1. The future Constitution of India will be of a Federal nature.
2. The Indian States will join the Federation.
3. The Provinces of British India will be re-constituted on a more rational basis.
4. The Provinces will be completely autonomous States.
5. The Federal Government will be responsible to the Federal Parliament, with necessary safeguards and reservations for the transition stage until India becomes a full Dominion.

An expert Committee is to be appointed for further consultation with Indian leaders and to draft a Constitution. A Boundary Commission will take up the question of re-constituting the Provinces. We had already a Commission and a Conference, and now we are to have a Committee. The Constitution that we have to draft must be such as will place India in a position of equality with the Dominions automatically, without any further need for commissions and conferences. Any mistake at this stage is sure to necessitate fresh commissions and conferences in another ten years. So the whole scheme has to be very carefully considered.

It is accepted by all that the Provinces have to be re-constituted. There is no reality about the present Provinces. The Congress scheme of Provinces will be an acceptable one for the future Government of India. Some alterations in details may be necessary. I assume that the following can be the major Provinces:

If the Bombay and the Madras Presidencies are so split up, Bombay will cease to be a Provincial capital, and perhaps Madras also. They will have to be ‘Free Cities’. I assume that Poona will be the capital for the Mahratta area, and Surat or Ahmedabad for the Gujerati area; similarly Bezwada may be the capital for the Andhra Province and Trichinopoly for the Tamil Province (being in the centre and easily accessible from all parts of the Tamil districts).

If all these Provinces are to be autonomous units of an All- India Federation, in which all the Indian States will come in, as is proposed at the Round Table Conference, what are the consequences? What chances have the Indian democratic forces to function in such a Constitution? Even with full Provincial Autonomy and responsibility at the Centre, what chance has such a Constitution to function smoothly along the current of nationalistic feeling in India? What reservations and safeguards must be provided on behalf of Indian nationalism in such a Constitution? These are points that must be considered.

At present, the chief Provinces have a Governor each at the head. There are nine of them. In the future Constitution, Burma goes out. And yet we must have about fifteen Governors, besides the Chief Commissioners for smaller areas and the Free Cities. Who will be the Governors? Public men from England? We have only three such Governorships now. Are we to raise it to fifteen? Or, are the Governors to be selected from the Civil Service? We have six such Governors now. Everyone knows what Provincial Autonomy would mean with about fifteen I.C.S. Governors in India and about five I.C.S. Chief Commissioners. Then the only other choice is to have fifteen Governors and five Chief Commissioners selected from among the public men of India.

If we can have all the Provinces and Cities with Indian public men as Governors and Chief Commissioners, assisted by a Cabinet of popular Ministers responsible to an elected Legislature, and this immediately, then the Federation will work. Then the minor details can easily be settled. Are the Governors to be nominated or elected? Can a popular Governor be his own Chief Minister also, as is the case with the President of the United States? Or, should there be a Governor above the parties in the Legislature? Should the Ministry be removable or can it be given a fixed tenure, but under the control of the Legislature? These are details that can be easily settled, if the main principle is accepted.

But if we are to have about twenty heads of Provinces, some appointed from England, some recruited from the I.C.S. and a few nominated from among the public men of India, Provincial Autonomy will be a sham. There must be some reserve powers for such heads of Provinces and the time will never come when the transitional period will be over. The prime necessity is that the heads of Provinces in the next Constitution must be Indians outside of the administrative machinery, that is, that they must be chosen from among the public men of India. If this can be got without any conditions, then there is little to be considered. But if some price has to be Paid for this, then what should that price be? This is the problem that I consider.

I am prepared to surrender Provincial Autonomy, in order that India may not have foreign and I.C.S. Governors with their patronage, durbars and State receptions. If the Provinces are not to be autonomous, what is the authority to control the Provinces? It cannot be the Federal Government. Then the only alternative is that the whole of British India should be under a unitary form of government, and the Provinces will be only parts of this unitary government. The Provinces shall have such powers as are devolved on them by statute, both in respect of legislation and administration. The real power will be in the Central Government for British India. The Central Government shall be a full sovereign State and will be the unit for federation with the States. The Federal Government shall be quite different from the Government for British India.

