October
1970 marked the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Organisation. The
occasion is commemorated with due solemnity. There has been an impressive gathering-in
of many Heads of Governments at the United Nations’ Headquarters in New York
city. Expressions of faith in the future of the Organisation have been promptly
made and these are only to be expected. But what is important is that many of
these leaders frankly admitted that the performance of the United Nations so
far has been discouraging. Sense of grave maturity has been evident in the
assessments made about the world body. While the smaller and the militarily
weaker members did not mince words in accusing the Great Powers of having
failed to fulfil their obligations under the Charter and of using the U. N.
floor for their power struggles the super-powers did not directly challenge
this interpretation. In fact, they tacitly conceded its validity. For example,
President Nixon in his speech to the General Assembly on 23rd October, said
“One of the paramount problems of our time is that we must transcend the old
pattern of power politics in which nations sought to exploit every volatile
situation for their own advantage or to squeeze the maximum advantage for
themselves out of every negotiation.”
Unfulfilled premise of
Great Power Unanimity
The
mood of disenchantment about the world today is mainly due to the colossal
disparity between the high expectations of 1945 and the low returns the system
yielded over the years. The expectations were that collective security based on
great power collaboration would be possible. In practice, this was never
forthcoming and the instrument of collective security, the Security Council
became defunct. The principle of great power unanimity, to be sure, is rightly
based upon the realistic assessment that no concerted effort towards world
peace is worth the while unless the Great Powers, are prepared to support it. The
logical implication in this is that collective security per se is ruled
out in the context of armed conflicts between the great Powers themselves. This
eventuality ill itself did not rule out the hope that the Great Powers would be
able to join together to restrain potential transgressors or punish aggressors.
It was this hope that lay shattered no sooner than the U.N. started
functioning. The origins of the cold war meant the conversion of almost every
dispute into a dispute between the Great Powers and the consequent inability of
the Security Council to play any role either by resorting to Pacific settlement
or by taking economic or military sanctions.
The
institution, however, showed enough resilience to overcome the paralysis caused
by the deadlocks in the Security Council. The General Assembly itself assorted
the Council’s functions throughout the innovation of Uniting for
Peace. In the Korean dispute, it was largely the Assembly that
took decisions over the U. N’s military intervention against North Korea.
Innovations also took place in devising other categories of U. N. action, some
of them not visualised by the framers of the Charter. For example, the U. N.
resorted to ‘peace keeping’ since the mid-fifties. A type of military
intervention short of involving itself in hostilities was thus hit upon by the
General Assembly. In West Asia, the Congo and Cyprus peace
keeping became the accepted form of U. N. action to
contain regional conflagrations. This, incidentally, brought
about a change in the nature and scope of the Secretary General’s
role. The history of the U. N.’s role in the political sphere reveals the
assumption by the three organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council and
the Secretary General roles that were not exactly contemplated by the framers.
The
trend of events has so changed that even if Great Power unanimity
is restored, members may no longer welcome the prospect or the world body being
run by the Great Powers. In this sense the original basis of the U. N. is not
likely to be acquiesced in any longer by the rest of the members. Recent events
illustrate the new trend. The virtual cessation of the cold war between the
super-powers has, in effect, restored Great Power unanimity which constituted
the sine qua non of collective security as visualised at Dumbarton Oaks.
Yet, the rest of the membership of the U. N. in the seventies seem to be rather
disturbed at the future implications of this super-power collaboration. The
whole tenor of President Nixon’s speech to the U. N. reveals how the
super-powers seem to arrogate to themselves the role of managing the future
world order. According to the International Herald Tribune “The Chief
Executive cast his 23 minute speech largely in terms of Soviet-American
relations because he said, ‘great central issue of our times’ turns on whether
there can be peace among the nuclear powers.” (October 24, 1970)
Characteristically enough it was the French Foreign Minister, M. Schumann, who
assailed this tendency on the part of the super-powers. The French Foreign
Minister interpreted the American President’s speech to the effect that it
“suggested making spectators out of all U. N. members except the two
super-powers. The spectators would be presented with decisions made for them by
super-powers.” (The International Herald Tribune, October 29, 1970) Mrs.
