INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY

 

DR. R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO

 

The Sixties-A Decade of Contrasts

 

            The unique feature of the decade just past is that it defies labelling. We cannot coin such neat names as the ‘gay nineties’ or the ‘roaring twenties.’ In one sense we can agree with Alistair Cooke’s characterisation of the decade as the ‘ghastly sixties.’ Political assassinations in the U. S., campus revolts and civil strife almost everywhere, the decline in the political stability in our own case (whether one regards it as symptomatic of a transition to maturity or as a descent to doom is a different matter), bloody civil wars in Nigeria and Vietnam, crude racialism in South Africa and Rhodesia, brutal suppression of Czechoslovak freedom by Russia–these are illustrative of the ghastliness. The ghastliness also lies in the contrasts the decade produced. Man landed on the moon, thus transforming, as it were, the interplanetary distances from an astronomical dimension to a mere microscopic measurement, yet the gaps in the economic levels of the communities within this planet are getting widened at unprecedented speed. The sixties transformed the advanced industrial societies into ‘technotronic societies’, while, in contrast, in the less developed areas even the transition from agro-feudal state to the industrial phase is proving difficult. The result, in the words of the noted scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski, is that within our planet ‘more distinct worlds’ are emerging. In a word, thus, the sixties seem to be unique in their contrasts.

 

The Washington-Moscow Detente

 

            Yet, viewing from the limited perspective of East-West relations, in particular of those between Washington and Moscow, one cannot but feel encouraged. It will be remembered that the decade opened with high expectations of the Summit Talks between Khruschev and Eisenhower in Paris. The fact that the previous meeting of these two statesmen at Camp David in 1959 generated a spirit of cordiality only reinforced the optimism about the proposed Paris summit in the Spring of 1960. It is comforting that the decade closed with the Russo-American ‘detente’ assuming almost Impregnable proportions. For, the strategic Arms Talks, now being held at Helsinki, indicate that the two super powers have settled down to working out lasting defences for the ‘detente’. Thus, the beginning and the end of the decade are marked by events spotlighting the genesis and consolidation of the ‘detente’.

 

            This is not to say that from 1960 to the end of 1969 there has been an unbroken ascent in the ‘cordiality curve’ of East-West relations. On the Contrary, the decade had witnessed events fraught with frightening potentialities. Let us recapitulate.

 

            Ironically enough, the Paris summit, which the dawn of the sixties heralded, proved abortive as a result of the U2J incident, in which an American plane entering Soviet territory north of the Turkish boundary was shot down by the Russians. The American plane was admittedly on an espionage mission. This had not only shattered the proposed Paris Summit, but brought back the two Powers almost to their former state of hostility. However, the inauguration of the Kennedy regime restored to a little degree the lost ground and President Kennedy followed up his professions of friendship in bargaining with Moscow over the Austrian Peace Treaty in 1961. And this trend was again rudely interrupted by the Cuban missile fiasco (1962), which brought Russo-American relations to an all time low and the world nearest to a nuclear holocaust. Whether Kennedy’s refusal to permit Russia installing missiles in Cuba saved Latin America from a shot-gun marriage with Castro’s Cuba or it merely saved Kennedy’s image of being a tough guy will be debated for a long time. Apparently, he called Khruschev’s bluff and won a resounding victory in the war of nerves. Yet , but for Khrushev’s decision not to run the American blockade, an all out nuclear war would have resulted. In this sense, it was the Russian leader that showed responsibility and wisdom at the expense of his own head which rolled two years later. For, it is well known that his performance in the Cuban missile crisis was one of the grounds seized upon by his neo-Stalinist opponents in the Kremlin to oust him from power in the autumn of 1964. The third episode is the American entry into the Vietnam tangle. This occurred during Kennedy’s time though it was during Johnson’s time that Washington’s involvement escalated into total committal.

 

            Yet, in spite of these events engendering tensions the search for détente continued, and what is surprising, succeeded. Four major breakthroughs can be cited: (i) the Austrian Peace Treaty which avoided the creation of a second German problem to reckon with, (ii) The Test-Ban Treaty of 1965, (iii) The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, and (iv) The Strategic Arms limitation Talks, currently in session at Helsinki. These are only the tangible manifestations of the rapprochement. Many more intangible indicators can also be cited. The American proposal to withdraw a sizable part of its troops from Western Europe; the indefatigable efforts by Washington and Moscow to jointly sponsor acceptable plan on West Asia (in spite of their conflict of interests); West Germany’s readiness to negotiate with Russia and Poland–all these and many more, illustrate these intangibles.

