I

According to the standard presentation of the Nyaya epistemology, perception is classified into laukiku or ordinary and alaukika or extraordinary perception, among others. ¹ The latter is further subdivided into three types, one of which is known as Jnaana-lakshanapratyaksha.² It is this form of alaukika pratyaksha which concerns us here. It may be summarized thus:

When we see a rose at a distance and apprehend its redness, form, etc., directly; and we may also become conscious then of its fragrance by virtue of the impression left on our mind by a past experience of that quality in the rose. But the flower being by supposition too far from us we cannot ascribe it to ordinary perception. This is regarded as another case of alaukika-pratyaksha. The psychological truth involved here is the familiar one that all precepts are partly presentative and partly representative. ³

Now if alongside this form of perception ⁴ we put the Nyaya theory of error, known as anyathaakhyaati then a curious similarity between these two doctrines seems to emerge, because error is explained in Nyaya as resulting from the mixing-up of two valid cognitions. In the case of jnaana-lakshana-pratyaksha as well there is the blending of two valid cognitions so that the distinction between jnaana-lakshana-pratyaksha and anyathaakhyaati obviously needs to be carefully examined.

II

Indeed, in view of the fact that their characteristics are so similar, it is rather strange that the distinction between them has not yet been scrutinized, even when the similarity has been recognized. Thus the section on jnaana-Iakshana-pratyaksha in a well-known text-book on Indian philosophy ends with the remark: “The Naiyaayikas also explain illusion, e. g., of a snake in a rope, as a case of jnaana-lakshana perception”. ⁶ But no more is said. The overlap between jnaana-lakshana and anyathaakhyaati is clearly implied in the following comment on the latter by M. Hiriyanna, yet again no attempt is made to distinguish between the two:

In the case of the yellow conch or the white crystal appearing red when placed in the vicinity of a red flower, the several elements constituting them are presented to the mind in the ordinary or laukika sense; but there are cases of error in which it is not so. Thus in the stock example of “shell-silver” (sukti-rajata), the silver cannot be said to so presented. Here also the system maintains that not only the subject but also the predicative element is “presented,” but the presentation is of the alaukika kind–that variety of it to which we have already alluded, where the impression of a former experience serves as the means of representing it to our mind. The silver is not here by elsewhere. It is aapana-stha (“in the shop”) as it is put. Thus even here error is due to a wrong synthesis of presented objects only.⁶

III

How then is jnnana-lakshana-pratyaksha different from anyathaakhyaati? At one level the answer is fairly simple. The former represents valid cognition and the latter invalid cognition. This answer, however, requires an external test for determining the validity or otherwise of the perception, it does not allow us to distinguish between the two by themselves.

It will now be suggested that it may be possible to draw such a distinction. In all cases of jnaana-lakshana-pratyaksha two sense perceptions seem to be involved, along with the mind.⁷ Thus “Jnaana-lakshana contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandalwood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact with the object with the organ of smell. The short of transcendental contact (alaukika sannikarsha) by which this is rendered possible is called jnaana-lakshana”.⁸

Cases of anyathaakhyaati, however, seem to involve the association of two sense-impressions relating to the same sense, as the visual, for example, in the stock example of mother-of-pearl andsilver. Jnaana-lakshana, however, as pointed out earlier, seems to involve the association of two sense-impressions relating to two different senses – as in the case of the “fragrant sandalwood”.⁹

Notes

¹ S. C. Chatterjee, The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge (Calcutta: The University of Calcutta, 1939) Chapter IX.

²For more on the point see S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971 [first published 1923]) Pp. 68-69; Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1963). Pp. 341 43, etc.

³M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1932) P. 250.

⁴But see Surendranath Dasgupta, op. cit., P. 342

⁵Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950). P. 180. The point is developed at some length by Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (London: Rider and Company, 1960) Pp. 196-67.

⁶Hiriyanna, Indian Philosophy Studies (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1957) Pp. 21-22. It may be noted, however, that this type of error could also be connected with Samanyalakshana if anyathaakhyvati is explained as “the knowledge (experience) of a generic nature, which does not abide in its own subject, but which abides in the subject of another generic nature. For instance, to know a pearl to be a piece of silver is invalid knowledge, in as much as the generic nature “silverness” does not abide here in the piece of silver which is its own subject, but abides in a pearl which is the subject of another generic nature viz., “pearlness.” (Satis Chandra Vidyabhushana, A History of Indian Logic [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.] Pp. 409-10.)

⁷For the possible explanations of how this might actually happen, see S. Radhakrishnan, op cit, Vol. II, P. 69.

⁸Surendranath Dasgupta op. cit, Vol. I, Pp. 341-42.

⁹This distinction is based on and restricted to ordinary treatment of the subject in the standard treatises. If one saw an artificial rose and smelt fragrance it would obviously be a case of anyathaakhyaati involving two sense-impressions relating to two distinct senses and the distinction drawn above would seem to break down. This underscores the need for further exploration of the point raised here: how does one distinguish anyathaakhyaati from jnaana-lakshana?

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