Gandhi’s address to the Assembly also identified the malady ‘to attempts made
by the Big Powers to use it as an instrument to advance their national interests
and then discarding it the moment they found they could not do so any more.” (The
Hindu, October, 24, 1970) Thus, curiously enough, the end of the cold war
resulted in a paradoxical situation. While super-power unanimity has now become
possible, this very possibility is making the rest of the world community, the
powers of the middle-range in particular, challenge the concerted role of the
super-powers. France has already entered its objections and one can be sure
that Communist China, whose debut into the U. N. cannot be put off by very much
longer, will also join in protesting against Russo-American hegemony. Not that
an era of democratic world order is in the offing; that is impossible. Nor is
the emergence of true World Government with supra-national authority in sight.
Even though critics like Emery Reves, even at the very inception of the U. N.
argued that a U. N. based on collective security is only a half-way house which
is bound to collapse, their prescriptions for a true World Government, as voiced
in such well known books as ‘The Anatomy of Peace’, have not been entirely
valid either. People like Reves tried to draw logical and facile distinctions
between the eras of Balance of Power, Collective Security and World Government
and then attempted to show that since Balance of Power failed by 1910 and
Collective Security also stood discredited during the inter-war years, the U.
N. ought not to have been erected on the base of collective security. But a
rigid separation of these concepts is wholly unwarranted. For “Unfortunately
the differences among these concepts have more often than not been exaggerated
and mis-stated. The case for adoption of one or another has often been argued
as if a choice had to be made between totally dissimilar systems, one offering
hopeful prospects for order and security, and the other leaving the world mired
in hopelessness. In fact, the differences among them are far from absolute and
are perhaps less interesting and significant than the similarities–to the
analyst, if not to the propagandist. Thus, the strategies as incorporated in
the Charter are not likely to exhaust the possibilities that the U. N. organs
have, in facing and solving problems.
Thus it is difficult to visualise that the U. N. would transform itself into a body always reflecting the wishes of the majority of its members and that the role of the big powers would get eliminated. No doubt, universality of membership is most likely to find implementation. In addition to China, the claims of the two Germanys, the two Koreas and the two Vietnams cannot be ignored either. Already there has been a phenomenal increase in membership from 50 in 1945 to 127 to date. The General Assembly may have its say in making matters. But the role of the middle range powers is likely to become most crucial in the coming years. As to the two giants, they wou1d still be able to exercise their weight more so because tensions between the middle range powers are likely to continue for long. In other words, decision-making in the world organisation may reflect the combination of the autocratic, the aristocratic and the democratic principles as the British Constitution of Victorian times supposedly reflected.
Who is to blame?
As
to the apportionment of blame for the unflattering record, the Great Powers
should bear the major portion. Whether motivated by the ideological factor or
by sheer national interest, the two blocs during the cold war days had not only
not solved the disputes between themselves, but they strove to convert disputes
between other powers into disputes of cold War. The Indo-Pakistani dispute over
Kashmir is a case in point. The way in which the Western Powers sought to woo
Pakistan and how this made any meaningful approach to the problem impossible
are well known. The cold war led to the paralysis of Security Council activity.
Till recently considerations of spheres of influence in the Middle-East led to
continued crisis in the area. Hegemonical designs motivated crisis like the
Anglo-French action over Suez and the Russian action over Hungary, both in 1957
and withhold a few days of each other. Crude imperialism was at the root of the
Franco-Belgian role in the Congo.
However,
the great powers had not the monopoly in frustrating the U.N.’s role. The
combinations of forces of anti-colonialism and communism resulted in major
crises like that of Vietnam, over which the U. N. is self-confessedly impotent.
Among the newly-born states, forces of religious intolerance, linguistic
chauvanism and tribalism have also contributed to the increase of tensions. The
U.N. in these cases once again proved none too effective. Thus, the oft-cited
reason of the world organisation failing because of its members not living upto
their responsibilities, deserves to be repeated in any stock-taking of the
U.N.’s role. Thus it is that the Great powers will have to accept a greater
share of responsibility for the U.N.’s
inadequate performance.
Perhaps
the single major failure of the world organisation where the Western Powers
deserve to be arraigned is over the racial situation in South Africa. No system
in contemporary times has been more unequivocally adjudged to be violative of
elementary principles of justice, decency and humanity than the system of
aparthied as practised in South Africa. And yet the U.N. has not been able to
deter that Government from its inhuman commitment. This indeed is a failure
which qualitatively is more serious than the world body’s failures in other
instances.