 

            Another significant feature of the decade is that the two super powers have developed a stake in the ‘detente’ to such a degree that at times they feel their respective ideological allies to be drags on their search for closer identity. Western Europe’s misgivings about Washington entering into bilateral understanding with Moscow are well known. Similarly, Eastern European capitals felt equally piqued at Moscow’s disposition to ignore them in dealing with the West. More than this, there is the special common interest of Moscow and Washington to contain China. Thus, in short, the fear of the destructive potential of their nuclear arsenals and a common concern against China seem to constitute the real reasons for the thaw in Russo-American relation rather than the emergence of new liking towards each other.

 

            And this brings us to the most important development of the decade – the Sino-Soviet schism. The seeds of this conflict might have been sown sometime before the start of the sixties. But it is during the past decade, particularly after 1962, that it assumed a recognizable dimension. Strong convictions about each other’s ideological departures apart, parochial nationalism, territorial ambitions and personality rivalries, pure and simple, also weighed in the situation. This ideology and power got inextricably mixed in the affair. The Sino-Indian War of September 1962 and the Cuban Missile affair of the same period provided the occasion for the schism to become overt. Khruschev was lukewarm towards China’s action against India and Mao was furious as Khruschev’s pusillanimity over the Cuban issue. The schism went unabated and not even the Soviet leader’s exit would turn the tide. In fact, his accusers and successors, Kosygin and Brezhnev, were so committed against China that they wanted to see the Indian sub-continent united as a bulwark against China’s revanchist potentialities. This explains the Russian mediatory role at Tashkent after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.

 

            The rise in the American involvement in Vietnam also contributed to the worsening of Sino-Russian relations. As pointed out by a student of Chinese affairs in a recent article in the journal, ‘problems of Communism’, “the U. S. bombing of North Vietnam, initiated in February 1965, was a catalytic agent in relations between the Soviet Union and China.” How to react to the American commitment was the question faced by the Chinese leadership. The Russians proposed that the American involvement be met by a bold confrontation. For the follow up action Moscow “requested the use of two airfields in southwest China, the right to station 500 men on them, an air Corridor or air transit rights, permission to send 4,000 men in a body through China, and possibly the use of a port in South China.

 

            The Maoist section of the Chinese leadership was averse to interpret the American involvement as warranting a conventional confrontation and combined to advocate guerilla warfare as the right action. The Soviet stand is capable of two alternative interpretations. Either Moscow sincerely advocated a war straight away with the U. S., in which case the untenability of regarding the Russians as being inherently more reasonable with the West becomes patently clear: or Moscow merely wanted to establish its military presence in China in the name of Vietnam. In any case the Russian proposal led to a rift within the Chinese leadership from which, no doubt, the Russians wanted to profit. To quote from the article cited above “Acceptance of this proposal would in effect have signified the ascendancy of the views of Lo, Liu, and Teng over those of Mao, as elaborated by Lin Piao. The Soviet leaders probab1y did not expect immediate acceptance, particularly as it was made before they knew that the United States would remain firmly committed to the war in Vietnam. Refraining from virtually all public polemics with China, Moscow settled back to await the outcome of the debate in Peking, probably hoping that the Soviet offer would embolden Mao’s opponents and set the stage for a shift of political power in China.” The Russian misgivings of Chinese international can also be seen in Moscow’s signing the Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, both of which are designed to make acquisition of nuclear capability appear irresponsible in the eyes of world public opinion. The stage now seems to have passed one of restrained hostility, and an impending war seems quite possible. The very nearness to the point of no return in their mutual hostility seemed to have forced them to open negotiations, which started a couple of months ago after the surprising meeting between Kosygin and Chou En Lai in Peking. Whether the seventies will reverse the general trend of the sixties in the Sino-Soviet relations is still to be seen. The urges for the consolidation of the Russo-American bonhomie are infinitely stronger than those for the relaxation of the inter-Communist tensions. In fact, it can be said that the Russians are making up with the West because of the hostile pressures of their Eastern ideological neighbour. And the Americans are also eager to isolate Peking and then deal with it. Yet, unless the Russians or the Americans are seriously contemplating war with China (not a probable prospect), it could not be that the two giants will continue to treat Peking as a parish. That is why while the Russians are exploring ways to de-fuse the situation in the East, the Americans, on their own, are also keen on opening a dialogue with Peking. That Vice-President Spirto Agnew, of all people, should praise the Nepalese for maintaining cordial relations with Peking is very suggestive indeed. The American Vice-President thereby conceded Peking’s claims to regard Nepal as coming under its sphere of influence also. The problem now is to reconcile the urges for a Russo-American detente with those for Sino-Soviet and Sino-American dialogues. Perhaps, a lasting peace with Moscow would constitute a more secure foundation for a long term understanding with Peking.

