THE TRAGIC PARADOX AND RASA
K. DWARAKANATH
Much water has flowed since Aristotle
propounded his concept of Tragedy maintaining “Mimesis” and “Katharsis” as its core. Ever since, through the ages, it
has been the endeavour of literary critics and
philosophers alike to pluck the heart of mystery from that baffling paradox,
pleasure in pain, that at once characterises and
distinguishes Tragedy as a genre unique of its kind. Yet, in spite of their
best efforts, the matter of tragic relief still remains a Sphinx Riddle and an
Oedipus is yet to come.
That the tragic involves a paradox was recognised even by the ancient Indian aestheticians. The
statement of Viswanatha Suyanarayana
in his “Sahityadarpana” unequivocally points to this.
“Karuna davapi rase jayate
yat param sukham, kincha desu yada duhkham,
na kopisyat tadunmukhah.”
(Even from the most
sorrowful themes that stir up the emotions of pity and fear, the highest joy
results; for, if they had been sources of pain, no body would have been so
eager to see them presented.)
This paradox is, in a way, an inversion of
another which is implied in the
emotional outburst of Jessica in The
Merchant of
“I am never merry when I hear tweet music.”
(V. i. 70)
or of Dushyanta in Kalidasa’s
masterpiece when he pensively reacts to the melody of a love Song.
“Ramyaani veekshya madhuramscha nisamya sabdaan
Paryutsuko bhavati yatsukhitopi jantuh
Tatchetasa smarati nuna mabodhapurvam
Bhaavasthiraani jananaantara
sauhridaani.”
(“Strange! That song has filled me with a most peculiar sensation! A
melancholy feeling has come over me, and I seem to be yearning after some long
forgotten object of affection.”)
This paradox of pain in pleasure need not be
viewed as the reverse of the other, though it does so seemingly. It is
antithetical only apparently, not actually. It is a half-way-house on the path
of aesthetic experience, a stage which precedes the consummation of a
long-drawn psychological process which culminates in Ananda,
Supreme Bliss, the sine qua non of any piece of art, let alone drama.
There is something that operates behind this psychological process and alchemises both pain in pleasure and pain in pain into
pleasure par excellence. What is this something, this phenomenon that
has been eluding all along the grasp of the literary theorists, philosophers,
psychoanalyst and aestheticians? It is amazing to note that the best efforts of
these men have resulted in explanations that are at best only inadequate to
unravel the mystery.
I. A. Richards tries to explain the problem
by saying “pity,” the impulse to approach, and “Terror,” the impulse to
retreat, are brought together in Tragedy to
reconciliation which they find nowhere else. But the riddle is not so simple as that. If it were really so, “Terror” would have
scared away from the theatre the audience that had approached it to see a
tragedy enacted. Nor is a tragedy enjoyed, as Goethe says, for the simple
reason that the sorrow presented is impersonal. Certainly, Tragedy is not a
show of bear-baiting to be sadistically enjoyed by onlookers.
Schopenhaur holds that Tragedy pleases by inducing in
the mind of the spectator a spirit of resignation to fate and a feeling that
life is a bad dream from which we have to awake. (The World as Will and
Idea) But viewed from the literary standpoint this explanation appears
unconvincing, for, the pleasure of Tragedy is not merely the pleasure of the
knowledge of truth. It is as much the pleasure of the enjoyment of beauty which
is lost sight of by the German philosopher. Nietzsche’s
explanation that Tragedy pleases by being “a metaphysical supplement to the
reality of nature.” (The Birth of Tragedy) is to some extent
analogous to Schopenhaur’s. And it fails for the same
reason; It also suffers the limitation of throwing no
light upon the form and features of tragic drama as a type of literary art.