Each of the Provinces shall have a Governor (elected or nominated) but never an official, with a popular Ministry responsible to a fully-elected Legislature. These Provincial Governments are not autonomous. They are subject to the Central Government for British India. They will be glorified District Boards, with wider powers for legislation and administration and higher status. The size of the Legislature and of the Ministry must depend on the area of the Province–say, for the Legislature there can be not less than forty and not more than one hundred and twenty members and the Ministers can be not less than three and not more than six.

The Government of British India shall be vested in a Governor-General advised by a Cabinet, responsible to a fully elected Legislature, as is now proposed for the various Provinces. This Government shall be fully autonomous. The Legislature can have about three hundred members, say about two members for every million population. The British Parliament shall have no direct control over this Government. All the appointments shall be made by the Government of British India and none by a member of the British Cabinet. The Governor-General shall be appointed by the Crown.

The Federal Government shall be vested in a Viceroy with a Federal Executive and a Federal Parliament. The method of representation to this Federal Parliament shall be decided by the federal units. None of the constituent States (including British India) are under the Federal Government. The Federal Government's jurisdiction shall be well defined in the Constitution and all the residuary powers shall be in the constituent States. The sources of federal revenue also shall be clearly defined. There need not be any dyarchy in the Federal Government. During the transitional stage, there can be an irremovable executive, controlled by the Federal Parliament. It is much better to have a unitary government, than to have a government partly composed of Ministers responsible to the Parliament and partly those who are responsible to the Viceroy. And even this technical responsibility of the Ministers to the Parliament, circumscribed by all sorts of safeguards and reservations even for a transitory period, will cease to have any value. Let the Ministers be irremovable. All the items of the budget must be subject to the vote of the Parliament. But the Viceroy can have powers of veto and certification.

If Muslims and other minority communities want separate electorate, let them have it. But there must be some way to automatically terminate such separate electorates, with the full consent of the community. Some device can be found out for recording such consent. I propose the following plan: The Communal representation is conceded on the ethical principle that no minority community shall be exposed to the coercion of the majority in the State. I think that the same ethical principle must be applied to the individuals in the community. If an individual belonging to a community to which special representation is conceded, wishes to vote in the general constituency, he shall have that privilege. The community shall not coerce him against his convictions, for the mere accident of his being born in that community. The number of seats reserved for the community through separate representation shall diminish in proportion to the number of members of that community joining the general electorate, in each succeeding general election. Now on account of the communal representation, there are many individuals belonging to such communities who are practically denied a vote; they cannot vote outside of the communal electoral roll, and they do not want to participate in communal election.

My central point is that what is now claimed and conceded for the various Provinces may be claimed and conceded for India as a unit. It will be found that the subjects in which safeguards. and reservations are wanted are mostly federal subjects–external loans, financial obligations, defence, foreign relations and others. These things can go outside the control of British India, and even outside the scope of technically responsible government. One need not worry much about responsibility on paper. After all, the responsibility at the centre secured at the Round Table Conference is of a very diluted nature. It is much better that complete sovereignty, free from control of British Parliament, is secured for the whole of British India. The affairs of British India, just like the affairs of the States, shall be placed outside the scope of Parliamentary legislation. When a stable and strong Government is established in British India, then the Federal Government may be handed over to a responsible Ministry. Let this be the transitional stage.

The Indian States will not join a Federation if the federating units are the people of the States and not the State Governments. If India is split up into twenty small Provinces, with official Governors and Chief Commissioners, and if the Federal Government can interfere with the provincial affairs even to the extent of supervision during the transitory stage (in which the States will not openly participate), practically the autocracy of the States will find its way into the administration of British Indian Provinces, instead of the tide of democracy and nationalism in the British Indian Provinces trying to wash away the autocracy of the States and the Provincial Governors. If, on the other hand, the whole of British India is under a democratic unitary government, with completely democratic Provinces as agents of the Central Government, and if such a British Indian Government federates with the States, it is then that Indian nationalism and democracy can exert influence over the States.

The disappearance of the official Governors and their replacement by popular Presidents will have a very healthy influence over the ordinary life in India. This I consider the first thing that must be achieved and no price is too much for winning this end. The high placed I.C.S., the undemocratic wealthy people, all of them, all the title-hunters and all those people who hang about the Government Houses for honours and patronage, will lose the prop on which they lean. Further, splitting up of India into autonomous Provinces and the consequent loss of the sense of unity and nationalism is too big a price to pay for the Provincial Autonomy and All-India Federation with responsibility at the Centre, all these being mere moonshine with twenty Governors and Chief Commissioners, assisted by the autocracy of the States.