 

            The sixties also saw the process of a permanent weakening of the bond uniting the Communist world. And this trend could be regarded as independent of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. This quarrel, however, led to the bifurcation in the Communist camp. More subtle than this is the weakening of Moscow’s hold even over those states that ostensibly remain under Moscow’s influence. The liberalisation in Czechoslovakia during 1968, even if eventually crushed with brutal contempt for everything democratic, points to the nature of forces working within the Communist systems themselves. One wonders whether the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’ does not betray an admission that the hitherto accepted modes of relationships between Moscow and its ideological cohorts are eroding! The example of Rumania is even more to the point. While daring to take an independent stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Bucharest has been pursuing an even more independent foreign policy–sometimes even being pro-Western as over the Arab-Israeli dispute. And developments did not stop at that. In addition to the appearance of cracks in the Eastern European monolith, chinks within individual Communist state systems have also manifested. The Russian society itself is an example. It is true that there fortunes of freedom fluctuated from mild permissiveness to near total repression. The trails of some intellectuals a couple of years ago and the recent expulsion of the eminent writer Solzhenitsyn from the Soviet Writer Union indicate that the official policy is to weed out dissent. But here again, it would seem that certain changes have come to stay. A few illustrations may be given. It is significant that a youngster, Anatoly Gromyko, the son of the Russian Foreign Minister, resigned from the diplomatic service and entered the Institute for the Study of the U. S. A., in Moscow. In this capacity, as the leading Russian ‘Americanologist’. he is playing the role of a Russian ‘dove’ neutralising the army ‘hawks.’ Only recently he published what is regarded as the most sophisticated Soviet book on American politics, a work on the Kennedy days entitled, “The 1036 Days of President Kennedy.” That he could operate still in the ‘intellectual establishment’ is highly suggestive of the changes in the society. A second instance is the petition signed by 54 members of a group, styled as the Initiative Group for the Defence of Civil Liberties, and sent to U Thant last May. It is true that some of these signatories have been imprisoned, and few others dismissed from their jobs. Yet the event itself is epochal.

 

India: The End of Innocence?

 

            The Sixties have been most agonising for us. Internally, the set-back to our economic development consequent on the Chinese invasion, the loss of the charismatic leader, Nehru, and later that of Lal Bahadur Shastri, brought about a change in our perspectives. The Chinese episode made us conscious of the blinkers we wore for long. The loss of the two leaders made us think about getting along with untried leadership, and to learn to live the future with a less stable political system. The elections of 1967 compelled us to face a reality totally different from the past. The complacent sentimentality about our democratic order associated (rightly or wrongly) with the halcyon days of the congress rule was rudely challenged with the emergence of non-Congress majorities in many states. And finally, as if the Sixties were predestined to play out their role of metamorphosing the old political structure to the last minute of the calendar. Just on the eve of the new decade the Congress itself got split beyond repair.

 