Judged
from its inability to solve international disputes and maintain peace and
security, it has been observed how the U.N. cannot even vindicate its raison-d-etre.
In fact one can argue that crucial break-throughs in outstanding disputes
have been accomplished outside the scope of the U.N. rather than through its
agencies. The Geneva meetings of 1954-55, the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Test
Ban Treaty, the Paris Talks over Vietnam, and the strategic Arms Limitation
Talks–all had been the result of direct negotiations rather than the fruits of
U. N. deliberations. If so, it may be asked what the U.N. is for? But on closer
examination, one finds that the question is rather hastily posed. The
psychology of international negotiations, given the longstanding committal of
Great powers to the pseudo-ideological verbiage of the cold war, for a long
time rendered the floor of the U.N. unsuited to the language of conciliation
and compromise. For the latter strategies to find their fulfilment the leading
powers had to seek refuge in private diplomacy. In other words, open stands
taken at the bar of open diplomacy could not be retraced openly. It
is only at private talks and secret negotiations that the spirit of give and
take and concession and compromise could manifest. This is what
happened to the U.N. It filled the need for open diplomacy as a precursor to
private negotiations. It served as a place where steam could be let off by
delegates eager to impress their countrymen with their unbending resolve to
stand up to their national interest, all the while aware that they would have
to bargain for something lower than what they pleaded for. And this bargain was
possibly only through secret diplomacy. The U. N. thus fulfilled the unenviable
task of allowing members to overstate their cases. In a sense it enabled
members to exhaust their invective before cooling down for compromises. It thus
allowed for the phenomenon of catharsis working itself out in inter-state
relations, especially those between the Great Powers. And this indeed is not a
meagre contribution.
The Credit Side
While
the record in maintaining peace and security has so far been meagre, the
contribution in the larger sphere of international economic, scientific and
cultural cooperation has been more encouraging. Of course, it should be
emphasised in this context that the framers of the Charter assigned a
conspicuously larger role to the General Assembly in this area than was given
to the Assembly of the League of Nations. One need not dwell at length on the
achievements of organisations like the World Health Organisation and the Food
and Agricultural Organisation. Their roles in lessening disease and helping the
increase in food production are well-known. The green revolution in India is
but one example of this. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr. Barlaug for
his discoveries of “new strains of wheat” which enabled this astounding leap
forward in food production is symbolic of the U.N.’s contribution in this area.
In
the area of economic cooperation, however, the record is somewhat equivocal. We
have two important authoritative appraisals to go by. One is the Report of the
Commission on International Developnlent (popularly known as the Pearson
Report). This commission was appointed by the Chairman of the World Bank to
evaluate the effects of aid on development in the poorer nations over the past
20 years and to examine the methods of development assistance and the order of
magnitude necessary for the coming 10 years and for the next generation in
order to ensure grounds for hope that a lasting and ultimately self-sufficient
growth might be attained in the developing countries. While the report
proclaimed that the First Development Decade, proposed by the late John F.
Kennedy in 1961 has been a success, it also identified trends of slackening
commitment on the part of the affluent nations. For example, “It is astonishing
to learn that despite the successes of the First Development Decade, the
contributions set aside for technical and capital assistance have declined over
the past few years. It is true that the full amounts increased from 1961 to
1968 from 8,000 million to 12,800 dollars but the share in the GNP of the donor
countries declined from 1 per cent to 0.7 per cent over the same period.” (Aussen
Politic: German Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 21, No. 1) The Pearson
Report does not cover the aid given by the communist countries. It appears it
did not obtain their cooperation in the preparation of the report. The
Russians, however, are not slow in criticising the report as intended to play
up the magnanimity of the Western Powers alone. A Russian scholar belittled the
Report’s suggestion that developed countries set apart about 1.1 per cent of
their Gross National Product towards the needs of the developing countries.
This would come to a total of 23,000 million dollars in 1975. The Russian
writer argues that on the U. N’s own estimate, by that year the developing
countries will have to repay about 10 to 11 thousand millions worth of loans
and credits and the deficit in their trade balance will have by then increased
to 24,000 million. (Prof. S. Tikhvinsky’s article in International Affairs,
Moscow, Vol. 10, 1970.)