With David Hume we stand on a less etherial plane. He
tries to explain the strange phenomenon of Tragedy in terms of the magical
property of “eloquence’ by which he means force and beauty of expression and
imitation. (Essays–Moral, Political and Literary) But then, these are
not characteristic of Tragedy alone. The former is common to all forms of art
and the latter is shared by comedy also. P. K. Guha
very rightly observes, “If eloquence and imitations are the only sources of
dramatic pleasure, a comedy has a clear advantage over tragedy by reason of its
joyous subject matter.” (Tragic Relief) Ever Hegel’s theory, with its
philosophical vein fares no better. Hegel traces the pleasure of Tragedy to “a
sense of reconciliation with the rightful vindication of eternal justice” which
is induced in us at the close of the play! The vulnerability of this
explanation lied in the fact that the pain involved in the occurrence of
situations is too much for the sense of the assertion of a supreme ethical
power. It cannot reconcile us to the situation and compensate for the pain of
the great spiritual loss we witness all through the play.
Aristotelian theory of Katharsis
is by far the most adequate of the explanations offered by tbe
great men of the West, despite its antiquity. What exactly Aristotle meant by Katharsis we can never know. He never explains it fully and
the result is that one may read into it any meaning one likes. The interpretation
of Bywater that Tragedy arouses pity and fear
wherewith to accomplish its Katharshs of such
emotions means that Tragedy serves as a sort of medicine curing and relieving
the soul of the accumulated emotions (pity and fear) by arousing the same
emotions. It is evident from this that Katharsis
refers to some sort of curative process. This homoeopathic interpretation
presupposes some malady on the part of the audience and ignores the fact that
we enjoy the experience of witnessing a tragedy. It reminds us of the Ayurvedic principle “ushnamushnena samyati” (heat neutralises
heat) and finds a parallel in the position taken by Bhatta
Tauta in respect of the values of poetry in his “Kavya Kautuka” – “just as dust is used to clean up a rust, mirror, the mind of the critic
is purified of passion through passion itself.” Speaking of Katharsis,
Butcher says: “It is not unlikely that originally the ‘Katharsis’,
viewed as a refineing
process, may have implied no more to Aristotle than the expulsion of the
disturbing element, namely the pain, which enters into pity and fear when
aroused by real objects.” Of these two most widely accepted interpretations we
may bypass the none-too-healthy pathological interpretations of Bywater in preference to the more sensible view of Butcher’s.
Does Butcher mean by “purification”
the diversion of feeling from
all considerations of self-interest so that the feeling is enjoyed for its own
sake? If Aristotle’s Katharsis really means it, to
quote Prof. Humayun Kabir,
“It would enable him to explain why experiences which in real life are painful
and evil become in art noble and exhilarating. But it can be called ‘purification’ only by an abuse of language.” (“Poetry, Katharsis and Creativity” – essay published in The Moving Finger) Aristotle’s “Mimesis” should not be taken as mere imitation
but an imitation of the
conception of a poet’s imagination. Tragedy imitates not life but a conception
of life. An experience is perceived by the imagination of a poet. Detached from
its relations with practical life, it is enjoyed for its own sake. This
imaginative enjoyment, not practical utilisation, ia what is expressed in art. In
this process, as Prof. Kabir explains, sensation is
cut out with the result the emotional and perpetual aspects of experience arc
apprehended. According to him Aristotle’s doctrine of “Mimesis” and “Katharsis” indicates freedom and disinterestedness as the
essence of art. “Katharsis” the
counterpart of “Mimesis.” The latter provides us with vivid imagination of significant experience
and the former is our ability to
withhold the act at the height of energy and enjoy experience for its own sake.
Hence we are able to enjoy the tragic or a tragedy free from all complexes. The
concept of Rasa goes a step further and explains the riddle more elaborately
and lucidly.
The most systematic statement of the Rasa
concept in a few words can be found in the utterance of Shelley: “Our sweetest
songs are those that tell of saddest thought.” This line of Shelley embodies
the profound aesthetic truth that even the saddest thought ceases to be sad
when it becomes an aesthetic experience and remains forever “a sweet song” in
our experience yielding positive pleasure. This is exactly what the Rasa
concept explains in a subtler way. This fact accounts for our enjoyment
of the tragic or the tragedy without any complexes, perversions or libidos on
our part. In his monumental work “Natyasastra,” Bharata dealt at length with dramaturgy with emphasis on
“Rasa” as its central principle. According to him production of Rasa should be
the chief concern of drama, whatever might be its type.