            Externally even at the very start of the period our foreign policy received a rude jolt and our military honour lay shattered. The Chinese betrayal of their solemn pledges to uphold the autonomy of Tibet, their cynical disregard of our territorial integrity in encroaching upon our territory in Aksai Chin and finally their perfidy in mounting a massive invasion in September 1962, seemed to take away the raison d’etre for our non-alignment. Even its architect, Nehru, realised the need for an ‘agonising reappraisal.’ Many more, in fact, thought that non-alignment, vis-a-vis China, has for long been a function of our willing suspension of disbelief. Non-alignment, however, still remained relevant as between Moscow and the West, for in the early years of the decade the thaw in the East-West relations had not assumed so recognisable a shape as to make neutralism of little consequence. As for China, Indian foreign policy came of age, adolescent enthusiasm being replaced by a realistic awareness of having to live with the Chinese threat. In pursuance of this, efforts, however feeble, have been made towards the end of the decade, to project our South East Asian identity. We have tried to bring ourselves closer to Asia’s economic collossus, Japan. The Prime Minister visited a good many of the South East Asian countries during ’67-69. Though we are averse to a military pact as an answer to the Chinese menace, it is significant that we are trying to make friends in the region and talking about the menace. The British decision to withdraw their naval presence from the region as also the possible curtailment of the American commitment in the area, has not lost its impact on us. We are talking loudly of the need to strengthen naval defences and our determination to go ahead can be seen, to an extent, in the attention bestowed in augmenting our naval wing.

 

            We obtained massive doses of aid during those precarious months mostly from the West. Yet, it is important to note that all this did not amount to throwing non-alignment overboard. Indeed, Russian sympathy shown in the shape of refusal to support Peking, vindicated our policy. And, further, that policy still remained relevant as between Moscow and the West. Russia’s role as the peace-maker between us and Pakistan–both non-communist states–revealed not only her closeness to India put also her preparedness to play the bourgeois role of a peace-maker in a quarrel between two bourgeois powers. But, again, it is curious, but true, that the Russian support for us as against Peking logically meant Russian neutrality between us and Pakistan. For, it was the Russian dislike for Peking that made Moscow refuse to identify itself with Peking in 1962 and it is precisely this fact that makes Moscow try to Wean Pindi away from Peking’s influence. This has now placed us in a tight comer. More and more the Russians have tended to equate us with Pindi in their policy calculations. And we see Pakistan getting the best of both the Western and Russian worlds; and this for being on the best of terms with Peking!

 

            While the disillusionment with China has been a chastening experience, maturity does not lie in sulky withdrawal but in being perpetually vigilant and cautiously conciliatory. It is noteworthy that Peking has been overcautious not to provoke India further and the lapse of eight years may bring down the walls of resentment caused by betrayal and humiliation. Delhi has stated that it would not hesitate to talk with Peking provided an honourable settlement is offered. At the same time Delhi cannot afford to forget the past and cannot but posit the Chinese threat as a constant in the formulation of its policies.

 

            To us, 1962 not only brought disillusionment with China but a sort of disenchantment with our role as a World leader too. The Afro-Asian states seemed not to be too impressed with our righteousness and many of them chose to remain neutral in our dispute with China. Again in our quarrel with Pakistan the religious bias of some of these showed up glaringly. Our reaction to these has not always been firm and wise. Our anxiety to please the Moslem states (partly a function of our efforts to keep our Moslem minority in good humour) in the face of their open sympathy for Pindi has been neither honourable nor profitable. It is to be hoped that a review of our attitudes towards these will be made soon.

 

The African Decade

 

            The Sixties have been even more fateful for Africa. In fact the consummation of the African liberation movement occurred in the early Sixties. It is true that Ghana was the first African country to attain freedom in the post-war era in 1957. Yet that event proved to be the herald of the events of the early Sixties. Almost all British West African colonies attained freedom by 1961 (Nigeria, 1960; Sierra Leone, 1961; Cameroun, 1960; Gambia, 1963). France under De Gaulle let to French West and Equatorial Africa by 1960. Soon British East and Central African possessions also emerged free. Even Belgian Congo, perhaps the most backward of the African areas, did not escape the rising tide and the Belgium led to concede freedom at the very start of the decade. It was only left to unregenerate Portugal to remain completely impervious to pangs of conscience and sense of shame in hanging on to her possessions in Mozambique, Angola and a few other pockets, using the most ruthless methods in suppressing nationalist aspirations. Yet another instance of the persistence of the colonial back-woods-man spirit is the further consolidation of apartheid in South Africa and its unabashed extension to Rhodesia. In the latter case a handful of white settlers not only refused to share power with the overwhelmingly large native Africans, but dared to defy the world at large and British authority in particular in announcing Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.

 

            The extent of African liberation is itself staggering. British and French West African colonies alone comprised over 40 million people and extended over an area of more than two million square miles. This would give one an idea of the quantitative dimensions of African liberation. Perhaps, at no other time in world’s history so large a tract underwent so radical a political transformation in so short a time.