The idea of a Central Government for British India alone and of making this the unit for federation with the States was discarded at the Round Table Conference, presumably on the ground that it will make the Centre clumsy with two Governments. Perhaps the assumption was that the same Governor-General will be the head of the British Indian Government and also of the Federal Government, with two Parliaments and two sets of Ministers. This will be clumsy. Yet that was the case in pre-War Germany, where the Kaiser of Germany was also the King of Prussia. But in my scheme, the Governor General for British India is different from the Viceroy for the whole of India. There is still some room for objection on the ground that the same city will be the capital for British India and also for Federal India. For one thing, that is the case with Germany now, Berlin being the capital of Prussia and also of the Reich. Even if this is a real objection, let Bombay, which ceases to be a provincial capital in the scheme of provincial re-distribution, be the capital for British India, leaving Delhi as the capital of Federal India.

Another objection that I anticipate is that if the whole of British India is under one unitary government, then the Central Government will be far away from the distant parts of the country, and that as such there may be inefficiency in the administration; if there are strong governments in the Provinces also this defect could be got over, and as such, in the interests of efficient government, it is necessary to maintain strong governments in the Provinces also. This cannot be done if the Provinces Should become mere subordinate parts of a big State. If the steel-frame wants re-inforcement, let there be four Governors, dividing the whole of India into four administrative areas. These Governors will be mere parts of the administrative machinery. They will have no courts, durbars, State receptions, and such other appurtenances of royalty, which the Governors now enjoy. The present Inspectors-General and Commissioners of the various departments in the Provinces can remain. But all social functions attached to the heads of areas, like durbars and power to recommend for honors and titles, will be vested in the Ministers of the Central Government and in the Presidents of the Provinces. The I.C.S. should take its natural position in the State, i.e., that of State servants. This is the only way in which the people can be placed above the Government. And yet the steel-frame, i.e. the departments, will maintain their efficiency through the hierarchy of Governors, Inspectors-General, District Officers and Sub-Officers in the districts. It is necessary that the Government machinery, to carry out the instructions of the Ministry, should not lose its efficiency.

Another objection to a unitary government for the whole of British India is that if the Provinces are mere subordinate parts of the central State, then this central State may not be responsive to the needs of the various Provinces with their varying cultures, traditions and requirements. This can be remedied by giving power to the Provinces to legislate on such matters as are of a purely local nature, provided such legislation is not against any enactment of the Central Legislature. There is no need to fear that the central State may thrust on the Provinces legislative measures which, considering the requirements and conditions of the Province, may be objectionable to the provincial feelings. In all such cases where the subject of legislation is not of a vital nature to the whole of British India, there can be made provision for local options. Everybody knows that in certain parts of India there is a super-abundance of local patriotism, and there must be enough security given to such Provinces.

If complete responsibility can be given to the Federal Government with no safeguards and no conditions; if the Provinces can have their Governors according to their choice, and if these Provinces can have absolute autonomy; and if the Princes will join such a Federation, my scheme needs no consideration. But if reservations are necessary, however temporary their nature may be, in the Federal Government and also in the Provinces; if complete autonomy cannot be given to Provinces with Indian Governors and Indian Ministers; then the Federation scheme approved by the Round Table Conference needs considerable revision, there must be considerable safeguard for the interests of the people. I believe that the above plan gives the line in which the Round Table Scheme may be revised. I wish to make a practical suggestion. Each of the great political parties in India, the Congress, the Muslim League, the Liberal Federation and the South Indian liberal Federation, should immediately hold their sessions and decide on general principles. Then each such organisation should appoint an accredited leader to negotiate on its behalf, giving its representative full plenipotentiary powers to negotiate, and to decide. The organisations must undertake to abide by their decisions. If, after that, these plenipotentiaries meet and discuss, there is a finality about it. Each of these organisations must take courage into their hands. They may have to lose on some counts, they will gain on other counts. If Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mr. Jinnah and Sir A. P. Patro can be given full powers to negotiate on behalf of their respective organisations, and if the organisations undertake to accept whatever they thought was acceptable, then Dominion Status for India will be a reality. If every such representative has to account for his actions before a big body after every item of negotiation, then there is no end. The fight has reached such a stage when the tail shall not wag the dog. There must be some leaders, whose word shall be a command for the following. Democracy and individual will are for times of peace.

Will these four big parties appoint their plenipotentiaries and settle the question once for all?

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