These
controversies apart, the Pearson Report is a reminder that the affluent world
has a moral obligation to make up for the direct or indirect exploitation by
the European nations of the nations of the underdeveloped areas. The balance
sheet of failures and successes in developmental aid over the past and its
potential for the future drawn up by the Pearson Committee will be of immense
use during the II Development Decade which has been launched during the Silver
Jubilee Celebrations.
The
second major assessment of the U. N’s role in the field of economic cooperation
has been the Jackson Report commissioned by the United Nations
Development Programme. The U. N. D. P. has been performing two functions. The
first technical cooperation, is of long standing and the one in which it is
pre-eminent. In the second pre-investment service–the idea is that while the
function of the World Bank is to concentrate on capital investment, the U. N.
D. P. aims at opening the way to investment. The Jackson Report appraised
in detail the work of 28 organisations in U.N. including the regional economic
committees and of the development banks and various bodies concerned with
international economic and technical development. While identifying the
limitations, the report suggested various remedial measures, methodological,
substantive as well as organisational. What concerns us here is to note the
achievements of U. N. as evaluated by Sir Robert Jackson. To quote his words,
“It operates in a hundred countries, brings help of the most varied kinds to
the solution of an astonishing range of problems–in fact it is the embodiment
of the United Nations to villagers and townspeople as much as to senior civil
servants and ministers. It demonstrates, and universally, that the U. N.
system can and does act.” (Markus Timmler: Two Strong Affirmatives for D
D 2–Aussen Politik. German Foreign Affairs Review Vol. 21.1/70)
In fine, the U. N. contribution in the economic sphere has been crucial and significant. If its limitations give cause for concern they certainly do not leave room for despair. The cause for celebration thus lies in the fact that the U.N. has made “the world a little safer, a little healthier, and a little unequal.”
President Nasser’s
Death
The
death of President Nasser is an irreparable loss to the Arab world and an
incalculable blow to the prospects of peace in the Middle-East. Nasser’s death
also removes from the world another of the doughtiest champions of
non-alignment. The extent of the loss to the Egyptian people can be visualised
when one realises that Nasser has been compared to the great Saladin of the
Medieval times.
A ‘Despot’ with a
Difference
Though
as armyman, who assumed power through revolutionary methods, Nasser remained
the least despotic of leaders that came to power under similar circumstances.
In contrast to people like President Soekarno of Indonesia and Nkrumah of
Ghana, Nasser remained a leader extremely modest in bearing and strikingly
averse to vulgar personal aggrandizement. In fact, while Soekarno,
a civilian, always paraded himself in a military uniform, Nasser a professional
soldier, loved to appear only in a lounge suit. Their sortorial preferences
very well indicated their mental make-ups. He was, no doubt, a plebescitarian
Ceaser and Egyptian democracy under him was a one-party affair. Even then the
genuine base of mass support that he enjoyed was never in doubt. His contributions
in the Socio-Economic field are not inconsiderable. In the midst of the
Arab-Israeli conflict it was very easy for a leader to become an unscrupulous
demogogue. The diversion of public frustrations towards the enemy across the
border has been the stock tactic of a dictator. Nasser, to his lasting credit,
never succumbed to this temptation. Ever since his coming to power in 1954, the
focus of his policy has been the socio-economic development of Egypt. The
liberation of the Egyptian peasantry was followed by the introduction of land
reforms. The Aswan Dam symbolised Nasser’s primary concern for economic
development. Nasser described the Socio-Economic system he desired to introduce
in Egypt as a “socialist community” wherein “There will be farm cooperatives,
small ownerships (with ten acres for each family), no landlords, industrial
co-operatives, government-owned factories, privately-owned factories and
factories half-privately-owned and half-state-owned. There will be small
capitalists holding small numbers of securities. This will be a different
society and one cannot foresee its political shape.” (Quoted by C. L.
Sulzberger in International Herald Tribune, Paris, October 16, 1970) Of course
this was not achieved during his lifetime, nor is it easy to say whether it
could ever be achieved. But the vision itself is a standing testimony to
Nasser’s primary concern for the development and modernization of Egypt.
Foreign policy
In
the area of foreign policy, Nasser is often accused of inciting the Arabs against
Israel, instead of giving a lead in the direction of accepting its existence.