 

            If the decade started with African independence it also witnessed the tragic problem of these new-born states: the problem of establishing their national identities. At the very start, the Congolese civil war, abetted by ungraceful colonial masters (Belgium and France), revealed the twin dangers to which these states are exposed: dangers of rear-guard colonialism and African sub-regionalism. We witness the persistence of the problem even to the end of the decade as can be seen from the Nigerian tragedy, which came out into the open in 1967. These episodes high-light the legacy of a continent partitioned by European powers as if it was personal real property and parcelled into chunks divided by artificial boundaries. Quite apart from this colonial legacy there is the problem of tribal loyalties challenging the claims to nationhood of the existing legal entities. The decade thus witnessed the rise of these politics with enthusiastic committal to rule of law and democracy, and their transformation, in most of the cases into single party states. Many of these have also experienced military take overs.

 

            One interesting development, as far as international relations are concerned, is that while communist powers, Russia and China, started with a natural advantage in gaining the confidence of most; of these new states, the crude overplaying of Chinese diplomacy in some of the African capitals resulted in the Africans’ getting rather suspicious of Chinese intentions. This happened in Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and in a few other states too. Of course, in some cases the Russians still enjoy strong foot-hold. For example, while the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana meant a fall from favour for the Russians, the Nigerian civil war gave Moscow a fine opportunity to acquire a favoured status in Logos.

 

            The decade also saw the futility of efforts to promote African unity. In the context of the difficulties facing the emergence of individual national identities pan-Africanism seemed a good answer. Yet regional and personality factors and basic difference in the approach to unity (supra-state or a mere promotion of a cultural idea?) made the search for unity a virtual non-starter. The Organisation for African Unity created in 1963 could not make even a small beginning in bringing Nigeria and Biafra to the conference table.

 

            Whether the Seventies will bring to Africa its unrealized hopes of democratic politics, economic development and unity is to be seen.

 

Whither International Aid?

 

            The foregoing survey indicates one thing. The Sixties, on the whole, saw the danger of a global confrontation recede, though local wars and aggressions were endemic. Thus, peace, understood as avoidance of war, has registered only a partial advance. When we turn to what may be termed the ‘maximal dimension’ of peace, that is, securing positive conditions conducive to the reduction of intersocietal tensions, we find again the syndrome of ‘contrariness’ that characterises the past decade.

 

            In some areas the achievements have been outstanding. The performance of the United Nations, through its specialised agencies has been purposeful. In fact, it is in the past decade that the world body’s role in this direction has come to be increasingly recognised. The award of the Nobel Prize for Peace to the International Labour Organisation last year is just a reminder of the silent service done by such organisations, in spite of the frustrating experience of all this effort being eclipsed by the political conflicts that get projected to the fore.

 

            This said, the extremely limited nature of the contribution of international aid in the economic development of under-developed areas cannot be over-emphasised. Ironically indeed, the U. N. sought to dedicate the past decade to development and declared 1966, in particular, as the International Co-operation Year. Yet the record in this regard has been uninspiring. There has not been even a symbolic attempt in the shape of a simple concerted effort to boost development to commemmorate the year. In fact, such has been the toxin that the politics of aid released over the years that Mr. McNamara, the President of the World Bank, came to perceive a crisis of vast dimensions. To meet the situation Mr. McNamara constituted a committee, to which the former Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, was invited, to be the chairman. Only a few months ago the Pearson Committee submitted its Report on International Aid. And what an exposure it made of the murky make-believe of international economic assistance! The net achievement of the decade in this field seems to be the Report itself. The trust of all its recommendations “is to bring most poor countries to a point where, by the end of the century, they will no longer need aid. Their growth will be self-sustaining. To accomplish this, the Report insists that their growth rate be raised to an average six per cent a year, which is a lot. This will require aid donors to give more; the United States Government, relatively a laggard now; will have to double its effort. Recipients will have to perform more efficiently, and to be judged on their performance. Poor countries will have to improve conditions for private investment. Rich countries will have to let the poor sell them more of their goods. The multilateral sources and administrators of aid, like the World Bank and the Aid-India Club, must be strengthened to spare rich countries like the United States, and the poor countries they help, the harshest of the political frictions inherent in any face-to-face dealing of patron and client.” Will the affluent West act on the experience of the decade? This is the big question.

 

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