The origin of the concept of Rasa can be
traced to the Vedic reference to the soul as enjoying the flavour
or essence (Rasa) of experience. This concept had its elaborate development
both in Upanishadic meditation and aesthetic
speculation. Just as a beautiful object in nature it relished, the aesthetic
creation is also savoured. The Longinian
transport conditioned by the transcendental experience of the aesthetic object,
Rasa, is somewhat akin to the sage’s intuitive experience of the self-luminous
consciousness which forms the substratum of the superimposed universe though
its stimulus belongs to the mundane world. This is what Krishna Chaitanya also states in his work “Sanskrit Poetics.”
In the “Natyasastra” speaking of the Rasa, Bharata
states:
“Vibhavanubhava vyabhichari
Samyogadrasa nishpattih.”
‘Rasa or aesthetic object is a configuration
of which Vibhavd, Anubhava,
Vyabhicharibhava are the constituents.” (K. C.
Pandey: Comparative
Aesthetics). In other words
“When the Vibhavas, Anubhavas
and the Vyabhicharibhavas combine to awaken the Sthayibhava, the awakened Sthayibhava
finally develops into Rasa.” (
Sthayibhava may be rendered as sentiment with some
special qualification. It is the abiding sentiment which can develop into emotins when confronted by appropriate stimuli. In short,
it is a latent emotive reactivity which is potential and complex. It is
potential in that it exists prior to the aesthetic situation as an abiding
reality of our psychological organisation. It is “Ayyakta Rasa” or
Rasa in its unmanifested form. “Vibhava”
is emotive situation with human focus and setting consisting of the physical
cause of the sentiment. It is the prime stimulus which activates the “Sthayin.” “Anubhavas” are mimetic changes which are
inspired by the aroused basic mental state and as such indicate the internal
state of mind. If Vibhava is the basic stimulus, Anubhavas are its behavioural
features. They are the results of the excitation produced in the Vibhava as the dramatic situation develops. “The perception
of the excitation transfers it to the spectator by sympathetyc
induction, in a parallel movement. (
Abbinavagupta, the famous commentator on Bharata, has analysed the
aesthetic experience and the involved levels in a very lucid manner from the
standpoint of the spectator. He has recognised in all
five levels in the process of aesthetic experience from the sense-level to its
culmination in pure and unmixed aesthetic experience, Ananda.
Here we have to note carefully the distinction between Rasa and Rasasvada–aesthetic object (this is essentially a product
of dramatic art and is not to be found in the creations of nature) and aesthetic
experience. The former is only the medium through which the latter is had.
According to Abbinavagupta aesthetic experience is
not the experience of the basic mental state with the universalised
self as its attribute as has been wrongly attributed to him as his opinion by Pandita Jagannatha
in “Rasagangadhara.” Abbinavagupta holds that substance-attribute relation
cannot be attributed to self. No doubt, he admits of a stage in the aesthetic
experience in which the self experiences itself as affected by the basic mental
state, but that is not the final stage. He maintains that aesthetic experience
at its culmination is the experience of the self itself when the basic mental
state is in the subconscious. On the basis of this varying subconscious element
drama is divided into various types. The function of the drama is only to
awaken this subconscious element. To conclude, according to Abbinavagupta,
the final stage in aesthetic experience is that in which there is the
experience of “Paramananda” and even the basic mental
state, awakened by dramatic presentation, sinks into the subconscious. It is a
state of aesthetic Samadhi as against the Upanishadic meditative Samadhi.
It is this that accounts for the pleasure yielded by drama, whether it be a tragedy or a comedy. On account of this phenomenon–the
experience of supreme bliss with the awakened basic mental state in the
subconscious–whether it be “Sakuntala”
or “Othello.” “Urubhanga”
or “King Lear,” we equally enjoy and get dissolved in the raptures of aesthetic
beatitude. Viewed from the standpoint of the concept of Rasa, whether the play
is a comedy or a tragedy, it is all one. They provide us whit the same
aesthetic experience.