This to an extent is true. Nasser did for a long time take the uncompromising
stand of wiping Israel out of existence. But one should understand the attitude
in the context of the unceremonious manner in which Arab feelings were ignored
by the world powers in creating Israel and the humiliating defeat the Arabs
suffered in 1948. With all his talk about wiping out Israel, Nasser did come
round to the acceptance of Israel as a fact. Still the
realities of Arab world and Nasser’s stake in its leadership, also compelled
him to assume more militant stances towards Israel. On the one hand he had to
stand against the conservative challenge from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. On the
other, he had to reckon with the ultra-radicals represented by the leaderships
in Syria and Iraq. These considerations made him repeatedly assume belligerent
postures. The attitude of the Western Powers only added to compulsions of these
factors. The Anglo-French action in 1957 remained an unforgivable act of
international bullying, the rude and insulting withdrawal of the American offer
to build the Aswan Dam was equally unforgivable in Egyptian eyes. Rightly or
wrongly, Israel’s strength was perceived largely in terms of the support from
the West that Tel Aviv received. The Eisenhower Doctrine of filling the power
vacuum in the Middle-East further rankled in the Arab leaders’ hearts. The
combined effect of all these factors was to facilitate the entry of the Soviet
Union into the Middle-Eastern affairs.
Nasser’s
involvement with Russia comes up for frequent criticism. It is said that Nasser
lost the initiative over his policies to the Russians and it is alleged that
one of the founders of non-alignment landed squarely on the Russian lap. In the
early stages the Russio-Egyptian understanding was prompted by the needs of
defence and economic development. But later on it would seem that Nasser was
carried away more by the prospect of a quick military victory over Israel than
by considerations of restraint. For example, he was reckless in 1967 both in
demanding the withdrawal of the U. N. Emergency Force from the Gaza area as
also in some of the provocative steps he has taken. Given this itch for a quick
victory over Israel, a drift to total reliance on Moscow (which started
supplying him with sophisticated weapons) becomes easy to understand.
The
defeat in 1967 only led to deeper dependence on the Soviet Union for the
replenishment of the defence material that was destroyed in the Six Days War.
Nasser could not but insist on the recovery of the lost possessions and assume
an even more belligerent mood. The proclaimed a ‘War of attrition’ in 1968 and
started building up his armaments. The Russian penetration became more visible
and by 1969 it was evident that Russian Military personnel were manning
Egyptian positions. This no doubt meant a further loss of initiative.
Thus Nasser apparently succumbed to the temptations that he
could get away with a quick victory over Israel given Russian
arms but the failure in this calculation resulted only in total dependence on
the Soviet Union.
But in a
sense this excessive dependence on Moscow had led to certain positive
development also. The Russians who were anxious to cooperate with the Americans
in securing peace in the Middle-East were able to use their influence in Cairo
to make it agree for the cease-fire that was signed in August 1970. While the
Russians have been arming the Egyptians, they have also been keen on bringing
about a settlement in the area. This in certain circles is interpreted as being
motivated by the Russian design to dominate the Middle-East and thus gain a
firm foothold over strategic areas between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian
Ocean. It is said that Moscow is not so much interested in exploiting the Arab
Israel conflict in the short run as in acquiring a firm base in Egyptian soil
for its future role in the Indian Ocean area. President Nasser may have
calculated that he could depend upon Russian bonafides. Above all, in the
context of the humiliations of 1967, the aggressive and uncompromising postures
of Israel and hostility of the Anglo-Americans, he had no alternative but to
rely more and more upon the Russians.
The Unique Arab Leader
Whatever
may have been the rights and wrongs of his Russian policy, Nasser demonstrated
repeatedly that he was the only leader whom the Arab people trusted even when
he advocated a policy of restraint. He was the first to impliedly accept the existence
of Israel. He was the person to persuade the Arab leadership to the cease-fire
in recent months. Though there were times when Nasser acted rather
provocatively, his has also been the restraining hand. In the role he naturally
suffered the embarrassment that goes with the role. The moderates held him to
be too radical and the extremists regarded him as too moderate. With consummate
skill he withstood the criticism and rivalry of the extremist leaders of Syria
and Iraq and the Palestinian refugee organisations. To advise caution and
moderation when the extremists called for Israel’s blood was an act of
courageous statesmanship which Nasser alone could have dared to venture.
It is a tribute to his leadership that he ultimately played the role of the mediator
between King Hussein of Jordan and the Palestinian guerilla
organisations. This was a struggle between Hussein, who did not want that his
territory should be used by guerillas to launch their raids against Israel and
the guerilla organisations, like the Palastinian Liberation Front, which wanted
to defy King Hussein. The struggle flared up into a Civil War in Jordan and it
was left to President Nasser to intervene and negotiate settlement between the
King and the guerilla leaders.
It
is Well known that one of the important phenomenon after the 1967 war was the
emergence of the role of Palestinian refugees. Hitherto the Middle-East problem
was considered as one primarily concerning the Arab States and Israel, in
particular between Egypt and Jordan on the one hand and Israel on the other,
and “the importance of the refugees has frequently been overlooked in the
numerous parleys and in the skein of complex international negotiations over
the Middle-East crisis.” (Don Pretz: Arab Palestine; Phoenix or Phantom–Foreign
Affairs, January, 1970) The Six Day War of 1967
resulted in Israel occupying more Arab areas and the number of refugees shot
up. There are now nearly three million Palestinian Arabs who have lost their
homes due to the Israeli occupation of Arab areas. The activisation of guerilla
organisations and their emergence as a weighty factor in the settlement of the
Middle-East problem has been an important feature since the
1967 war. It is doubtful Whether the statesmen of any of the countries
in the area can, by themselves, agree to a settlement without
the consent of the Palestinian guerillas. It was only a leader
like Nasser, who was able to influence and persuade even the extremist of the
guerilla leaders.
India’s special friend
Nasser
had been one of the founding fathers of non-alignment along with Nehru and
Tito. Even when the non-aligned world got split into those that kept themselves
equidistant from the Communist Powers and the Western Powers and those that
adopted an overtly pro- Peking stand. Nasser resisted the temptation of joining
the latter group. Thus while leaders like Soekarno and Nkrumah turned more
sympathetic to peking over the Sino-Indian dispute, Nasser in comparison showed
more of concern for the Indian sentiments. Of course, many in India felt that
Nasser too did not extend as much of moral and vocal support to India’s case as
one expected. However, it cannot be denied that Nasser’s attitude was one of concealed
sympathy for India. In spite of occasional instances of not being able to see
eye to eye with each other, the original ‘uncommitted triumvirate’–India, Egypt
and Yugoslavia–continued to be the main exponents of non-alignment. This policy
and the personality of late Jawaharlal Nehru helped to bring about a special
relationship between India and Egypt. It is this fact that makes one feel sorry
that India’s Prime Minister and Nehru’s daughter, did not make it convenient to
attend Nasser’s funeral.
The succession to Nasser has been accomplished without controversy. President Sadat had alone been Number Two and his selection to the Presidency is not surprising. There are rumours, however, that the present leadership is more pro-Russian. The inclusion of Ali Sabri, reputed to be Moscowite in his leanings, and the exclusion of Hassnien Heikal, known to be pro-American, seem to confirm the rumour. It is still to be seen whether the new leadership will enter into further entanglements with Moscow. If Moscow is keen on a Middle-Eastern settlement and if it can further pressurise Egypt into accepting a settlement, the Egyptian leadership may well ask for a gradual Soviet disengagement from Egypt. In any case there is no doubt that it is the military dependence, which is in itself a function of the Arab Israeli conflict, that made Egypt come closer to Moscow. Neither in their Socio- Economic policies nor in their ideologies, can the Egyptian leaders be termed as Communist.
The
Middle-Eastern problem has again reached a deadlock. Though the cease-fire has
been extended, negotiations have been stalled. Israel is refusing to negotiate
unless Egypt is prepared to move back its missile bases which it moved
forward during the early period of the cease-fire. The Egyptians are not
prepared to do this. The U. N. Negotiator has once again withdrawn from the
scene. It is to be hoped that the deadlock would not give rise to precipitate
action on the part of any of the parties. It is also to be hoped that the
Palestinian guerillas would not provoke the Israel into making punitive raids
into Jordan. A concerted effort by Russia and America alone can break the ice.
It is to be hoped that this would be forthcoming.